Update DTLS code to match CBC decoding in TLS.

This change updates the DTLS code to match the constant-time CBC
behaviour in the TLS.
(cherry picked from commit 9f27de170d1b7bef3d46d41382dc4dafde8b3900)

diff --git a/ssl/d1_enc.c b/ssl/d1_enc.c
index da42348b3df2f50677f23f52558abc676b110f0f..712c4647f24cb072beddda21a79d993f583a100d 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_enc.c
@@ -126,6 +126,14 @@
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
 
+/* dtls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured. */
 int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
        {
        SSL3_RECORD *rec;
@@ -165,8 +173,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
                        {
                        mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-                       if (mac_size < 0)
-                               return -1;
+                       OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
                        }
                ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
                rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -231,7 +238,7 @@ int dtls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                if (!send)
                        {
                        if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                               return -1;
+                               return 0;
                        }
                
                EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);

diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 4763d5cd1f9398f42646f16a89c061095c0c9187..02c881ab3176c849c800b013f73a1f061aa641d9 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -376,15 +376,11 @@ static int
 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 {
        int i,al;
-       int clear=0;
        int enc_err;
        SSL_SESSION *sess;
        SSL3_RECORD *rr;
        unsigned int mac_size;
        unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-       int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
-       unsigned char *mac = NULL;
-
 
        rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
        sess = s->session;
@@ -417,12 +413,16 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
        rr->orig_len=rr->length;
 
        enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
-       if (enc_err <= 0)
+       /* enc_err is:
+        *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+        *    1: if the padding is valid
+        *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
+       if (enc_err == 0)
                {
-               /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
-                * perform all computations before discarding the message.
-                */
-               decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+               /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+               rr->length = 0;
+               s->packet_length = 0;
+               goto err;
                }
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -432,45 +432,59 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
        /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-       if (    (sess == NULL) ||
-               (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-               (s->read_hash == NULL))
-               clear=1;
-
-       if (!clear)
+       if ((sess != NULL) &&
+           (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+           (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
                {
-               /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
-               int t;
-               t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
-               OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
-               mac_size=t;
-
-               if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+               /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+               unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+               unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+               mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+               OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+               /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+                * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+                * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
+                * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+                */
+               if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+                   /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+                   (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+                    rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
                        {
-#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
-                       al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+                       al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                        goto f_err;
-#else
-                       decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
-#endif                 
                        }
-               /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-               if (rr->length >= mac_size)
+
+               if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
                        {
+                       /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
+                        * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
+                        * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
+                        * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
+                        * */
+                       mac = mac_tmp;
+                       ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
                        rr->length -= mac_size;
-                       mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                        }
                else
-                       rr->length = 0;
-               i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-               if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md,mac,mac_size) != 0)
                        {
-                       decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+                       /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
+                        * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
+                        * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
+                       rr->length -= mac_size;
+                       mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
                        }
+
+               i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
+               if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+                       enc_err = -1;
+               if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
+                       enc_err = -1;
                }
 
-       if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+       if (enc_err < 0)
                {
                /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
                rr->length = 0;

diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 98f38949549785b66949ebe4335300f1503dbbb7..0282ef4620d0af01d09ff7307b276917b6e976fa 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -552,11 +552,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                if (!send)
                        {
                        if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                               {
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-                               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                                return 0;
-                               }
                        /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
                        }
                

diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 3e60f5018c41c3e11fdb6298dcc68235f6c85eaf..032a8558ed1765c90363810eab8f4511739d7a87 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -291,7 +291,6 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
        unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
        short version;
        unsigned mac_size;
-       int clear=0;
        size_t extra;
 
        rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
@@ -410,8 +409,9 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
         *    -1: if the padding is invalid */
        if (enc_err == 0)
                {
-               /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
-               goto err;
+               al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+               goto f_err;
                }
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -421,14 +421,11 @@ printf("\n");
 #endif
 
        /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-       if (    (sess == NULL) ||
-               (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
-               (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
-               clear=1;
-
-       if (!clear)
+       if ((sess != NULL) &&
+           (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+           (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
                {
-               /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+               /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
                unsigned char *mac = NULL;
                unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
                mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);

diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 4b31742783d6d60308d8c52281b06bf9e5a6768b..c7759ebf14d47d1e9be3d1c44eadee8156b81854 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -849,11 +849,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                if (!send)
                        {
                        if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-                               {
-                               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-                               ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                                return 0;
-                               }
                        }
                
                i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);