-
OpenSSL CHANGES
===============
[log]: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/
-### Changes between 1.1.1 and 3.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx] ###
+
+OpenSSL Releases
+----------------
+
+ - [OpenSSL 3.0](#openssl-30)
+ - [OpenSSL 1.1.1](#openssl-111)
+ - [OpenSSL 1.1.0](#openssl-110)
+ - [OpenSSL 1.0.2](#openssl-102)
+ - [OpenSSL 1.0.1](#openssl-101)
+ - [OpenSSL 1.0.0](#openssl-100)
+ - [OpenSSL 0.9.x](#openssl-09x)
+
+OpenSSL 3.0
+-----------
+
+### Changes between 1.1.1 and 3.0 [xx XXX xxxx] ###
+
+ * The test suite is changed to preserve results of each test recipe.
+ A new directory test-runs/ with subdirectories named like the
+ test recipes are created in the build tree for this purpose.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * The command line utilities ecparam and ec have been deprecated. Instead
+ use the pkeyparam, pkey and genpkey programs.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * All of the low level RSA functions have been deprecated including:
+
+ RSA_new_method, RSA_bits, RSA_size, RSA_security_bits,
+ RSA_get0_pss_params, RSA_get_version, RSA_get0_engine,
+ RSA_generate_key_ex, RSA_generate_multi_prime_key,
+ RSA_X931_derive_ex, RSA_X931_generate_key_ex, RSA_check_key,
+ RSA_check_key_ex, RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_encrypt,
+ RSA_public_decrypt, RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_set_default_method,
+ RSA_get_default_method, RSA_null_method, RSA_get_method, RSA_set_method,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL, RSA_print_fp, RSA_print, RSA_sign, RSA_verify,
+ RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ RSA_blinding_on, RSA_blinding_off, RSA_setup_blinding,
+ RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1,
+ RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2,
+ PKCS1_MGF1, RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP,
+ RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1,
+ RSA_padding_add_SSLv23, RSA_padding_check_SSLv23,
+ RSA_padding_add_none, RSA_padding_check_none, RSA_padding_add_X931,
+ RSA_padding_check_X931, RSA_X931_hash_id, RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS,
+ RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS, RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1,
+ RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1, RSA_set_ex_data, RSA_get_ex_data,
+ RSA_meth_new, RSA_meth_free, RSA_meth_dup, RSA_meth_get0_name,
+ RSA_meth_set1_name, RSA_meth_get_flags, RSA_meth_set_flags,
+ RSA_meth_get0_app_data, RSA_meth_set0_app_data, RSA_meth_get_pub_enc,
+ RSA_meth_set_pub_enc, RSA_meth_get_pub_dec, RSA_meth_set_pub_dec,
+ RSA_meth_get_priv_enc, RSA_meth_set_priv_enc, RSA_meth_get_priv_dec,
+ RSA_meth_set_priv_dec, RSA_meth_get_mod_exp, RSA_meth_set_mod_exp,
+ RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp, RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp, RSA_meth_get_init,
+ RSA_meth_set_init, RSA_meth_get_finish, RSA_meth_set_finish,
+ RSA_meth_get_sign, RSA_meth_set_sign, RSA_meth_get_verify,
+ RSA_meth_set_verify, RSA_meth_get_keygen, RSA_meth_set_keygen,
+ RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen and RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen.
+
+ Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged for a long
+ time. Instead applications should use L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(3)>,
+ L<EVP_PKEY_encrypt(3)>, L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(3)> and
+ L<EVP_PKEY_decrypt(3)>.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * X509 certificates signed using SHA1 are no longer allowed at security
+ level 1 and above.
+ In TLS/SSL the default security level is 1. It can be set either
+ using the cipher string with @SECLEVEL, or calling
+ SSL_CTX_set_security_level(). If the leaf certificate is signed with SHA-1,
+ a call to SSL_CTX_use_certificate() will fail if the security level is not
+ lowered first.
+ Outside TLS/SSL, the default security level is -1 (effectively 0). It can
+ be set using X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() or using the -auth_level
+ options of the apps.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+ * The command line utilities dhparam, dsa, gendsa and dsaparam have been
+ deprecated. Instead use the pkeyparam, pkey, genpkey and pkeyparam
+ programs respectively.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * All of the low level DH functions have been deprecated including:
+
+ DH_OpenSSL, DH_set_default_method, DH_get_default_method, DH_set_method,
+ DH_new_method, DH_bits, DH_size, DH_security_bits, DH_get_ex_new_index,
+ DH_set_ex_data, DH_get_ex_data, DH_generate_parameters_ex,
+ DH_check_params_ex, DH_check_ex, DH_check_pub_key_ex,
+ DH_check, DH_check_pub_key, DH_generate_key, DH_compute_key,
+ DH_compute_key_padded, DHparams_print_fp, DHparams_print, DH_get_nid,
+ DH_KDF_X9_42, DH_get0_engine, DH_get_length, DH_set_length, DH_meth_new,
+ DH_meth_free, DH_meth_dup, DH_meth_get0_name, DH_meth_set1_name,
+ DH_meth_get_flags, DH_meth_set_flags, DH_meth_get0_app_data,
+ DH_meth_set0_app_data, DH_meth_get_generate_key,
+ DH_meth_set_generate_key, DH_meth_get_compute_key,
+ DH_meth_set_compute_key, DH_meth_get_bn_mod_exp,
+ DH_meth_set_bn_mod_exp, DH_meth_get_init, DH_meth_set_init,
+ DH_meth_get_finish, DH_meth_set_finish, DH_meth_get_generate_params
+ and DH_meth_set_generate_params.
+
+ Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged for a long
+ time. Instead applications should use L<EVP_PKEY_derive_init(3)>
+ and L<EVP_PKEY_derive(3)>.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * All of the low level DSA functions have been deprecated including:
+
+ DSA_do_sign, DSA_do_verify, DSA_OpenSSL, DSA_set_default_method,
+ DSA_get_default_method, DSA_set_method, DSA_get_method, DSA_new_method,
+ DSA_sign_setup, DSA_sign, DSA_verify, DSA_get_ex_new_index,
+ DSA_set_ex_data, DSA_get_ex_data, DSA_generate_parameters_ex,
+ DSA_generate_key, DSA_meth_new, DSA_get0_engine, DSA_meth_free,
+ DSA_meth_dup, DSA_meth_get0_name, DSA_meth_set1_name, DSA_meth_get_flags,
+ DSA_meth_set_flags, DSA_meth_get0_app_data, DSA_meth_set0_app_data,
+ DSA_meth_get_sign, DSA_meth_set_sign, DSA_meth_get_sign_setup,
+ DSA_meth_set_sign_setup, DSA_meth_get_verify, DSA_meth_set_verify,
+ DSA_meth_get_mod_exp, DSA_meth_set_mod_exp, DSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp,
+ DSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp, DSA_meth_get_init, DSA_meth_set_init,
+ DSA_meth_get_finish, DSA_meth_set_finish, DSA_meth_get_paramgen,
+ DSA_meth_set_paramgen, DSA_meth_get_keygen and DSA_meth_set_keygen.
+
+ Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged for a long
+ time. Instead applications should use L<EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(3)>,
+ L<EVP_DigestSignUpdate(3)> and L<EVP_DigestSignFinal(3)>.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Reworked the treatment of EC EVP_PKEYs with the SM2 curve to
+ automatically become EVP_PKEY_SM2 rather than EVP_PKEY_EC.
+ This means that applications don't have to look at the curve NID and
+ `EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(pkey, EVP_PKEY_SM2)` to get SM2 computations.
+ However, they still can, that EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type() call acts as
+ a no-op when the EVP_PKEY is already of the given type.
+
+ Parameter and key generation is also reworked to make it possible
+ to generate EVP_PKEY_SM2 parameters and keys without having to go
+ through EVP_PKEY_EC generation and then change the EVP_PKEY type.
+ However, code that does the latter will still work as before.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Deprecated low level ECDH and ECDSA functions. These include:
+
+ ECDH_compute_key, ECDSA_do_sign, ECDSA_do_sign_ex, ECDSA_do_verify,
+ ECDSA_sign_setup, ECDSA_sign, ECDSA_sign_ex, ECDSA_verify and
+ ECDSA_size.
+
+ Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged for a long
+ time. Instead applications should use the EVP_PKEY_derive(3),
+ EVP_DigestSign(3) and EVP_DigestVerify(3) functions.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Deprecated the EC_KEY_METHOD functions. These include:
+
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_new, EC_KEY_METHOD_free, EC_KEY_METHOD_set_init,
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_set_keygen, EC_KEY_METHOD_set_compute_key,
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign, EC_KEY_METHOD_set_verify,
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_get_init, EC_KEY_METHOD_get_keygen,
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_get_compute_key, EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign and
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_get_verify.
+
+ Instead applications and extension writers should use the OSSL_PROVIDER APIs.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Deprecated EVP_PKEY_decrypt_old(), please use EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init()
+ and EVP_PKEY_decrypt() instead.
+ Deprecated EVP_PKEY_encrypt_old(), please use EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init()
+ and EVP_PKEY_encrypt() instead.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Enhanced the documentation of EVP_PKEY_size(), EVP_PKEY_bits()
+ and EVP_PKEY_security_bits(). Especially EVP_PKEY_size() needed
+ a new formulation to include all the things it can be used for,
+ as well as words of caution.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * The SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(3) function has been deprecated.
+ Instead used the new SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_evp_cb(3) function.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * All of the low level HMAC functions have been deprecated including:
+
+ HMAC, HMAC_size, HMAC_CTX_new, HMAC_CTX_reset, HMAC_CTX_free,
+ HMAC_Init_ex, HMAC_Update, HMAC_Final, HMAC_CTX_copy, HMAC_CTX_set_flags
+ and HMAC_CTX_get_md.
+
+ Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged for a long
+ time. Instead applications should use L<EVP_MAC_CTX_new(3)>,
+ L<EVP_MAC_CTX_free(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_init(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_update(3)>
+ and L<EVP_MAC_final(3)>.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Over two thousand fixes were made to the documentation, including:
+ - Common options (such as -rand/-writerand, TLS version control, etc)
+ were refactored and point to newly-enhanced descriptions in openssl.pod.
+ - Added style conformance for all options (with help from Richard Levitte),
+ documented all reported missing options, added a CI build to check
+ that all options are documented and that no unimplemented options
+ are documented.
+ - Documented some internals, such as all use of environment variables.
+ - Addressed all internal broken L<> references.
+
+ *Rich Salz*
+
+ * All of the low level CMAC functions have been deprecated including:
+
+ CMAC_CTX_new, CMAC_CTX_cleanup, CMAC_CTX_free, CMAC_CTX_get0_cipher_ctx,
+ CMAC_CTX_copy, CMAC_Init, CMAC_Update, CMAC_Final and CMAC_resume.
+
+ Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged for a long
+ time. Instead applications should use L<EVP_MAC_CTX_new(3)>,
+ L<EVP_MAC_CTX_free(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_init(3)>, L<EVP_MAC_update(3)>
+ and L<EVP_MAC_final(3)>.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * All of the low level MD2, MD4, MD5, MDC2, RIPEMD160, SHA1, SHA224, SHA256,
+ SHA384, SHA512 and Whirlpool digest functions have been deprecated.
+ These include:
+
+ MD2, MD2_options, MD2_Init, MD2_Update, MD2_Final, MD4, MD4_Init,
+ MD4_Update, MD4_Final, MD4_Transform, MD5, MD5_Init, MD5_Update,
+ MD5_Final, MD5_Transform, MDC2, MDC2_Init, MDC2_Update, MDC2_Final,
+ RIPEMD160, RIPEMD160_Init, RIPEMD160_Update, RIPEMD160_Final,
+ RIPEMD160_Transform, SHA1_Init, SHA1_Update, SHA1_Final, SHA1_Transform,
+ SHA224_Init, SHA224_Update, SHA224_Final, SHA224_Transform, SHA256_Init,
+ SHA256_Update, SHA256_Final, SHA256_Transform, SHA384, SHA384_Init,
+ SHA384_Update, SHA384_Final, SHA512, SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update,
+ SHA512_Final, SHA512_Transform, WHIRLPOOL, WHIRLPOOL_Init,
+ WHIRLPOOL_Update, WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate and WHIRLPOOL_Final.
+
+ Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged
+ for a long time. Applications should use the EVP_DigestInit_ex(3),
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(3) and EVP_DigestFinal_ex(3) functions instead.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Corrected the documentation of the return values from the EVP_DigestSign*
+ set of functions. The documentation mentioned negative values for some
+ errors, but this was never the case, so the mention of negative values
+ was removed.
