Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a
+ single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract
+ information. For detailed background information, see
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron,
+ J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL
+ and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change
+ are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and
+ BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(),
+ respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant
+ conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div()
+ and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for the
+ modulus. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to remove a
+ conditional branch.
+
+ BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous
+ BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just
+ modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag
+ in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative
+ implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name
+ remains as a deprecated alias.
+
+ Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general
+ RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses
+ constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation.
+ Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias.
+
+ BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that
+ the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the
+ modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to
+ BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now
+ essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually
+ change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows
+ RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to
+ enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+
+ [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)]
+
*) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID
context matching (which matters if an application uses a single
external cache for different purposes). Previously,
#define BN_FLG_MALLOCED 0x01
#define BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA 0x02
-#define BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x04 /* avoid leaking exponent information through timings
- * (BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime) */
+#define BN_FLG_CONSTTIME 0x04 /* avoid leaking exponent information through timing,
+ * BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime,
+ * BN_div() will call BN_div_no_branch,
+ * BN_mod_inverse() will call BN_mod_inverse_no_branch.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+#define BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME BN_FLG_CONSTTIME /* deprecated name for the flag */
+ /* avoid leaking exponent information through timings
+ * (BN_mod_exp_mont() will call BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime) */
+#endif
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
#define BN_FLG_FREE 0x8000 /* used for debuging */
#endif
int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
BN_CTX *ctx);
+int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
+ const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
#define BN_mod(rem,m,d,ctx) BN_div(NULL,(rem),(m),(d),(ctx))
int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a,const BIGNUM *b,BN_CTX *ctx); /* returns -2 for error */
BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *ret,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
+BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *ret,
+ const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *ret,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n,BN_CTX *ctx);
#define BN_BLINDING_NO_UPDATE 0x00000001
#define BN_BLINDING_NO_RECREATE 0x00000002
-BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod);
+BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, /* const */ BIGNUM *mod);
void BN_BLINDING_free(BN_BLINDING *b);
int BN_BLINDING_update(BN_BLINDING *b,BN_CTX *ctx);
int BN_BLINDING_convert(BIGNUM *n, BN_BLINDING *b, BN_CTX *ctx);
unsigned long BN_BLINDING_get_flags(const BN_BLINDING *);
void BN_BLINDING_set_flags(BN_BLINDING *, unsigned long);
BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b,
- const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ const BIGNUM *e, /* const */ BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx),
BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
};
-BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, BIGNUM *mod)
+BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_new(const BIGNUM *A, const BIGNUM *Ai, /* const */ BIGNUM *mod)
{
BN_BLINDING *ret=NULL;
{
if ((ret->Ai = BN_dup(Ai)) == NULL) goto err;
}
- ret->mod = mod;
+
+ /* save a copy of mod in the BN_BLINDING structure */
+ if ((ret->mod = BN_dup(mod)) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_get_flags(mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ BN_set_flags(ret->mod, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
ret->counter = BN_BLINDING_COUNTER;
return(ret);
err:
if (r->A != NULL) BN_free(r->A );
if (r->Ai != NULL) BN_free(r->Ai);
if (r->e != NULL) BN_free(r->e );
+ if (r->mod != NULL) BN_free(r->mod);
OPENSSL_free(r);
}
}
BN_BLINDING *BN_BLINDING_create_param(BN_BLINDING *b,
- const BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+ const BIGNUM *e, /* const */ BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx),
BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
BN_ULONG d0,d1;
int num_n,div_n;
+ if (BN_get_flags(num, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ {
+ return BN_div_no_branch(dv, rm, num, divisor, ctx);
+ }
+
bn_check_top(dv);
bn_check_top(rm);
bn_check_top(num);
rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2;
#endif
+#if defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI)
+ BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l,t2h,d1,q);
+#elif defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
+ t2l = d1 * q;
+ t2h = BN_UMULT_HIGH(d1,q);
+#else
+ t2l=LBITS(d1); t2h=HBITS(d1);
+ ql =LBITS(q); qh =HBITS(q);
+ mul64(t2l,t2h,ql,qh); /* t2=(BN_ULLONG)d1*q; */
+#endif
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ if ((t2h < rem) ||
+ ((t2h == rem) && (t2l <= wnump[-2])))
+ break;
+ q--;
+ rem += d0;
+ if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */
+ if (t2l < d1) t2h--; t2l -= d1;
+ }
+#endif /* !BN_LLONG */
+ }
+#endif /* !BN_DIV3W */
+
+ l0=bn_mul_words(tmp->d,sdiv->d,div_n,q);
+ tmp->d[div_n]=l0;
+ wnum.d--;
+ /* ingore top values of the bignums just sub the two
+ * BN_ULONG arrays with bn_sub_words */
+ if (bn_sub_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, tmp->d, div_n+1))
+ {
+ /* Note: As we have considered only the leading
+ * two BN_ULONGs in the calculation of q, sdiv * q
+ * might be greater than wnum (but then (q-1) * sdiv
+ * is less or equal than wnum)
+ */
+ q--;
+ if (bn_add_words(wnum.d, wnum.d, sdiv->d, div_n))
+ /* we can't have an overflow here (assuming
+ * that q != 0, but if q == 0 then tmp is
+ * zero anyway) */
+ (*wnump)++;
+ }
+ /* store part of the result */
+ *resp = q;
+ }
+ bn_correct_top(snum);
+ if (rm != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Keep a copy of the neg flag in num because if rm==num
+ * BN_rshift() will overwrite it.
+ */
+ int neg = num->neg;
+ BN_rshift(rm,snum,norm_shift);
+ if (!BN_is_zero(rm))
+ rm->neg = neg;
+ bn_check_top(rm);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return(1);
+err:
+ bn_check_top(rm);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+
+/* BN_div_no_branch is a special version of BN_div. It does not contain
+ * branches that may leak sensitive information.
+ */
+int BN_div_no_branch(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rm, const BIGNUM *num,
+ const BIGNUM *divisor, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ int norm_shift,i,loop;
+ BIGNUM *tmp,wnum,*snum,*sdiv,*res;
+ BN_ULONG *resp,*wnump;
+ BN_ULONG d0,d1;
+ int num_n,div_n;
+
+ bn_check_top(dv);
+ bn_check_top(rm);
+ bn_check_top(num);
+ bn_check_top(divisor);
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(divisor))
+ {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_DIV,BN_R_DIV_BY_ZERO);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ tmp=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ snum=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ sdiv=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (dv == NULL)
+ res=BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ else res=dv;
+ if (sdiv == NULL || res == NULL) goto err;
+
+ /* First we normalise the numbers */
+ norm_shift=BN_BITS2-((BN_num_bits(divisor))%BN_BITS2);
+ if (!(BN_lshift(sdiv,divisor,norm_shift))) goto err;
+ sdiv->neg=0;
+ norm_shift+=BN_BITS2;
+ if (!(BN_lshift(snum,num,norm_shift))) goto err;
+ snum->neg=0;
+
+ /* Since we don't know whether snum is larger than sdiv,
+ * we pad snum with enough zeroes without changing its
+ * value.
