X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_srvr.c;h=a6b8a87092718e9d32ed3f26cd33957a1a299ec1;hp=3294be99183500a4a238478103c62cd3b03bc272;hb=f046afb0663fc4514f7fc5d1724439caa6858932;hpb=d4d78943798df19e5e6ba7c2b1512f1bfa926d2d diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c index 3294be9918..a6b8a87092 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c @@ -1,112 +1,12 @@ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ + /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * @@ -147,7 +47,6 @@ * OTHERWISE. */ - #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" @@ -164,8 +63,9 @@ static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, - int sslv2format, int *al); + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) + **skp, int sslv2format, + int *al); /* * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake @@ -181,7 +81,7 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_BEFORE: case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { @@ -201,13 +101,29 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 * list if we requested a certificate) */ - if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE - && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request - || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) - && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; - return 1; + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) + && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { + /* + * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just + * not going to accept it because we require a client + * cert. + */ + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, + SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, + SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); + return 0; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; + return 1; + } + } else { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; + return 1; + } } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; @@ -297,6 +213,8 @@ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) } /* No valid transition found */ + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } @@ -319,7 +237,7 @@ static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) * the server certificate contains the server's public key for * key exchange. */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE) + if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE) /* * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if * provided @@ -335,7 +253,7 @@ static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) #endif - ) { + ) { return 1; } @@ -366,11 +284,11 @@ static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) * RFC 2246): */ && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) - /* - * ... except when the application insists on - * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts - * this for SSL 3) - */ + /* + * ... except when the application insists on + * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts + * this for SSL 3) + */ || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) @@ -393,113 +311,113 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { - case TLS_ST_BEFORE: - /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */; - return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - - case TLS_ST_OK: - /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - - case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + switch (st->hand_state) { + case TLS_ST_BEFORE: + /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified - && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) - st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; - else - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: - return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: - if (s->hit) { - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; - else - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; - } else { - /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ - /* normal PSK or SRP */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & - (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; - } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; - } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; - } else { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; - } - } - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified + && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) + st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } - /* Fall through */ + case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: - if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { + case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: + if (s->hit) { + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; + } else { + /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ + /* normal PSK or SRP */ + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & + (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; + } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } - /* Fall through */ - - case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: - if (send_certificate_request(s)) { + } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; } - /* Fall through */ + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ - case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: - return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - - case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: - if (s->hit) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; - } else { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; - } + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: + if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ - case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; + case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: + if (send_certificate_request(s)) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* Fall through */ - case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: - if (s->hit) { - return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - } + case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + + case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: + if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; + } else { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: + if (s->hit) { + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } } @@ -511,17 +429,17 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); + dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); break; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); + dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s); /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ st->use_timer = 0; } @@ -592,19 +510,24 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) s->init_num = 0; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + return WORK_ERROR; + } break; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ - if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + return WORK_ERROR; + } /* * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to * treat like it was the first packet @@ -626,8 +549,9 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, + 0) <= 0) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } @@ -650,7 +574,8 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) + { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } @@ -698,7 +623,7 @@ int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s); @@ -775,7 +700,7 @@ unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; @@ -814,7 +739,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); @@ -854,7 +779,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); @@ -863,11 +788,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ - BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - /* Are we renegotiating? */ - && s->renegotiate - && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ + BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + /* Are we renegotiating? */ + && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); @@ -924,8 +848,8 @@ int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s) } unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *cookie, - unsigned char cookie_len) + unsigned char *cookie, + unsigned char cookie_len) { unsigned int msg_len; unsigned char *p; @@ -961,10 +885,9 @@ int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) } len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], - s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); + s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, - len); + dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len); len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* number of bytes to write */ @@ -1013,7 +936,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) - || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { + || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { /* * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record @@ -1045,7 +968,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ - if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) { + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; @@ -1089,8 +1012,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET challenge; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -1157,15 +1080,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0) - return 1; + return 1; } } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; } /* Could be empty. */ extensions = *pkt; @@ -1176,16 +1099,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie), - PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) { + PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == + 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } - /* default verification */ - } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, - s->d1->cookie_len)) { + /* default verification */ + } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -1260,8 +1183,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) id = s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", - sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); + fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); #endif for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); @@ -1482,7 +1404,8 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (rv < 0) { @@ -1491,17 +1414,19 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } - cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); + cipher = + ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (cipher == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, - ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); + ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); if (s->session->not_resumable) /* do not send a session ticket */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; @@ -1520,8 +1445,8 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) /*- * we now have the following setup. * client_random - * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers - * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers + * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers + * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers * compression - basically ignored right now * ssl version is set - sslv3 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. @@ -1531,7 +1456,7 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { + if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto f_err; @@ -1557,7 +1482,7 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) */ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } } @@ -1685,6 +1610,7 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; + int j; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; @@ -1697,7 +1623,7 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) int al, i; unsigned long type; int n; - BIGNUM *r[4]; + const BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4], kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); @@ -1779,7 +1705,7 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto err; } - s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp, NID_undef); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp); if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); @@ -1813,7 +1739,7 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } - s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(NULL, nid); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); /* Generate a new key for this curve */ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -1822,10 +1748,8 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } /* Encode the public key. */ - encodedlen = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->tmp.pkey), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - &encodedPoint, NULL); - + encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey, + &encodedPoint); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; @@ -1875,11 +1799,21 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) n += 1 + nr[i]; else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + /*- + * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS + * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length + * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here + */ + if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) + n += 2 + nr[0]; + else #endif n += 2 + nr[i]; } - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) { if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) { @@ -1887,6 +1821,11 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto f_err; } kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + /* Allow space for signature algorithm */ + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + kn += 2; + /* Allow space for signature length */ + kn += 2; } else { pkey = NULL; kn = 0; @@ -1902,10 +1841,19 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (type & SSL_PSK) { /* copy PSK identity hint */ if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) { - s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p); - strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, - strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint)); - p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); + size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); + if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + /* + * Should not happen - we already checked this when we set + * the identity hint + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + s2n(len, p); + memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len); + p += len; } else { s2n(0, p); } @@ -1918,6 +1866,20 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) *p = nr[i]; p++; } else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + /*- + * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS + * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length + * as the prime + */ + if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) { + s2n(nr[0], p); + for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) { + *p = 0; + ++p; + } + } else #endif s2n(nr[i], p); BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); @@ -1969,13 +1931,13 @@ int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 - || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { + || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 + || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; @@ -2057,10 +2019,8 @@ int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s) for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean - (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; @@ -2087,508 +2047,561 @@ int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s) return 0; } -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { - int al; - unsigned long alg_k; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa = NULL; -#endif -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) - EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; -#endif - PACKET enc_premaster; - unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ - if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { - unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; - size_t psklen; - PACKET psk_identity; - - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); - goto f_err; - } + unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; + size_t psklen; + PACKET psk_identity; - if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); + return 0; + } - psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, - psk, sizeof(psk)); + if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } else if (psklen == 0) { - /* - * PSK related to the given identity not found - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - goto f_err; - } + psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, + psk, sizeof(psk)); - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); - s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); - OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); + if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } else if (psklen == 0) { + /* + * PSK related to the given identity not found + */ + *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + return 0; + } - if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); + s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); - s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; + if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } - if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { - /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ - if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - } else + + s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; + + return 1; +#else + /* Should never happen */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - int decrypt_len; - unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; - size_t j; - - /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ - rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); - if (rsa == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); - goto f_err; - } +} - /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { - enc_premaster = *pkt; - } else { - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - } +static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + int decrypt_len; + unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; + size_t j, padding_len; + PACKET enc_premaster; + RSA *rsa = NULL; + unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL; + int ret = 0; - /* - * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to - * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret - * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because - * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. - */ - if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); - goto f_err; - } + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); + if (rsa == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); + return 0; + } - rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); - if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + enc_premaster = *pkt; + } else { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; } + } - /* - * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of - * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, - * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and - * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt - * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 - */ + /* + * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to + * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret + * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because + * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. + */ + if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } - if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, - sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) { - goto err; - } + rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); + if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } - decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), - PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), - rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); - ERR_clear_error(); + /* + * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of + * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, + * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and + * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt + * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 + */ - /* - * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will - * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. - */ - decrypt_good = - constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); + if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) + goto err; - /* - * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then - * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The - * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack - * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number - * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in - * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. - */ - version_good = - constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], - (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); - version_good &= - constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1], - (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); + /* + * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of + * the timing-sensitive code below. + */ + decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), + PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), + rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); + if (decrypt_len < 0) + goto err; - /* - * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the - * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the - * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). - * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol - * version instead if the server does not support the requested - * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such - * clients. - */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { - unsigned char workaround_good; - workaround_good = - constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); - workaround_good &= - constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1], - (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); - version_good |= workaround_good; - } + /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ - /* - * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to - * remain non-zero (0xff). - */ - decrypt_good &= version_good; + /* + * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys + * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures + * PS is at least 8 bytes. + */ + if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } - /* - * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using - * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not - * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees - * it is still sufficiently large to read from. - */ - for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { - rsa_decrypt[j] = - constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j], - rand_premaster_secret[j]); - } + padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; + decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) & + constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2); + for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { + decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]); + } + decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]); - if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, - sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); - rsa_decrypt = NULL; - } else + /* + * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then + * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The + * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack + * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number + * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in + * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. + */ + version_good = + constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], + (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); + version_good &= + constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], + (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); + + /* + * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the + * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the + * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). + * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol + * version instead if the server does not support the requested + * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such + * clients. + */ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { + unsigned char workaround_good; + workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len], + (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); + workaround_good &= + constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1], + (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); + version_good |= workaround_good; + } + + /* + * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to + * remain non-zero (0xff). + */ + decrypt_good &= version_good; + + /* + * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using + * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not + * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees + * it is still sufficiently large to read from. + */ + for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { + rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] = + constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, + rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j], + rand_premaster_secret[j]); + } + + if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len, + sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + err: + OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); + return ret; +#else + /* Should never happen */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; #endif +} + +static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; - DH *cdh; + EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; + DH *cdh; + unsigned int i; + BIGNUM *pub_key; + const unsigned char *data; + EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, + SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); + goto err; + } + skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; + if (skey == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto err; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto err; + } + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { + /* We already checked we have enough data */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); + if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); + pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); + + if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (pub_key != NULL) + BN_free(pub_key); + goto err; + } + + if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; + err: + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); + return ret; +#else + /* Should never happen */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; + EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { + /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); + goto err; + } else { unsigned int i; - BIGNUM *pub_key; const unsigned char *data; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) { - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } - i = 0; - } - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto err; - } - skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; - if (skey == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } + /* + * Get client's public key from encoded point in the + * ClientKeyExchange message. + */ - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { - /* We already checked we have enough data */ - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + /* Get encoded point length */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); - if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); + if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } - cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); - pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); - - if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - if (pub_key != NULL) - BN_free(pub_key); + if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } + } - if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } + if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } - EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - ckey = NULL; - EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); - s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; + ret = 1; + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; + err: + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - } else + return ret; +#else + /* Should never happen */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; #endif +} -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; +static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + unsigned int i; + const unsigned char *data; - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { - /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } else { - unsigned int i; - const unsigned char *data; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); + return 0; + } + if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + return 0; + } + if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + return 0; + } + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); + s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); + if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } - /* - * Get client's public key from encoded point in the - * ClientKeyExchange message. - */ + if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - /* Get encoded point length */ - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); - if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), data, i, - NULL) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } + return 1; +#else + /* Should never happen */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +#endif +} - if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; +static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; + EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; + unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; + const unsigned char *start; + size_t outlen = 32, inlen; + unsigned long alg_a; + int Ttag, Tclass; + long Tlen; + long sess_key_len; + const unsigned char *data; + int ret = 0; + + /* Get our certificate private key */ + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { + /* + * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too + */ + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; + if (pk == NULL) { + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; + } + if (pk == NULL) { + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; } + } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { + pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; + } - EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - ckey = NULL; - EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); - s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); + if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* + * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe + * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from + * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a + * client certificate for authorization only. + */ + client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if (client_pub_pkey) { + if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) + ERR_clear_error(); + } + /* Decrypt session key */ + sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, + &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED + || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + start = data; + inlen = Tlen; + if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt + (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + goto err; + } + /* Generate master secret */ + if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, + sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl + (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) + s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; - return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - } else + ret = 1; + err: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + return ret; +#else + /* Should never happen */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; #endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - unsigned int i; - const unsigned char *data; +} - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 - || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); - s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + int al = -1; + unsigned long alg_k; - if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } else -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; - EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; - unsigned char premaster_secret[32]; - const unsigned char *start; - size_t outlen = 32, inlen; - unsigned long alg_a; - int Ttag, Tclass; - long Tlen; - long sess_key_len; - const unsigned char *data; + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - /* Get our certificate private key */ - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { - /* - * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too - */ - pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; - if (pk == NULL) { - pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; - } - if (pk == NULL) { - pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; - } - } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { - pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; - } + /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ + if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) + goto err; - pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); - if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - /* - * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe - * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from - * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a - * client certificate for authorization only. - */ - client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (client_pub_pkey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) - ERR_clear_error(); - } - /* Decrypt session key */ - sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto gerr; - } - if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, - &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED - || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE - || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto gerr; - } - start = data; - inlen = Tlen; - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt - (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { + /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto gerr; + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } - /* Generate master secret */ - if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, - sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { + /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ + if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto gerr; + goto err; } - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl - (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) - s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; - - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - gerr: - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - goto f_err; - } else -#endif - { + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { + if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); - goto f_err; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); + goto err; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) err: -#endif -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) - EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); -#endif - OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); + if (al != -1) + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; @@ -2612,8 +2625,9 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, + 0) <= 0) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR;; } @@ -2625,13 +2639,13 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B) - /* Is this SCTP? */ - && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - /* Are we renegotiating? */ - && s->renegotiate - /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ - && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) - && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { + /* Is this SCTP? */ + && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + /* Are we renegotiating? */ + && s->renegotiate + /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ + && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) + && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); @@ -2643,17 +2657,17 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } #endif - if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) { - /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */ - BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); - s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; + if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) { + /* + * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need + * the handshake_buffer + */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + return WORK_ERROR; + } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } else { - if (!s->session->peer) { - /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */ - BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); - return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; - } if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -2756,7 +2770,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) - || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; @@ -2782,7 +2796,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); @@ -2845,8 +2858,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) - || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -2854,7 +2867,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -3045,7 +3058,22 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1) < 0) + /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */ + int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, + hctx, 1); + + if (ret == 0) { + l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ + s2n(0, p); /* length */ + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header + (s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s))) + goto err; + OPENSSL_free(senc); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); + return 1; + } + if (ret < 0) goto err; iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); } else { @@ -3122,34 +3150,35 @@ int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; + size_t msglen; + /*- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + + * follows handshake_header_length + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) * + (ocsp response) */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) { - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; - } + msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) + goto err; - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - /* do the header */ - *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; - /* message length */ - l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); /* status type */ *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; /* length of OCSP response */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); /* actual response */ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); - /* number of bytes to write */ - s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; - s->init_off = 0; + + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen)) + goto err; return 1; + + err: + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG @@ -3176,8 +3205,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto err; } - if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, - &next_proto_len)) { + if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) { s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; goto err; } @@ -3185,7 +3213,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; -err: + err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } @@ -3196,8 +3224,7 @@ err: STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, - int sslv2format, int *al - ) + int sslv2format, int *al) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; @@ -3224,7 +3251,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) { sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ - if(sk == NULL) { + if (sk == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return NULL; @@ -3247,7 +3274,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. */ if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') - continue; + continue; /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&