Drop cached certificate signature validity flag
authorViktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
Sun, 17 Jan 2016 07:33:14 +0000 (02:33 -0500)
committerViktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
Mon, 18 Jan 2016 18:20:48 +0000 (13:20 -0500)
It seems risky in the context of cross-signed certificates when the
same certificate might have multiple potential issuers.  Also rarely
used, since chains in OpenSSL typically only employ self-signed
trust-anchors, whose self-signatures are not checked, while untrusted
certificates are generally ephemeral.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
crypto/x509/x_x509.c

index 5997a21..c11d3b3 100644 (file)
@@ -192,7 +192,6 @@ struct x509_st {
     X509_CINF cert_info;
     X509_ALGOR sig_alg;
     ASN1_BIT_STRING signature;
-    int valid;
     int references;
     char *name;
     CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
index 48d9367..ec9c321 100644 (file)
@@ -1618,9 +1618,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
          * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
          * time.
          */
-        if (!xs->valid
-            && (xs != xi
-                || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
+        if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
             if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
                 ctx->current_cert = xi;
@@ -1636,8 +1634,6 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
             }
         }
 
-        xs->valid = 1;
-
  check_cert:
         ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
         if (!ok)
index 4733321..53a5eb7 100644 (file)
@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
     switch (operation) {
 
     case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST:
-        ret->valid = 0;
         ret->name = NULL;
         ret->ex_flags = 0;
         ret->ex_pathlen = -1;