Add the key_share processing to the server side
authorMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Tue, 1 Nov 2016 10:53:32 +0000 (10:53 +0000)
committerMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Wed, 16 Nov 2016 10:09:46 +0000 (10:09 +0000)
At the moment the server doesn't yet do anything with this information.
We still need to send the server's key_share info back to the client. That
will happen in subsequent commits.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
include/openssl/ssl.h
ssl/ssl_err.c
ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
ssl/t1_lib.c

index b61a992..dab0c4e 100644 (file)
@@ -2427,6 +2427,7 @@ int ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 # define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER                           193
 # define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS             376
 # define SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES                           359
+# define SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE                      101
 # define SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS                              216
 # define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK                  403
 # define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX                               195
index 6c438fe..7523f1c 100644 (file)
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[] = {
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS),
      "no shared signature algorithms"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES), "no srtp profiles"},
+    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE), "no suitable key share"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS), "no valid scts"},
     {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK),
      "no verify cookie callback"},
index 142c637..38a1b69 100644 (file)
@@ -1263,6 +1263,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         goto err;
     }
 
+    /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
+    if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
+        /* No suitable share */
+        /* TODO(1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
+        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+        goto f_err;
+    }
+
     /*
      * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
      * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
index d78ea68..37e6841 100644 (file)
@@ -2201,8 +2201,108 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
         }
 #endif
         else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
-                 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
+                 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
             s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+        } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
+                   && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+            unsigned int group_id;
+            PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
+            const unsigned char *curves;
+            size_t num_curves, i;
+            int group_nid;
+            unsigned int curve_flags;
+
+            /* Sanity check */
+            if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                       SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
+                if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
+                        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
+                                                         &encoded_pt)) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                           SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                /* Find a share that we can use */
+                if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                           ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
+                    unsigned int share_id = (curves[0] << 8) | (curves[1]);
+                    if (group_id == share_id
+                            && tls_curve_allowed(s, curves,
+                                                 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK)) {
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                if (i == num_curves) {
+                    /* Share not suitable */
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
+
+                if (group_nid == 0) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                           SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
+                    /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
+                    EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+                    if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
+                        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                    s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
+                } else {
+                    /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
+                    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
+                    if (pctx == NULL
+                        || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
+                        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
+                                                                  group_nid) <= 0
+                        || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
+                        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+                    pctx = NULL;
+                }
+
+                if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
+                        PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+                        PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
         /*
          * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
          * tls_check_client_ems_support()