X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ftls13_enc.c;h=93118661d66d5db8cb66c6efd8555e898e106a41;hp=449e6f9f36baff6cf8d01c7b8a3ade24fded0e2f;hb=6738bf1417289a14758590fca5a26b62c9b2c0be;hpb=049043127209a4a1846a1c0fcc56eff601c41be2 diff --git a/ssl/tls13_enc.c b/ssl/tls13_enc.c index 449e6f9f36..93118661d6 100644 --- a/ssl/tls13_enc.c +++ b/ssl/tls13_enc.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include @@ -18,18 +19,17 @@ static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; /* - * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and a |hash| of the - * handshake messages, derive a new secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in - * the location pointed to be |out|. The |hash| value may be NULL. Returns 1 on - * success 0 on failure. + * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length + * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new + * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|. + * The |data| value may be zero length. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. */ -int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, +int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen, - const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { - const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "TLS 1.3, "; - const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 "; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL); int ret; size_t hkdflabellen; @@ -54,10 +54,13 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label_prefix, sizeof(label_prefix) - 1) || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, labellen) || !WPACKET_close(&pkt) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, hash, (hash == NULL) ? 0 : hashlen) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, data, (data == NULL) ? 0 : datalen) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &hkdflabellen) || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) { + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -71,6 +74,10 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + if (ret != 0) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_HKDF_EXPAND, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return ret == 0; } @@ -78,35 +85,36 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, * Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on * success 0 on failure. */ -int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen) +int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key"; - return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1, NULL, - key, keylen); + return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1, + NULL, 0, key, keylen); } /* * Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on * success 0 on failure. */ -int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *iv, - size_t ivlen) +int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, + unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) { static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv"; - return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1, NULL, - iv, ivlen); + return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1, + NULL, 0, iv, ivlen); } -static int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, - unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen) +int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, + unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen) { static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished"; - return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, secret, finishedlabel, - sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, fin, finlen); + return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel, + sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen); } /* @@ -114,18 +122,23 @@ static int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const unsigned char *secret, * length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location * pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. */ -static int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *prevsecret, - const unsigned char *insecret, - size_t insecretlen, - unsigned char *outsecret) +int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *prevsecret, + const unsigned char *insecret, + size_t insecretlen, + unsigned char *outsecret) { - const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); size_t mdlen, prevsecretlen; int ret; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL); + static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived"; + unsigned char preextractsec[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - if (pctx == NULL) + if (pctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; + } mdlen = EVP_MD_size(md); @@ -137,6 +150,32 @@ static int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *prevsecret, prevsecret = default_zeros; prevsecretlen = 0; } else { + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + + /* The pre-extract derive step uses a hash of no messages */ + if (mctx == NULL + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + return 0; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + + /* Generate the pre-extract secret */ + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, prevsecret, + (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label, + sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1, hash, mdlen, + preextractsec, mdlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + return 0; + } + + prevsecret = preextractsec; prevsecretlen = mdlen; } @@ -150,21 +189,16 @@ static int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *prevsecret, || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, outsecret, &mdlen) <= 0; + if (ret != 0) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_GENERATE_SECRET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + if (prevsecret == preextractsec) + OPENSSL_cleanse(preextractsec, mdlen); return ret == 0; } -/* - * Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the early - * secret. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. - */ -int tls13_generate_early_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret, - size_t insecretlen) -{ - return tls13_generate_secret(s, NULL, insecret, insecretlen, - (unsigned char *)&s->early_secret); -} - /* * Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the * handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been @@ -173,7 +207,9 @@ int tls13_generate_early_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret, int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret, size_t insecretlen) { - return tls13_generate_secret(s, s->early_secret, insecret, insecretlen, + /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */ + return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret, + insecret, insecretlen, (unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret); } @@ -186,8 +222,11 @@ int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen, size_t *secret_size) { - *secret_size = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s)); - return tls13_generate_secret(s, prev, NULL, 0, out); + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + + *secret_size = EVP_MD_size(md); + /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */ + return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out); } /* @@ -203,8 +242,10 @@ size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) + if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, @@ -217,8 +258,11 @@ size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, || ctx == NULL || EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, md, NULL, key) <= 0 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, hash, hashlen) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &hashlen) <= 0) + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &hashlen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_FINAL_FINISH_MAC, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; + } ret = hashlen; err: @@ -240,7 +284,8 @@ int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s) s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, NULL, NULL, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, + SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); return 0; } @@ -250,29 +295,90 @@ int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s) return 1; } -int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) +static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md, + const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, + const unsigned char *insecret, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *label, + size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret, + unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx) { - static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = - "client handshake traffic secret"; - static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = - "client application traffic secret"; - static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = - "server handshake traffic secret"; - static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = - "server application traffic secret"; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen; + size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md); + + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen, + secret, hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* TODO(size_t): convert me */ + keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph); + if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { + uint32_t algenc; + + ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN; + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { + /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */ + algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc; + } else { + algenc = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc; + } + if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) + taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN; + else + taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } else { + ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ciph); + taglen = 0; + } + + if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen) + || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0 + || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL) + || (taglen != 0 && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, + taglen, NULL)) + || EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DERIVE_SECRET_KEY_AND_IV, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key)); + return 