+
+ Code that followed the documentation and thereby check with something
+ like `EVP_DigestSignInit(...) <= 0` will continue to work undisturbed.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * All of the low level cipher functions have been deprecated including:
+
+ AES_options, AES_set_encrypt_key, AES_set_decrypt_key, AES_encrypt,
+ AES_decrypt, AES_ecb_encrypt, AES_cbc_encrypt, AES_cfb128_encrypt,
+ AES_cfb1_encrypt, AES_cfb8_encrypt, AES_ofb128_encrypt,
+ AES_wrap_key, AES_unwrap_key, BF_set_key, BF_encrypt, BF_decrypt,
+ BF_ecb_encrypt, BF_cbc_encrypt, BF_cfb64_encrypt, BF_ofb64_encrypt,
+ BF_options, Camellia_set_key, Camellia_encrypt, Camellia_decrypt,
+ Camellia_ecb_encrypt, Camellia_cbc_encrypt, Camellia_cfb128_encrypt,
+ Camellia_cfb1_encrypt, Camellia_cfb8_encrypt, Camellia_ofb128_encrypt,
+ Camellia_ctr128_encrypt, CAST_set_key, CAST_encrypt, CAST_decrypt,
+ CAST_ecb_encrypt, CAST_cbc_encrypt, CAST_cfb64_encrypt,
+ CAST_ofb64_encrypt, DES_options, DES_encrypt1, DES_encrypt2,
+ DES_encrypt3, DES_decrypt3, DES_cbc_encrypt, DES_ncbc_encrypt,
+ DES_pcbc_encrypt, DES_xcbc_encrypt, DES_cfb_encrypt, DES_cfb64_encrypt,
+ DES_ecb_encrypt, DES_ofb_encrypt, DES_ofb64_encrypt, DES_random_key,
+ DES_set_odd_parity, DES_check_key_parity, DES_is_weak_key, DES_set_key,
+ DES_key_sched, DES_set_key_checked, DES_set_key_unchecked,
+ DES_string_to_key, DES_string_to_2keys, DES_fixup_key_parity,
+ DES_ecb2_encrypt, DES_ede2_cbc_encrypt, DES_ede2_cfb64_encrypt,
+ DES_ede2_ofb64_encrypt, DES_ecb3_encrypt, DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt,
+ DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt, DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt, DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt,
+ DES_cbc_cksum, DES_quad_cksum, IDEA_encrypt, IDEA_options,
+ IDEA_ecb_encrypt, IDEA_set_encrypt_key, IDEA_set_decrypt_key,
+ IDEA_cbc_encrypt, IDEA_cfb64_encrypt, IDEA_ofb64_encrypt, RC2_set_key,
+ RC2_encrypt, RC2_decrypt, RC2_ecb_encrypt, RC2_cbc_encrypt,
+ RC2_cfb64_encrypt, RC2_ofb64_encrypt, RC4, RC4_options, RC4_set_key,
+ RC5_32_set_key, RC5_32_encrypt, RC5_32_decrypt, RC5_32_ecb_encrypt,
+ RC5_32_cbc_encrypt, RC5_32_cfb64_encrypt, RC5_32_ofb64_encrypt,
+ SEED_set_key, SEED_encrypt, SEED_decrypt, SEED_ecb_encrypt,
+ SEED_cbc_encrypt, SEED_cfb128_encrypt and SEED_ofb128_encrypt.
+
+ Use of these low level functions has been informally discouraged for
+ a long time. Applications should use the high level EVP APIs, e.g.
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex, EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, and the
+ equivalently named decrypt functions instead.
+
+ *Matt Caswell and Paul Dale*
* Removed include/openssl/opensslconf.h.in and replaced it with
include/openssl/configuration.h.in, which differs in not including
<openssl/macros.h>. A short header include/openssl/opensslconf.h
was added to include both.
-
+
This allows internal hacks where one might need to modify the set
of configured macros, for example this if deprecated symbols are
still supposed to be available internally:
-
+
#include <openssl/configuration.h>
-
+
#undef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
-
+
#include <openssl/macros.h>
-
+
This should not be used by applications that use the exported
symbols, as that will lead to linking errors.
+
*Richard Levitte*
-* Fixed an an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure
- used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are
- affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024,
- 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect would be very
- difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH512
- are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the target would
- have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended anyway.
- Also applications directly using the low level API BN_mod_exp may be
- affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
- (CVE-2019-1551)
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ * Fixed an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure
+ used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are
+ affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024,
+ 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect would be very
+ difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH512
+ are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the target would
+ have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended anyway.
+ Also applications directly using the low level API BN_mod_exp may be
+ affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
+ [CVE-2019-1551][]
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
-* Most memory-debug features have been deprecated, and the functionality
- replaced with no-ops.
- *Rich Salz*
+ * Most memory-debug features have been deprecated, and the functionality
+ replaced with no-ops.
-* Most common options (such as -rand/-writerand, TLS version control, etc)
- were refactored and point to newly-enhanced descriptions in openssl.pod
- *Rich Salz*
+ *Rich Salz*
-* Introduced a new method type and API, OSSL_SERIALIZER, to
+ * Introduced a new method type and API, OSSL_SERIALIZER, to
represent generic serializers. An implementation is expected to
be able to serialize an object associated with a given name (such
as an algorithm name for an asymmetric key) into forms given by
this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
- (CVE-2019-1547)
+ [CVE-2019-1547][]
*Billy Bob Brumley*
*Boris Pismenny*
-### Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [xx XXX xxxx] ###
+
+OpenSSL 1.1.1
+-------------
+
+### Changes between 1.1.1d and 1.1.1e [xx XXX xxxx] ###
+
+ * Added a new method to gather entropy on VMS, based on SYS$GET_ENTROPY.
+ The presence of this system service is determined at run-time.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Added newline escaping functionality to a filename when using openssl dgst.
+ This output format is to replicate the output format found in the '*sum'
+ checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward compatibility.
+
+ *Matt Eaton, Richard Levitte, and Paul Dale*
+
+ * Print all values for a PKCS#12 attribute with 'openssl pkcs12', not just
+ the first value.
+
+ *Jon Spillett*
+
+### Changes between 1.1.1c and 1.1.1d [10 Sep 2019] ###
+
+ * Fixed a fork protection issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random
+ number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the
+ event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child
+ processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not
+ being used in the default case.
+
+ A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high
+ precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent
+ and child process sharing state is significantly reduced.
+
+ If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using
+ OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all.
+ [CVE-2019-1549][]
+
+ *Matthias St. Pierre*
+
+ * For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+ used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
+ or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
+ `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
+ This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
+ especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
+ By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
+ serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
+ internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
+
+ *Nicola Tuveri*
+
+ * Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
+ this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
+ NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
+ does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
+ [CVE-2019-1547][]
+
+ *Billy Bob Brumley*
+
+ * Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
+ An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
+ second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
+ recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
+ encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
+ decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
+ used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
+ As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
+ key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
+ certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
+ The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+ [CVE-2019-1563][]
+
+ *Bernd Edlinger*
+
+ * Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been
+ improved for older Linux systems. The RAND subsystem will wait for
+ /dev/random to be producing output before seeding from /dev/urandom.
+ The seeded state is stored for future library initialisations using
+ a system global shared memory segment. The shared memory identifier
+ can be configured by defining OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID to
+ the desired value. The default identifier is 114.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Correct the extended master secret constant on EBCDIC systems. Without this
+ fix TLS connections between an EBCDIC system and a non-EBCDIC system that
+ negotiate EMS will fail. Unfortunately this also means that TLS connections
+ between EBCDIC systems with this fix, and EBCDIC systems without this
+ fix will fail if they negotiate EMS.
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds
+
+ Mingw isn't a POSIX environment per se, which means that Windows
+ paths should be used for installation.
+ [CVE-2019-1552][]
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Changed DH_check to accept parameters with order q and 2q subgroups.
+ With order 2q subgroups the bit 0 of the private key is not secret
+ but DH_generate_key works around that by clearing bit 0 of the
+ private key for those. This avoids leaking bit 0 of the private key.
+
+ *Bernd Edlinger*
+
+ * Significantly reduce secure memory usage by the randomness pools.
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Revert the DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems
+
+ The DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature added a select() call to wait for the
+ /dev/random device to become readable before reading from the
+ /dev/urandom device.
+
+ It turned out that this change had negative side effects on
+ performance which were not acceptable. After some discussion it
+ was decided to revert this feature and leave it up to the OS
+ resp. the platform maintainer to ensure a proper initialization
+ during early boot time.
+
+ *Matthias St. Pierre*
+
+### Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019] ###
+
+ * Add build tests for C++. These are generated files that only do one
+ thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each. This tests that
+ the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application.
+
+ This test isn't enabled by default. It can be enabled with the option
+ 'enable-buildtest-c++'.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA.
+
+ *Patrick Steuer*
+
+ * Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
+ This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
+ fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
+ generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+ * Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES,
+ EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust
+ util/fix-doc-nits accordingly.
+
+ *Paul Yang, Joshua Lock*
+
+ * Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine()
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme
+ along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging.
+
+ *Lorinczy Zsigmond*
+
+ * Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time.
+
+ *Bernd Edlinger*
+
+ * Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305.
+
+ ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input
+ for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value
+ (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length
+ and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12
+ bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16
+ bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any
+ additional leading bytes are ignored.
+
+ It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are
+ unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to
+ serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes
+ the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a
+ change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a
+ new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt
+ messages with a reused nonce.
+
+ Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
+ integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
+ integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
+ affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS,
+ is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
+ applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
+ length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk
+ Greef of Ronomon.
+ [CVE-2019-1543][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Add DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems
+
+ On older Linux systems where the getrandom() system call is not available,
+ OpenSSL normally uses the /dev/urandom device for seeding its CSPRNG.
+ Contrary to getrandom(), the /dev/urandom device will not block during
+ early boot when the kernel CSPRNG has not been seeded yet.
+
+ To mitigate this known weakness, use select() to wait for /dev/random to
+ become readable before reading from /dev/urandom.
+
+ * Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm
+
+ *Paul Yang*
+
+### Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019] ###
* Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake
message exchange in TLSv1.3. In 1.1.1/1.1.1a we used SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
- (CVE-2018-0734)
+ [CVE-2018-0734][]
*Paul Dale*
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
- (CVE-2018-0735)
+ [CVE-2018-0735][]
*Paul Dale*
bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 - TLSv1.2 to fragment such
alerts across multiple records (some of which could be empty). In practice
it make no sense to send an empty alert record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3
- prohibts this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not
+ prohibits this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not
support this at all. Supporting it adds significant complexity to the
- record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause inter-operability
+ record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause interoperability
issues.
*Matt Caswell*
*Rich Salz*
+OpenSSL 1.1.0
+-------------
-### Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [xx XXX xxxx] ###
- * Client DoS due to large DH parameter
+### Changes between 1.1.0k and 1.1.0l [10 Sep 2019] ###
- During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
- malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
- cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
- key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
- could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
+ * For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+ used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
+ or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
+ `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
+ This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
+ especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
+ By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
+ serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
+ internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
- (CVE-2018-0732)
+ *Nicola Tuveri*
- *Guido Vranken*
+ * Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
+ this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
+ NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
+ does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
+ [CVE-2019-1547][]
- * Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
+ *Billy Bob Brumley*
- The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
- a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
- mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
- recover the private key.
+ * Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
+ An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
+ second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
+ recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
+ encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
+ decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
+ used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
+ As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
+ key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
+ certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
+ The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+ [CVE-2019-1563][]
+
+ *Bernd Edlinger*
+
+ * Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds
+
+ Mingw isn't a POSIX environment per se, which means that Windows
+ paths should be used for installation.
+ [CVE-2019-1552][]
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+### Changes between 1.1.0j and 1.1.0k [28 May 2019] ###
+
+ * Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
+ This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
+ fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
+ generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+ * Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305.
+
+ ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input
+ for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value
+ (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length
+ and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12
+ bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16
+ bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any
+ additional leading bytes are ignored.
+
+ It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are
+ unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to
+ serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes
+ the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a
+ change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a
+ new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt
+ messages with a reused nonce.
+
+ Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
+ integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
+ integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
+ affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS,
+ is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
+ applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
+ length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk
+ Greef of Ronomon.
+ [CVE-2019-1543][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through
+ a new dedicated field_inv() pointer in EC_METHOD.
+ This also addresses a leakage affecting conversions from projective
+ to affine coordinates.
+
+ *Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri*
+
+ * Fix a use after free bug in d2i_X509_PUBKEY when overwriting a
+ re-used X509_PUBKEY object if the second PUBKEY is malformed.
+
+ *Bernd Edlinger*
+
+ * Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+ * Remove the 'dist' target and add a tarball building script. The
+ 'dist' target has fallen out of use, and it shouldn't be
+ necessary to configure just to create a source distribution.
+
+ *Richard Levitte*
+
+### Changes between 1.1.0i and 1.1.0j [20 Nov 2018] ###
+
+ * Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
+
+ The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
+ timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
+ algorithm to recover the private key.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
+ [CVE-2018-0734][]
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
+
+ The OpenSSL ECDSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
+ timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
+ algorithm to recover the private key.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
+ [CVE-2018-0735][]
+
+ *Paul Dale*
+
+ * Add coordinate blinding for EC_POINT and implement projective
+ coordinate blinding for generic prime curves as a countermeasure to
+ chosen point SCA attacks.
+
+ *Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri, Billy Bob Brumley*
+
+### Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [14 Aug 2018] ###
+
+ * Client DoS due to large DH parameter
+
+ During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
+ malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
+ cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
+ key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
+ could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
+ [CVE-2018-0732][]
+
+ *Guido Vranken*
+
+ * Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
+
+ The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
+ a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
+ mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
+ recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
- (CVE-2018-0737)
+ [CVE-2018-0737][]
*Billy Brumley*
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz
project.
- (CVE-2018-0739)
+ [CVE-2018-0739][]
*Matt Caswell*
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd March 2018 by Peter Waltenberg
(IBM).
- (CVE-2018-0733)
+ [CVE-2018-0733][]
*Andy Polyakov*
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue
was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project.
- (CVE-2017-3738)
+ [CVE-2017-3738][]
*Andy Polyakov*
like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
- (CVE-2017-3736)
+ [CVE-2017-3736][]
*Andy Polyakov*
would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
- (CVE-2017-3735)
+ [CVE-2017-3735][]
*Rich Salz*
and servers are affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joe Orton (Red Hat).
- (CVE-2017-3733)
+ [CVE-2017-3733][]
*Matt Caswell*
perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google.
