Since ssleay_rand_initialize() unlocks then locks CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND,
authorRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Wed, 29 Mar 2000 17:25:52 +0000 (17:25 +0000)
committerRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Wed, 29 Mar 2000 17:25:52 +0000 (17:25 +0000)
it's a good thing if ssleay_rand_status() would do the corresponding
lock and unlock as everyone else...

crypto/rand/md_rand.c

index b1d51e890b70ba2cb4586c537a11a195b7c2a9d7..79e3484b4dec1012957cb6691ff731a83e74b1e4 100644 (file)
@@ -559,8 +559,13 @@ static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
 
 static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
        {
+       CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
        if (!initialized)
                ssleay_rand_initialize();
+
+       CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
        return (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
        }