+ */
+ if (snum->top <= sdiv->top+1)
+ {
+ if (bn_wexpand(snum, sdiv->top + 2) == NULL) goto err;
+ for (i = snum->top; i < sdiv->top + 2; i++) snum->d[i] = 0;
+ snum->top = sdiv->top + 2;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (bn_wexpand(snum, snum->top + 1) == NULL) goto err;
+ snum->d[snum->top] = 0;
+ snum->top ++;
+ }
+
+ div_n=sdiv->top;
+ num_n=snum->top;
+ loop=num_n-div_n;
+ /* Lets setup a 'window' into snum
+ * This is the part that corresponds to the current
+ * 'area' being divided */
+ wnum.neg = 0;
+ wnum.d = &(snum->d[loop]);
+ wnum.top = div_n;
+ /* only needed when BN_ucmp messes up the values between top and max */
+ wnum.dmax = snum->dmax - loop; /* so we don't step out of bounds */
+
+ /* Get the top 2 words of sdiv */
+ /* div_n=sdiv->top; */
+ d0=sdiv->d[div_n-1];
+ d1=(div_n == 1)?0:sdiv->d[div_n-2];
+
+ /* pointer to the 'top' of snum */
+ wnump= &(snum->d[num_n-1]);
+
+ /* Setup to 'res' */
+ res->neg= (num->neg^divisor->neg);
+ if (!bn_wexpand(res,(loop+1))) goto err;
+ res->top=loop-1;
+ resp= &(res->d[loop-1]);
+
+ /* space for temp */
+ if (!bn_wexpand(tmp,(div_n+1))) goto err;
+
+ /* if res->top == 0 then clear the neg value otherwise decrease
+ * the resp pointer */
+ if (res->top == 0)
+ res->neg = 0;
+ else
+ resp--;
+
+ for (i=0; i<loop-1; i++, wnump--, resp--)
+ {
+ BN_ULONG q,l0;
+ /* the first part of the loop uses the top two words of
+ * snum and sdiv to calculate a BN_ULONG q such that
+ * | wnum - sdiv * q | < sdiv */
+#if defined(BN_DIV3W) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM)
+ BN_ULONG bn_div_3_words(BN_ULONG*,BN_ULONG,BN_ULONG);
+ q=bn_div_3_words(wnump,d1,d0);
+#else
+ BN_ULONG n0,n1,rem=0;
+
+ n0=wnump[0];
+ n1=wnump[-1];
+ if (n0 == d0)
+ q=BN_MASK2;
+ else /* n0 < d0 */
+ {
+#ifdef BN_LLONG
+ BN_ULLONG t2;
+
+#if defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) && !defined(bn_div_words)
+ q=(BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG)n0)<<BN_BITS2)|n1)/d0);
+#else
+ q=bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0);
+#ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE
+ fprintf(stderr,"DEBUG: bn_div_words(0x%08X,0x%08X,0x%08\
+X) -> 0x%08X\n",
+ n0, n1, d0, q);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED
+ /*
+ * rem doesn't have to be BN_ULLONG. The least we
+ * know it's less that d0, isn't it?
+ */
+ rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2;
+#endif
+ t2=(BN_ULLONG)d1*q;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ if (t2 <= ((((BN_ULLONG)rem)<<BN_BITS2)|wnump[-2]))
+ break;
+ q--;
+ rem += d0;
+ if (rem < d0) break; /* don't let rem overflow */
+ t2 -= d1;
+ }
+#else /* !BN_LLONG */
+ BN_ULONG t2l,t2h,ql,qh;
+
+ q=bn_div_words(n0,n1,d0);
+#ifdef BN_DEBUG_LEVITTE
+ fprintf(stderr,"DEBUG: bn_div_words(0x%08X,0x%08X,0x%08\
+X) -> 0x%08X\n",
+ n0, n1, d0, q);
+#endif
+#ifndef REMAINDER_IS_ALREADY_CALCULATED
+ rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2;
+#endif
+
#if defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI)
BN_UMULT_LOHI(t2l,t2h,d1,q);
#elif defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)
int i,bits,ret=0;
BIGNUM *v,*rr;
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
{
- /* BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+ /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
if (BN_is_odd(m))
{
# ifdef MONT_EXP_WORD
- if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0))
+ if (a->top == 1 && !a->neg && (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) == 0))
{
BN_ULONG A = a->d[0];
ret=BN_mod_exp_mont_word(r,A,p,m,ctx,NULL);
BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
BN_RECP_CTX recp;
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
{
- /* BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+ /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL;
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
{
return BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont);
}
#define BN_TO_MONTGOMERY_WORD(r, w, mont) \
(BN_set_word(r, (w)) && BN_to_montgomery(r, r, (mont), ctx))
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
{
- /* BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+ /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
/* Table of variables obtained from 'ctx' */
BIGNUM *val[TABLE_SIZE];
- if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ if (BN_get_flags(p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
{
- /* BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
+ /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
BIGNUM *ret=NULL;
int sign;
+ if (BN_get_flags(n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0)
+ {
+ return BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(in, a, n, ctx);
+ }
+
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(n);
bn_check_top(ret);
return(ret);
}
+
+
+/* BN_mod_inverse_no_branch is a special version of BN_mod_inverse.