- (CVE-2017-3731)
+ [CVE-2017-3731][]
*Andy Polyakov*
of Service attack.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
- (CVE-2017-3730)
+ [CVE-2017-3730][]
*Matt Caswell*
similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
- (CVE-2017-3732)
+ [CVE-2017-3732][]
*Andy Polyakov*
crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team)
- (CVE-2016-7054)
+ [CVE-2016-7054][]
*Richard Levitte*
affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure.
- (CVE-2016-7053)
+ [CVE-2016-7053][]
*Stephen Henson*
This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
providing reproducible case.
- (CVE-2016-7055)
+ [CVE-2016-7055][]
*Andy Polyakov*
This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.1.0a.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki.
- (CVE-2016-6309)
+ [CVE-2016-6309][]
*Matt Caswell*
the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
- (CVE-2016-6304)
+ [CVE-2016-6304][]
*Matt Caswell*
Denial Of Service attack.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Alex Gaynor.
- (CVE-2016-6305)
+ [CVE-2016-6305][]
*Matt Caswell*
*Andy Polyakov*
- * To mitigate the SWEET32 attack (CVE-2016-2183), 3DES cipher suites
+ * To mitigate the SWEET32 attack [CVE-2016-2183][], 3DES cipher suites
have been disabled by default and removed from DEFAULT, just like RC4.
See the RC4 item below to re-enable both.
* Deprecate SRP_VBASE_get_by_user.
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
- In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak (CVE-2016-0798),
+ In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak [CVE-2016-0798][],
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP
seed, even if the seed is configured.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
- preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+ preparing the fix [CVE-2014-0160][]
*Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller*
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
- flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix [CVE-2014-0076][]
*Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger*
*Steve Henson*
- * New macro __owur for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of
+ * New macro `__owur` for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of
a gcc attribute to warn if the result of a function is ignored. This
is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h
whose return value is often ignored.
*Rob Percival <robpercival@google.com>*
-### Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] ###
-
- * Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
+OpenSSL 1.0.2
+-------------
- A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
- when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
- AES-NI.
+### Changes between 1.0.2s and 1.0.2t [10 Sep 2019] ###
- This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
- attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in
- constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
- compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
- checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
- bytes.
+ * For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
+ used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
+ or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
+ `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`.
+ This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains,
+ especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs.
+ By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later
+ serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if
+ internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation.
- This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
- (CVE-2016-2107)
+ *Nicola Tuveri*
- *Kurt Roeckx*
+ * Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before
+ this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as
+ NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also
+ does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order.
+ [CVE-2019-1547][]
- * Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
+ *Billy Bob Brumley*
- An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
- Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
- amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
- corruption.
+ * Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey.
+ An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
+ second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
+ recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
+ encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
+ decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
+ used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
+ As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
+ key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
+ certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
+ The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
+ CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+ [CVE-2019-1563][]
- Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarily used by
- the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
- OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
- from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
- vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
- with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
+ *Bernd Edlinger*
- This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
- (CVE-2016-2105)
+ * Document issue with installation paths in diverse Windows builds
- *Matt Caswell*
+ '/usr/local/ssl' is an unsafe prefix for location to install OpenSSL
+ binaries and run-time config file.
+ [CVE-2019-1552][]
- * Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
+ *Richard Levitte*
- An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
- is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
- EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
- resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
- internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
- forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
- the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
- specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
- EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
- therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
- one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
- internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
- EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
- Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
- of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
- instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
+### Changes between 1.0.2r and 1.0.2s [28 May 2019] ###
- This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
- (CVE-2016-2106)
+ * Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
+ This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
+ fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
+ generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
- *Matt Caswell*
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
- * Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
+ * Add FIPS support for Android Arm 64-bit
- When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
- a short invalid encoding can cause allocation of large amounts of memory
- potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
+ Support for Android Arm 64-bit was added to the OpenSSL FIPS Object
+ Module in Version 2.0.10. For some reason, the corresponding target
+ 'android64-aarch64' was missing OpenSSL 1.0.2, whence it could not be
+ built with FIPS support on Android Arm 64-bit. This omission has been
+ fixed.
- Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
- affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
- Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
- applications are not affected.
+ *Matthias St. Pierre*
- This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
- (CVE-2016-2109)
+### Changes between 1.0.2q and 1.0.2r [26 Feb 2019] ###
- *Stephen Henson*
+ * 0-byte record padding oracle
- * EBCDIC overread
+ If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls
+ SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one)
+ then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte
+ record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is
+ received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently
+ based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this
+ amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data.
- ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
- using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
- in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
+ In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in
+ use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain
+ commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown()
+ twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do
+ this but some do anyway).
- This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
- (CVE-2016-2176)
+ This issue was discovered by Juraj Somorovsky, Robert Merget and Nimrod
+ Aviram, with additional investigation by Steven Collison and Andrew
+ Hourselt. It was reported to OpenSSL on 10th December 2018.
+ [CVE-2019-1559][]
*Matt Caswell*
- * Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
- callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+ * Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
- *Todd Short*
+ *Richard Levitte*
- * Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the
- default.
+### Changes between 1.0.2p and 1.0.2q [20 Nov 2018] ###
- *Kurt Roeckx*
+ * Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication
- * Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
- methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+ OpenSSL ECC scalar multiplication, used in e.g. ECDSA and ECDH, has been
+ shown to be vulnerable to a microarchitecture timing side channel attack.
+ An attacker with sufficient access to mount local timing attacks during
+ ECDSA signature generation could recover the private key.
- *Kurt Roeckx*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th October 2018 by Alejandro
+ Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Cesar Pereida Garcia and
+ Nicola Tuveri.
+ [CVE-2018-5407][]
-### Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] ###
+ *Billy Brumley*
-* Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
- Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
- provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+ * Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
- *Viktor Dukhovni*
+ The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
+ timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
+ algorithm to recover the private key.
-* Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
- is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
- "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
- users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
- will need to explicitly call either of:
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
+ [CVE-2018-0734][]
- SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
- or
- SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ *Paul Dale*
- as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
- explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
- server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
- recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
- ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
- (CVE-2016-0800)
+ * Resolve a compatibility issue in EC_GROUP handling with the FIPS Object
+ Module, accidentally introduced while backporting security fixes from the
+ development branch and hindering the use of ECC in FIPS mode.
- *Viktor Dukhovni*
+ *Nicola Tuveri*
- * Fix a double-free in DSA code
+### Changes between 1.0.2o and 1.0.2p [14 Aug 2018] ###
- A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
- keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
- that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
- considered rare.
+ * Client DoS due to large DH parameter
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
- libFuzzer.
- (CVE-2016-0705)
+ During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
+ malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
+ cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
+ key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
+ could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
- *Stephen Henson*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
+ [CVE-2018-0732][]
- * Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
+ *Guido Vranken*
- Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
+ * Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
- SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
- In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
- was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
- is configured.
+ The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
+ a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
+ mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
+ recover the private key.
- Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
- SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
- also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
- invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
- credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
- guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
- that of a valid user.
- (CVE-2016-0798)
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
+ Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
+ [CVE-2018-0737][]
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ *Billy Brumley*
- * Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+ * Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str
+ parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL
+ pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
- In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
- int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
- large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
- memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
- field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
- of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
- In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
- is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
- in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
- is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
- This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+ *Richard Levitte*
- All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
- to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
- arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
- on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
- consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+ * Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
+ length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
- (CVE-2016-0797)
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- *Matt Caswell*
+ * Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
+ being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
+ For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
+ The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
+ to 2^-128.
- * Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+ *Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar*
- The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
- the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
- string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+ * Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
- Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
- OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
- memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
- the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
- could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
- also occur.
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
- The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
- These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
- is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
- in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
- functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
- applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
- untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
- vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
- as command line arguments.
+ * Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
+ attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
- Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
- received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
- trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+ *Matt Caswell*
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
- (CVE-2016-0799)
+ * When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
+ now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
- *Matt Caswell*
+ *Richard Levitte*
- * Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+ * Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
+ compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
+ are no longer allowed.
- A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
- the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
- of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
- an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
- hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
+ *Emilia Käsper*
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
- Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
- Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
- http://cachebleed.info.
- (CVE-2016-0702)
+### Changes between 1.0.2n and 1.0.2o [27 Mar 2018] ###
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ * Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack
- * Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
- if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
- omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
- apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+ Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found
+ in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
+ excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There
+ are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources
+ so this is considered safe.
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz
+ project.
+ [CVE-2018-0739][]
-### Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] ###
- * DH small subgroups
+ *Matt Caswell*
- Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
- primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
- generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114
- support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
- application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are
- not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private
- DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple
- handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example
- this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's
- reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite.
+### Changes between 1.0.2m and 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017] ###
- OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in
- TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server
- reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and
- would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular
- applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk.
+ * Read/write after SSL object in error state
- The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
- available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
- only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH
- ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact.
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
+ mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
+ then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
+ you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
+ explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
+ SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
+ SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
+ handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
+ call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
+ for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
+ being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer.
- Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by
- default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.
+ In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present
+ that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having
+ already received a fatal error.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
- (CVE-2016-0701)
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google).
+ [CVE-2017-3737][]
*Matt Caswell*
- * SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
+ * rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64
- A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
- the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
- been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
- SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+ There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
+ used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
+ Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this
+ defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely.
+ Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the
+ work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed
+ offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be
+ significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server
+ would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is
+ no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
- and Sebastian Schinzel.
- (CVE-2015-3197)
+ This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
+ like Intel Haswell (4th generation).
- *Viktor Dukhovni*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue
+ was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ [CVE-2017-3738][]
-### Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] ###
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- * BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+### Changes between 1.0.2l and 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017] ###
+
+ * bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64
There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
- key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
- default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.
+ key that is shared between multiple clients.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck.
- (CVE-2015-3193)
+ This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions
+ like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ [CVE-2017-3736][]
*Andy Polyakov*
- * Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
+ * Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read
- The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
- dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
- algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
- routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
- used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
- DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
- vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
- authentication.
+ If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension,
+ OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result
+ would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
- (CVE-2015-3194)
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ [CVE-2017-3735][]
- *Stephen Henson*
+ *Rich Salz*
- * X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+### Changes between 1.0.2k and 1.0.2l [25 May 2017] ###
- When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
- memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
- application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
- affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
+ * Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target
+ platform rather than 'mingw'.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
- libFuzzer.
- (CVE-2015-3195)
+ *Richard Levitte*
- *Stephen Henson*
+### Changes between 1.0.2j and 1.0.2k [26 Jan 2017] ###
- * Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
- This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
- though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
- legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+ * Truncated packet could crash via OOB read
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific
+ cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to
+ perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash.
- * In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
- return an error
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google.
+ [CVE-2017-3731][]
- *Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>*
+ *Andy Polyakov*
-### Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] ###
+ * BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
- * Alternate chains certificate forgery
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+ procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+ against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+ perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+ feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+ deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+ of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+ likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+ additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+ private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+ key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+ default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very
+ similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem.
- During certificate verification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
- alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
- fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
- attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
- bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
- certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
+ [CVE-2017-3732][]
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
- (Google/BoringSSL).
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- *Matt Caswell*
+ * Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results
-### Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] ###
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
+ multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but
+ longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA
+ and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in
+ question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input
+ of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as
+ transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible
+ erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input.
+ Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
+ presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
+ detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely
+ multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to
+ share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour.
+ Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.
- * Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
- incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
- restored.
+ This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
+ initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
+ providing reproducible case.
+ [CVE-2016-7055][]
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0
+ or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to
+ prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually
+ sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them.
*Matt Caswell*
-### Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] ###
+### Changes between 1.0.2i and 1.0.2j [26 Sep 2016] ###
- * Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
+ * Missing CRL sanity check
- When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
- if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
- field.
-
- This can be used to perform denial of service against any
- system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
- certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
- client authentication enabled.
+ A bug fix which included a CRL sanity check was added to OpenSSL 1.1.0
+ but was omitted from OpenSSL 1.0.2i. As a result any attempt to use
+ CRLs in OpenSSL 1.0.2i will crash with a null pointer exception.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
- (CVE-2015-1788)
+ This issue only affects the OpenSSL 1.0.2i
+ [CVE-2016-7052][]
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ *Matt Caswell*
- * Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+### Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.0.2i [22 Sep 2016] ###
- X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
- string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
- X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
- time string.
+ * OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
- An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
- various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
- a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
- that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
- authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
- callbacks.
+ A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
+ extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a
+ large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded
+ memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of
+ Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default
+ configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using
+ the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
- independently by Hanno Böck.
- (CVE-2015-1789)
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-6304][]
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ *Matt Caswell*
- * PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
+ * In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack, the DES ciphers were moved from
+ HIGH to MEDIUM.
- The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
- correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
- with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaetan
+ Leurent (INRIA)
+ [CVE-2016-2183][]
- Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
- structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
- servers are not affected.
+ *Rich Salz*
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
- (CVE-2015-1790)
+ * OOB write in MDC2_Update()
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or
+ through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous
+ call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check
+ can overflow resulting in a heap corruption.
- * CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+ The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical
+ on most platforms.
- When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
- if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
- denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
- the CMS code.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
- (CVE-2015-1792)
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-6303][]
*Stephen Henson*
- * Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+ * Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS
- If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
- reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
- a double free of the ticket data.
- (CVE-2015-1791)
+ If a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a
+ DoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will
+ ultimately crash.
- *Matt Caswell*
+ The use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires
+ a custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism.
- * Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the
- 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported
- curves, prefer P-256 (both).
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-6302][]
- *Emilia Kasper*
+ *Stephen Henson*
-### Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] ###
+ * OOB write in BN_bn2dec()
- * ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix
+ The function BN_bn2dec() does not check the return value of BN_div_word().
+ This can cause an OOB write if an application uses this function with an
+ overly large BIGNUM. This could be a problem if an overly large certificate
+ or CRL is printed out from an untrusted source. TLS is not affected because
+ record limits will reject an oversized certificate before it is parsed.
