X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=31fc70e05e2d332c48f635d52a64d0fe0258cf0c;hp=73924392f962577024b0ea3d000086651927a70b;hb=4563da1d7c53e969e8d092d018795179bb648a7c;hpb=a43526302f3049f2eed3fc2ea538c14a5f3ff956

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 73924392f9..31fc70e05e 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
 				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
 				SSL_SESSION **psess);
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 #endif
 
 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
@@ -138,6 +140,49 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
 	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
 	tls1_alert_code,
 	tls1_export_keying_material,
+	0,
+	SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+	ssl3_handshake_write
+	};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
+	tls1_enc,
+	tls1_mac,
+	tls1_setup_key_block,
+	tls1_generate_master_secret,
+	tls1_change_cipher_state,
+	tls1_final_finish_mac,
+	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+	tls1_alert_code,
+	tls1_export_keying_material,
+	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+	SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+	ssl3_handshake_write
+	};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
+	tls1_enc,
+	tls1_mac,
+	tls1_setup_key_block,
+	tls1_generate_master_secret,
+	tls1_change_cipher_state,
+	tls1_final_finish_mac,
+	TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+	tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+	tls1_alert_code,
+	tls1_export_keying_material,
+	SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+		|SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+	SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+	ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+	ssl3_handshake_write
 	};
 
 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
@@ -199,7 +244,10 @@ static int nid_list[] =
 		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
 		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
 		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
-		NID_secp521r1  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
+		NID_secp521r1,  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
+		NID_brainpoolP256r1,  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */	
+		NID_brainpoolP384r1,  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */	
+		NID_brainpoolP512r1  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */	
 	};
 
 
@@ -215,11 +263,14 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
 		0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
 		0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
 		0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */	
+		0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */	
 		0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
 		0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+		0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */	
 		0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
 		0,9,  /* sect283k1 (9) */
 		0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+		0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */	
 		0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
 		0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
 		0,8,  /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
@@ -239,6 +290,12 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
 		0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
 	};
 
+static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
+	{
+		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+	};
+
 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
 	{
 	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
@@ -303,6 +360,12 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
 		return 24;
 	case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
 		return 25;
+	case NID_brainpoolP256r1:  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+		return 26;
+	case NID_brainpoolP384r1:  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+		return 27;
+	case NID_brainpoolP512r1:  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+		return 28;
 	default:
 		return 0;
 		}
@@ -318,22 +381,74 @@ static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
 		{
 		*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
 		*pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+		return;
 		}
-	else
+	/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
+	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
 		{
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+		*pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+		*pcurveslen = 2;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+		*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
+		*pcurveslen = 2;
+		break;
+	default:
 		*pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
 		*pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
 		}
-	/* If not set use default: for now static structure */
 	if (!*pcurves)
 		{
 		*pcurves = eccurves_default;
 		*pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
 		}
 	}
+/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
+int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *curves;
+	size_t curveslen, i;
+	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+	if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
+		return 0;
+	/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
+	if (suiteb_flags)
+		{
+		unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+		if (p[1])
+			return 0;
+		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+			{
+			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+				return 0;
+			}
+		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+			{
+			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+				return 0;
+			}
+		else	/* Should never happen */
+			return 0;
+		}
+	tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
+	for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
+		{
+		if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
+			return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
 
 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
- * matches.
+ * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * an EC tmp key.
  */
 
 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
@@ -344,6 +459,25 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
 	/* Can't do anything on client side */
 	if (s->server == 0)
 		return -1;
+	if (nmatch == -2)
+		{
+		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+			{
+			/* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we 
+			 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
+			 * checks.
+			 */
+			unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+				return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
+			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+				return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
+			/* Should never happen */
+			return NID_undef;
+			}
+		/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
+		nmatch = 0;
+		}
 	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
 				&supp, &supplen);
 	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
@@ -405,7 +539,7 @@ int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-#define MAX_CURVELIST	25
+#define MAX_CURVELIST	28
 