+ * It does not contain branches that may leak sensitive information.
+ */
+BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
+ const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *n, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ BIGNUM *A,*B,*X,*Y,*M,*D,*T,*R=NULL;
+ BIGNUM local_A, local_B;
+ BIGNUM *pA, *pB;
+ BIGNUM *ret=NULL;
+ int sign;
+
+ bn_check_top(a);
+ bn_check_top(n);
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ B = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ X = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ D = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ M = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ Y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ T = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (T == NULL) goto err;
+
+ if (in == NULL)
+ R=BN_new();
+ else
+ R=in;
+ if (R == NULL) goto err;
+
+ BN_one(X);
+ BN_zero(Y);
+ if (BN_copy(B,a) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_copy(A,n) == NULL) goto err;
+ A->neg = 0;
+
+ if (B->neg || (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0))
+ {
+ /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
+ * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
+ */
+ pB = &local_B;
+ BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ sign = -1;
+ /* From B = a mod |n|, A = |n| it follows that
+ *
+ * 0 <= B < A,
+ * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
+ */
+
+ while (!BN_is_zero(B))
+ {
+ BIGNUM *tmp;
+
+ /*
+ * 0 < B < A,
+ * (*) -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|)
+ */
+
+ /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
+ * BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
+ */
+ pA = &local_A;
+ BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
+ if (!BN_div(D,M,pA,B,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* Now
+ * A = D*B + M;
+ * thus we have
+ * (**) sign*Y*a == D*B + M (mod |n|).
+ */
+
+ tmp=A; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */
+
+ /* (A, B) := (B, A mod B) ... */
+ A=B;
+ B=M;
+ /* ... so we have 0 <= B < A again */
+
+ /* Since the former M is now B and the former B is now A,
+ * (**) translates into
+ * sign*Y*a == D*A + B (mod |n|),
+ * i.e.
+ * sign*Y*a - D*A == B (mod |n|).
+ * Similarly, (*) translates into
+ * -sign*X*a == A (mod |n|).
+ *
+ * Thus,
+ * sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * i.e.
+ * sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
+ *
+ * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
+ * -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
+ * Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
+ */
+
+ if (!BN_mul(tmp,D,X,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(tmp,tmp,Y)) goto err;
+
+ M=Y; /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not matter */
+ Y=X;
+ X=tmp;
+ sign = -sign;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
+ * A == gcd(a,n);
+ * we have
+ * sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|),
+ * where Y is non-negative.
