* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
long max, int *ok);
-static void dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len);
static hm_fragment *
dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len)
if ( frag == NULL)
return NULL;
- buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len
- + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- if ( buf == NULL)
+ if (frag_len)
{
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
- return NULL;
+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
+ if ( buf == NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ return NULL;
+ }
}
+ /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
frag->fragment = buf;
return frag;
static void
dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
{
- OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
}
/* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
* message got sent. but why would this happen? */
- OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
+ OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
+ {
/* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
* we'll ignore the result anyway */
- ssl3_finish_mac(s,
- (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off +
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
+ unsigned char *p = &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+ const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+ int len;
+
+ if (frag_off == 0)
+ {
+ /* reconstruct message header is if it
+ * is being sent in single fragment */
+ *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+ s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+ l2n3(0,p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+ p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ len = ret;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ len = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, len);
+ }
+
if (ret == s->init_num)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
s->init_num = 0;
-
+
return(1);
}
s->init_off+=ret;
long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
{
int i, al;
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
/* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
* by the absence of an optional handshake message */
return s->init_num;
}
+ msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
do
{
- if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
+ if ( msg_hdr->frag_off == 0)
{
/* s->d1->r_message_header.msg_len = 0; */
- memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
}
i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
return i;
- if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len == (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ /* Note that s->init_sum is used as a counter summing
+ * up fragments' lengths: as soon as they sum up to
+ * handshake packet length, we assume we have got all
+ * the fragments. Overlapping fragments would cause
+ * premature termination, so we don't expect overlaps.
+ * Well, handling overlaps would require something more
+ * drastic. Indeed, as it is now there is no way to
+ * tell if out-of-order fragment from the middle was
+ * the last. '>=' is the best/least we can do to control
+ * the potential damage caused by malformed overlaps. */
+ if ((unsigned int)s->init_num >= msg_hdr->msg_len)
{
- memset(&(s->d1->r_msg_hdr), 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+ unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data;
+ unsigned long msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+ /* reconstruct message header as if it was
+ * sent in single fragment */
+ *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_len,p);
+ s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+ l2n3(0,p);
+ l2n3(msg_len,p);
+ p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ p, msg_len,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
/* we just read a handshake message from the other side:
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- return s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ return s->init_num;
}
else
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off = i;
+ msg_hdr->frag_off = i;
} while(1) ;
f_err:
}
+static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
+ {
+ size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
+
+ msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+ frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
+ frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+ /* sanity checking */
+ if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
+ {
+ /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
+ * against max above */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
+ }
+ else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
+ {
+ /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
+ * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* no error */
+ }
+
+
static int
-dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, unsigned long *copied)
+dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
{
/* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
* if so:
*/
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
- unsigned long overlap;
- unsigned char *p;
+ int al;
+ *ok = 0;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
if ( item == NULL)
return 0;
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq &&
- frag->msg_header.frag_off <= (unsigned int)s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
{
pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
- overlap = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- - frag->msg_header.frag_off;
- p = frag->fragment;
+ al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
- memcpy(&s->init_buf->data[s->init_num],
- p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap,
- frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap);
-
- OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
- OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ if (al==0) /* no alert */
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
+ frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+ }
+
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
pitem_free(item);
- *copied = frag->msg_header.frag_len - overlap;
- return *copied;
+ if (al==0)
+ {
+ *ok = 1;
+ return frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return -1;
}
else
return 0;
static int
-dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
+ int i=-1;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->frag_len);
- if ( frag == NULL)
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
goto err;
- memcpy(frag->fragment, &(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
- msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
+ {
+ unsigned char devnull [256];
+
+ while (frag_len)
+ {
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ devnull,
+ frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
+ if (i<=0) goto err;
+ frag_len -= i;
+ }
+ }
+
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+ if (frag_len)
+ {
+ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+ if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
goto err;
pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
- return 1;
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-static void
-dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int frag_len)
- {
- unsigned char *p;
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, &p[s->init_num - frag_len], frag_len);
- }
-
-
-static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr, int *ok)
- {
- int i;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- /* make sure there's enough room to read this fragment */
- if ( (int)msg_hdr->frag_len && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
- (int)msg_hdr->frag_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
- if ( msg_hdr->frag_len > 0)
- {
- i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- &p[s->init_num],
- msg_hdr->frag_len,0);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- *ok = 0;
- return i;
- }
- }
-
- if ( msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
- dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, msg_hdr);
- else
- OPENSSL_assert(msg_hdr->seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq);
-
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
-err:
*ok = 0;
- return -1;
+ return i;
}
static long
dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
{
- unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
unsigned long l, frag_off, frag_len;
int i,al;
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
- unsigned long overlap;
/* see if we have the required fragment already */
- if (dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s, &l))
- {
- /* compute MAC, remove fragment headers */
- dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, l);
- s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->state = stn;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* get a handshake fragment from the record layer */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ {
+ if (*ok) s->init_num += frag_len;
+ return frag_len;
+ }
/* read handshake message header */
- i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,&p[s->init_num],
+ i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
{
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
-
OPENSSL_assert(i == DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
- p += s->init_num;
/* parse the message fragment header */
-
- dtls1_get_message_header(p, &msg_hdr);
+ dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
/*
* if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
- /* sanity checking */
- if ( frag_off + frag_len > l)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
- p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
{
/* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
* we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
* if their format is correct. Does not count for
* 'Finished' MAC. */
- if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 &&p[3] == 0)
+ if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
{
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- p, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+ wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
s->init_num = 0;
}
}
- /* XDTLS: do a sanity check on the fragment */
-
- s->init_num += i;
-
- if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
- {
- /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
- if (l > (INT_MAX-DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,(int)l
- + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Only do this test when we're reading the expected message.