 typedef struct
 	{
@@ -446,6 +580,8 @@ int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
 	ncb.nidcnt = 0;
 	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
 		return 0;
+	if (pext == NULL)
+		return 1;
 	return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
 	}
 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
@@ -454,14 +590,12 @@ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
 	{
 	int is_prime, id;
 	const EC_GROUP *grp;
-	const EC_POINT *pt;
 	const EC_METHOD *meth;
 	if (!ec)
 		return 0;
 	/* Determine if it is a prime field */
 	grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
-        pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
-	if (!grp || !pt)
+	if (!grp)
 		return 0;
         meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
 	if (!meth)
@@ -489,6 +623,8 @@ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
 		}
 	if (comp_id)
 		{
+        	if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
+			return 0;
 		if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
 			{
 			if (is_prime)
@@ -523,6 +659,8 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
 		if (i == plen)
 			return 0;
 		}
+	if (!curve_id)
+		return 1;
 	/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
 	for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
 		{
@@ -534,32 +672,136 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
 			}
 		if (i == plen)
 			return 0;
+		/* For clients can only check sent curve list */
+		if (!s->server)
+			return 1;
 		}
 	return 1;
 	}
-/* Check EC server key is compatible with client extensions */
-int tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s)
+
+static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+					size_t *pformatslen)
+	{
+	/* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
+	 * use default */
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+		{
+		*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+		*pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		*pformats = ecformats_default;
+		/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
+		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+			*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
+		else
+			*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
+ * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
+ */
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
 	{
-	int rv;
-	CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->cert->pkeys + SSL_PKEY_ECC;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
 	unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
-	if (!cpk->x509 || !cpk->privatekey)
-		return 0;
-	pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cpk->x509);
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+	int rv;
+	pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
 	if (!pkey)
 		return 0;
+	/* If not EC nothing to do */
+	if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		return 1;
+		}
 	rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 	if (!rv)
 		return 0;
-	return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
+	/* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
+	 * supported curves extension.
+	 */
+	rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
+	if (!rv)
+		return 0;
+	/* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
+	 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
+	 */
+	if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+		int check_md;
+		size_t i;
+		CERT *c = s->cert;
+		if (curve_id[0])
+			return 0;
+		/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
+		if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+		else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
+		else
+			return 0; /* Should never happen */
+		for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+			if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+				break;
+		if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
+			return 0;
+		if (set_ee_md == 2)
+			{
+			if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
+			else
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
+			}
+		}
+	return rv;
 	}
 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
-int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
 	{
 	unsigned char curve_id[2];
 	EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+	/* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
+	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	/* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
+	 * no other curves permitted.
+	 */
+	if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+		/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
+		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+		else
+			return 0;
+		curve_id[0] = 0;
+		/* Check this curve is acceptable */
+		if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
+			return 0;
+		/* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
+		if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
+			return 1;
+		/* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
+		else 
+			{
+			unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
+			if (!ec)
+				return 0;
+			if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
+				return 0;
+			if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
+				return 1;
+			return 0;
+			}
+			
+		}
 	if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
 		{
 		/* Need a shared curve */
@@ -575,8 +817,20 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
 			return 0;
 		}
 	if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
-		return 1;
+		return 0;
+/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
+#if 0
+	return 1;
+#else
 	return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
+#endif
+	}
+
+#else
+
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+	{
+	return 1;
 	}
 
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
@@ -622,32 +876,227 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
 	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-	tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
-#endif
 };
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+};
+#endif
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
+	{
+	/* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+	 * preferences.
+	 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+		return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+		return 2;
 
