X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=8f16668e9d3a87522b034ea18d96b3594a56c858;hp=622bdd983359a037b15937ff4f4821460a6c9534;hb=77ab2b0193a5b53112af3e99409e3ac57e6b5555;hpb=fa0c23de83efaf92da17cffce12444adbca48c89 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index 622bdd9833..8f16668e9d 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1,131 +1,31 @@ -/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include +#include #include #include #include #include +#include +#include #include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -# include -# include -#endif +#include +#include #include "ssl_locl.h" +#include static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess); static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); -int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); +static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, @@ -208,7 +108,10 @@ void tls1_free(SSL *s) void tls1_clear(SSL *s) { ssl3_clear(s); - s->version = s->method->version; + if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) + s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION; + else + s->version = s->method->version; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC @@ -219,9 +122,17 @@ typedef struct { unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */ } tls_curve_info; -# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1 +/* Mask for curve type */ +# define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0 +# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1 +# define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2 +/* + * Table of curve information. + * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup + * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id. + */ static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = { {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */ {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */ @@ -251,6 +162,8 @@ static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = { {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ + /* X25519 (29) */ + {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, }; static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { @@ -261,45 +174,32 @@ static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { /* The default curves */ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = { - /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ + 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ - 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ - 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ }; static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { - /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ + 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */ 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ - 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ + 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ + 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ + + /* + * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set + * via an explicit callback or parameters. + */ 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ - /* - * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set - * via an explicit callback or parameters. - */ 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ @@ -333,67 +233,12 @@ int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) { - /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ - switch (nid) { - case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ - return 1; - case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ - return 2; - case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ - return 3; - case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ - return 4; - case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ - return 5; - case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ - return 6; - case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ - return 7; - case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ - return 8; - case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ - return 9; - case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ - return 10; - case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ - return 11; - case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ - return 12; - case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ - return 13; - case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ - return 14; - case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ - return 15; - case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ - return 16; - case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ - return 17; - case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ - return 18; - case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ - return 19; - case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ - return 20; - case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ - return 21; - case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ - return 22; - case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ - return 23; - case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ - return 24; - case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ - return 25; - case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - return 26; - case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - return 27; - case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - return 28; - default: - return 0; + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) { + if (nid_list[i].nid == nid) + return i + 1; } + return 0; } /* @@ -664,46 +509,33 @@ int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) { - int is_prime, id; + int id; const EC_GROUP *grp; - const EC_METHOD *meth; if (!ec) return 0; /* Determine if it is a prime field */ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); if (!grp) return 0; - meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); - if (!meth) - return 0; - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) - is_prime = 1; - else - is_prime = 0; /* Determine curve ID */ id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); - /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ - if (id) { - curve_id[0] = 0; - curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; - } else { - curve_id[0] = 0xff; - if (is_prime) - curve_id[1] = 0x01; - else - curve_id[1] = 0x02; - } + /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */ + if (id == 0) + return 0; + curve_id[0] = 0; + curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; if (comp_id) { if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) return 0; - if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { - if (is_prime) + if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { + *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; + } else { + if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME) *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; else *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; - } else - *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; + } } return 1; } @@ -786,16 +618,13 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; EVP_PKEY *pkey; int rv; - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (!pkey) return 0; /* If not EC nothing to do */ - if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) return 1; - } - rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); if (!rv) return 0; /* @@ -839,7 +668,7 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* - * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity + * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility * @s: SSL connection * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using * @@ -850,11 +679,6 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) */ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) { -# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) - return 1; -# endif /* * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other * curves permitted. @@ -990,10 +814,10 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) + if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) return 0; if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); @@ -1055,34 +879,21 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, } /* - * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't - * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike - * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global - * settings. + * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't + * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported + * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level. + * + * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported + * by the client. + * + * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not. */ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) { s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0; s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0; - /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ - if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; - else - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0; - /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */ - if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION) - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1; ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); - /* - * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature - * algorithms. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA) - s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr; - if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS) - s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; - if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA) - s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; + ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ if (!s->psk_client_callback) { @@ -1098,12 +909,28 @@ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) #endif } +/* + * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not + * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on + * @c: cipher to check + * @op: Security check that you want to do + * + * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled. + */ int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op) { - if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl - || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k + if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a) return 1; + if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0) + return 1; + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) + return 1; + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) + return 1; + return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c); } @@ -1114,6 +941,79 @@ static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s) return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL); } +static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) { + unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1); + unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2); + if (u1 < u2) + return -1; + else if (u1 > u2) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +/* + * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be + * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. + * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those + * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions + * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error + * occurred. + */ +static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) { + PACKET extensions = *packet; + size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; + unsigned int *extension_types = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + /* First pass: count the extensions. */ + while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) { + unsigned int type; + PACKET extension; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || + !