X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_lib.c;h=2f78a3f60251b015ef408b69fde6c51f6ce52572;hp=d2962437c6bd70554b82ff9319721df92c5000d3;hb=bcc1f3e2baa9caa83a0a94bd19fb37488ef3ee57;hpb=eb5fd03bb2ae358b103d1c69577131f2f20c562a diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index d2962437c6..2f78a3f602 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html @@ -19,6 +19,21 @@ #include #include +/* + * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. + */ +typedef struct x509err2alert_st { + int x509err; + int alert; +} X509ERR2ALERT; + +/* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ +const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { + 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, + 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, + 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c +}; + /* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) @@ -31,27 +46,30 @@ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num, &written); if (ret < 0) - return (-1); + return -1; if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway + * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ - if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, - (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - written)) - return -1; - + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, + (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + written)) + return -1; if (written == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); - return (1); + return 1; } s->init_off += written; s->init_num -= written; - return (0); + return 0; } int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) @@ -70,8 +88,10 @@ int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) { - if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; + } /* Reset any extension flags */ memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); @@ -85,9 +105,9 @@ int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the * ClientHello. */ - if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { @@ -104,39 +124,26 @@ int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) break; } if (!ok) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, + SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " "SSL/TLS version"); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return 0; } if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; - } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* Renegotiation is disabled */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); - return 0; - } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && - !(s->options & - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* - * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't - * support secure renegotiation. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return 0; + /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); } else { - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; } } else { if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); else - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); /* mark client_random uninitialized */ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); @@ -188,6 +195,7 @@ static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } @@ -195,10 +203,14 @@ static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; } else { size_t retlen; + long retlen_l; - retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); - if (retlen <= 0) + retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); + if (retlen_l <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; + } *hdatalen = retlen; } @@ -218,41 +230,47 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Get the data to be signed */ if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); if (sig == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } @@ -260,7 +278,8 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } } @@ -271,11 +290,13 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) s->session->master_key) || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } @@ -291,13 +312,16 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) #endif if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; + } OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); @@ -305,7 +329,6 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) err: OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -316,7 +339,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; #endif - int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; int j; unsigned int len; @@ -329,51 +351,55 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; if (mctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } peer = s->session->peer; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); - if (pkey == NULL) - goto f_err; + if (pkey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, - SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); + goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - int rv; unsigned int sigalg; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); + goto err; } - rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey); - if (rv == -1) { - goto f_err; - } else if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", + md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without @@ -390,35 +416,37 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } else #endif if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); + fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", + md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { @@ -427,8 +455,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); data = gost_data; @@ -440,8 +469,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; } } if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { @@ -449,29 +479,37 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, (int)s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; } if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; } } else { j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); if (j <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; } } - ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - } + /* + * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client + * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the + * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest + * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We + * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual + * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. + */ + if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + else + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + err: BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); @@ -488,7 +526,7 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) size_t slen; /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ - if (!s->server) + if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; /* @@ -499,13 +537,8 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) && !s->server && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); - /* - * This is a fatal error, which leaves - * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state - * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash. - */ + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } @@ -521,15 +554,16 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md); if (finish_md_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } /* @@ -539,16 +573,17 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } if (!s->server) { memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, @@ -561,36 +596,29 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) } return 1; - err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; } int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; return 1; - - err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; unsigned int updatetype; s->key_update_count++; if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* @@ -598,16 +626,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * be on a record boundary. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* @@ -616,47 +644,39 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, + SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should - * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). + * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We + * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already + * sent close_notify. */ - if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) + if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED + && (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0) s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; - err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen * to far. */ -static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) +int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; size_t slen; - /* - * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set - * the appropriate error. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) - return; + if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; @@ -665,16 +685,20 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender, - slen, - s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = + s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, + s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); + + if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; } -#endif MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al; size_t remain; remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); @@ -688,32 +712,32 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { if (remain != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -733,62 +757,69 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t md_len; /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ - if (s->server) - s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (s->server) { + /* + * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We + * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less + * than TLSv1.3 + */ + s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } /* * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the * message must be on a record boundary. */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (s->server) { memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, @@ -806,40 +837,39 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (s->server) { - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && + !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, &s->session->master_key_length)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); - goto f_err; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) - goto f_err; } } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -847,42 +877,42 @@ int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) } /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ -static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, - int *al) +static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) { int len; unsigned char *outbytes; len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); if (len < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, + ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, - chain, al)) + chain)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; + } return 1; } /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ -static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) +static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { int i, chain_count; X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; X509_STORE *chain_store; - int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) return 1; @@ -908,13 +938,15 @@ static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (xs_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return 0; } /* * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we @@ -935,52 +967,58 @@ static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); #endif X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; } chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); - if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); - goto err; + return 0; } } X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); } else { i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); if (i != 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); - goto err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + return 0; + } + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; } - if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) - goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); - if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) - goto err; + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } } } return 1; - - err: - *al = tmpal; - return 0; } -unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, - int *al) +unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { - int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) + return 0; - if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) - || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) - || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *al = tmpal; + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + return 1; } @@ -989,19 +1027,10 @@ unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is * freed up as well. */ -WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) +WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) { void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { - WORK_STATE ret; - ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); - if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) - return ret; - } -#endif - if (clearbufs) { if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* @@ -1011,46 +1040,65 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; } - if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) + if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; + } s->init_num = 0; } + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server + && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; + + /* + * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 + * post handshake exchange + */ if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->server) { - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); - - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; - s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; - } else { /* - * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the * NewSessionTicket */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); + s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; + } else { + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, + * so we remove this one from the cache. + */ + if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode + & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + } else { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + } if (s->hit) - s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; - s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); } - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; @@ -1060,21 +1108,30 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs) } } - /* - * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do, - * so continue. - */ - if (!clearbufs) - return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + + if (!stop) { + /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) { /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ - int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; + int skip_message, i, recvd_type; unsigned char *p; size_t l, readbytes; @@ -1096,10 +1153,21 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) * in the middle of a handshake message. */ if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return 0; + } + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE + && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { + /* + * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is + * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. + * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do + * not return success until we see the second ClientHello + * with a valid cookie. + */ + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; s->init_num = readbytes - 1; @@ -1107,9 +1175,10 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; return 1; } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return 0; } s->init_num += readbytes; } @@ -1157,9 +1226,9 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) n2l3(p, l); /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); - goto f_err; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; @@ -1168,9 +1237,6 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) } return 1; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; } int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) @@ -1199,21 +1265,21 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) n -= readbytes; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for * Finished verification. */ - if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) - ssl3_take_mac(s); -#endif + if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ *len = 0; return 0; } @@ -1224,14 +1290,25 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) /* * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of * processing the message + * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished + * message. */ - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST - && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, - s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *len = 0; - return 0; +#define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) + /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET + && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO + || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + || memcmp(hrrrandom, + s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + } } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, @@ -1243,73 +1320,59 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) return 1; } -int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) +static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { + {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + + /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ + {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} +}; + +int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) { - int al; + const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; - switch (type) { - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: - case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: - case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: - case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: - case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: - case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: - case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: - case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: - case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: - case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: - case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - break; - case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: - al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - break; - default: - al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; - break; - } - return (al); + for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) + if (tp->x509err == x509err) + break; + return tp->alert; } int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) @@ -1336,7 +1399,7 @@ typedef struct { const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); } version_info; -#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION +#if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. #endif @@ -1370,7 +1433,7 @@ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { {0, NULL, NULL}, }; -#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION +#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. #endif @@ -1420,6 +1483,62 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) return 0; } +/* + * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable + * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise + * returns 0. + */ +static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) +{ + int i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + int curve; + EC_KEY *eckey; +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) + return 1; +#endif + + if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) + return 1; + + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ + switch (i) { + case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: + continue; + default: + break; + } + if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) + continue; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) + return 1; + /* + * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is + * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this + * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. + */ + eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); + if (eckey == NULL) + continue; + curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); + if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) + return 1; +#else + return 1; +#endif + } + + return 0; +} + /* * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by * `SSL *` instance @@ -1429,7 +1548,7 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) * * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 */ -int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) +int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; @@ -1449,9 +1568,14 @@ int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) for (vent = table; vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; ++vent) { - if (vent->cmeth != NULL && - version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && - ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { + if (vent->cmeth != NULL + && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 + && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 + && (!s->server + || version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || is_tls13_capable(s))) { + if (meth != NULL) + *meth = vent->cmeth(); return 1; } } @@ -1542,12 +1666,12 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: - if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) + if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) return 0; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: - if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || + if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) || DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) return 0; break; @@ -1560,11 +1684,18 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) { if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION - && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; - } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION - && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION) - || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) { + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION + /* + * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 + * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still + * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and + * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is + * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. + */ + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; } else { *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; @@ -1586,7 +1717,7 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: * * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, - * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. + * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. * * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the * handle version. @@ -1630,6 +1761,10 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; + /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ + if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; unsigned int best_vers = 0; @@ -1643,30 +1778,23 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } + /* + * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. + * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: + * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with + * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to + * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." + * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. + * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. + */ + if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) + return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; + while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { - /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ - if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) - candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about - * whether to ignore versions version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; - ++vent) - continue; - if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { - const SSL_METHOD *method; - - method = vent->smeth(); - if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { - best_vers = candidate_vers; - best_method = method; - } - } + if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) + best_vers = candidate_vers; } if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { /* Trailing data? */ @@ -1674,10 +1802,10 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) } if (best_vers > 0) { - if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { /* - * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this - * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3 + * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we + * negotiated TLSv1.3 */ if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; @@ -1727,31 +1855,44 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) * * @s: client SSL handle. * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. - * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random - * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated + * @extensions: The extensions received * - * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. + * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. */ -int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) +int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; - int highver = 0; + int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; - /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ - if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) - version = TLS1_3_VERSION; + origv = s->version; + s->version = version; - if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { - *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, + NULL, 0)) { + s->version = origv; + return 0; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE + && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; } switch (s->method->version) { default: - if (version != s->version) { - *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + if (s->version != s->method->version) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; } /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't @@ -1760,7 +1901,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ - return 0; + return 1; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; @@ -1769,64 +1910,69 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) break; } - for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { - const SSL_METHOD *method; - int err; - - if (vent->cmeth == NULL) - continue; + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); + if (ret != 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) + : s->version < ver_min) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) + : s->version > ver_max) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } - if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version) - continue; + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) + real_max = ver_max; - method = vent->cmeth(); - err = ssl_method_error(s, method); - if (err != 0) { - if (version == vent->version) { - *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - return err; - } - - continue; + /* Check for downgrades */ + if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls12downgrade), + sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) + && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION + && real_max > s->version) { + if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, + s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls11downgrade), + sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; } - if (highver == 0) - highver = vent->version; + } - if (version != vent->version) + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) continue; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE - /* Check for downgrades */ - if (checkdgrd) { - if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) { - if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, - s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - - sizeof(tls12downgrade), - sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; - } - } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) - && version < TLS1_2_VERSION - && highver > version) { - if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, - s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - - sizeof(tls11downgrade), - sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; - } - } - } -#endif - - s->method = method; - s->version = version; - return 0; + s->method = vent->cmeth(); + return 1; } - *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; } /* @@ -1834,6 +1980,9 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) * @s: The SSL connection * @min_version: The minimum supported version * @max_version: The maximum supported version + * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole + * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled + * protocol. * * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx @@ -1848,9 +1997,10 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al) * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ -int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) +int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, + int *real_max) { - int version; + int version, tmp_real_max; int hole; const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *method; @@ -1867,6 +2017,12 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ *min_version = *max_version = s->version; + /* + * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version + * flexible method. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) + return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; @@ -1899,6 +2055,9 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) */ *min_version = version = 0; hole = 1; + if (real_max != NULL) + *real_max = 0; + tmp_real_max = 0; for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { /* * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the @@ -1906,15 +2065,22 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version) */ if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { hole = 1; + tmp_real_max = 0; continue; } method = vent->cmeth(); + + if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) + tmp_real_max = vent->version; + if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { hole = 1; } else if (!hole) { single = NULL; *min_version = method->version; } else { + if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) + *real_max = tmp_real_max; version = (single = method)->version; *min_version = version; hole = 0; @@ -1942,7 +2108,14 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) { int ver_min, ver_max, ret; - ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); + /* + * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent + * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return 0; + + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); if (ret != 0) return ret; @@ -1964,7 +2137,7 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) * 1) or 0 otherwise. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups, +int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, size_t num_groups, int checkallow) { size_t i; @@ -1972,10 +2145,12 @@ int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups, if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) return 0; - for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) { - if (group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0) + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + uint16_t group = groups[i]; + + if (group_id == group && (!checkallow - || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { + || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { return 1; } } @@ -1985,31 +2160,53 @@ int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups, #endif /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ -int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s) +int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, + size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, + size_t hrrlen) { - unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - size_t hashlen = 0; + unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); - /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) - || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + if (hashval == NULL) { + hashval = hashvaltmp; + hashlen = 0; + /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), + &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } } /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ - if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; + } /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; - msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen; + msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* + * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted + * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after + * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. + */ + if (hrr != NULL + && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->s3->tmp.message_size + + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } @@ -2021,21 +2218,22 @@ static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); } -int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) +int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); X509_NAME *xn = NULL; PACKET cadns; if (ca_sk == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto decerr; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; } /* get the CA RDNs */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto decerr; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { @@ -2044,23 +2242,26 @@ int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto decerr; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } namestart = namebytes; if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto decerr; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; } if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto decerr; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } xn = NULL; @@ -2071,21 +2272,36 @@ int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 1; - decerr: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; err: sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); X509_NAME_free(xn); return 0; } -int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) { - const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); + const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; + + if (s->server) { + ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); + if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) + ca_sk = NULL; + } + + if (ca_sk == NULL) + ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); + + return ca_sk; +} +int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) +{ /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ - if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; + } if (ca_sk != NULL) { int i; @@ -2100,26 +2316,34 @@ int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, &namebytes) || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } - if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; + } return 1; } /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ -size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, +size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, const void *param, size_t paramlen) { size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); - if (tbs == NULL) + if (tbs == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; + } memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); @@ -2128,3 +2352,54 @@ size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(const SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, *ptbs = tbs; return tbslen; } + +/* + * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, + * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once + */ +int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + + s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, + s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest + * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request + */ +int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, + s->pha_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; +}