-int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
+		return 2;
+		}
+#endif
+	/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
+	if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
+		{
+		*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+		return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
+		{
+		*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+		return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+		return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+		}
+	}
+/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
+ * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
+ */
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+				const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 	{
-	size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	/* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
-	if (FIPS_mode())
-		slen -= 2;
+	const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
+	size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+	int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+	/* Should never happen */
+	if (sigalg == -1)
+		return -1;
+	/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+	if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+		{
+		unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+		/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+		if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
+			return 0;
+		if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		/* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
+		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+			{
+			if (curve_id[0])
+				return 0;
+			if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+				{
+				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+						SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+					return 0;
+					}
+				}
+			else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+				{
+				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+						SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+					return 0;
+					}
+				}
+			else
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+		return 0;
+#endif
+
+	/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+	sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
+	for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
+		{
+		if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+			break;
+		}
+	/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
+	if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	*pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
+	if (*pmd == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	/* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
+	 * wish.
+	 */
+	if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
+		s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
+	return 1;
+	}
+/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
+ * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
+ * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
+ * session and not global settings.
+ * 
+ */
+void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
+	{
+	CERT *c = s->cert;
+	const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+	size_t i, sigalgslen;
+	int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
+	c->mask_a = 0;
+	c->mask_k = 0;
+	/* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
+	if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
+		c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+	else
+		c->mask_ssl = 0;
+	/* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
+	 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
+	 * TLS 1.2.
+	 */
+	sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
+	for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
+		{
+		switch(sigalgs[1])
+			{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+			have_rsa = 1;
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+			have_dsa = 1;
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+		case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+			have_ecdsa = 1;
+			break;
+#endif
+			}
+		}
+	/* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
+	 * signature algorithms.
+	 */
+	if (!have_rsa)
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
+		}
+	if (!have_dsa)
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+		}
+	if (!have_ecdsa)
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+		}
 #endif
-	if (p)
-		memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
-	return (int)slen;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+	if (!s->psk_client_callback)
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+	c->valid = 1;
 	}
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
 	{
 	int extdatalen=0;
 	unsigned char *ret = p;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 	/* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
 	int using_ecc = 0;
-	if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 		{
 		int i;
 		unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
@@ -659,7 +1108,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 
 			alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
 			alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-			if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
+			if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
 				|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
 				{
 				using_ecc = 1;
@@ -770,16 +1219,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		long lenmax; 
 		const unsigned char *plist;
 		size_t plistlen;
-		/* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
-		 * use default */
-		plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
-		if (plist)
-			plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-		else
-			{
-			plist = ecformats_default;
-			plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
-			}
+
+		tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
 
 		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
 		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
@@ -857,20 +1298,22 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 		skip_ext:
 
-	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+	if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
 		{
-		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
+		size_t salglen;
+		const unsigned char *salg;
+		salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
+		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
 			return NULL; 
 		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
-		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
-		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
-		memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
-		ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+		s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
+		s2n(salglen, ret);
+		memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
+		ret += salglen;
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
 		{
 		size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
 		
@@ -887,8 +1330,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
-	if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
 		{
 		int i;
 		long extlen, idlen, itmp;
@@ -962,6 +1404,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+	if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
+		{
+		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
+			return NULL;
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+		s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+		s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+		memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
+		       s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+		ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+		}
+
         if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
                 {
                 int el;
@@ -981,21 +1435,95 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                 ret += el;
                 }
 
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
+	/* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
+	if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
+		{
+		size_t i;
+		custom_cli_ext_record* record;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
+			{
+			const unsigned char* out = NULL;
+			unsigned short outlen = 0;
+
+			record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
+			/* NULL callback sends empty extension */ 
+			/* -1 from callback omits extension */
+			if (record->fn1)
+				{
+				int cb_retval = 0;
+				cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
+							&out, &outlen, al,
+							record->arg);
+				if (cb_retval == 0)
+					return NULL; /* error */
+				if (cb_retval == -1)
+					continue; /* skip this extension */
+				}
+			if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
+				return NULL;
+			s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
+			s2n(outlen, ret);
+			memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+			ret += outlen;
+			}
+		}
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+	s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+	s2n(0,ret);
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
+	/* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
+	 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
+	 *
+	 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
+	 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
+	 */
+	{
+	int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+	/* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+	 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
+	 * not. */
+	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+		hlen -= 5;
+	if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+		{
+		hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+		if (hlen >= 4)
+			hlen -= 4;
+		else
+			hlen = 0;
+
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+		s2n(hlen, ret);
+		memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+		ret += hlen;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
 		return p;
 
 	s2n(extdatalen,p);
 	return ret;
 	}
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
 	{
 	int extdatalen=0;
 	unsigned char *ret = p;
+	size_t i;
+	custom_srv_ext_record *record;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	int next_proto_neg_seen;
 #endif
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+	int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+#endif
 	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
 	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
 		return p;
@@ -1036,25 +1564,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (using_ecc)
 		{
-		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
+		const unsigned char *plist;
+		size_t plistlen;
+		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
 
