X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_lib.c;h=e6e61f787686d188fc065a08dd6b62e78bfbe108;hp=7b1811543cc94269ad1adb966f8b68e81a1acc31;hb=60690b5b8396d7d5234cd067206190fb8aca78d2;hpb=88050dd1960bfaba7ede12a3ce1afe40f5deb124 diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index 7b1811543c..e6e61f7876 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -19,6 +19,21 @@ #include #include +/* + * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. + */ +typedef struct x509err2alert_st { + int x509err; + int alert; +} X509ERR2ALERT; + +/* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ +const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { + 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, + 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, + 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c +}; + /* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) @@ -36,12 +51,15 @@ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway + * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, - (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - written)) - return -1; - + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, + (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + written)) + return -1; if (written == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, @@ -87,7 +105,7 @@ int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the * ClientHello. */ - if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { + if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; @@ -114,37 +132,18 @@ int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) } if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept, 1, &i, - s->session_ctx->lock); - } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* Renegotiation is disabled */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - return 0; - } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && - !(s->options & - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* - * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't - * support secure renegotiation. - */ - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); } else { /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate, 1, &i, - s->ctx->lock); + tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; } } else { - int discard; if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect, 1, &discard, - s->session_ctx->lock); + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); else - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate, - 1, &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); /* mark client_random uninitialized */ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); @@ -204,9 +203,10 @@ static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; } else { size_t retlen; + long retlen_l; - retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); - if (retlen <= 0) { + retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); + if (retlen_l <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; @@ -382,9 +382,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -397,6 +394,11 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto err; } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without @@ -511,7 +513,7 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) size_t slen; /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ - if (!s->server) + if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; /* @@ -637,9 +639,12 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should - * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). + * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We + * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already + * sent close_notify. */ - if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) + if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED + && (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0) s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { @@ -650,21 +655,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen * to far. */ -static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) +int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; size_t slen; - /* - * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set - * the appropriate error. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) - return; + if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; @@ -673,12 +672,17 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender, - slen, - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = + s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); + + if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; } -#endif MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { @@ -748,8 +752,20 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ - if (s->server) - s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (s->server) { + /* + * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We + * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less + * than TLSv1.3 + */ + s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } /* * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the @@ -808,7 +824,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (s->server) { - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && + !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; @@ -997,20 +1014,10 @@ unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is * freed up as well. */ -WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) +WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) { - int discard; void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { - WORK_STATE ret; - ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); - if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) - return ret; - } -#endif - if (clearbufs) { if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* @@ -1028,44 +1035,74 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) s->init_num = 0; } + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server + && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; + + /* + * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 + * post handshake exchange + */ if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->server) { - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); - - /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good, 1, &discard, - s->ctx->lock); - s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; - } else { /* - * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the * NewSessionTicket */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); + s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { + /* + * We are finishing after the client. We start the timer going + * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight + * required. + */ + dtls1_start_timer(s); + } + } else { + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, + * so we remove this one from the cache. + */ + if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode + & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + } else { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + } if (s->hit) - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit, 1, &discard, - s->session_ctx->lock); + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good, 1, - &discard, s->session_ctx->lock); - } + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { + /* + * We are finishing after the server. We start the timer going + * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight + * required. + */ + dtls1_start_timer(s); + } + } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ @@ -1076,14 +1113,23 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) } } - /* - * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, - * so continue. - */ - if (!clearbufs) - return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + + if (!stop) { + /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } @@ -1117,6 +1163,17 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); return 0; } + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE + && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { + /* + * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is + * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. + * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do + * not return success until we see the second ClientHello + * with a valid cookie. + */ + return 0; + } s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; s->init_num = readbytes - 1; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; @@ -1213,14 +1270,15 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) n -= readbytes; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for * Finished verification. */ - if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) - ssl3_take_mac(s); -#endif + if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { @@ -1237,13 +1295,25 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) /* * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of * processing the message + * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished + * message. */ - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST - && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, - s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - /* SSLfatal() already called */ - *len = 0; - return 0; +#define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) + /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET + && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO + || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + || memcmp(hrrrandom, + s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + } } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, @@ -1255,73 +1325,59 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) return 1; } -int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) +static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { + {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + + /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ + {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} +}; + +int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) { - int al; + const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; - switch (type) { - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: - case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: - case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: - case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: - case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: - al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - break; - default: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; - break; - } - return al; + for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) + if (tp->x509err == x509err) + break; + return tp->alert; } int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) @@ -1432,6 +1488,41 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) return 0; } +/* + * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable + * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise + * returns 0. + */ +static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) +{ + int i; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) + return 1; +#endif + + if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) + return 1; + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ + switch (i) { + case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: + continue; + default: + break; + } + if (ssl_has_cert(s, i)) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + /* * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by * `SSL *` instance @@ -1441,7 +1532,7 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) * * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 */ -int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) +int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; @@ -1461,9 +1552,14 @@ int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) for (vent = table; vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; ++vent) { - if (vent->cmeth != NULL && - version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && - ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { + if (vent->cmeth != NULL + && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 + && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 + && (!s->server + || version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || is_tls13_capable(s))) { + if (meth != NULL) + *meth = vent->cmeth(); return 1; } } @@ -1572,11 +1668,18 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) { if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION - && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; - } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION - && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) - || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION + /* + * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 + * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still + * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and + * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is + * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. + */ + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; } else { *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; @@ -1642,6 +1745,10 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; + /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ + if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; unsigned int best_vers = 0; @@ -1655,30 +1762,23 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } + /* + * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. + * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: + * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with + * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to + * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." + * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. + * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. + */ + if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) + return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; + while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { - /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ - if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) - candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about - * whether to ignore versions version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; - ++vent) - continue; - if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { - const SSL_METHOD *method; - - method = vent->smeth(); - if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { - best_vers = candidate_vers; - best_method = method; - } - } + if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) + best_vers = candidate_vers; } if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { /* Trailing data? */ @@ -1686,10 +1786,10 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) } if (best_vers > 0) { - if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { /* - * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this - * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 + * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we + * negotiated TLSv1.3 */ if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; @@ -1747,8 +1847,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; - int highver = 0; - int origv; + int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; origv = s->version; s->version = version; @@ -1762,7 +1861,8 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) return 0; } - if (s->hello_retry_request && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE + && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { s->version = origv; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); @@ -1794,64 +1894,62 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) break; } - for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { - const SSL_METHOD *method; - int err; - - if (vent->cmeth == NULL) - continue; - - if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version) - continue; + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); + if (ret != 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) + : s->version < ver_min) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) + : s->version > ver_max) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } - method = vent->cmeth(); - err = ssl_method_error(s, method); - if (err != 0) { - if (s->version == vent->version) { - s->version = origv; - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, - SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err); - return 0; - } + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) + real_max = ver_max; - continue; + /* Check for downgrades */ + if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls12downgrade), + sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION + && real_max > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls11downgrade), + sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; } - if (highver == 0) - highver = vent->version; + } - if (s->version != vent->version) + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) continue; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE - /* Check for downgrades */ - if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) { - if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, - s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - - sizeof(tls12downgrade), - sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { - s->version = origv; - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, - SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, - SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - return 0; - } - } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) - && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION - && highver > s->version) { - if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, - s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - - sizeof(tls11downgrade), - sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { - s->version = origv; - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, - SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, - SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); - return 0; - } - } -#endif - - s->method = method; + s->method = vent->cmeth(); return 1; } @@ -1866,6 +1964,9 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) * @s: The SSL connection * @min_version: The minimum supported version * @max_version: The maximum supported version + * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole + * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled + * protocol. * * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx @@ -1880,9 +1981,10 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ -int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) +int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, + int *real_max) { - int version; + int version, tmp_real_max; int hole; const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *method; @@ -1899,6 +2001,12 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ *min_version = *max_version = s->version; + /* + * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version + * flexible method. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) + return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; @@ -1931,6 +2039,9 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) */ *min_version = version = 0; hole = 1; + if (real_max != NULL) + *real_max = 0; + tmp_real_max = 0; for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { /* * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the @@ -1938,15 +2049,22 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) */ if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { hole = 1; + tmp_real_max = 0; continue; } method = vent->cmeth(); + + if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) + tmp_real_max = vent->version; + if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { hole = 1; } else if (!hole) { single = NULL; *min_version = method->version; } else { + if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) + *real_max = tmp_real_max; version = (single = method)->version; *min_version = version; hole = 0; @@ -1974,7 +2092,14 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) { int ver_min, ver_max, ret; - ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); + /* + * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent + * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return 0; + + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); if (ret != 0) return ret; @@ -2019,19 +2144,25 @@ int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, #endif /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ -int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) +int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, + size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, + size_t hrrlen) { - unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - size_t hashlen = 0; + unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); - /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) - || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { - /* SSLfatal() already called */ - return 0; + if (hashval == NULL) { + hashval = hashvaltmp; + hashlen = 0; + /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), + &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } } /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ @@ -2049,6 +2180,20 @@ int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) return 0; } + /* + * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted + * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after + * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. + */ + if (hrr != NULL + && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->s3->tmp.message_size + + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + return 1; } @@ -2177,3 +2322,54 @@ size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, *ptbs = tbs; return tbslen; } + +/* + * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, + * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once + */ +int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + + s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, + s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest + * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request + */ +int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, + s->pha_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; +}