+ */
+
+ if (sign < 0)
+ {
+ if (!BN_sub(Y,n,Y)) goto err;
+ }
+ /* Now Y*a == A (mod |n|). */
+
+ if (BN_is_one(A))
+ {
+ /* Y*a == 1 (mod |n|) */
+ if (!Y->neg && BN_ucmp(Y,n) < 0)
+ {
+ if (!BN_copy(R,Y)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_nnmod(R,Y,n,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_INVERSE,BN_R_NO_INVERSE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret=R;
+err:
+ if ((ret == NULL) && (in == NULL)) BN_free(R);
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ bn_check_top(ret);
+ return(ret);
+ }
i=n/BN_BITS2;
j=n%BN_BITS2;
if (a->top <= i) return 0;
- return((a->d[i]&(((BN_ULONG)1)<<j))?1:0);
+ return(((a->d[i])>>j)&((BN_ULONG)1));
}
int BN_mask_bits(BIGNUM *a, int n)
{
BN_init(&local_prk);
prk = &local_prk;
- BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
prk = priv_key;
if ((dh->flags & DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0)
{
/* XXX */
- BN_set_flags(dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (!mont)
goto err;
{
BN_init(&local_prk);
prk = &local_prk;
- BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
prk = priv_key;
while (BN_is_zero(&k));
if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0)
{
- BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P)
* default (ignoring RSA_FLAG_BLINDING),
* but other engines might not need it
*/
-#define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME 0x0100 /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in RSA
+#define RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME 0x0100 /* new with 0.9.8f; the built-in RSA
+ * implementation now uses constant time
+ * operations by default in private key operations,
+ * e.g., constant time modular exponentiation,
+ * modular inverse without leaking branches,
+ * division without leaking branches. This
+ * flag disables these constant time
+ * operations and results in faster RSA
+ * private key operations.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
+#define RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME /* deprecated name for the flag*/
+ /* new with 0.9.7h; the built-in RSA
* implementation now uses constant time
* modular exponentiation for secret exponents
* by default. This flag causes the
* faster variable sliding window method to
* be used for all exponents.
*/
+#endif
+
#define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
#define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
BN_init(&local_d);
d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
d = rsa->d;
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
d = rsa->d;
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
- BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1;
- BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1;
+ BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
+ int bn_flags;
int ret=0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
+ * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
+ */
+ bn_flags = rsa->p->flags;
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ rsa->p->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
+ }
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ /* We restore bn_flags back */
+ rsa->p->flags = bn_flags;
+
+ /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
+ * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
+ */
+ bn_flags = rsa->q->flags;
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ rsa->q->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
+ }
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ /* We restore bn_flags back */
+ rsa->q->flags = bn_flags;
+
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ /* compute I mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ c = &local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
- BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ /* compute I mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ c = &local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
- BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+
+ /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ pr1 = &local_r1;
+ BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ pr1 = r1;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
BIGNUM local_d;
BIGNUM *d = NULL;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
{
d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
}
else
d = rsa->d;
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
{
BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp;
+ BIGNUM local_r0,local_d,local_p;
+ BIGNUM *pr0,*d,*p;
int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */
if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */
if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2,ctx)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,r0,ctx)) goto err; /* d */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ pr0 = &local_r0;
+ BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ pr0 = r0;
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d,rsa->e,pr0,ctx)) goto err; /* d */
+
+ /* set up d for correct BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ d = &local_d;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ d = rsa->d;
/* calculate d mod (p-1) */
- if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,d,r1,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
- if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,d,r2,ctx)) goto err;
/* calculate inverse of q mod p */
- if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ p = &local_p;
+ BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ p = rsa->p;
+ if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp,rsa->q,p,ctx)) goto err;
ok=1;
err:
BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
{
- BIGNUM *e;
+ BIGNUM local_n;
+ BIGNUM *e,*n;
BN_CTX *ctx;
BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0.0);
}
- ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
+ {
+ /* Set BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag */
+ n = &local_n;
+ BN_with_flags(n, rsa->n, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ }
+ else
+ n = rsa->n;
+
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_create_param(NULL, e, n, ctx,
rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp, rsa->_method_mod_n);
if (ret == NULL)
{
clen = key3(key, ctext_ex);
break;
}
- if (v/3 > 1) key->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME;
+ if (v/3 >= 1) key->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME;
num = RSA_public_encrypt(plen, ptext_ex, ctext, key,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
BIO_set_callback 3903 EXIST::FUNCTION:
d2i_ASIdOrRange 3904 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
i2d_ASIdentifiers 3905 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779
+BN_div_no_branch 3906 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+BN_mod_inverse_no_branch 3907 EXIST::FUNCTION:
projects / openssl.git / commitdiff