X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_clnt.c;h=8c658da8990d6e1e93fb9e57c759e5c0997aa534;hp=6313b31a0809b401678a41b62f8baee5ed9cb218;hb=1bf4cb0fe3b00e1c501a04ace4e3e3145314cb20;hpb=5cc807da2571c52cc7c1c87197a81963def7ee3a diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index 6313b31a08..8c658da899 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include @@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); @@ -160,6 +162,26 @@ static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE; return 1; } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { +#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION +# error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message. +#endif + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) { + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED; + /* + * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the + * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding + * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the + * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished? + */ + if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; + } + } break; } @@ -354,6 +376,20 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) err: /* No valid transition found */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + BIO *rbio; + + /* + * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably + * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it. + */ + s->init_num = 0; + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); + BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); + return 0; + } SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); @@ -382,6 +418,25 @@ static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + /* + * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after + * we already sent close_notify + */ + if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) { + /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + } + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) @@ -498,8 +553,16 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: - /* We only get here in TLSv1.3 */ - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + /* + * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a + * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one + * because we did early data. + */ + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0 + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: @@ -546,7 +609,9 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: - if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { + if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA; } else { #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) @@ -655,9 +720,11 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA: + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1); + case TLS_ST_OK: /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ - return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1); + return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1); } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; @@ -687,8 +754,6 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly. */ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) { - if (!statem_flush(s)) - return WORK_MORE_A; if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ @@ -723,12 +788,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) break; case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: - if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) break; if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING && s->max_early_data > 0) { - if (statem_flush(s) != 1) - return WORK_MORE_A; /* * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead @@ -790,11 +853,17 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return WORK_MORE_B; if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { + if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return WORK_ERROR; } + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return WORK_ERROR; + } + } } break; @@ -1058,7 +1127,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) } if (sess == NULL - || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) + || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL) || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) { if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { @@ -1143,8 +1212,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; session_id = s->tmp_session_id; if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE - && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id, - sess_id_len) <= 0) { + && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -1154,14 +1222,14 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) sess_id_len = 0; } } else { + assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id)); sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) { s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len; memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len); } } - if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) - || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id, sess_id_len)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { @@ -1349,7 +1417,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) unsigned int compression; unsigned int sversion; unsigned int context; - int discard; RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; @@ -1556,8 +1623,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->session->ext.tick_identity != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) { - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard, - s->session_ctx->lock); + tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss); if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; @@ -1731,7 +1797,7 @@ static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1. */ - if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) { + if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } @@ -1853,7 +1919,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. */ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { - SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result), + SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result), SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto err; @@ -2147,7 +2213,8 @@ static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey) * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not * server has sent an invalid curve. */ - if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) { + if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE + || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); return 0; @@ -2272,9 +2339,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -2286,6 +2350,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { @@ -2386,13 +2454,24 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET reqctx, extensions; RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { + /* + * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3 + * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so + * we just ignore it + */ + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + } + /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL; s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0; + OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); + s->pha_context = NULL; - /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */ - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) || + !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -2443,13 +2522,17 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET sigalgs; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) { + /* + * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility + * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field. + */ + if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); @@ -2471,7 +2554,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; @@ -2491,16 +2574,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL; PACKET nonce; + PACKET_null_init(&nonce); + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce) - || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce, - &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len))) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce))) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) - || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) - || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) - && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) { + || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen) + : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; @@ -2523,8 +2605,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * cache. */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) { - int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; SSL_SESSION *new_sess; + /* * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new * one @@ -2536,9 +2618,12 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto err; } - if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) { + if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0 + && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* - * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails + * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that + * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the + * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails */ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); } @@ -2577,10 +2662,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET extpkt; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0 - || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, - SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, - &exts, NULL, 1) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts, + NULL, 1) || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, exts, NULL, 0, 1)) { @@ -2612,9 +2703,36 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto err; } s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; + s->session->not_resumable = 0; /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md); + size_t hashlen; + static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption"; + + /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ + if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; + + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret, + nonce_label, + sizeof(nonce_label) - 1, + PACKET_data(&nonce), + PACKET_remaining(&nonce), + s->session->master_key, + hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + s->session->master_key_length = hashlen; + OPENSSL_free(exts); ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; @@ -2873,7 +2991,7 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ - if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) { + if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; @@ -3094,7 +3212,7 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) /* Generate session key * TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ - || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) { + || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; @@ -3344,8 +3462,12 @@ WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } - if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) + if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) { + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) { + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; + } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */ wst = WORK_MORE_B; @@ -3390,6 +3512,8 @@ WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } } + if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } @@ -3401,14 +3525,19 @@ WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in - * later - */ - if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, - SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->pha_context == NULL) { + /* no context available, add 0-length context */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL @@ -3587,8 +3716,13 @@ int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) int i; size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; + /* Set disabled masks for this session */ - ssl_set_client_disabled(s); + if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, + SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); + return 0; + } if (sk == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,