- If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an
- invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will
- occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-2182][]
- This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford
- University.
- (CVE-2015-0291)
+ *Stephen Henson*
- *Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell*
+ * OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio()
- * Multiblock corrupted pointer fix
+ The function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is
+ the total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount
+ of data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are
+ presented.
- OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
- feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
- NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
- OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
- using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
- socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
- However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
- fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-2180][]
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller.
- (CVE-2015-0290)
+ *Stephen Henson*
- *Matt Caswell*
+ * Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour
- * Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix
+ Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
- The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the
- initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop
- over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with
- an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means
- that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next
- that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial
- ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be
- that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
- server.
+ A common idiom in the codebase is to check limits in the following manner:
+ "p + len > limit"
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson.
- (CVE-2015-0207)
+ Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
+ limit == p + SIZE
- *Matt Caswell*
+ "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
+ message).
- * Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
+ The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
+ defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
+ undefined behaviour.
- The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
- made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
- certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
- certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
- application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
- OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
- (CVE-2015-0286)
+ For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
+ provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
+ values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit.
- *Stephen Henson*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken
+ [CVE-2016-2177][]
- * Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix
+ *Matt Caswell*
- The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
- dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
- algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify
- certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any
- certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
- application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
- OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+ * Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing
- This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter.
- (CVE-2015-0208)
+ Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
+ order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
+ implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
+ certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
+ attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
- *Stephen Henson*
+ This issue was reported by César Pereida (Aalto University), Billy Brumley
+ (Tampere University of Technology), and Yuval Yarom (The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA).
+ [CVE-2016-2178][]
- * ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
+ *César Pereida*
- Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
- memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
- strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
+ * DTLS buffered message DoS
- Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
- components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
- functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
- not affected.
- (CVE-2015-0287)
+ In a DTLS connection where handshake messages are delivered out-of-order
+ those messages that OpenSSL is not yet ready to process will be buffered
+ for later use. Under certain circumstances, a flaw in the logic means that
+ those messages do not get removed from the buffer even though the handshake
+ has been completed. An attacker could force up to approx. 15 messages to
+ remain in the buffer when they are no longer required. These messages will
+ be cleared when the DTLS connection is closed. The default maximum size for
+ a message is 100k. Therefore the attacker could force an additional 1500k
+ to be consumed per connection. By opening many simulataneous connections an
+ attacker could cause a DoS attack through memory exhaustion.
- *Stephen Henson*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Quan Luo.
+ [CVE-2016-2179][]
- * PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
+ *Matt Caswell*
- The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
- correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
- missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+ * DTLS replay protection DoS
- Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
- otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
- affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
+ A flaw in the DTLS replay attack protection mechanism means that records
+ that arrive for future epochs update the replay protection "window" before
+ the MAC for the record has been validated. This could be exploited by an
+ attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to
+ decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means
+ that all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of
+ service for a specific DTLS connection.
- This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
- (CVE-2015-0289)
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OCAP audit team.
+ [CVE-2016-2181][]
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ *Matt Caswell*
- * DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
+ * Certificate message OOB reads
- A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
- servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
- a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
+ In OpenSSL 1.0.2 and earlier some missing message length checks can result
+ in OOB reads of up to 2 bytes beyond an allocated buffer. There is a
+ theoretical DoS risk but this has not been observed in practice on common
+ platforms.
- This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
- (OpenSSL development team).
- (CVE-2015-0293)
+ The messages affected are client certificate, client certificate request
+ and server certificate. As a result the attack can only be performed
+ against a client or a server which enables client authentication.
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-6306][]
- * Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
+ *Stephen Henson*
- If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
- ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message
- being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
- (CVE-2015-1787)
+### Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] ###
- *Matt Caswell*
+ * Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
- * Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix
+ A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
+ when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
+ AES-NI.
- Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake
- with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded
- automatically, and the user has not seeded manually
- - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
- SSL_client_methodv23)
- - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from
- the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA).
+ This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
+ attack [CVE-2013-0169][]. The padding check was rewritten to be in
+ constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
+ compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
+ checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
+ bytes.
- If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
- have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the
- output may be predictable.
+ This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
+ [CVE-2016-2107][]
- For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
- succeed on an unpatched platform:
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
- openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
- (CVE-2015-0285)
+ * Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
+ Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
+ amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
+ corruption.
+
+ Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarily used by
+ the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
+ OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
+ from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
+ vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
+ with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-2105][]
*Matt Caswell*
- * Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
+ * Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
- A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
- could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
- free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
- or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
- for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
- sources. This scenario is considered rare.
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
+ resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
+ internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
+ forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
+ the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
+ specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
+ therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
+ one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
+ internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
+ Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
+ of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
+ instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
- This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
- commit 517073cd4b.
- (CVE-2015-0209)
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-2106][]
*Matt Caswell*
- * X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
+ * Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
- The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
- the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
+ When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
+ a short invalid encoding can cause allocation of large amounts of memory
+ potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
- This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
- (CVE-2015-0288)
+ Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
+ affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
+ Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
+ applications are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
+ [CVE-2016-2109][]
*Stephen Henson*
- * Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+ * EBCDIC overread
- *Kurt Roeckx*
+ ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
+ using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
+ in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
-### Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015] ###
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-2176][]
- * Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
- ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
- So far those who have to target multiple platforms would compromise
- and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on
- ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing
- near-optimal performance even on newer platforms.
+ *Matt Caswell*
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ * Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
- * Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64
- (other platforms pending).
+ *Todd Short*
- *Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov*
+ * Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the
+ default.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+ * Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
+ methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] ###
+
+* Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+ Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
+ provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni*
+
+* Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
+ is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
+ "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
+ users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
+ will need to explicitly call either of:
+
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ or
+ SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+ as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
+ explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
+ server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
+ recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
+ ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
+ [CVE-2016-0800][]
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni*
+
+ * Fix a double-free in DSA code
+
+ A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+ keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
+ that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
+ considered rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ [CVE-2016-0705][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
+
+ Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
+
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+ In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
+ was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
+ is configured.
+
+ Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+ also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+ invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+ credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+ guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+ that of a valid user.
+ [CVE-2016-0798][]
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+
+ In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
+ int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
+ large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
+ memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
+ field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
+ of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
+ In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
+ is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
+ in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
+ is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
+ This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+
+ All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
+ to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
+ arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
+ on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
+ consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-0797][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+ The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
+ the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
+ string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+
+ Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
+ OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
+ memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
+ the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
+ could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
+ also occur.
+
+ The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
+ These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
+ is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
+ in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
+ functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
+ applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
+ untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
+ vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
+ as command line arguments.
+
+ Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
+ received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
+ trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-0799][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+
+ A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
+ the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
+ of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
+ an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+ hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
+ Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
+ http://cachebleed.info.
+ [CVE-2016-0702][]
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
+ if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
+ omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
+ apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] ###
+ * DH small subgroups
+
+ Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
+ primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
+ generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114
+ support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
+ application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are
+ not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private
+ DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple
+ handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example
+ this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's
+ reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite.
+
+ OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in
+ TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server
+ reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and
+ would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular
+ applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk.
+
+ The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is
+ available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the
+ only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH
+ ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by
+ default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe).
+ [CVE-2016-0701][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
+
+ A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
+ the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
+ been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
+ SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
+ and Sebastian Schinzel.
+ [CVE-2015-3197][]
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] ###
+
+ * BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
+
+ There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
+ procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
+ against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
+ perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
+ feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
+ deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
+ of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
+ likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
+ additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
+ private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
+ key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
+ default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck.
+ [CVE-2015-3193][]
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
+
+ The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+ algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
+ routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
+ used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
+ DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
+ vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
+ authentication.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
+ [CVE-2015-3194][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+
+ When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+ memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+ application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+ affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ [CVE-2015-3195][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
+ This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
+ though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
+ legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+ return an error
+
+ *Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] ###
+
+ * Alternate chains certificate forgery
+
+ During certificate verification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+ alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
+ fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
+ attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
+ bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
+ certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
+ (Google/BoringSSL).
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] ###
+
+ * Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
+ incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
+ restored.
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] ###
+
+ * Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
+
+ When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
+ if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
+ field.
+
+ This can be used to perform denial of service against any
+ system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
+ certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
+ client authentication enabled.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
+ [CVE-2015-1788][]
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+
+ X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
+ string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
+ X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
+ time string.
+
+ An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
+ various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
+ a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
+ that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
+ authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
+ callbacks.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
+ independently by Hanno Böck.
+ [CVE-2015-1789][]
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
+ with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
+ structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
+ servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ [CVE-2015-1790][]
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+
+ When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
+ if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
+ denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
+ the CMS code.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
+ [CVE-2015-1792][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+
+ If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
+ reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
+ a double free of the ticket data.
+ [CVE-2015-1791][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the
+ 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported
+ curves, prefer P-256 (both).
+
+ *Emilia Kasper*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] ###
+
+ * ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix
+
+ If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an
+ invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will
+ occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server.
+
+ This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford
+ University.
+ [CVE-2015-0291][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Multiblock corrupted pointer fix
+
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This
+ feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES
+ NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause
+ OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when
+ using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a
+ socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection.
+ However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation
+ fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller.
+ [CVE-2015-0290][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix
+
+ The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the
+ initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop
+ over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with
+ an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means
+ that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next
+ that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial
+ ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be
+ that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only
+ server.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson.
+ [CVE-2015-0207][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
+
+ The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
+ made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
+ certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
+ certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+ application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+ OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+ [CVE-2015-0286][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix
+
+ The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+ algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify
+ certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any
+ certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+ application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+ OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+
+ This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter.
+ [CVE-2015-0208][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
+
+ Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
+ memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
+ strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
+
+ Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
+ components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
+ functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
+ not affected.
+ [CVE-2015-0287][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
+ missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
+ otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
+ affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ [CVE-2015-0289][]
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
+
+ A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
+ servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
+ a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
+ (OpenSSL development team).
+ [CVE-2015-0293][]
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
+
+ If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE
+ ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message
+ being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack.
+ [CVE-2015-1787][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix
+
+ Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake
+ with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
+ - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded
+ automatically, and the user has not seeded manually
+ - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
+ SSL_client_methodv23)
+ - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from
+ the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA).
+
+ If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
+ have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the
+ output may be predictable.
+
+ For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
+ succeed on an unpatched platform:
+
+ openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
+ [CVE-2015-0285][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
+
+ A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
+ could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
+ free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
+ or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
+ for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
+ sources. This scenario is considered rare.
+
+ This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
+ commit 517073cd4b.
+ [CVE-2015-0209][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
+
+ The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
+ the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
+ [CVE-2015-0288][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015] ###
+
+ * Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
+ ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
+ So far those who have to target multiple platforms would compromise
+ and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on
+ ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing
+ near-optimal performance even on newer platforms.
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64
+ (other platforms pending).
+
+ *Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov*
* Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and
OCSP response extensions from RFC6962.
- *Rob Stradling*
+ *Rob Stradling*
+
+ * Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+
+ *Bodo Moeller*
+
+ * Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8.
+ This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most
+ common cases are optimized and there still is room for further
+ improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added.
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target.
+
+ *Marcelo Cerri (IBM)*
+
+ * Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES,
+ SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases
+ are optimized and there still is room for further improvements.
+ Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported.
+
+ *Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)*
+
+ * Improved ARMv7 NEON support.
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first
+ implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1,
+ SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation.
+
+ *Andy Polyakov, David Miller*
+
+ * Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a.
+ RSAZ.
+
+ *Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)*
+
+ * Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2,
+ BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched"
+ implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support
+ for TLS encrypt.
+
+ This work was sponsored by Intel Corp.
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method()
+ supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer
+ supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
+ this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
+ MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
+ existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
+ the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
+ algorithms and include tests cases.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
+ structure.
+
+ *Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson*
+
+ * New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
+ difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
+ received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
+ summary of the connection parameters.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
+ of connection parameters.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
+
+ *Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie*
+
+ * New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
+ from CRLDP extension in certificates.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
+ of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve
+ X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
+ certificates.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
+ HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
+ CRLs using the OCSP API.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application
+ configuration using configuration files or command lines.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
+ message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
+ "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
+ tracing.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
+ Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
+ OID NID.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
+ client to OpenSSL.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
+ of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
+ only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
+ strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
+ algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
+ by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
+ certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
+ comparison.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
+ preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
+ signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
+ use the certificate.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
+ possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
+ the parent SSL_CTX. Include distinct stores for certificate chain
+ verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
+ to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returning
+ an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
+ to test if a chain is correctly configured.
+
+ Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
+ store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
+
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
+ mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
+ hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
+ request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
+ types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
+ supported signature algorithms.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
+ is required by client or server. An application can decide which
+ certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
+ supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
+ This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
+ certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
+ certificate and specify the whole chain.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
+ the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
+ in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
+ to have similar checks in it.
+
+ Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
+ This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
+ certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
+ extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
+ with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
+ shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
+ and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
+ shared signature algorithms.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
+ for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
+ to support them.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
+ from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
+ it couldn't be removed.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
+ verification. New verify options supporting checking in openssl utility.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
+ functions. Add manual page.
+
+ *Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)*
+
+ * New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
+ certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
+ a certificate.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Fix OCSP checking.
+
+ *Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie*
+
+ * Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
+ OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
+ intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
+ setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509
+ utility) or reject.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
+ trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE,
+ platform support for Linux and Android.
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework.
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
+ When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
+ when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
+ This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the
+ (often lower performance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
+ PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
+ the new parameter format automatically.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly
+ to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled
+ the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of
+ hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call:
+ SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically
+ support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use
+ static structures instead of allocation if default values are used.
