X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_lib.c;h=c92c8b5ff898328e5dacfe5bb43d28b1279b66a8;hp=a7f2a0f5d78cb1e1d805f51c3c199ac581927676;hb=67dc995eaf538ea309c6292a1a5073465201f55b;hpb=cd99883755f428ac47e8e2ccb21333b675ec22d9 diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index a7f2a0f5d7..c92c8b5ff8 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -7,17 +8,12 @@ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. - */ - #include #include #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include @@ -72,12 +68,446 @@ int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) return 1; } +int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) +{ + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) + return 0; + + /* Reset any extension flags */ + memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); + + if (s->server) { + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); + int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; + + /* + * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers + * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the + * ClientHello. + */ + if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && + DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) + ok = 1; + } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { + ok = 1; + } + if (ok) + break; + } + if (!ok) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " + "SSL/TLS version"); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; + } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { + /* Renegotiation is disabled */ + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + return 0; + } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !(s->options & + SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { + /* + * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't + * support secure renegotiation. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return 0; + } else { + s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; + + s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; + } + } else { + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; + else + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; + + /* mark client_random uninitialized */ + memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); + s->hit = 0; + + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + s->statem.use_timer = 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: + * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator + */ +#define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 +#define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) + +static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, + void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) +{ + static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; + static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + size_t hashlen; + + /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ + memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); + /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); + else + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); + + /* + * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake + * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because + * that includes the CertVerify itself. + */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { + memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, + s->cert_verify_hash_len); + hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; + } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { + return 0; + } + + *hdata = tls13tbs; + *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; + } else { + size_t retlen; + + retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); + if (retlen <= 0) + return 0; + *hdatalen = retlen; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char *sig = NULL; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; + + if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; + + if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the data to be signed */ + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); + if (sig == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key) + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { + + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + int pktype = lu->sig; + + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) + BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); + } +#endif + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) + goto err; + + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const unsigned char *data; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; +#endif + int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + int j; + unsigned int len; + X509 *peer; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + + peer = s->session->peer; + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); + if (pkey == NULL) + goto f_err; + + if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto f_err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + int rv; + unsigned int sigalg; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey); + if (rv == -1) { + goto f_err; + } else if (rv == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ + /* + * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without + * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) + && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 + && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 + && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { + len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); + } else +#endif + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto f_err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { + if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); + data = gost_data; + } + } +#endif + + if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto f_err; + } + } + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto f_err; + } + if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); + if (j <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + if (0) { + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + } + BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); + s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + OPENSSL_free(gost_data); +#endif + return ret; +} + int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { size_t finish_md_len; const char *sender; size_t slen; + /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ + if (!s->server) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + + /* + * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the + * client certificate + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !s->server + && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 + && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + /* + * This is a fatal error, which leaves + * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state + * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. + */ + return 0; + } + if (s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; @@ -101,16 +531,29 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) goto err; } + /* + * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for + * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, + s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ + if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } if (!s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; @@ -122,6 +565,82 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) return 0; } +int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; + return 1; + + err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + int al; + unsigned int updatetype; + + s->key_update_count++; + if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); + goto err; + } + + /* + * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must + * be on a record boundary. + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + goto err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we + * didn't recognise. + */ + if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED + && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need + * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should + * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). + */ + if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) + s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; + + if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen @@ -152,111 +671,6 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) } #endif -/* - * Comparison function used in a call to qsort (see tls_collect_extensions() - * below.) - * The two arguments |p1| and |p2| are expected to be pointers to RAW_EXTENSIONs - * - * Returns: - * 1 if the type for p1 is greater than p2 - * 0 if the type for p1 and p2 are the same - * -1 if the type for p1 is less than p2 - */ -static int compare_extensions(const void *p1, const void *p2) -{ - const RAW_EXTENSION *e1 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p1; - const RAW_EXTENSION *e2 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p2; - - if (e1->type < e2->type) - return -1; - else if (e1->type > e2->type) - return 1; - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Gather a list of all the extensions. We don't actually process the content - * of the extensions yet, except to check their types. - * - * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be - * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. - * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their - * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully - * parsed, or an internal error occurred. - */ -/* - * TODO(TLS1.3): Refactor ServerHello extension parsing to use this and then - * remove tls1_check_duplicate_extensions() - */ -int tls_collect_extensions(PACKET *packet, RAW_EXTENSION **res, - size_t *numfound, int *ad) -{ - PACKET extensions = *packet; - size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; - RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL; - - /* First pass: count the extensions. */ - while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) { - unsigned int type; - PACKET extension; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || - !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { - *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto err; - } - num_extensions++; - } - - if (num_extensions > 0) { - raw_extensions = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*raw_extensions) - * num_extensions); - if (raw_extensions == NULL) { - *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Second pass: collect the extensions. */ - for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet, &raw_extensions[i].type) || - !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet, - &raw_extensions[i].data)) { - /* This should not happen. */ - *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - - if (PACKET_remaining(packet) != 0) { - *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto err; - } - /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ - qsort(raw_extensions, num_extensions, sizeof(*raw_extensions), - compare_extensions); - for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { - if (raw_extensions[i - 1].type == raw_extensions[i].type) { - *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } - } - - *res = raw_extensions; - *numfound = num_extensions; - return 1; - - err: - OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions); - return 0; -} - - - MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; @@ -273,14 +687,14 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } } else { if (remain != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; @@ -326,11 +740,26 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; + int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t md_len; + + /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ + if (s->server) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the + * message must be on a record boundary. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + goto f_err; + } + /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); goto f_err; @@ -355,18 +784,49 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ + if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } if (s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; } + /* + * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing + * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->server) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, + &s->session->master_key_length)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) + goto f_err; + } + } + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -385,18 +845,150 @@ int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) return 1; } -unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) +/* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, + int *al) +{ + int len; + unsigned char *outbytes; + + len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); + if (len < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) + || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, + chain, al)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) +{ + int i, chain_count; + X509 *x; + STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + X509_STORE *chain_store; + int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) + return 1; + + x = cpk->x509; + + /* + * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. + */ + if (cpk->chain != NULL) + extra_certs = cpk->chain; + else + extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) + chain_store = NULL; + else if (s->cert->chain_store) + chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; + else + chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; + + if (chain_store != NULL) { + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto err; + } + /* + * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we + * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately + * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying + * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can + */ + (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); + /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ + ERR_clear_error(); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); + if (i != 1) { +#if 0 + /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); +#endif + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + goto err; + } + chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); + for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + goto err; + } + } + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + } else { + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); + if (i != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + goto err; + } + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) + goto err; + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) + goto err; + } + } + return 1; + + err: + *al = tmpal; + return 0; +} + +unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, + int *al) { + int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) - || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk) + || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = tmpal; return 0; } return 1; } -WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) +/* + * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result + * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is + * freed up as well. + */ +WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) { void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; @@ -409,26 +1001,27 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } #endif - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); - - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - /* - * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf - * in case there are any unexpected retransmits - */ - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf = NULL; + if (clearbufs) { + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* + * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf + * in case there are any unexpected retransmits + */ + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf = NULL; + } + if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) + return WORK_ERROR; + s->init_num = 0; } - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); - - s->init_num = 0; - - if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) { + if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; + s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; + + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->server) { ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); @@ -436,7 +1029,12 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; } else { - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; @@ -461,6 +1059,14 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } } + /* + * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, + * so continue. + */ + if (!clearbufs) + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } @@ -509,7 +1115,8 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) skip_message = 0; if (!s->server) - if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) + if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK + && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if @@ -613,8 +1220,13 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, - s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* + * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of + * processing the message + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST + && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); *len = 0; @@ -630,33 +1242,6 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) return 1; } -int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) -{ - if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) - return -1; - - switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { - default: - return -1; - case EVP_PKEY_RSA: - return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; - case EVP_PKEY_DSA: - return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - case EVP_PKEY_EC: - return SSL_PKEY_ECC; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; - case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; - case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: - return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; -#endif - } -} - int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) { int al; @@ -754,6 +1339,7 @@ typedef struct { # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. #endif +/* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, @@ -787,6 +1373,7 @@ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. #endif +/* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, @@ -828,8 +1415,6 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; - else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) - return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; return 0; } @@ -971,6 +1556,20 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) return 1; } +static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) +{ + if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION + && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) + || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; + } else { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + } +} + /* * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and @@ -980,7 +1579,7 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ -int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) +int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) { /*- * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: @@ -1002,16 +1601,24 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) switch (server_version) { default: - if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) - return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) + return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + /* + * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't + * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope + * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol + * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return + * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + */ + return 0; + } /* - * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't - * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope - * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol - * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return - * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after + * a HelloRetryRequest */ - return 0; + /* fall thru */ case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; @@ -1020,24 +1627,17 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) break; } - suppversions = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts, - hello->num_extensions, - TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions); + suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): We only look at this if our max protocol version is TLS1.3 - * or above. Should we allow it for lower versions too? - */ - if (suppversions != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) - && (s->max_proto_version == 0 - || TLS1_3_VERSION <= s->max_proto_version)) { + if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; unsigned int best_vers = 0; const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; PACKET versionslist; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist) - || PACKET_remaining(&suppversions->data) != 0) { + suppversions->parsed = 1; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { /* Trailing or invalid data? */ return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } @@ -1046,14 +1646,18 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; - if ((int)candidate_vers > s->client_version) - s->client_version = candidate_vers; + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about + * whether to ignore versions version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; - ++vent); - if (vent->version != 0) { + ++vent) + continue; + if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { const SSL_METHOD *method; method = vent->smeth(); @@ -1069,6 +1673,16 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) } if (best_vers > 0) { + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this + * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 + */ + if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + return 0; + } + check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); s->version = best_vers; s->method = best_method; return 0; @@ -1095,6 +1709,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) continue; method = vent->smeth(); if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { + check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); s->version = vent->version; s->method = method; return 0; @@ -1111,18 +1726,32 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) * * @s: client SSL handle. * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. + * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random + * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ -int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) +int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; + int highver = 0; + + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ + if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) + version = TLS1_3_VERSION; + + if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + } switch (s->method->version) { default: - if (version != s->version) + if (version != s->version) { + *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + } /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope @@ -1143,24 +1772,64 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) const SSL_METHOD *method; int err; - if (version != vent->version) - continue; if (vent->cmeth == NULL) - break; + continue; + + if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version) + continue; + method = vent->cmeth(); err = ssl_method_error(s, method); - if (err != 0) - return err; + if (err != 0) { + if (version == vent->version) { + *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + return err; + } + + continue; + } + if (highver == 0) + highver = vent->version; + + if (version != vent->version) + continue; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE + /* Check for downgrades */ + if (checkdgrd) { + if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) { + if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls12downgrade), + sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; + } + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && version < TLS1_2_VERSION + && highver > version) { + if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls11downgrade), + sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; + } + } + } +#endif + s->method = method; s->version = version; return 0; } + *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } /* - * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version + * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version * @s: The SSL connection * @min_version: The minimum supported version * @max_version: The maximum supported version @@ -1168,7 +1837,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B - * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, + * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. * * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, @@ -1178,8 +1847,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ -int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, - int *max_version) +int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) { int version; int hole; @@ -1263,7 +1931,7 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, /* * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for - * the initial ClientHello. + * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. * * @s: client SSL handle. * @@ -1273,11 +1941,189 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) { int ver_min, ver_max, ret; - ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); if (ret != 0) return ret; - s->client_version = s->version = ver_max; + s->version = ver_max; + + /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) + ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; + + s->client_version = ver_max; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is + * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be + * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is + * 1) or 0 otherwise. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups, + size_t num_groups, int checkallow) +{ + size_t i; + + if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { + if (group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0) + && (!checkallow + || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + +/* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ +int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + size_t hashlen = 0; + unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; + + memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + + /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) + return 0; + + /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ + msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; + msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen; + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +{ + return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); +} + +int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + PACKET cadns; + + if (ca_sk == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto decerr; + } + /* get the CA RDNs */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto decerr; + } + + while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { + const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; + unsigned int name_len; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto decerr; + } + + namestart = namebytes; + if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto decerr; + } + if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto decerr; + } + + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + } + xn = NULL; + } + + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); + s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; + + return 1; + + decerr: + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + err: + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); + X509_NAME_free(xn); return 0; } + +int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); + + /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) + return 0; + + if (ca_sk != NULL) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { + unsigned char *namebytes; + X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); + int namelen; + + if (name == NULL + || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, + &namebytes) + || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { + return 0; + } + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ +size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, + const void *param, size_t paramlen) +{ + size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; + unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); + + if (tbs == NULL) + return 0; + memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); + + *ptbs = tbs; + return tbslen; +}