+		tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
+
 		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
+		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
+		if (plistlen > 255)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			return NULL;
 			}
 		
 		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
-		s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
-		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
-		ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+		s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
+		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
+		memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
+		ret+=plistlen;
 
 		}
 	/* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
@@ -1076,8 +1607,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
 		{
 		size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
 		
@@ -1168,6 +1698,62 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+	for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
+		{
+		const unsigned char *out = NULL;
+		unsigned short outlen = 0;
+		int cb_retval = 0;
+
+		record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
+
+		/* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
+		if (!record->fn2)
+			continue;
+		cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
+								&out, &outlen, al,
+								record->arg);
+		if (cb_retval == 0)
+			return NULL; /* error */
+		if (cb_retval == -1)
+			continue; /* skip this extension */
+		if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
+			return NULL;
+		s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
+		s2n(outlen, ret);
+		memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+		ret += outlen;
+		}
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+	if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+		{
+		/* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
+		 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
+		 */
+		if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
+			s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+		else
+			{
+			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+			s2n(0,ret);
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
+	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+		{
+		const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
+		unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+
+		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
+			return NULL;
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+		s2n(3 + len,ret);
+		s2n(1 + len,ret);
+		*ret++ = len;
+		memcpy(ret, selected, len);
+		ret += len;
+		}
+
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
 
@@ -1175,14 +1761,167 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 	return ret;
 	}
 
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
+ * ClientHello.
+ *   data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
+ *   data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
+ *   al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
+ *       return.
+ *
+ *   returns: 0 on success. */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+					 unsigned data_len, int *al)
 	{
+	unsigned i;
+	unsigned proto_len;
+	const unsigned char *selected;
+	unsigned char selected_len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (data_len < 2)
+		goto parse_error;
+
+	/* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
+	 * length-prefixed strings. */
+	i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
+	    ((unsigned) data[1]);
+	data_len -= 2;
+	data += 2;
+	if (data_len != i)
+		goto parse_error;
+
+	if (data_len < 2)
+		goto parse_error;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
+		{
+		proto_len = data[i];
+		i++;
+
+		if (proto_len == 0)
+			goto parse_error;
+
+		if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
+			goto parse_error;
+
+		i += proto_len;
+		}
+
+	r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
+				   s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+	if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+		if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+			OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+		s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+		if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+			{
+			*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			return -1;
+			}
+		memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
+		s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+parse_error:
+	*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+	return -1;
+	}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ *   SNI,
+ *   elliptic_curves
+ *   ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+	unsigned short type, size;
+	static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+		0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
+		0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
+		0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+		0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
+		0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
+		0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */
+
+		0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
+		0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
+		0x01,        /* 1 point format */
+		0x00,        /* uncompressed */
+	};
+
+	/* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+	static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+		0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
+		0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
+		0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
+		0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
+		0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
+		0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
+		0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+		0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+	};
+
+	if (data >= (d+n-2))
+		return;
+	data += 2;
+
+	if (data > (d+n-4))
+		return;
+	n2s(data,type);
+	n2s(data,size);
+
+	if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+		return;
+
+	if (data+size > d+n)
+		return;
+	data += size;
+
+	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+		const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+		if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+			return;
+		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+			return;
+		if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+			return;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+		if (data + len != d+n)
+			return;
+		if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+			return;
+		}
+
+	s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 
+	{	
 	unsigned short type;
 	unsigned short size;
 	unsigned short len;
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-	int sigalg_seen = 0;
+	size_t i;
 
 	s->servername_done = 0;
 	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
@@ -1190,11 +1929,53 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
 #endif
 
+	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+		}
+
+	/* Clear observed custom extensions */
+	s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
+	if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
+		s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
+		}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
 	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
 	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+		ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+	/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
+	if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
+		s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+		}
+	/* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
+	if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
+		s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+		}
+	/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+		{
+		s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
+		s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
+		}
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+	s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		goto ri_check;
 	n2s(data,len);
@@ -1348,13 +2129,13 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
 
-			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 
+				ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1383,14 +2164,14 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
 			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
 			ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
 