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { + goto done; + } + num_extensions++; + } + + if (num_extensions <= 1) + return 1; + + extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions); + if (extension_types == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto done; + } + + /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */ + extensions = *packet; + for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { + PACKET extension; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) || + !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { + /* This should not happen. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto done; + } + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto done; + } + /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ + qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint); + for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { + if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) + goto done; + } + ret = 1; + done: + OPENSSL_free(extension_types); + return ret; +} + unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al) { @@ -1129,12 +1029,12 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { - SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); + const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { + if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) + || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { using_ecc = 1; break; } @@ -1180,7 +1080,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, /*- * check for enough space. - * 4 for the servername type and entension length + * 4 for the servername type and extension length * 2 for servernamelist length * 1 for the hostname type * 2 for hostname length @@ -1218,7 +1118,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, /*- * check for enough space. - * 4 for the srp type type and entension length + * 4 for the srp type type and extension length * 1 for the srp user identity * + srp user identity length */ @@ -1330,7 +1230,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } skip_ext: - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { size_t salglen; const unsigned char *salg; unsigned char *etmp; @@ -1348,6 +1248,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, ret += salglen; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { int i; long extlen, idlen, itmp; @@ -1391,27 +1292,30 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, if (extlen > 0) i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* Add Heartbeat extension */ - if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); - s2n(1, ret); - /*- - * Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - else - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* Add Heartbeat extension */ + if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) + return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); + s2n(1, ret); + /*- + * Set mode: + * 1: peer may send requests + * 2: peer not allowed to send requests + */ + if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) + *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + else + *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { /* - * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support + * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support * for Next Protocol Negotiation */ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) @@ -1421,6 +1325,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } #endif + /* + * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so + * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation + * (see longer comment below) + */ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) return NULL; @@ -1429,6 +1338,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; + s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { @@ -1457,9 +1367,13 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) return NULL; -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); s2n(0, ret); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret); + s2n(0, ret); + } #endif s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); s2n(0, ret); @@ -1508,8 +1422,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); + int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); #endif @@ -1640,7 +1553,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) { if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); @@ -1650,10 +1563,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) + *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; } #endif @@ -1682,7 +1595,6 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, #endif if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) return NULL; -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) { /* * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable @@ -1698,15 +1610,14 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(0, ret); } } -#endif - if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); s2n(0, ret); } - if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { + if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; - unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; + unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) return NULL; @@ -1728,63 +1639,85 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } /* - * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a - * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type - * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the - * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on - * success. + * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. + * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length. + * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. + * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. */ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { - unsigned int data_len; - unsigned int proto_len; - const unsigned char *selected; - unsigned char *data; - unsigned char selected_len; - int r; - - if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) - return 0; + PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; - /* - * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, - * length-prefixed strings. - */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len - || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len)) - goto parse_error; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { + return 0; + } + save_protocol_list = protocol_list; do { - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len) - || proto_len == 0 - || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len)) - goto parse_error; - } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)); - - r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len, - s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return -1; + /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) + || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { + return 0; } - memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; + } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); + + if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, + &s->s3->alpn_proposed, + &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; } - return 0; - parse_error: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return -1; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. + * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_* + * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. + * returns 1 on success, 0 + */ +static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al) +{ + const unsigned char *selected = NULL; + unsigned char selected_len = 0; + + if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { + int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, + s->s3->alpn_proposed, + s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, + s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); + + if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); + s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); + if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + return 0; + } + s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ + s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; +#endif + } else { + *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; + *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + return 0; + } + } + + return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /*- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X - * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. + * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|. * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: * SNI, * elliptic_curves @@ -1797,9 +1730,9 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) */ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) { - unsigned int type, size; - unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2; - PACKET tmppkt; + unsigned int type; + PACKET sni, tmppkt; + size_t ext_len; static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ @@ -1813,10 +1746,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 0x00, /* uncompressed */ - }; - - /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ - static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { + /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ @@ -1827,51 +1757,46 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; + /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ + static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; + tmppkt = *pkt; if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size) - || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size)) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { return; + } if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; - if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2) - || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt)) - return; - if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) - return; - if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) - return; - } else { - const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len) - || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt)) - return; - if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) - return; - } + ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? + sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; - s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; + s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, + ext_len); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +/* + * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of + * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions. + * + * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no + * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise + * ignored. + * + * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. + * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert. + */ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { unsigned int type; - unsigned int size; - unsigned int len; - unsigned char *data; int renegotiate_seen = 0; + PACKET extensions; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; s->servername_done = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG @@ -1880,9 +1805,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; + s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); + s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; + s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); + s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | + SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC @@ -1893,9 +1822,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL; -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); @@ -1907,26 +1834,29 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) goto ri_check; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) - goto err; - - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) - goto err; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) + return 0; - while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) { - PACKET subpkt; + if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) + return 0; - if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size)) - goto err; + /* + * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but, + * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon + * resumption. + */ + while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) { + PACKET extension; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) + return 0; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); - - if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size)) - goto err; + s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension), + PACKET_remaining(&extension), + s->tlsext_debug_arg); if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al)) + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { @@ -1957,219 +1887,185 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { - unsigned char *sdata; unsigned int servname_type; - unsigned int dsize; - PACKET ssubpkt; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize)) - goto err; - - while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len) - || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len) - goto err; - - if (s->servername_done == 0) - switch (servname_type) { - case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: - if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) - goto err; - - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = - OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt, - (unsigned char *)s->session - ->tlsext_hostname, - len)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; - if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); - s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = 1; - - } else { - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname - && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len - && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, - (char *)sdata, len) == 0; - } - - break; - - default: - break; - } + PACKET sni, hostname; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni) + /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ + || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { + return 0; + } + + /* + * Although the server_name extension was intended to be + * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the + * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as + * such. + * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types + * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other + * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. + * + * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, + * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) + || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name + || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { + return 0; } - /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */ - if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0) - goto err; + if (!s->hit) { + if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + + if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + + if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + s->servername_done = 1; + } else { + /* + * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST + * fall back to a full handshake. + */ + s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname + && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname, + strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname)); + } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len) - || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) - goto err; - - if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) - return -1; - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login, - len)) - goto err; - s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; - - if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len - || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) - goto err; + PACKET srp_I; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I)) + return 0; + + if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) + return 0; + + /* + * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user + * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. + */ + if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { - unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; + PACKET ec_point_format_list; - if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length) - || ecpointformatlist_length == 0) - goto err; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, + &ec_point_format_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { + return 0; + } if (!s->hit) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { + if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, + &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, + &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = - ecpointformatlist_length; - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - ecpointformatlist_length)) - goto err; - } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) { - goto err; - } - /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */ - if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { - unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length; + PACKET elliptic_curve_list; - /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length) - || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0 - || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0) - goto err; + /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, + &elliptic_curve_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 + || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) { + return 0; + } if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) - goto err; - - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { + if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list, + &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, + &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = - ellipticcurvelist_length; - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - ellipticcurvelist_length)) - goto err; - } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) { - goto err; - } - /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */ - if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { - goto err; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size) - || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) { + if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && + !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension), + PACKET_remaining(&extension), + s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { - unsigned int dsize; - - if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize) - || (dsize & 1) != 0 - || (dsize == 0) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize) - || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0 - || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) { - goto err; + PACKET supported_sig_algs; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs) + || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0 + || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { + return 0; } - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { - PACKET ssubpkt; - if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, - (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) - goto err; + if (!s->hit) { + if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), + PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { + return 0; + } + } + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { + if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, + (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { + return 0; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - const unsigned char *sdata; - unsigned int dsize; - /* Read in responder_id_list */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize)) - goto err; - - while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) { + const unsigned char *ext_data; + PACKET responder_id_list, exts; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list)) + return 0; + + while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; - unsigned int idsize; + PACKET responder_id; + const unsigned char *id_data; - if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4 - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) { - goto err; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, + &responder_id) + || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { + return 0; } - sdata = data; - data += idsize; - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); - if (!id) - goto err; - if (data != sdata) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - goto err; + + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL + && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = + sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; } - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids - && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { + + id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); + id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, + PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); + if (id == NULL) + return 0; + + if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } + if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2178,43 +2074,46 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } /* Read in request_extensions */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize) - || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { - goto err; - } - sdata = data; - if (dsize > 0) { + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts)) + return 0; + + if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { + ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) - goto err; + d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, + PACKET_remaining(&exts)); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL + || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { + return 0; + } } - } - /* - * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. - */ - else + } else +#endif + { + /* + * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. + */ s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { + else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { unsigned int hbtype; - if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype) - || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { + if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype) + || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } switch (hbtype) { case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; @@ -2224,15 +2123,14 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && - s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { /*- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a * renegotiation. * * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on - * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when + * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing * anything like that, but this might change). @@ -2248,31 +2146,26 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) #endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && - s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0) + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { + if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al)) return 0; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -#endif } /* session ticket processed earlier */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al)) + if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al)) return 0; } #endif -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { - if (!s->hit) - s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; - } + /* + * Note: extended master secret extension handled in + * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early() + */ + /* * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom @@ -2281,14 +2174,17 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * ServerHello may be later returned. */ else if (!s->hit) { - if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0) + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension), + PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0) return 0; } } - /* Spurious data on the end */ - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) - goto err; + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } ri_check: @@ -2302,10 +2198,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } + /* + * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly. + * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early. + * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must + * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers. + */ return 1; -err: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; } int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) @@ -2316,7 +2215,6 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); return 0; @@ -2332,11 +2230,11 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) { - unsigned int len; + PACKET tmp_protocol; while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len) - || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len)) + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) + || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) return 0; } @@ -2358,13 +2256,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); + s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | + SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); #endif -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -#endif + + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length)) goto ri_check; @@ -2374,8 +2272,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } + if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) { - unsigned char *data; + const unsigned char *data; PACKET spkt; if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size) @@ -2452,6 +2355,30 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + /* + * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation + * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we + * need to let control continue to flow to that. + */ + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp && + s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { + /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ + if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts); + s->tlsext_scts = NULL; + } + s->tlsext_scts_len = size; + if (size > 0) { + s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); + if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size); + } + } +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { @@ -2489,7 +2416,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { unsigned len; /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { + if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } @@ -2519,7 +2446,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { + else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { unsigned int hbtype; if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -2527,11 +2454,11 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } switch (hbtype) { case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; @@ -2545,15 +2472,14 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } #endif -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; } -#endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; } @@ -2573,7 +2499,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { if (s->tlsext_hostname) { if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; @@ -2603,12 +2529,25 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } + if (s->hit) { + /* + * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with + * original session. + */ + if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != + !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; } int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { - + s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; return 1; } @@ -2687,7 +2626,8 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) { int al; size_t i; - /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ + + /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; @@ -2767,6 +2707,10 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) } else s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) { + goto err; + } + err: switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: @@ -2799,8 +2743,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { + && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { /* we are using an ECC cipher */ size_t i; unsigned char *list; @@ -2833,29 +2776,12 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); /* - * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the - * callback + * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event + * that we don't receive a status message */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) - && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int r; - /* - * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no - * response. - */ - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (r == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - if (r < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - } + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: @@ -2892,8 +2818,11 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /*- * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the - * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle - * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. + * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions + * need to be handled at the same time. + * + * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master + * secret. * * session_id: ClientHello session ID. * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix) @@ -2920,23 +2849,29 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. + * + * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present. + * */ -int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id, - SSL_SESSION **ret) +int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, + const PACKET *session_id, + SSL_SESSION **ret) { unsigned int i; PACKET local_ext = *ext; int retv = -1; + int have_ticket = 0; + int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s); + *ret = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; /* * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful * resumption. */ - if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) - return 0; if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)) return 0; @@ -2957,9 +2892,16 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id, retv = 0; goto end; } - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) { int r; - unsigned char *etick; + const unsigned char *etick; + + /* Duplicate extension */ + if (have_ticket != 0) { + retv = -1; + goto end; + } + have_ticket = 1; if (size == 0) { /* @@ -2968,7 +2910,7 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id, */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; retv = 1; - goto end; + continue; } if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { /* @@ -2978,7 +2920,7 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id, * calculate the master secret later. */ retv = 2; - goto end; + continue; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) { /* Shouldn't ever happen */ @@ -3003,15 +2945,18 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id, retv = -1; break; } - goto end; + continue; } else { + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) { retv = -1; goto end; } } } - retv = 0; + if (have_ticket == 0) + retv = 0; end: return retv; } @@ -3020,13 +2965,14 @@ end: * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. * * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. - * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. + * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension. * sess_id: points at the session ID. * sesslen: the length of the session ID. * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * * Returns: + * -2: fatal error, malloc failure. * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. @@ -3039,36 +2985,48 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *sdec; const unsigned char *p; - int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; + int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1; unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - HMAC_CTX hctx = HMAC_CTX_EMPTY; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ if (eticklen < 48) return 2; /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); + if (hctx == NULL) + return -2; + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + ret = -2; + goto err; + } if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, - &ctx, &hctx, 0); + ctx, hctx, 0); if (rv < 0) - return -1; - if (rv == 0) - return 2; + goto err; + if (rv == 0) { + ret = 2; + goto err; + } if (rv == 2) renew_ticket = 1; } else { /* Check key name matches */ - if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) - return 2; - if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) { + ret = 2; + goto err; + } + if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, - etick + 16) <= 0) { + etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) { goto err; } } @@ -3076,38 +3034,40 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity * checks on ticket. */ - mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); + mlen = HMAC_size(hctx); if (mlen < 0) { goto err; } eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ - if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 - || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { + if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 + || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { goto err; } - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return 2; } /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ - p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); + p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); + eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); if (sdec == NULL - || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + OPENSSL_free(sdec); return -1; } - if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return 2; } slen += mlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + ctx = NULL; p = sdec; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); @@ -3134,9 +3094,9 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, */ return 2; err: - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - return -1; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); + return ret; } /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ @@ -3206,7 +3166,7 @@ int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) { - return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); + return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); } typedef struct { @@ -3287,7 +3247,7 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) { - int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0; + int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) return; if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { @@ -3301,9 +3261,9 @@ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, *psign_nid = sign_nid; } if (psignhash_nid) { - if (sign_nid && hash_nid) - OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid); - else + if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef + || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, + sign_nid) <= 0) *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; } } @@ -3492,30 +3452,6 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) return 0; -#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { - /* - * Use first set signature preference to force message digest, - * ignoring any peer preferences. - */ - const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; - if (s->server) - sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; - else - sigs = c->client_sigalgs; - if (sigs) { - idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); - md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); - pmd[idx] = md; - pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { - pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md; - } - } - } -#endif - for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); @@ -3607,160 +3543,6 @@ int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS -int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length) -{ - unsigned char *pl; - unsigned short hbtype; - unsigned int payload; - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - p, length, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* Read type and payload length first */ - if (1 + 2 + 16 > length) - return 0; /* silently discard */ - hbtype = *p++; - n2s(p, payload); - if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length) - return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ - pl = p; - - if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { - unsigned char *buffer, *bp; - int r; - - /* - * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, - * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding - */ - buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); - if (buffer == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - bp = buffer; - - /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ - *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; - s2n(payload, bp); - memcpy(bp, pl, payload); - bp += payload; - /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { - OPENSSL_free(buffer); - return -1; - } - - r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, - 3 + payload + padding); - - if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buffer, 3 + payload + padding, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - OPENSSL_free(buffer); - - if (r < 0) - return r; - } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { - unsigned int seq; - - /* - * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 - * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number - */ - n2s(pl, seq); - - if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *buf, *p; - int ret = -1; - unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - - /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ - if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || - s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); - return -1; - } - - /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); - return -1; - } - - /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ - if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return -1; - } - - /*- - * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number - * as payload to distuingish different messages and add - * some random stuff. - * - Message Type, 1 byte - * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) - * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) - * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) - * - Padding - */ - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); - if (buf == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - p = buf; - /* Message Type */ - *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; - /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ - s2n(payload, p); - /* Sequence number */ - s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); - /* 16 random bytes */ - if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += 16; - /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); - if (ret >= 0) { - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buf, 3 + payload + padding, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; - } - - err: - OPENSSL_free(buf); - return ret; -} -#endif - #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) typedef struct { @@ -3943,15 +3725,6 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, /* If no cert or key, forget it */ if (!x || !pk) goto end; -#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { - rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | - CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; - *pvalid = rv; - return rv; - } -#endif } else { if (!x || !pk) return 0; @@ -3992,13 +3765,11 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, switch (idx) { case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: - case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; break; case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: - case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; break; @@ -4091,7 +3862,7 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, if (!s->server && strict_mode) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; int check_type = 0; - switch (pk->type) { + switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; break; @@ -4101,15 +3872,6 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, case EVP_PKEY_EC: check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; break; - case EVP_PKEY_DH: - case EVP_PKEY_DHX: - { - int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); - if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA) - check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; - if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA) - check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; - } } if (check_type) { const unsigned char *ctypes; @@ -4190,8 +3952,6 @@ void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA); - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256); @@ -4223,17 +3983,20 @@ DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) if (dh_secbits >= 128) { DH *dhp = DH_new(); + BIGNUM *p, *g; if (dhp == NULL) return NULL; - dhp->g = BN_new(); - if (dhp->g != NULL) - BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2); + g = BN_new(); + if (g != NULL) + BN_set_word(g, 2); if (dh_secbits >= 192) - dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); else - dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); - if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) { + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); + if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) { DH_free(dhp); + BN_free(p); + BN_free(g); return NULL; } return dhp; @@ -4246,13 +4009,17 @@ DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) { - int secbits; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + int secbits = -1; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey) { + /* + * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default + * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will + * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and + * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice. + */ secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - } else - secbits = -1; + } if (s) return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x); else @@ -4263,6 +4030,9 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) { /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */ int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid; + /* Don't check signature if self signed */ + if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0) + return 1; sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) { const EVP_MD *md;