+ New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves.
+ Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client
+ to set list of supported curves.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and
+ supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility
+ to print out received values.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert
+ between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
+ ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different
+ chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both
+ server and client use DH certificates with common parameters.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server
+ certificates.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of
+ the certificate.
+ Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info,
+ X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and
+ X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review.
+
+
+OpenSSL 1.0.1
+-------------
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1t and 1.0.1u [22 Sep 2016] ###
+
+ * OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
+
+ A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
+ extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a
+ large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded
+ memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of
+ Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default
+ configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using
+ the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-6304][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * In order to mitigate the SWEET32 attack, the DES ciphers were moved from
+ HIGH to MEDIUM.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Karthikeyan Bhargavan and Gaetan
+ Leurent (INRIA)
+ [CVE-2016-2183][]
+
+ *Rich Salz*
+
+ * OOB write in MDC2_Update()
+
+ An overflow can occur in MDC2_Update() either if called directly or
+ through the EVP_DigestUpdate() function using MDC2. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous
+ call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check
+ can overflow resulting in a heap corruption.
+
+ The amount of data needed is comparable to SIZE_MAX which is impractical
+ on most platforms.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-6303][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Malformed SHA512 ticket DoS
+
+ If a server uses SHA512 for TLS session ticket HMAC it is vulnerable to a
+ DoS attack where a malformed ticket will result in an OOB read which will
+ ultimately crash.
+
+ The use of SHA512 in TLS session tickets is comparatively rare as it requires
+ a custom server callback and ticket lookup mechanism.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-6302][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * OOB write in BN_bn2dec()
+
+ The function BN_bn2dec() does not check the return value of BN_div_word().
+ This can cause an OOB write if an application uses this function with an
+ overly large BIGNUM. This could be a problem if an overly large certificate
+ or CRL is printed out from an untrusted source. TLS is not affected because
+ record limits will reject an oversized certificate before it is parsed.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-2182][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio()
+
+ The function TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_obj2txt(): the return value is
+ the total length the OID text representation would use and not the amount
+ of data written. This will result in OOB reads when large OIDs are
+ presented.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-2180][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Pointer arithmetic undefined behaviour
+
+ Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
+
+ A common idiom in the codebase is to check limits in the following manner:
+ "p + len > limit"
+
+ Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
+ limit == p + SIZE
+
+ "len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
+ message).
+
+ The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
+ defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
+ undefined behaviour.
+
+ For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
+ provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
+ values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken
+ [CVE-2016-2177][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Constant time flag not preserved in DSA signing
+
+ Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
+ order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
+ implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
+ certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
+ attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
+
+ This issue was reported by César Pereida (Aalto University), Billy Brumley
+ (Tampere University of Technology), and Yuval Yarom (The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA).
+ [CVE-2016-2178][]
+
+ *César Pereida*
+
+ * DTLS buffered message DoS
+
+ In a DTLS connection where handshake messages are delivered out-of-order
+ those messages that OpenSSL is not yet ready to process will be buffered
+ for later use. Under certain circumstances, a flaw in the logic means that
+ those messages do not get removed from the buffer even though the handshake
+ has been completed. An attacker could force up to approx. 15 messages to
+ remain in the buffer when they are no longer required. These messages will
+ be cleared when the DTLS connection is closed. The default maximum size for
+ a message is 100k. Therefore the attacker could force an additional 1500k
+ to be consumed per connection. By opening many simulataneous connections an
+ attacker could cause a DoS attack through memory exhaustion.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Quan Luo.
+ [CVE-2016-2179][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * DTLS replay protection DoS
+
+ A flaw in the DTLS replay attack protection mechanism means that records
+ that arrive for future epochs update the replay protection "window" before
+ the MAC for the record has been validated. This could be exploited by an
+ attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to
+ decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means
+ that all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of
+ service for a specific DTLS connection.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OCAP audit team.
+ [CVE-2016-2181][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Certificate message OOB reads
+
+ In OpenSSL 1.0.2 and earlier some missing message length checks can result
+ in OOB reads of up to 2 bytes beyond an allocated buffer. There is a
+ theoretical DoS risk but this has not been observed in practice on common
+ platforms.
+
+ The messages affected are client certificate, client certificate request
+ and server certificate. As a result the attack can only be performed
+ against a client or a server which enables client authentication.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
+ [CVE-2016-6306][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1s and 1.0.1t [3 May 2016] ###
+
+ * Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check
+
+ A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic
+ when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support
+ AES-NI.
+
+ This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding
+ attack [CVE-2013-0169][]. The padding check was rewritten to be in
+ constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and
+ compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer
+ checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding
+ bytes.
+
+ This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker.
+ [CVE-2016-2107][]
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+ * Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for
+ Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
+ amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
+ corruption.
+
+ Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarly used by
+ the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
+ OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data
+ from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered
+ vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly
+ with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-2105][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow
+
+ An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker
+ is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow
+ resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL
+ internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two
+ forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be
+ the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that
+ specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and
+ therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are
+ one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in
+ internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths.
+ Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances
+ of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no
+ instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-2106][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation
+
+ When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio()
+ a short invalid encoding can casuse allocation of large amounts of memory
+ potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory.
+
+ Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is
+ affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected.
+ Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS
+ applications are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter.
+ [CVE-2016-2109][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * EBCDIC overread
+
+ ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications
+ using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result
+ in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.
+
+ This issue was reported by Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-2176][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername
+ callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN.
+
+ *Todd Short*
+
+ * Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the
+ default.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+ * Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the
+ methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1r and 1.0.1s [1 Mar 2016] ###
+
+* Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+ Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
+ provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni*
+
+* Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
+ is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
+ "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
+ users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
+ will need to explicitly call either of:
+
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ or
+ SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+ as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
+ explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
+ server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
+ recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
+ ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
+ [CVE-2016-0800][]
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni*
+
+ * Fix a double-free in DSA code
+
+ A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+ keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
+ that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
+ considered rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ [CVE-2016-0705][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
+
+ Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
+
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+ In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
+ was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
+ is configured.
+
+ Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+ also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+ invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+ credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+ guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+ that of a valid user.
+ [CVE-2016-0798][]
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+
+ In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
+ int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
+ large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
+ memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
+ field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
+ of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
+ In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
+ is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
+ in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
+ is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
+ This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+
+ All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
+ to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
+ arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
+ on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
+ consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-0797][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+ The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
+ the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
+ string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+
+ Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
+ OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
+ memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
+ the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
+ could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
+ also occur.
+
+ The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
+ These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
+ is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
+ in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
+ functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
+ applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
+ untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
+ vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
+ as command line arguments.
+
+ Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
+ received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
+ trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
+ [CVE-2016-0799][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+
+ A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
+ the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
+ of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
+ an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+ hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
+ Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
+ http://cachebleed.info.
+ [CVE-2016-0702][]
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
+ if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
+ omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
+ apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1q and 1.0.1r [28 Jan 2016] ###
+
+ * Protection for DH small subgroup attacks
+
+ As a precautionary measure the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been
+ switched on by default and cannot be disabled. This could have some
+ performance impact.
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers
+
+ A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on
+ the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have
+ been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via
+ SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram
+ and Sebastian Schinzel.
+ [CVE-2015-3197][]
+
+ *Viktor Dukhovni*
+
+ * Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 1024 bits.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1p and 1.0.1q [3 Dec 2015] ###
+
+ * Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
+
+ The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
+ dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
+ algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
+ routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
+ used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
+ DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
+ vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
+ authentication.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
+ [CVE-2015-3194][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+
+ When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+ memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+ application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+ affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ [CVE-2015-3195][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
+ This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
+ though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
+ legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
+ use a random seed, as already documented.
+
+ *Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1o and 1.0.1p [9 Jul 2015] ###
+
+ * Alternate chains certificate forgery
+
+ During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
+ alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
+ fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
+ attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
+ bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
+ certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
+ (Google/BoringSSL).
+ [CVE-2015-1793][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Race condition handling PSK identify hint
+
+ If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
+ the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
+ result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
+ identify hint data.
+ [CVE-2015-3196][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015] ###
+ * Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
+ incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
+ restored.
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1m and 1.0.1n [11 Jun 2015] ###
+
+ * Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
+
+ When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
+ if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
+ field.
+
+ This can be used to perform denial of service against any
+ system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
+ certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
+ client authentication enabled.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
+ [CVE-2015-1788][]
+
+ *Andy Polyakov*
+
+ * Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
+
+ X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
+ string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
+ X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
+ time string.
+
+ An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
+ various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
+ a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
+ that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
+ authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
+ callbacks.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
+ independently by Hanno Böck.
+ [CVE-2015-1789][]
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
+ with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
+ structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
+ servers are not affected.
- * Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
- for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
- bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ [CVE-2015-1790][]
- *Bodo Moeller*
+ *Emilia Käsper*
- * Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8.
- This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most
- common cases are optimized and there still is room for further
- improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added.
+ * CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
+
+ When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
+ if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
+ denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
+ the CMS code.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
+ [CVE-2015-1792][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
+
+ If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
+ reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
+ a double free of the ticket data.
+ [CVE-2015-1791][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper*
+
+ * dhparam: generate 2048-bit parameters by default.
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.1m [19 Mar 2015] ###
+
+ * Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
+
+ The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
+ made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
+ certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
+ certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+ application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+ OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+ [CVE-2015-0286][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
+
+ Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
+ memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
+ strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
+
+ Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
+ components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
+ functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
+ not affected.
+ [CVE-2015-0287][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
+
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
+ missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
+
+ Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
+ otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
+ affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ [CVE-2015-0289][]
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
+
+ A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
+ servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
+ a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
+ (OpenSSL development team).
+ [CVE-2015-0293][]
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ * Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
+
+ A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
+ could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
+ free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
+ or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
+ for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
+ sources. This scenario is considered rare.
+
+ This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
+ commit 517073cd4b.
+ [CVE-2015-0209][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
+
+ The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
+ the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
+
+ This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
+ [CVE-2015-0288][]
+
+ *Stephen Henson*
+
+ * Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] ###
+
+ * Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
+
+ *Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] ###
+
+ * Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
+ message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
+ dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
+ Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3571][]
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
+ dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
+ could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
+ sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
+ by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
+ Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2015-0206][]
+
+ *Matt Caswell*
+
+ * Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
+ built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
+ method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
+ dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3569][]
+
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
+
+ * Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
+ ECDH ciphersuites.
+
+ Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
+ reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3572][]
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
+ violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
+ non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
+ downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
+ certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
+ INRIA or reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2015-0204][]
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
+ An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
+ without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
+ authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
+ which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
+ containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
+ Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
+ this issue.
+ [CVE-2015-0205][]
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
+ SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
+
+ The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX,
+ and can vary with the CTX.
+
+ *Adam Langley*
+
+ * Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+ By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+ certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+ Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+ this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+ certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+ 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+ If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+ the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+ 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+ Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+ certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+ errors for some broken certificates.
+
+ Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+ 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+ Re-encode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+ signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+ This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+ (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+ program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+ (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+ Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+ of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+ [CVE-2014-8275][]
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+ results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+ with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+ way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+ Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+ fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+ Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+ the OpenSSL core team.
+ [CVE-2014-3570][]
*Andy Polyakov*
- * Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target.
+ *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
+ version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
+ version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
+ sanity and breaks all known clients.
- *Marcelo Cerri (IBM)*
+ *David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper*
+
+ *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
+ early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
+ renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+ *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
+ ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
+ the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
+ announced in the initial ServerHello.
+
+ Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
+ was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
+ ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
+
+ *Emilia Käsper*
+
+### Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] ###
+
+ * SRTP Memory Leak.
+
+ A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
+ sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
+ to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
+ exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
+ 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
+ whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
+ have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
- * Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES,
- SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases
- are optimized and there still is room for further improvements.
- Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported.
+ The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
+ [CVE-2014-3513][]
- *Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)*
+ *OpenSSL team*
- * Improved ARMv7 NEON support.
+ * Session Ticket Memory Leak.
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
+ integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
+ ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
+ causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
+ tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
+ attack.
+ [CVE-2014-3567][]
- * Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first
- implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1,
- SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation.
+ *Steve Henson*
- *Andy Polyakov, David Miller*
+ * Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
- * Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a.
- RSAZ.
+ When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
+ could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
+ configured to send them.
+ [CVE-2014-3568][]
- *Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)*
+ *Akamai and the OpenSSL team*
- * Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2,
- BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched"
- implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support
- for TLS encrypt.
+ * Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
+ Client applications doing fallback retries should call
+ SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
+ [CVE-2014-3566][]
- This work was sponsored by Intel Corp.
+ *Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller*
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ * Add additional DigestInfo checks.
- * Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method()
- supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer
- supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only.
+ Re-encode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+ verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
+ DigestInfo structures.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
- * Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
- this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
*Steve Henson*
- * Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
- MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
+### Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] ###
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
+ SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
+ g, A, B < N to SRP code.
- * Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
- existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
- the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
- algorithms and include tests cases.
+ Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
+ Group for discovering this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3512][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
- structure.
+ * A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
+ TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
+ is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
+ downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
+ higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
- *Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
+ researching this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3511][]
- * New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
- difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
+ *David Benjamin*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+ to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+ with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+ ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
- * Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
- received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
- summary of the connection parameters.
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3510][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Emilia Käsper*
- * New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
- of connection parameters.
+ * By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+ to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3507][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Adam Langley*
- * Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
+ * An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+ processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3506][]
- *Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net> and Ben Laurie*
+ *Adam Langley*
- * New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
- from CRLDP extension in certificates.