-			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+				ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1421,8 +2202,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -1469,15 +2249,14 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
 			{
 			int dsize;
-			if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 
+			if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 
 				{
 				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
 				}
-			sigalg_seen = 1;
 			n2s(data,dsize);
 			size -= 2;
-			if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 
+			if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) 
 				{
 				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1487,9 +2266,18 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
 				}
+			/* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
+			 * error.
+			 */
+			if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+					SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+				*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+				return 0;
+				}
 			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
 			{
 		
 			if (size < 5) 
@@ -1619,7 +2407,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-                         s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
+			 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
 			{
 			/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
 			 * renegotiation.
@@ -1640,6 +2429,18 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 #endif
 
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
+			 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
+			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+			{
+			if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
+				return 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+			/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+			}
+
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
                         {
@@ -1647,10 +2448,34 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 							      al))
 				return 0;
                         }
+		/* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is 
+		 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a 
+		 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
+		 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
+		 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
+		 */
+		else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
+			{
+			custom_srv_ext_record *record;
+
+			for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
+				{
+				record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
+				if (type == record->ext_type)
+					{
+					if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
+						return 0;
+					}						
+				}
+			}
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+			s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
 
 		data+=size;
 		}
-				
+
 	*p = data;
 
 	ri_check:
@@ -1661,19 +2486,39 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 		{
 		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-	 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+	 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
 				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 		return 0;
 		}
+	/* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
+	if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
+		ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
 
 	return 1;
 	}
 
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) 
+	{
+	int al = -1;
+	if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) 
+		{
+		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) 
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	return 1;
+}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
  * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
  * the length of the block. */
-static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
 	{
 	unsigned int off = 0;
 
@@ -1689,7 +2534,7 @@ static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
 	}
 #endif
 
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
 	{
 	unsigned short length;
 	unsigned short type;
@@ -1702,11 +2547,21 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
 #endif
 
+	if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+		s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+		}
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
 	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
 	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+	s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		goto ri_check;
 
@@ -1740,8 +2595,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -1787,8 +2641,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
 			}
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -1818,8 +2671,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				}
 			}
 #endif
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
 			{
 			/* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
 			 * a status request message.
@@ -1840,7 +2692,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			unsigned char selected_len;
 
 			/* We must have requested it. */
-			if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+			if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
 				return 0;
@@ -1867,6 +2719,52 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
 			}
 #endif
+
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
+			{
+			unsigned len;
+
+			/* We must have requested it. */
+			if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			if (size < 4)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			/* The extension data consists of:
+			 *   uint16 list_length
+			 *   uint8 proto_length;
+			 *   uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
+			len = data[0];
+			len <<= 8;
+			len |= data[1];
+			if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			len = data[2];
+			if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+				OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+			s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+			if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
+			s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+			}
+
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
 			{
 			if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
@@ -1896,8 +2794,35 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 							      al))
                                 return 0;
                         }
+		/* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but 
+		 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
+		 * callback */
+		else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
+			{
+			size_t i;
+			custom_cli_ext_record* record;
 
-		data+=size;		
+			for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
+				{
+				record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
+				if (record->ext_type == type)
+					{
+					if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
+						return 0;
+					break;
+					}
+				}			
+			}
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+			{
+			/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
+			if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
+				s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+			}
+#endif
+ 
+		data += size;
 		}
 
 	if (data != d+n)
@@ -1943,7 +2868,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 		{
 		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
 				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 		return 0;
 		}
@@ -1994,36 +2919,10 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 
 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	/* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 
-	 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension.  Note that the server is not
-	 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
-	 */
-
-	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
-	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-	
-	if (using_ecc)
-		{
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-		if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -2042,42 +2941,12 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
 		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
 
-	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
- 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
- 	 * the certificate has changed.
- 	 */
-	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-		{
-		int r;
-		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-		switch (r)
-			{
-			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* status request response should be sent */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
-				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
-				else
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* something bad happened */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
  	{
 		/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
 		 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
-		 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+		 * so this has to happen here in
+		 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
 
 		int r = 1;
 	
@@ -2129,8 +2998,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 			}
 	}
 
-#endif
  err:
+#endif
 	switch (ret)
 		{
 		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -2148,53 +3017,118 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	}
 
