X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_enc.c;h=fdd20d900925dd46db8fb715727a213650ce8182;hp=1c14637072ebf13b16e8ee56287f09f182a2342a;hb=c6913eeb762edffddecaaba5c84909d7a7962927;hpb=7532071aa3ad7845b53f6943327c75b7c0b3e37c

diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c
index 1c14637072..fdd20d9009 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 	{
         int i;
         for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
-		printf("%02x", key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
+		printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]);  printf("\n");
         }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
@@ -456,7 +456,11 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
 	j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
 	               cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
 	/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
-	k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+	/* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+		k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+	else
+		k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
 	if (	(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
 		(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
 		{
@@ -539,13 +543,43 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 	}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+		{
+		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
+		}
+	else	
+		EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
 
 	/* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
 	if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
 				*mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+	if (s->msg_callback)
+		{
+		int wh = which & SSL3_CC_WRITE ? TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_WRITE : 0;
+		if (*mac_secret_size)
+			s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MAC,
+						mac_secret, *mac_secret_size,
+						s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+		if (c->key_len)
+			s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh | TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_KEY,
+						key, c->key_len,
+						s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+		if (k)
+			{
+			if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+				wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_FIXED_IV;
+			else
+				wh |= TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_IV;
+			s->msg_callback(2, s->version, wh, iv, k,
+						s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
 { int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
@@ -657,12 +691,21 @@ err:
 	return(ret);
 	}
 
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ *       short etc).
+ *   1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ *   -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ *       an internal error occured.
+ */
 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	{
 	SSL3_RECORD *rec;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 	unsigned long l;
-	int bs,i,ii,j,k,pad=0;
+	int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
 	const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
 	if (send)
@@ -681,7 +724,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 			int ivlen;
 			enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
 			/* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
-			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+			if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
 				&& EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 				ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
 			else
@@ -719,11 +762,11 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 	printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
-		(enc == NULL))
+	if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
 		{
 		memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
 		rec->input=rec->data;
+		ret = 1;
 		}
 	else
 		{
@@ -736,7 +779,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 			seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
 
-			if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+			if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
 				{
 				unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
 
@@ -787,13 +830,13 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-                unsigned long ui;
+		unsigned long ui;
 		printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
-                        ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+			ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
 		printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
-                        ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
-                        DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
-                        ds->cipher->iv_len);
+			ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+			DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+			ds->cipher->iv_len);
 		printf("\t\tIV: ");
 		for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
 		printf("\n");
@@ -806,80 +849,41 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
 		if (!send)
 			{
 			if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
-				{
-				if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
-					return -1;
-				SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
-				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
 				return 0;
-				}
 			}
 		
-		if (!EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l))
+		i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+		if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+						?(i<0)
+						:(i==0))
 			return -1;	/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
+			{
+			rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+			rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+			rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+			}
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 		{
-                unsigned long i;
-                printf("\trec->data=");
+		unsigned long i;
+		printf("\trec->data=");
 		for (i=0; i<l; i++)
-                        printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
-                }
+			printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]);  printf("\n");
+		}
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
+		ret = 1;
+		if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+			mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 		if ((bs != 1) && !send)
-			{
-			ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
-			i++;
-			/* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
-			 * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
-			 * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
-			 * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
-			 * now or no buggy implementation supports compression 
-			 * [steve]
-			 */
-			if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
-				&& !s->expand)
-				{
-				/* First packet is even in size, so check */
-				if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
-					"\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
-					s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
-				if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
-					i--;
-				}
-			/* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
-			 * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
-			if (i > (int)rec->length)
-				{
-				/* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
-				 * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
-				 * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
-				 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
-				return -1;
-				}
-			for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
-				{
-				if (rec->data[j] != ii)
-					{
-					/* Incorrect padding */
-					return -1;
-					}
-				}
-			rec->length -=i;
-			if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
-				&& EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
-				{
-				rec->data += bs;    /* skip the explicit IV */
-				rec->input += bs;
-				rec->length -= bs;
-				}
-			}
+			ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
 		if (pad && !send)
 			rec->length -= pad;
 		}
-	return(1);
+	return ret;
 	}
+
 int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
 	{
 	unsigned int ret;
@@ -972,7 +976,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	size_t md_size;
 	int i;
 	EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
-	unsigned char buf[5]; 
+	unsigned char header[13];
 	int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
 	int t;
 
