Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [xx XXX 1999]
+ *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2
+ handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to
+ the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key.
+ A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key
+ to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine
+ the effective key length. In this case the effective key lenth can still
+ be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed
+ by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the
+ EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes
+ the key length and effective key length are equal.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of
X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do:
X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0);
{
int i,j;
BIO *out=NULL,*btmp=NULL,*etmp=NULL,*bio=NULL;
- char *tmp=NULL;
+ unsigned char *tmp=NULL;
X509_ALGOR *xa;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data_body=NULL;
const EVP_MD *evp_md;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk=NULL;
X509_ALGOR *xalg=NULL;
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri=NULL;
+ char is_rc2 = 0;
/* EVP_PKEY *pkey; */
#if 0
X509_STORE_CTX s_ctx;
goto err;
}
+ if(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher) == NID_rc2_cbc) is_rc2 = 1;
+
/* We will be checking the signature */
if (md_sk != NULL)
{
}
jj=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- tmp=Malloc(jj+10);
+ tmp=(unsigned char *)Malloc(jj+10);
if (tmp == NULL)
{
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt((unsigned char *)tmp,
- M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
- M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key),
- pkey);
+ jj=EVP_PKEY_decrypt(tmp, M_ASN1_STRING_data(ri->enc_key),
+ M_ASN1_STRING_length(ri->enc_key), pkey);
if (jj <= 0)
{
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(evp_ctx,enc_alg->parameter) < 0)
return(NULL);
- if (jj != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx))
- {
- PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
+ if (jj != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)) {
+ /* HACK: some S/MIME clients don't use the same key
+ * and effective key length. The key length is
+ * determined by the size of the decrypted RSA key.
+ * So we hack things to manually set the RC2 key
+ * because we currently can't do this with the EVP
+ * interface.
+ */
+ if(is_rc2) RC2_set_key(&(evp_ctx->c.rc2_ks),jj, tmp,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(evp_ctx)*8);
+ else {
+
+ PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATADECODE,
PKCS7_R_DECRYPTED_KEY_IS_WRONG_LENGTH);
- goto err;
+ goto err;
}
- EVP_CipherInit(evp_ctx,NULL,(unsigned char *)tmp,NULL,0);
+ } else EVP_CipherInit(evp_ctx,NULL,tmp,NULL,0);
memset(tmp,0,jj);