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
 	{
-	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
-	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+	int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+	int al;
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	/* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
-	 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
-	 * it must contain uncompressed.
-	 */
-	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
-	    (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
-	    ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+ 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
+ 	 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+	 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
+ 	 */
+	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
 		{
-		/* we are using an ECC cipher */
-		size_t i;
-		unsigned char *list;
-		int found_uncompressed = 0;
-		list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
-		for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+		int r;
+		CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+		certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+		/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+		if (certpkey == NULL)
 			{
-			if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
-				{
-				found_uncompressed = 1;
-				break;
-				}
+			s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+			return 1;
 			}
-		if (!found_uncompressed)
+		/* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+		 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+		 */
+		s->cert->key = certpkey;
+		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+		switch (r)
 			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		}
-	ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
-		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
-		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
-		{
-		/* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
+			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* status request response should be sent */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+				else
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* something bad happened */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+ err:
+	switch (ret)
+		{
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+			return -1;
+
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+			return 1; 
+
+		default:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+	/* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
+	 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
+	 * it must contain uncompressed.
+	 */
+	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+	if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
+	    (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
+	    ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+		{
+		/* we are using an ECC cipher */
+		size_t i;
+		unsigned char *list;
+		int found_uncompressed = 0;
+		list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+		for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
+			{
+			if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
+				{
+				found_uncompressed = 1;
+				break;
+				}
+			}
+		if (!found_uncompressed)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+			return -1;
+			}
+		}
+	ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+	if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 
+		ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
+		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
+		{
+		/* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
 		 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
 
 		if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
@@ -2260,6 +3194,25 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	}
 
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) 
+	{
+	int al = -1;
+	if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
+		return 1;
+	if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) 
+		{
+		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
  * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
  * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
@@ -2313,7 +3266,7 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 	if (p >= limit)
 		return -1;
 	/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
-	if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 		{
 		i = *(p++);
 		p+= i;
@@ -2449,7 +3402,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-	if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
 		return 2;
 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
@@ -2596,127 +3549,284 @@ const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
 		}
 	}
 
+static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
+	{
+	switch(sig_alg)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+		return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+		return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+	case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+		return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+#endif
+		}
+	return -1;
+	}
+
+/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
+static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
+			int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
+	{
+	int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
+	if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
+		return;
+	if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
+		{
+		hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
+					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+		if (phash_nid)
+			*phash_nid = hash_nid;
+		}
+	if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
+		{
+		sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
+					sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+		if (psign_nid)
+			*psign_nid = sign_nid;
+		}
+	if (psignhash_nid)
+		{
+		if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
+			OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
+							hash_nid, sign_nid);
+		else
+			*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
+		}
+	}
+/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
+static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
+				const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
+				const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
+	size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
+	for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
+		{
+		/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
+		if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+			continue;
+		for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
+			{
+			if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
+				{
+				nmatch++;
+				if (shsig)
+					{
+					shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
+					shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
+					tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
+						&shsig->sign_nid,
+						&shsig->signandhash_nid,
+						ptmp);
+					shsig++;
+					}
+				break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	return nmatch;
+	}
+
+/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
+static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
+	size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
+	size_t nmatch;
+	TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
+	CERT *c = s->cert;
+	unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
+	if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+		c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+		}
+	/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
+	if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
+		{
+		conf = c->client_sigalgs;
+		conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
+		{
+		conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
+		conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else
+		conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+	if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
+		{
+		pref = conf;
+		preflen = conflen;
+		allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
+		allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		allow = conf;
+		allowlen = conflen;
+		pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
+		preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+	if (!nmatch)
+		return 1;
+	salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+	if (!salgs)
+		return 0;
+	nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+	c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
+	c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
+	return 1;
+	}
+		
+
 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
 
 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
 	{
-	int i, idx;
+	int idx;
+	size_t i;
 	const EVP_MD *md;
 	CERT *c = s->cert;
 	TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
-	/* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
-	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+	/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+	if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
 		return 1;
 	/* Should never happen */
 	if (!c)
 		return 0;
 
-	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
-	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
-	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
-	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
-
-	if (c->sigalgs)
-		OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
-	c->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((dsize/2) * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
-	if (!c->sigalgs)
+	if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+		OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
+	c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
+	if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
 		return 0;
-	c->sigalgslen = dsize/2;
+	c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
+	memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
 