0; +} + +int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) +{ + static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic"; + static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic"; + static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic"; + static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic"; + static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic"; + static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "exp master"; + static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master"; unsigned char *iv; unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *hash = hashval; unsigned char *insecret; unsigned char *finsecret = NULL; + const char *log_label = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx; - const EVP_CIPHER *ciph = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; - size_t ivlen, keylen, finsecretlen = 0; + size_t finsecretlen = 0; const unsigned char *label; size_t labellen, hashlen = 0; int ret = 0; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { @@ -280,7 +386,8 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) } else { s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } @@ -294,7 +401,8 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) } else { s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } @@ -306,18 +414,95 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) { - if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) { + if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) { + EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL; + long handlen; + void *hdata; + unsigned int hashlenui; + const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session); + + insecret = s->early_secret; + label = client_early_traffic; + labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1; + log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL; + + handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); + if (handlen <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, + SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + && s->max_early_data > 0 + && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) { + /* + * If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to + * actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we + * must be using an external PSK. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL + && s->max_early_data == + s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession); + } + if (sslcipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from + * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't + * use ssl_handshake_md(). + */ + mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mdctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(sslcipher)); + md = ssl_md(sslcipher->algorithm2); + if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen) + || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx); + goto err; + } + hashlen = hashlenui; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx); + } else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) { insecret = s->handshake_secret; finsecret = s->client_finished_secret; finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s)); label = client_handshake_traffic; labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1; + log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL; + /* + * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake + * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server + * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we + * processed early data then we delay changing the server + * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake + * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier + * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state. + */ + hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash; } else { - int hashleni; - - insecret = s->session->master_key; + insecret = s->master_secret; label = client_application_traffic; labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1; + log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL; /* * For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server * Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is @@ -325,85 +510,138 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) * previously saved value. */ hash = s->server_finished_hash; - hashleni = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst); - if (hashleni < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; } } else { + /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */ if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) { insecret = s->handshake_secret; finsecret = s->server_finished_secret; finsecretlen = EVP_MD_size(ssl_handshake_md(s)); label = server_handshake_traffic; labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1; + log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL; } else { - insecret = s->session->master_key; + insecret = s->master_secret; label = server_application_traffic; labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1; + log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL; } } - if (label != client_application_traffic) { + if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) { + md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1) - || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */; goto err; } + } + /* + * Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the + * client application traffic secret + */ + if (label == server_application_traffic) + memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen); + + if (label == server_handshake_traffic) + memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen); + + if (label == client_application_traffic) { /* - * Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the - * client application traffic secret + * We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the + * hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished */ - if (label == server_application_traffic) - memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hash, hashlen); + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret, + resumption_master_secret, + sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1, + hashval, hashlen, s->session->master_key, + hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; } - if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, insecret, label, labellen, hash, secret, - hashlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher, + insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, iv, + ciph_ctx)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } - /* TODO(size_t): convert me */ - keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph); - ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ciph); - - if (!tls13_derive_key(s, secret, key, keylen) - || !tls13_derive_iv(s, secret, iv, ivlen) - || (finsecret != NULL && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, secret, - finsecret, - finsecretlen))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (label == server_application_traffic) { + memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen); + /* Now we create the exporter master secret */ + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret, + exporter_master_secret, + sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1, + hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret, + hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (label == client_application_traffic) + memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen); + + if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } - if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL, - (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS13_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + if (finsecret != NULL + && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret, + finsecret, finsecretlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } -#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO - if (s->msg_callback) { - int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0; + ret = 1; + err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret)); + return ret; +} + +int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending) +{ + static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd"; + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md); + unsigned char *insecret, *iv; + unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx; + int ret = 0; + + if (s->server == sending) + insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret; + else + insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret; - if (ciph->key_len) - s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY, - key, ciph->key_len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + if (sending) { + iv = s->write_iv; + ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer); + } else { + iv = s->read_iv; + ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx; + RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); + } - wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV; - s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, ivlen, s, - s->msg_callback_arg); + if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, ssl_handshake_md(s), + s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL, + application_traffic, + sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, iv, + ciph_ctx)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } -#endif + + memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen); ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret)); - OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key)); return ret; } @@ -414,3 +652,41 @@ int tls13_alert_code(int code) return tls1_alert_code(code); } + +int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, + const char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *context, + size_t contextlen, int use_context) +{ + unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter"; + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + unsigned int hashsize, datalen; + int ret = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s)) + goto err; + + if (!use_context) + contextlen = 0; + + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0 + || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret, + (const unsigned char *)label, llen, + data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize) + || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel, + sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize, + out, olen)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; +}