+ * An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+ whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+ can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+ this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3505][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Adam Langley*
- * New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
+ * If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+ session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+ up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3509][]
- * New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
- of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
+ *Gabor Tyukasz*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
+ dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
+ properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
- * New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve
- X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
+ Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
+ discovering and researching this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-5139][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
- certificates.
+ * A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+ X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+ from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+ output to the attacker.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3508][]
- * Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
- HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
- CRLs using the OCSP API.
+ *Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
- * Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs.
+ *Bodo Moeller*
- *Steve Henson*
+### Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] ###
- * SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application
- configuration using configuration files or command lines.
+ * Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+ handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+ SSL/TLS clients and servers.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+ researching this issue. [CVE-2014-0224][]
- * SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
- message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
- "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
- tracing.
+ *KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+ OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+ in a DoS attack.
- * New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
- Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
+ Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-0221][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Imre Rad, Steve Henson*
- * New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
- OID NID.
+ * Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+ be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+ client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+ code on a vulnerable client or server.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. [CVE-2014-0195][]
- * Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
- client to OpenSSL.
+ *Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+ are subject to a denial of service attack.
- * New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
- of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
- only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
- strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+ this issue. [CVE-2014-3470][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson*
- * New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
- algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
+ * Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+ compilation flags.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>*
- * Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
- by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
- certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
- comparison.
+ * Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+ in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>*
- * If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
- preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
- signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
- use the certificate.
+ * Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>*
- * If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
+### Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] ###
- *Steve Henson*
+ * A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
+ can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
+ server.
- * Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
- possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
- the parent SSL_CTX. Include distinct stores for certificate chain
- verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
- to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returning
- an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
- to test if a chain is correctly configured.
+ Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
+ Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
+ preparing the fix [CVE-2014-0160][]
- Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
- store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
+ *Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller*
+ * Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
- *Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix [CVE-2014-0076][]
- * New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
- mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
- hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
+ *Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
- * New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
- request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
- types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
- supported signature algorithms.
+ Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
+ TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
+ less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
+ is at least 512 bytes long.
- *Steve Henson*
- * Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
+ *Adam Langley, Steve Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+### Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] ###
- * Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
- is required by client or server. An application can decide which
- certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
- supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
- This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
- certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
- certificate and specify the whole chain.
+ * Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
+ handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
+ Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
+ [CVE-2013-4353][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+ structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+ to be resent. [CVE-2013-6450][]
- * Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
- the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
- in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
- to have similar checks in it.
+ *Steve Henson*
- Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
- This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
- certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
- extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
- with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
+ * Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+ avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+ Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+ several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
+ is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+ 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Rob Stradling, Adam Langley*
- * Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
- shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
- and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
- shared signature algorithms.
+### Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013] ###
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
+ supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
- * Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
- for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
- to support them.
+ *Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+### Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013] ###
- * New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
- from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
- it couldn't be removed.
+ * Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
- *Steve Henson*
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
- * Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
- verification. New verify options supporting checking in openssl utility.
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ [CVE-2013-0169][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson*
- * Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
- functions. Add manual page.
+ * Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
+ ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
+ Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
+ and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
+ <wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
+ [CVE-2012-2686][]
- *Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)*
+ *Adam Langley*
- * New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
- certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
- a certificate.
+ * Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. [CVE-2013-0166][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Fix OCSP checking.
+ * Make openssl verify return errors.
- *Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com> and Ben Laurie*
+ *Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie*
- * Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
- OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
- intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
- setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509
- utility) or reject.
+ * Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>*
- * Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
- trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
+ * Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
*Steve Henson*
- * MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE,
- platform support for Linux and Android.
+ * Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
+ if renegotiating.
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ *Steve Henson*
- * Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework.
+### Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] ###
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ * Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
+ 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
- * Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
- When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
- when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
- This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the
- (often lower performance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode.
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ [CVE-2012-2333][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
- PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
- the new parameter format automatically.
+ * Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
*Steve Henson*
- * Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly
- to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters.
+ * In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
+ approved.
*Steve Henson*
- * Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest.
+### Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012] ###
+
+ * OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
+ 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
+ mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
+ SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disabling
+ TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
+ 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
+ OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+ will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
+ inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
+ in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
*Steve Henson*
- * Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled
- the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of
- hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call:
- SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically
- support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters.
+ * In order to ensure interoperability SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
+ disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
+ protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
+ that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
+ above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
+ SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
+ client side.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- * Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use
- static structures instead of allocation if default values are used.
- New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves.
- Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client
- to set list of supported curves.
+### Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012] ###
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
- * New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and
- supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility
- to print out received values.
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ [CVE-2012-2110][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team*
- * Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert
- between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
- ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
+ * Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Adam Langley*
- * Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different
- chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX.
+ * Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
+ record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+
+ 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
+ hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
+ 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
+ the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
+ set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
+ -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
+ Most broken servers should now work.
+ 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
+ TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
*Steve Henson*
- * Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both
- server and client use DH certificates with common parameters.
+ * Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- * Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server
- certificates.
+### Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012] ###
+
+ * Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
+ STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
*Steve Henson*
- * New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of
- the certificate.
- Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info,
- X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and
- X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review.
+ * The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
+ and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
+ OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
+ those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect
+ the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
-### Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] ###
+ *Steve Henson*
- * Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
+ * Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
+ support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
+ encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum permitted
+ client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy
+ and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL.
- *Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte*
+ *Steve Henson*
-### Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] ###
+ * Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
- * Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
- message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
- dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
- Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3571)
+ *Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Add support for SCTP.
- * Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
- dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
- could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
- sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
- by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
- Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2015-0206)
+ *Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>*
- *Matt Caswell*
+ * Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
- * Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
- built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
- method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
- dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3569)
+ *Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>*
- *Kurt Roeckx*
+ * Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably:
- * Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
- ECDH ciphersuites.
+ - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support;
+ - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES);
+ - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation;
+ - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations;
+ - s390x: z196 support;
+ - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations;
- Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
- reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3572)
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup
+ (removal of unnecessary code)
- * Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
- violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
- non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
- downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
- certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
- INRIA or reporting this issue.
- (CVE-2015-0204)
+ *Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705.
- * Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
- An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
- without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
- authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
- which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
- containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
- Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
- this issue.
- (CVE-2015-0205)
+ *Eric Rescorla*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764.
- * Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
- SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
+ *Eric Rescorla*
- The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX,
- and can vary with the CTX.
+ * Add Next Protocol Negotiation,
+ http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be
+ disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated
+ by Google.
- *Adam Langley*
+ *Adam Langley <agl@google.com> and Ben Laurie*
- * Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+ * Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224,
+ NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on
+ typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type `__uint128_t` is
+ required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds).
+ Code made available under Apache License version 2.0.
- By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
- certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
- Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
- this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
- certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+ Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command
+ line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or
+ "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs:
- 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+ EC_GFp_nistp224_method()
+ EC_GFp_nistp256_method()
+ EC_GFp_nistp521_method()
- If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
- the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+ EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
+ EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
+ implementations).
- 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+ *Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)*
- Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
- certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
- errors for some broken certificates.
+ * Use type ossl_ssize_t instead of ssize_t which isn't available on
+ all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
+ header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h
- Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+ *Steve Henson*
- 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+ * New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional
+ signature parameters can be passed using this option and in
+ particular PSS.
- Re-encode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
- signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+ *Steve Henson*
- This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
- (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
- program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
- (negative or with leading zeroes).
+ * Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the
+ appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the
+ corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet.
- Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
- of the OpenSSL core team.
+ *Steve Henson*
- (CVE-2014-8275)
+ * Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines.
+ New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised
+ EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on
+ the appropriate parameters.
*Steve Henson*
- *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
- results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
- with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
- way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
- Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
- fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
- Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
- the OpenSSL core team.
- (CVE-2014-3570)
+ * Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function
+ to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1
+ handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used.
+ Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked
+ against a number of sample certificates.
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ *Steve Henson*
- *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
- version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
- version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
- sanity and breaks all known clients.
+ * Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs.
- *David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper*
+ *Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser <lists@kaiser.cx>*
- *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
- early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
- renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
+ * Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method
+ can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump.
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful
+ information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature
+ parameters r, s.
- *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
- ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
- the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
- reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
- announced in the initial ServerHello.
+ *Steve Henson*
- Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
- was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
- ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
+ * Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing
+ RFC3211.
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ *Steve Henson*
-### Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] ###
+ * Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This
+ neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required
+ for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as
+ password based CMS).
- * SRTP Memory Leak.
+ *Steve Henson*
- A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
- sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
- to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
- exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
- 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
- whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
- have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
+ * Session-handling fixes:
+ - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID,
+ but also support Session Tickets.
+ - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client
+ presented a ticket with an expired session.
+ - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable.
+ - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information.
+ - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets.
- The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
- (CVE-2014-3513)
+ *Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)*
- *OpenSSL team*
+ * Fix PSK session representation.
- * Session Ticket Memory Leak.
+ *Bodo Moeller*
- When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
- integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
- ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
- causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
- tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
- attack.
- (CVE-2014-3567)
+ * Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations.
- *Steve Henson*
+ This work was sponsored by Intel.
- * Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
- could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
- configured to send them.
- (CVE-2014-3568)
+ * Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split
+ the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record)
+ portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and
+ RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to include GCM and
+ add a special AESGCM string for GCM only.
- *Akamai and the OpenSSL team*
+ *Steve Henson*
- * Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
- Client applications doing fallback retries should call
- SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
- (CVE-2014-3566)
+ * Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation
+ field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt.
- *Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller*
+ *Steve Henson*
- * Add additional DigestInfo checks.
+ * Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support.
+ As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for
+ versions of TLS earlier than 1.2.
- Re-encode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
- verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
- DigestInfo structures.
+ *Steve Henson*
- Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
+ * For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method
+ as unset and return the appropriate default but do *not* set the default.
+ This means we can return the appropriate method in applications that
+ switch between FIPS and non-FIPS modes.
+
+ *Steve Henson*
+ * Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an
+ ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we
+ keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed.
*Steve Henson*
-### Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] ###
+ * Add -attime option to openssl utilities.
- * Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
- SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
- g, A, B < N to SRP code.
+ *Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>, Ben Laurie and Steve Henson*
- Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
- Group for discovering this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3512)
+ * Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode.
*Steve Henson*
- * A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
- TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
- is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
- downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
- higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
-
- Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
- researching this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3511)
+ * Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use
+ FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now.
- *David Benjamin*
+ *Steve Henson*
- * OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
- to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
- with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
- ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
+ * New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
- Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
- issue.
- (CVE-2014-3510)
+ *Steve Henson*
- *Emilia Käsper*
+ * Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not
+ all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities.
- * By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
- to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
- Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3507)
+ *Steve Henson*
- *Adam Langley*
+ * Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen,
+ encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods.
- * An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
- processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
- Denial of Service attack.
- Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3506)
+ *Steve Henson*
- *Adam Langley*
+ * Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers.
- * An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
- whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
- can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
- Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
- this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3505)
+ *Steve Henson*
- *Adam Langley*
+ * Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt
+ to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want
+ to use them can use the private_* version instead.
- * If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
- session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
- up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
+ *Steve Henson*
- Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
- issue.
- (CVE-2014-3509)
+ * Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
- *Gabor Tyukasz*
+ *Steve Henson*
- * A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
- dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
- properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
- Denial of Service attack.
+ * Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
- Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
- discovering and researching this issue.
- (CVE-2014-5139)
+ *Steve Henson*
+
+ * Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o
+ for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed.
*Steve Henson*
- * A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
- X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
- from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
- output to the attacker.
+ * Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical
+ order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first.
+ This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength.
- Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
- (CVE-2014-3508)
+ *Steve Henson*
- *Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson*
+ * Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication.
- * Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
- for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
- bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
+ *Steve Henson*
- *Bodo Moeller*
+ * Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers
+ and enable MD5.
-### Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] ###
+ *Steve Henson*
- * Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
- handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
- SSL/TLS clients and servers.
+ * Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying
+ FIPS modules versions.
- Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
- researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
+ *Steve Henson*
- *KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson*
+ * Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache
+ of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use
+ until after the certificate request message is received.
- * Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
- OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
- in a DoS attack.
+ *Steve Henson*
- Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
- (CVE-2014-0221)
+ * Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms
+ extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature
+ format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for
+ TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246.
- *Imre Rad, Steve Henson*
+ *Steve Henson*
- * Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
- be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
- client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
- code on a vulnerable client or server.
+ * Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch
+ to new signature format when needed using client digest preference.
+ All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client
+ support yet and no support for client certificates.
- Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
+ *Steve Henson*
- *Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson*
+ * Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch
+ to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based
+ ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with
+ TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete
+ SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods
+ and version checking.
- * Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
- are subject to a denial of service attack.
+ *Steve Henson*
- Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
- this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
+ * New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled
+ with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal
+ structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application
+ to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
- *Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson*
+ *Steve Henson*
- * Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
- compilation flags.
+ * A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter
+ Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated.
+ *Christophe Renou <christophe.renou@edelweb.fr>, Peter Sylvester
+ <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>, Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu>, and
+ Ben Laurie*
- *mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>*
+ * Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
- * Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
- in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
+ *Steve Henson*
- *mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>*
+ * Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function
+ SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated().
- * Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
+ *Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>*
- *mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>*
+ * Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used
+ automatically instead of needing explicit application support.
-### Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] ###
+ *Steve Henson*
- * A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
- can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
- server.
+ * Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705.
- Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
- Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
- preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
+ *Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>, Steve Henson*
- *Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller*
+ * Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
+ a few changes are required:
- * Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
- ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
- by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
+ Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
+ Add TLSv1_1 methods.
+ Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
+ Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
+ Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
- Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
- flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
+ *Steve Henson*
- *Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger*
+OpenSSL 1.0.0
+-------------
- * TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+### Changes between 1.0.0s and 1.0.0t [3 Dec 2015] ###
- Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
- TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
- less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
- is at least 512 bytes long.