-	for (i = 0, sigptr = c->sigalgs; i < dsize; i += 2, sigptr++)
+	tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
 		{
-		sigptr->rhash = data[i];
-		sigptr->rsign = data[i + 1];
-		sigptr->hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rhash, tls12_md,
-					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-		sigptr->sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rsign, tls12_sig,
-					sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-		if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&sigptr->signandhash_nid,
-						sigptr->hash_nid,
-						sigptr->sign_nid))
-			sigptr->signandhash_nid = NID_undef;
-		switch(sigptr->rsign)
+		/* Use first set signature preference to force message
+		 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
+		 */
+		const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
+		if (s->server)
+			sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
+		else
+			sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
+		if (sigs)
 			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-			case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
-			idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
-			break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-			case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
-			idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
-			break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-			case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
-			idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
-			break;
-#endif
-			default:
-			continue;
+			idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
+			md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
+			c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+			c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+			if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+				{
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+				}
 			}
+		}
+#endif
 
-		if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
+	for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
+			i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
+		{
+		idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
+		if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
 			{
 			md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
-			if (md)
+			c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+			c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+			if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
 				{
-				c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
-				if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
-					c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
 				}
 			}
 
 		}
-
-
-	/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
-	 * supported it stays as NULL.
+	/* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
+	 * use the certificate for signing.
 	 */
+	if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
+		{
+		/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
+		 * not supported it stays as NULL.
+	 	 */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
+		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
+			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
-		{
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-		}
+		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
+			{
+			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+			}
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
+		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
+			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
+		}
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-#endif
 
 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
-			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignandhash,
+			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
 			unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
 	{
-	if (s->cert->sigalgs == NULL)
+	const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
+	if (psig == NULL)
 		return 0;
 	if (idx >= 0)
 		{
-		TLS_SIGALGS *psig;
-		if (idx >= (int)s->cert->sigalgslen)
+		idx <<= 1;
+		if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
 			return 0;
-		psig = s->cert->sigalgs + idx;
-		if (psign)
-			*psign = psig->sign_nid;
-		if (phash)
-			*phash = psig->hash_nid;
-		if (psignandhash)
-			*psignandhash = psig->signandhash_nid;
-		if (rsig)
-			*rsig = psig->rsign;
+		psig += idx;
 		if (rhash)
-			*rhash = psig->rhash;
+			*rhash = psig[0];
+		if (rsig)
+			*rsig = psig[1];
+		tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
 		}
-	return s->cert->sigalgslen;
+	return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+			unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+	{
+	TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
+	if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
+		return 0;
+	shsigalgs += idx;
+	if (phash)
+		*phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
+	if (psign)
+		*psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
+	if (psignhash)
+		*psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
+	if (rsig)
+		*rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
+	if (rhash)
+		*rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
+	return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
 	}
 	