- * Stale messages will be dropped and future messages will be buffered */
- if ( l > (unsigned long)max)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- s->s3->tmp.message_size=l;
- }
-
- if ( frag_len > (unsigned long)max)
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
goto f_err;
- }
- if ( frag_len + s->init_num > (INT_MAX - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
- {
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- if ( frag_len & !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)frag_len
- + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + s->init_num))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
- {
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr.type;
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr.type;
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = l;
- /* s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = seq_num; */
- }
/* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
s->state=stn;
- /* next state (stn) */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
if ( frag_len > 0)
{
+ unsigned char *p=s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
- &p[s->init_num],
- frag_len,0);
+ &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
/* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
if (i <= 0)
{
* handshake to fail */
OPENSSL_assert(i == (int)frag_len);
-#if 0
- /* Successfully read a fragment.
- * It may be (1) out of order, or
- * (2) it's a repeat, in which case we dump it
- * (3) the one we are expecting next (maybe with overlap)
- * If it is next one, it may overlap with previously read bytes
- */
-
- /* case (1): buffer the future fragment
- * (we can treat fragments from a future message the same
- * as future fragments from the message being currently read, since
- * they are sematically simply out of order.
- */
- if ( msg_hdr.seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
- frag_off > s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
- {
- dtls1_buffer_handshake_fragment(s, &msg_hdr);
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
- }
-
- /* case (2): drop the entire fragment, and try again */
- if ( msg_hdr.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
- frag_off + frag_len < s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
- {
- s->init_num -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
- }
-#endif
-
- /* case (3): received a immediately useful fragment. Determine the
- * possible overlap and copy the fragment.
- */
- overlap = (s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) - frag_off;
+ *ok = 1;
- /* retain the header for the first fragment */
- if ( s->init_num > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
- {
- memmove(&(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num]),
- &(s->init_buf->data[s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + overlap]),
- frag_len - overlap);
-
- s->init_num += frag_len - overlap;
- }
- else
- s->init_num += frag_len;
-
- dtls1_process_handshake_fragment(s, frag_len - overlap);
-
- if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
- (size_t)s->init_num, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
- *ok=1;
-
- return s->init_num;
+ /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
+ * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
+ * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
+ * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
+ s->init_num += frag_len;
+ return frag_len;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
s->init_num = 0;
-err:
+
*ok=0;
return(-1);
}
for (;;)
{
n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(n+l+3)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return(0);
{
x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+l+3)))
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(n+l+3)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return(0);
return 1;
}
-#if 0
-static dtls1_message_buffer *
-dtls1_message_buffer_new(unsigned int len)
- {
- dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf;
-
- msg_buf = (dtls1_message_buffer *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer));
- if ( msg_buf == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- memset(msg_buf, 0x00, sizeof(dtls1_message_buffer));
-
- msg_buf->data = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if ( msg_buf->data == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- memset(msg_buf->data, 0x00, len);
- return msg_buf;
- }
-#endif
-
-#if 0
-static void
-dtls1_message_buffer_free(dtls1_message_buffer *msg_buf)
- {
- if (msg_buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(msg_buf->data);
- OPENSSL_free(msg_buf);
- }
- }
-#endif
-
int
dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
{
projects / openssl.git / commitdiff