+ * X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
+ When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
+ memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
+ application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
+ affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
- *Adam Langley, Steve Henson*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ [CVE-2015-3195][]
-### Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] ###
+ *Stephen Henson*
- * Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
- handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
- Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
- (CVE-2013-4353)
+ * Race condition handling PSK identify hint
- * Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
- structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
- to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
+ If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
+ the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
+ result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
+ identify hint data.
+ [CVE-2015-3196][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Stephen Henson*
- * Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
- avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
- Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
- several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
- is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
- 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
+### Changes between 1.0.0r and 1.0.0s [11 Jun 2015] ###
- *Rob Stradling, Adam Langley*
+ * Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop
-### Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013] ###
+ When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop
+ if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial
+ field.
- * Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
- supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
+ This can be used to perform denial of service against any
+ system which processes public keys, certificate requests or
+ certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with
+ client authentication enabled.
- *Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton.
+ [CVE-2015-1788][]
-### Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013] ###
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- * Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
+ * Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time
- This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
- Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
- at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
+ X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME
+ string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition,
+ X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the
+ time string.
- Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
- Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
- (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
- Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
- (CVE-2013-0169)
+ An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of
+ various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in
+ a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients
+ that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client
+ authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification
+ callbacks.
- *Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
+ independently by Hanno Böck.
+ [CVE-2015-1789][]
- * Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
- ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
- Thanks go to and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for discovering
- and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
- <wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com> for independently discovering this issue.
- (CVE-2012-2686)
+ *Emilia Käsper*
- *Adam Langley*
+ * PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
- * Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
- This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs
+ with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7
+ structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and
+ servers are not affected.
- * Make openssl verify return errors.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ [CVE-2015-1790][]
- *Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com> and Ben Laurie*
+ *Emilia Käsper*
- * Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
- the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
- so it returns the certificate actually sent.
- See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ * CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
- *Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>*
+ When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop
+ if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform
+ denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using
+ the CMS code.
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer.
+ [CVE-2015-1792][]
- * Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
+ *Stephen Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Race condition handling NewSessionTicket
- * Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
- if renegotiating.
+ If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to
+ reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to
+ a double free of the ticket data.
+ [CVE-2015-1791][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Matt Caswell*
-### Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] ###
+### Changes between 1.0.0q and 1.0.0r [19 Mar 2015] ###
- * Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
- 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack.
+ * Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
+
+ The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is
+ made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check
+ certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any
+ certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any
+ application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including
+ OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication.
+ [CVE-2015-0286][]
- Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
- fuzzing as a service testing platform.
- (CVE-2012-2333)
+ *Stephen Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix
- * Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
- Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
+ Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause
+ memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been
+ strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY
+ components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related
+ functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are
+ not affected.
+ [CVE-2015-0287][]
- * In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
- approved.
+ *Stephen Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix
-### Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012] ###
+ The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo
+ correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with
+ missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing.
- * OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
- 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
- mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
- SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disabling
- TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
- 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
- OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
- will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
- inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
- in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
+ Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or
+ otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are
+ affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected.
- *Steve Henson*
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
+ [CVE-2015-0289][]
- * In order to ensure interoperability SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
- disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
- protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
- that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
- above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
- SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
- client side.
+ *Emilia Käsper*
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ * DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
-### Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012] ###
+ A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in
+ servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
+ a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
- * Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
- BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
- in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
+ This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
+ (OpenSSL development team).
+ [CVE-2015-0293][]
- Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
- issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
- (CVE-2012-2110)
+ *Emilia Käsper*
- *Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team*
+ * Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
- * Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
+ A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function
+ could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double
+ free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey
+ or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption
+ for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted
+ sources. This scenario is considered rare.
- *Adam Langley*
+ This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their
+ commit 517073cd4b.
+ [CVE-2015-0209][]
- * Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
- record length exceeds 255 bytes.
+ *Matt Caswell*
- 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
- hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
- 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
- the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
- set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
- -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
- Most broken servers should now work.
- 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
- TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
+ * X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix
- *Steve Henson*
+ The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if
+ the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice.
- * Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
+ This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter.
+ [CVE-2015-0288][]
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ *Stephen Henson*
-### Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012] ###
+ * Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers
- * Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET
- STRING form instead of a DigestInfo.
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
- *Steve Henson*
+### Changes between 1.0.0p and 1.0.0q [15 Jan 2015] ###
- * The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP
- and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when
- OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular
- those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect
- the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work.
+ * Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte*
- * Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate
- support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA
- encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum permitted
- client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy
- and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL.
+### Changes between 1.0.0o and 1.0.0p [8 Jan 2015] ###
+
+ * Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS
+ message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer
+ dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to
+ Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3571][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats.
+ * Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the
+ dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this
+ could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same
+ sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited
+ by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion.
+ Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2015-0206][]
- *Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>*
+ *Matt Caswell*
- * Add support for SCTP.
+ * Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is
+ built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl
+ method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer
+ dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3569][]
- *Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>*
+ *Kurt Roeckx*
- * Improved PRNG seeding for VOS.
+ * Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
+ ECDH ciphersuites.
- *Paul Green <Paul.Green@stratus.com>*
+ Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
+ reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3572][]
- * Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably:
+ *Steve Henson*
- - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support;
- - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES);
- - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation;
- - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations;
- - s390x: z196 support;
- - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations;
+ * Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
+ violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
+ non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
+ downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
+ certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
+ INRIA or reporting this issue.
+ [CVE-2015-0204][]
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ *Steve Henson*
- * Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup
- (removal of unnecessary code)
+ * Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification.
+ An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication
+ without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to
+ authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers
+ which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates
+ containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered.
+ Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting
+ this issue.
+ [CVE-2015-0205][]
- *Peter Sylvester <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>*
+ *Steve Henson*
- * Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705.
+ *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect
+ results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random
+ with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any
+ way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter
+ Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial
+ fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and
+ Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of
+ the OpenSSL core team.
+ [CVE-2014-3570][]
- *Eric Rescorla*
+ *Andy Polyakov*
- * Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764.
+ * Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
- *Eric Rescorla*
+ By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+ certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+ Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+ this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+ certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
- * Add Next Protocol Negotiation,
- http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be
- disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated
- by Google.
+ 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
- *Adam Langley <agl@google.com> and Ben Laurie*
+ If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+ the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
- * Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224,
- NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on
- typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is
- required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds).
- Code made available under Apache License version 2.0.
+ 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
- Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command
- line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or
- "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs:
+ Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+ certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+ errors for some broken certificates.
- EC_GFp_nistp224_method()
- EC_GFp_nistp256_method()
- EC_GFp_nistp521_method()
+ Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
- EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
- EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
- implementations).
+ 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
- *Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)*
+ Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+ signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
- * Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
- all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
- header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h
+ This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+ (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+ program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+ (negative or with leading zeroes).
- *Steve Henson*
+ Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+ of the OpenSSL core team.
- * New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional
- signature parameters can be passed using this option and in
- particular PSS.
+ [CVE-2014-8275][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the
- appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the
- corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet.
+### Changes between 1.0.0n and 1.0.0o [15 Oct 2014] ###
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Session Ticket Memory Leak.
- * Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines.
- New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised
- EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on
- the appropriate parameters.
+ When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
+ integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
+ ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
+ causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
+ tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
+ attack.
+ [CVE-2014-3567][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function
- to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1
- handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used.
- Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked
- against a number of sample certificates.
+ * Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
- *Steve Henson*
+ When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
+ could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
+ configured to send them.
+ [CVE-2014-3568][]
- * Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs.
+ *Akamai and the OpenSSL team*
+
+ * Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
+ Client applications doing fallback retries should call
+ SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
+ [CVE-2014-3566][]
- *Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser <lists@kaiser.cx>*
+ *Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller*
- * Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method
- can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump.
+ * Add additional DigestInfo checks.
- More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful
- information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature
- parameters r, s.
+ Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
+ verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
+ DigestInfo structures.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
- * Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing
- RFC3211.
*Steve Henson*
- * Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This
- neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required
- for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as
- password based CMS).
+### Changes between 1.0.0m and 1.0.0n [6 Aug 2014] ###
- *Steve Henson*
+ * OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
+ to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
+ with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
+ ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
- * Session-handling fixes:
- - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID,
- but also support Session Tickets.
- - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client
- presented a ticket with an expired session.
- - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable.
- - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information.
- - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets.
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3510][]
- *Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)*
+ *Emilia Käsper*
- * Fix PSK session representation.
+ * By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
+ to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3507][]
- *Bodo Moeller*
+ *Adam Langley*
- * Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations.
+ * An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
+ processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
+ Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3506][]
- This work was sponsored by Intel.
+ *Adam Langley*
- *Andy Polyakov*
+ * An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
+ whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
+ can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
+ Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
+ this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3505][]
- * Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split
- the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record)
- portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and
- RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to include GCM and
- add a special AESGCM string for GCM only.
+ *Adam Langley*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
+ session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
+ up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
- * Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation
- field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt.
+ Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
+ issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3509][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Gabor Tyukasz*
- * Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support.
- As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for
- versions of TLS earlier than 1.2.
+ * A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
+ X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
+ from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
+ output to the attacker.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-3508][]
- * For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method
- as unset and return the appropriate default but do *not* set the default.
- This means we can return the appropriate method in applications that
- switch between FIPS and non-FIPS modes.
+ *Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
+ for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
+ bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
- * Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an
- ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we
- keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed.
+ *Bodo Moeller*
- *Steve Henson*
+### Changes between 1.0.0l and 1.0.0m [5 Jun 2014] ###
- * Add -attime option to openssl utilities.
+ * Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
+ handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
+ SSL/TLS clients and servers.
- *Peter Eckersley <pde@eff.org>, Ben Laurie and Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
+ researching this issue. [CVE-2014-0224][]
- * Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode.
+ *KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
+ OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
+ in a DoS attack.
- * Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use
- FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now.
+ Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
+ [CVE-2014-0221][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Imre Rad, Steve Henson*
- * New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code.
+ * Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
+ be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
+ client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
+ code on a vulnerable client or server.
- *Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. [CVE-2014-0195][]
- * Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not
- all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities.
+ *Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson*
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
+ are subject to a denial of service attack.
- * Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen,
- encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods.
+ Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
+ this issue. [CVE-2014-3470][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson*
- * Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers.
+ * Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
+ compilation flags.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>*
- * Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt
- to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want
- to use them can use the private_* version instead.
+ * Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
+ in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>*
- * Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
+ * Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
- *Steve Henson*
+ *mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>*
- * Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds.
+ * Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
+ ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
+ by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
+ http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
- *Steve Henson*
+ Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
+ flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix [CVE-2014-0076][]
- * Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o
- for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed.
+ *Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger*
- *Steve Henson*
+### Changes between 1.0.0k and 1.0.0l [6 Jan 2014] ###
- * Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical
- order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first.
- This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength.
+ * Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
+ structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
+ to be resent. [CVE-2013-6450][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication.
-
- *Steve Henson*
+ * Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
+ avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
+ Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
+ several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
+ is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
+ 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
- * Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers
- and enable MD5.
+ *Rob Stradling, Adam Langley*
- *Steve Henson*
+### Changes between 1.0.0j and 1.0.0k [5 Feb 2013] ###
- * Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying
- FIPS modules versions.
+ * Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
- *Steve Henson*
+ This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
+ Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
+ at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
- * Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache
- of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use
- until after the certificate request message is received.
+ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
+ Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
+ (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
+ Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
+ [CVE-2013-0169][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson*
- * Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms
- extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature
- format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for
- TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246.
+ * Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
+ This fixes a DoS attack. [CVE-2013-0166][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch
- to new signature format when needed using client digest preference.
- All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client
- support yet and no support for client certificates.
+ * Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
+ the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
+ so it returns the certificate actually sent.
+ See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
+ (This is a backport)
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Rob Stradling <rob.stradling@comodo.com>*
- * Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch
- to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based
- ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with
- TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete
- SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods
- and version checking.
+ * Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
*Steve Henson*
- * New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled
- with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal
- structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application
- to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined.
+### Changes between 1.0.0i and 1.0.0j [10 May 2012] ###
- *Steve Henson*
+[NB: OpenSSL 1.0.0i and later 1.0.0 patch levels were released after
+OpenSSL 1.0.1.]
- * A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter
- Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated.
- *Christophe Renou <christophe.renou@edelweb.fr>, Peter Sylvester
- <peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr>, Tom Wu <tjw@cs.stanford.edu>, and
- Ben Laurie*
+ * Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS
+ to fix DoS attack.
- * Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id.
+ Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
+ fuzzing as a service testing platform.
+ [CVE-2012-2333][]
*Steve Henson*
- * Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function
- SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated().
-
- *Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>*
-
- * Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used
- automatically instead of needing explicit application support.
+ * Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
+ Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
*Steve Henson*
- * Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705.
-
- *Robin Seggelmann <seggelmann@fh-muenster.de>, Steve Henson*
+### Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.0i [19 Apr 2012] ###
- * Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only
- a few changes are required:
+ * Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
+ BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
+ in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
- Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag.
- Add TLSv1_1 methods.
- Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1.
- Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code).
- Add command line options to s_client/s_server.
+ Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
+ issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
+ [CVE-2012-2110][]
- *Steve Henson*
+ *Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team*
### Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] ###
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where
an MMA defence is not necessary.
Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com> for discovering
- this issue. (CVE-2012-0884)
+ this issue. [CVE-2012-0884][]
*Steve Henson*
* Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109.
Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and
Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and
- preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050)
+ preparing a fix. [CVE-2012-0050][]
*Antonio Martin*
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann
<seggelmann@fh-muenster.de> and Michael Tuexen <tuexen@fh-muenster.de>
- for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108)
+ for preparing the fix. [CVE-2011-4108][]
*Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen*
* Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records.
- (CVE-2011-4576)
+ [CVE-2011-4576][]
*Adam Langley (Google)*
* Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George
Kadianakis <desnacked@gmail.com> for discovering this issue and
- Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619)
+ Adam Langley for preparing the fix. [CVE-2011-4619][]
*Adam Langley (Google)*
- * Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027)
+ * Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. [CVE-2012-0027][]
*Andrey Kulikov <amdeich@gmail.com>*
* Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure.
Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw
- and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577)
+ and Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net> for fixing it. [CVE-2011-4577][]
*Rob Austein <sra@hactrn.net>*
### Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011] ###
* Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted
- by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207)
+ by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. [CVE-2011-3207][]
*Kaspar Brand <ossl@velox.ch>*
* Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular
- for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210)
+ for multi-threaded use of ECDH. [CVE-2011-3210][]
*Adam Langley (Google)*
### Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010] ###
* Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover
- (CVE-2010-1633)
+ [CVE-2010-1633][]
*Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager <hager@dortmund.net>*
*NTT*
+OpenSSL 0.9.x
+-------------
+
### Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010] ###
* When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never
- OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits,
the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when
receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload
- protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740)
+ protection is active. [CVE-2010-0740][]
*Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>*
### Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010] ###
- * Always check bn_wexpand() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245)
+ * Always check bn_wexpand() return values for failure. [CVE-2009-3245][]
*Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta*
left. Additionally every future message was buffered, even if the
sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake.
So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be
- buffered. (CVE-2009-1378)
+ buffered. [CVE-2009-1378][]
*Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz*
a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no
memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to determine
the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries.
- (CVE-2009-1377)
+ [CVE-2009-1377][]
*Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz*
* Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the
- parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379)
+ parent structure is freed. [CVE-2009-1379][]
*Daniel Mentz*
### Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009] ###
* Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security
- problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all
+ problem [CVE-2009-3555][] at the cost of breaking all
renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting
SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at
run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what
* Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by
underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in
- zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789)
+ zeroing past the valid field. [CVE-2009-0789][]
*Paolo Ganci <Paolo.Ganci@AdNovum.CH>*
* Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not
checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to
- appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591)
+ appear to verify correctly. [CVE-2009-0591][]
*Ivan Nestlerode <inestlerode@us.ibm.com>*
* Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This
prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have
- a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590)
+ a legal length. [CVE-2009-0590][]
*Steve Henson*
### Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009] ###
* Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values
- (CVE-2008-5077).
+ [CVE-2008-5077][].
*Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team*
### Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008] ###
* Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received
- ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386).
+ ChangeCipherSpec as first record [CVE-2009-1386][].
*PR #1679*
* Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS
handshake which could lead to a client crash as found using the
- Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672)
+ Codenomicon TLS test suite [CVE-2008-1672][]
*Steve Henson, Mark Cox*
* Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to
- a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891)
+ a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite [CVE-2008-0891][]
*Joe Orton*
anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code
backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements,
namely BN_from_montgomery_word. (To enable this otherwise,
- e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".)
+ e.g. x86_64, try `-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD`.)
*Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)*
* Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was
not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow
- (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie]
+ [CVE-2007-5135][] [Ben Laurie]
### Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007] ###
### Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006] ###
* Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
- cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940)
+ cause a denial of service. [CVE-2006-2940][]
*Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller*
* Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
- in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
+ in a denial of service. [CVE-2006-2937][] [Steve Henson]
* Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
- (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+ [CVE-2006-3738][] [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
* Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
- malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343)
+ malicious SSLv2 server. [CVE-2006-4343][]
*Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team*
### Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006] ###
* Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
- (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+ [CVE-2006-4339][] [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
* Add AES IGE and biIGE modes.
*Steve Henson*
* Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use
- "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32
+ "zlib1.dll" and use the default `__cdecl` calling convention on Win32
to conform with the standards mentioned here:
http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt
Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include
(part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
- idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
+ idea. [CVE-2005-2969][]
*Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
### Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006] ###
* Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to
- cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940)
+ cause a denial of service. [CVE-2006-2940][]
*Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller*
* Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result
- in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
+ in a denial of service. [CVE-2006-2937][] [Steve Henson]
* Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function.
- (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
+ [CVE-2006-3738][] [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
* Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a
- malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343)
+ malicious SSLv2 server. [CVE-2006-4343][]
*Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team*
### Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006] ###
* Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
- (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+ [CVE-2006-4339][] [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
* Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
(part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the
countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version
rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad
- idea. (CVE-2005-2969)
+ idea. [CVE-2005-2969][]
*Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center
for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial
### Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004] ###
* Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool [CVE-2004-0079][]
*Joe Orton, Steve Henson*
* Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites
- (CVE-2004-0112)
+ [CVE-2004-0112][]
*Joe Orton, Steve Henson*
Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with
invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544).
- Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545).
+ Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid [CVE-2003-0545][].
If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check
certificate signature with the NULL public key.
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. [CVE-2003-0078][]
*Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
- (CVE-2002-0657)
+ [CVE-2002-0657][]
*Ben Laurie (CHATS)*
* New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or
read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output
- parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet:
+ parsed, outputted or printed in text form. Not complete yet:
still needs to check the OCSP response validity.
*Steve Henson*
### Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004] ###
* Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed
- by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079)
+ by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool [CVE-2004-0079][]
*Joe Orton, Steve Henson*
* Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite:
Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with
- certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851)
+ certain ASN.1 tags [CVE-2003-0851][]
*Steve Henson*
via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect
block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure
against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish
- between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078)
+ between bad padding and a MAC verification error. [CVE-2003-0078][]
*Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL),
Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and
* Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear
negative or the content length exceeds the length of the
- supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659)
+ supplied buffer. [CVE-2002-0659][]
*Steve Henson, Adi Stav <stav@mercury.co.il>, James Yonan <jim@ntlp.com>*
*Ben Laurie (CHATS)*
* Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were
- too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655)
+ too small for 64 bit platforms. [CVE-2002-0655][]
*Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
* Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656)
+ supply an oversized session ID to a client. [CVE-2002-0656][]
- [Ben Laurie (CHATS)*
+ *Ben Laurie (CHATS)*
* Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could
- supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656)
+ supply an oversized client master key. [CVE-2002-0656][]
*Ben Laurie (CHATS)*
messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us
strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS.
- [Bodo Moeller*
+ *Bodo Moeller*
* Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear()
never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within
*Andy Polyakov*
* Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set
- specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being
+ specifically for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being
used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was
ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of
the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced
as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface.
NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file,
which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same
- arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the
+ arguments as the old CONF_* functions with the exception of the
first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'.
- To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions,
+ To make it easier to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions,
the function CONF_set_default_method is provided.
*Richard Levitte*
than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to
read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions
aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of
- translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded
+ translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code embedded
in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which
have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all
on one line (which resulted in some large lines...).
* Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and
other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the
- Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure
+ Configure script every time: One now can use ``perl Configure
<id>:<details>'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended
to them (separated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static
pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key <id> with value
bytes sent in the client random.
*Edward Bishop <ebishop@spyglass.com>*
+
+
+<!-- Links -->
+
+[CVE-2019-1563]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2019-1563
+[CVE-2019-1559]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2019-1559
+[CVE-2019-1552]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2019-1552
+[CVE-2019-1551]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2019-1551
+[CVE-2019-1549]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2019-1549
+[CVE-2019-1547]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2019-1547
+[CVE-2019-1543]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2019-1543
+[CVE-2018-5407]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2018-5407
+[CVE-2018-0739]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2018-0739
+[CVE-2018-0737]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2018-0737
+[CVE-2018-0735]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2018-0735
+[CVE-2018-0734]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2018-0734
+[CVE-2018-0733]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2018-0733
+[CVE-2018-0732]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2018-0732
+[CVE-2017-3738]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2017-3738
+[CVE-2017-3737]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2017-3737
+[CVE-2017-3736]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2017-3736
+[CVE-2017-3735]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2017-3735
+[CVE-2017-3733]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2017-3733
+[CVE-2017-3732]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2017-3732
+[CVE-2017-3731]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2017-3731
+[CVE-2017-3730]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2017-3730
+[CVE-2016-7055]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-7055
+[CVE-2016-7054]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-7054
+[CVE-2016-7053]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-7053
+[CVE-2016-7052]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-7052
+[CVE-2016-6309]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-6309
+[CVE-2016-6308]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-6308
+[CVE-2016-6307]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-6307
+[CVE-2016-6306]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-6306
+[CVE-2016-6305]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-6305
+[CVE-2016-6304]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-6304
+[CVE-2016-6303]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-6303
+[CVE-2016-6302]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-6302
+[CVE-2016-2183]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2183
+[CVE-2016-2182]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2182
+[CVE-2016-2181]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2181
+[CVE-2016-2180]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2180
+[CVE-2016-2179]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2179
+[CVE-2016-2178]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2178
+[CVE-2016-2177]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2177
+[CVE-2016-2176]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2176
+[CVE-2016-2109]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2109
+[CVE-2016-2107]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2107
+[CVE-2016-2106]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2106
+[CVE-2016-2105]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-2105
+[CVE-2016-0800]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-0800
+[CVE-2016-0799]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-0799
+[CVE-2016-0798]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-0798
+[CVE-2016-0797]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-0797
+[CVE-2016-0705]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-0705
+[CVE-2016-0702]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-0702
+[CVE-2016-0701]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2016-0701
+[CVE-2015-3197]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-3197
+[CVE-2015-3196]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-3196
+[CVE-2015-3195]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-3195
+[CVE-2015-3194]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-3194
+[CVE-2015-3193]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-3193
+[CVE-2015-1793]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-1793
+[CVE-2015-1792]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-1792
+[CVE-2015-1791]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-1791
+[CVE-2015-1790]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-1790
+[CVE-2015-1789]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-1789
+[CVE-2015-1788]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-1788
+[CVE-2015-1787]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-1787
+[CVE-2015-0293]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0293
+[CVE-2015-0291]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0291
+[CVE-2015-0290]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0290
+[CVE-2015-0289]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0289
+[CVE-2015-0288]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0288
+[CVE-2015-0287]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0287
+[CVE-2015-0286]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0286
+[CVE-2015-0285]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0285
+[CVE-2015-0209]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0209
+[CVE-2015-0208]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0208
+[CVE-2015-0207]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0207
+[CVE-2015-0206]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0206
+[CVE-2015-0205]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0205
+[CVE-2015-0204]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2015-0204
+[CVE-2014-8275]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-8275
+[CVE-2014-5139]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-5139
+[CVE-2014-3572]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3572
+[CVE-2014-3571]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3571
+[CVE-2014-3570]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3570
+[CVE-2014-3569]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3569
+[CVE-2014-3568]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3568
+[CVE-2014-3567]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3567
+[CVE-2014-3566]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3566
+[CVE-2014-3513]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3513
+[CVE-2014-3512]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3512
+[CVE-2014-3511]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3511
+[CVE-2014-3510]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3510
+[CVE-2014-3509]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3509
+[CVE-2014-3508]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3508
+[CVE-2014-3507]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3507
+[CVE-2014-3506]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3506
+[CVE-2014-3505]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3505
+[CVE-2014-3470]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-3470
+[CVE-2014-0224]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-0224
+[CVE-2014-0221]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-0221
+[CVE-2014-0195]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-0195
+[CVE-2014-0160]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-0160
+[CVE-2014-0076]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2014-0076
+[CVE-2013-6450]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2013-6450
+[CVE-2013-4353]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2013-4353
+[CVE-2013-0169]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2013-0169
+[CVE-2013-0166]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2013-0166
+[CVE-2012-2686]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2012-2686
+[CVE-2012-2333]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2012-2333
+[CVE-2012-2110]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2012-2110
+[CVE-2012-0884]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2012-0884
+[CVE-2012-0050]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2012-0050
+[CVE-2012-0027]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2012-0027
+[CVE-2011-4619]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2011-4619
+[CVE-2011-4577]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2011-4577
+[CVE-2011-4576]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2011-4576
+[CVE-2011-4109]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2011-4109
+[CVE-2011-4108]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2011-4108
+[CVE-2011-3210]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2011-3210
+[CVE-2011-3207]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2011-3207
+[CVE-2011-0014]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2011-0014
+[CVE-2010-4252]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2010-4252
+[CVE-2010-4180]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2010-4180
+[CVE-2010-3864]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2010-3864
+[CVE-2010-1633]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2010-1633
+[CVE-2010-0740]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2010-0740
+[CVE-2010-0433]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2010-0433
+[CVE-2009-4355]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-4355
+[CVE-2009-3555]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-3555
+[CVE-2009-3245]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-3245
+[CVE-2009-1386]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-1386
+[CVE-2009-1379]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-1379
+[CVE-2009-1378]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-1378
+[CVE-2009-1377]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-1377
+[CVE-2009-0789]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-0789
+[CVE-2009-0591]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-0591
+[CVE-2009-0590]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2009-0590
+[CVE-2008-5077]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2008-5077
+[CVE-2008-1678]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2008-1678
+[CVE-2008-1672]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2008-1672
+[CVE-2008-0891]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2008-0891
+[CVE-2007-5135]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2007-5135
+[CVE-2007-4995]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2007-4995
+[CVE-2006-4343]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2006-4343
+[CVE-2006-4339]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2006-4339
+[CVE-2006-3738]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2006-3738
+[CVE-2006-2940]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2006-2940
+[CVE-2006-2937]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2006-2937
+[CVE-2005-2969]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2005-2969
+[CVE-2004-0112]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2004-0112
+[CVE-2004-0079]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2004-0079
+[CVE-2003-0851]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2003-0851
+[CVE-2003-0545]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2003-0545
+[CVE-2003-0544]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2003-0544
+[CVE-2003-0543]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2003-0543
+[CVE-2003-0078]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2003-0078
+[CVE-2002-0659]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2002-0659
+[CVE-2002-0657]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2002-0657
+[CVE-2002-0656]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2002-0656
+[CVE-2002-0655]: https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#CVE-2002-0655
projects / openssl.git / commitdiff