 
@@ -2864,3 +3974,468 @@ tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	return ret;
 	}
 #endif
+
+#define MAX_SIGALGLEN	(TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
+
+typedef struct
+	{
+	size_t sigalgcnt;
+	int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
+	} sig_cb_st;
+
+static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+	{
+	sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
+	size_t i;
+	char etmp[20], *p;
+	int sig_alg, hash_alg;
+	if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
+		return 0;
+	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+		return 0;
+	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+	etmp[len] = 0;
+	p = strchr(etmp, '+');
+	if (!p)
+		return 0;
+	*p = 0;
+	p++;
+	if (!*p)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
+		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+	else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
+		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+	else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
+		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+	else return 0;
+
+	hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
+	if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
+		hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
+	if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
+		{
+		if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
+			&& sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
+	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
+ * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+	{
+	sig_cb_st sig;
+	sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
+	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
+		return 0;
+	if (c == NULL)
+		return 1;
+	return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
+	}
+
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
+	{
+	unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
+	int rhash, rsign;
+	size_t i;
+	if (salglen & 1)
+		return 0;
+	sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
+	if (sigalgs == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
+		{
+		rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
+					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+		rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
+				sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+
+		if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
+			goto err;
+		*sptr++ = rhash;
+		*sptr++ = rsign;
+		}
+
+	if (client)
+		{
+		if (c->client_sigalgs)
+			OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+		c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+		c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+			OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+		c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+		c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+
+	err:
+	OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+	{
+	int sig_nid;
+	size_t i;
+	if (default_nid == -1)
+		return 1;
+	sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+	if (default_nid)
+		return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+		if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+			return 1;
+	return 0;
+	}
+/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
+static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
+	{
+	X509_NAME *nm;
+	int i;
+	nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
+		{
+		if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
+			return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
+ * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to 
+ * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
+ * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
+ */
+
+/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
+
+#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
+	(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
+/* Strict mode flags */
+#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
+	 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
+	 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
+
+int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+									int idx)
+	{
+	int i;
+	int rv = 0;
+	int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
+	CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
+	CERT *c = s->cert;
+	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+	/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
+	if (idx != -1)
+		{
+		/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
+		if (idx == -2)
+			{
+			cpk = c->key;
+			idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+			}
+		else
+			cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+		x = cpk->x509;
+		pk = cpk->privatekey;
+		chain = cpk->chain;
+		strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
+		/* If no cert or key, forget it */
+		if (!x || !pk)
+			goto end;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+		/* Allow any certificate to pass test */
+		if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+			{
+			rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+			cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+			return rv;
+			}
+#endif
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (!x || !pk)
+			goto end;
+		idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
+		if (idx == -1)
+			goto end;
+		cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+		if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
+		else
+			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
+		strict_mode = 1;
+		}
+
+	if (suiteb_flags)
+		{
+		int ok;
+		if (check_flags)
+			check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+		ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
+		if (ok != X509_V_OK)
+			{
+			if (check_flags)
+				rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+			else
+				goto end;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
+	 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
+	 * and strict mode.
+	 */
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
+		{
+		int default_nid;
+		unsigned char rsign = 0;
+		if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+			default_nid = 0;
+		/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
+		else
+			{
+			switch(idx)
+				{	
+			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+			case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+				default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
+				break;
+
+			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+			case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
+				default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
+				break;
+
+			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+				default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				default_nid = -1;
+				break;
+				}
+			}
+		/* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
+		 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
+		 * sha1.
+		 */
+		if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
+			{
+			size_t j;
+			const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
+			for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
+				{
+				if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
+					break;
+				}
+			if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
+				{
+				if (check_flags)
+					goto skip_sigs;
+				else
+					goto end;
+				}
+			}
+		/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
+		if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
+			{
+			if (!check_flags) goto end;
+			}
+		else
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+			{
+			if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
+							default_nid))
+				{
+				if (check_flags)
+					{
+					rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+					break;
+					}
+				else
+					goto end;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
+	else if(check_flags)
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+	skip_sigs:
+	/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
+	if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
+	else if (!check_flags)
+		goto end;
+	if (!s->server)
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+	/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
+	else if (strict_mode)
+		{
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+			{
+			X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+			if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
+				{
+				if (check_flags)
+					{
+					rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+					break;
+					}
+				else
+					goto end;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	if (!s->server && strict_mode)
+		{
+		STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
+		int check_type = 0;
+		switch (pk->type)
+			{
+		case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+			check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+			break;
+		case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+			check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+			break;
+		case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+			check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+			break;
+		case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+		case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
+				{
+				int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
+				if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
+					check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
+				if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
+					check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
+				}
+			}
+		if (check_type)
+			{
+			const unsigned char *ctypes;
+			int ctypelen;
+			if (c->ctypes)
+				{
+				ctypes = c->ctypes;
+				ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+				ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
+				}
+			for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
+				{
+				if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
+					{
+					rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+					break;
+					}
+				}
+			if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
+				goto end;
+			}
+		else
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+
+		ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
+
+		if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+		if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+			{
+			if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
+				rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+			}
+		if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+			{
+			for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+				{
+				X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+				if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
+					{
+					rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+					break;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+			goto end;
+		}
+	else
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+	if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+
+	end:
+
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+		else if (cpk->digest)
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+		}
+	else
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+
+	/* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
+	 * if the chain is invalid.
+	 */
+	if (!check_flags)
+		{
+		if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
+			cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+		else
+			{
+			/* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+			cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	return rv;
+	}
+
+/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
+void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
+	{
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
+	}
+/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
+int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+	{
+	return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
+	}
+
+#endif