@@ -993,12 +997,6 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 	OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
 	md_size=t;
 
-	buf[0]=rec->type;
-	buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
-	buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
-	buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
-	buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
-
 	/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
 	if (stream_mac) 
 		{
@@ -1010,24 +1008,58 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
 			mac_ctx = &hmac;
 		}
 
-	if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+	if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
 		{
 		unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
 
 		s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
 		memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
 
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8);
+		memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
 		}
 	else
-		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8);
+		memcpy(header, seq, 8);
 
-	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
-	EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
-	t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
-	OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+	header[8]=rec->type;
+	header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+	header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+	header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+	header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
+
+	if (!send &&
+	    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+	    ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+		{
+		/* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+		 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+		 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+		 * timing-oracle. */
+		ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+			mac_ctx,
+			md, &md_size,
+			header, rec->input,
+			rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+			ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+			0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+		EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+		t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+		OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (!send && FIPS_mode())
+			tls_fips_digest_extra(
+	    				ssl->enc_read_ctx,
+					mac_ctx, rec->input,
+					rec->length, rec->orig_len);
+#endif
+		}
 		
-	if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+	if (!stream_mac)
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("sec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
@@ -1039,7 +1071,7 @@ printf("rec=");
 {unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
 #endif
 
-	if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+	if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl))
 		{
 		for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
 			{
@@ -1097,12 +1129,119 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
 	BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO
+	if (s->msg_callback)
+		{
+		s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER,
+						p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+		s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM,
+					s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+						s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+		s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM,
+					s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+					s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+		s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER,
+					s->session->master_key,
+					SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE,
+					s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+		}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 	return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
 	}
 
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+	 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
+	 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buff;
+	unsigned char *val = NULL;
+	size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+	int rv;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+	buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+	if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
+
+	/* construct PRF arguments
+	 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
+	 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
+	 * does not create a prohibited label.
+	 */
+	vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+	if (use_context)
+		{
+		vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+		}
+
+	val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+	if (val == NULL) goto err2;
+	currentvalpos = 0;
+	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
+	currentvalpos += llen;
+	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+	memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+	currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+	if (use_context)
+		{
+		val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+		currentvalpos++;
+		val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+		currentvalpos++;
+		if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
+			{
+			memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* disallow prohibited labels
+	 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
+	 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
+	 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+	 */
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+	if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+		 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+
+	rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+		      val, vallen,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      NULL, 0,
+		      s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+		      out,buff,olen);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+	goto ret;
+err1:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+	rv = 0;
+	goto ret;
+err2:
+	SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+	rv = 0;
+ret:
+	if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
+	if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
+	return(rv);
+	}
+
 int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 	{
 	switch (code)
@@ -1137,9 +1276,6 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
 	case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
 	case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
-	case SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME:return(TLS1_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME);
-#endif
 #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
 	case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return 
 					  (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
@@ -1147,27 +1283,3 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
 	default:			return(-1);
 		}
 	}
-
-int SSL_tls1_key_exporter(SSL *s, unsigned char *label, int label_len,
-                           unsigned char *context, int context_len,
-                           unsigned char *out, int olen)
-	{
-	unsigned char *tmp;
-	int rv;
-
-	tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
-
-	if (!tmp)
-		return 0;
-	
-	rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
-			 label, label_len,
-			 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-			 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
-			 context, context_len, NULL, 0,
-			 s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length,
-			 out, tmp, olen);
-
-	OPENSSL_free(tmp);
-	return rv;
-	}