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Improve 386 portability of aes-586.pl.
author
Andy Polyakov
<appro@openssl.org>
Mon, 18 Sep 2006 19:13:15 +0000
(19:13 +0000)
committer
Andy Polyakov
<appro@openssl.org>
Mon, 18 Sep 2006 19:13:15 +0000
(19:13 +0000)
crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
patch
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diff --git
a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
index 7b75685025410170315bf13fadcbf4444f6d08eb..8b27e4c65cd429bafe817f5bb5f426263761dfce 100755
(executable)
--- a/
crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
+++ b/
crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
@@
-117,8
+117,9
@@
#
# Version 4.3 implements switch between compact and non-compact block
# functions in AES_cbc_encrypt depending on how much data was asked
#
# Version 4.3 implements switch between compact and non-compact block
# functions in AES_cbc_encrypt depending on how much data was asked
-# to
process
in one stroke.
+# to
be processed
in one stroke.
#
#
+######################################################################
# Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when
# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects
# timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when
# Timing attacks are classified in two classes: synchronous when
# attacker consciously initiates cryptographic operation and collects
# timing data of various character afterwards, and asynchronous when
@@
-141,7
+142,7
@@
# timing. But note that *if* plain-text was concealed in such way that
# input to block function is distributed *uniformly*, then attack
# wouldn't apply. Now note that some encryption modes, most notably
# timing. But note that *if* plain-text was concealed in such way that
# input to block function is distributed *uniformly*, then attack
# wouldn't apply. Now note that some encryption modes, most notably
-# CBC, do mask
s
the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output
+# CBC, do mask the plain-text in this exact way [secure cipher output
# is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that
# would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of
# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key
# is distributed uniformly]. Yes, one still might find input that
# would reveal the information about given key, but if amount of
# candidate inputs to be tried is larger than amount of possible key
@@
-2459,7
+2460,7
@@
my $mark=&DWP(76+240,"esp"); # copy of aes_key->rounds
&pushf (); # kludge, never executed
&set_label("slow_enc_tail",16);
&pushf (); # kludge, never executed
&set_label("slow_enc_tail",16);
- &emms ();
+ &emms ()
if (!$x86only)
;
&mov ($key eq "edi"? $key:"",$s3); # load out to edi
&mov ($s1,16);
&sub ($s1,$s2);
&mov ($key eq "edi"? $key:"",$s3); # load out to edi
&mov ($s1,16);
&sub ($s1,$s2);