X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_clnt.c;h=84dcf08bd46c1c50038549b63b9636a3802785cb;hp=cba0ece62fd4111650f513287ea3818f548c9a9f;hb=0baed5e90b5c211b092a1279b0dac50166cd34d2;hpb=0217dd19c00657b8bfd2bce1090785eb32abb235 diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index cba0ece62f..84dcf08bd4 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ #include #include +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt); + static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); @@ -106,22 +108,107 @@ static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) return 0; } +/* + * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed + * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the + * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The + * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. + * + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) + */ +static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time + * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 + */ + + /* + * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't + * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by + * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() + */ + + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + if (s->hit) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + } else { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; + } + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; + return 1; + } + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; + return 1; + } + break; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED; + return 1; + } + break; + + } + + /* No valid transition found */ + return 0; +} + /* * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * - * Return values are: - * 1: Success (transition allowed) - * 0: Error (transition not allowed) + * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error + * (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ske_expected; + /* + * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going + * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt)) + goto err; + return 1; + } + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; @@ -258,9 +345,6 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) return 1; } break; - - default: - break; } err: @@ -271,14 +355,72 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) } /* - * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next - * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. + * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to + * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the + * server. + */ +static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s) +{ + OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time + * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3 + */ + + /* + * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, + * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are + * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition(). + */ + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT + : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: + /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */ + st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY + : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } +} + +/* + * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to + * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; + /* + * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what + * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until + * later + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s); + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_OK: /* Renegotiation - fall through */ case TLS_ST_BEFORE: @@ -367,10 +509,6 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } - - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } } @@ -383,6 +521,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No pre work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -408,14 +550,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); #endif } - return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + break; case TLS_ST_OK: return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); - - default: - /* No pre work to be done */ - break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; @@ -432,6 +570,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) s->init_num = 0; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No post work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; @@ -493,10 +635,12 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) #endif if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_B; - break; - default: - /* No post work to be done */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) + return WORK_ERROR; + } break; } @@ -504,63 +648,79 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) } /* - * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server. + * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the + * client * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ -int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s) +int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + confunc_f *confunc, int *mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return 0; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + else + *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: - return tls_construct_client_hello(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; + break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: - return tls_construct_client_certificate(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE; + break; case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: - return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; + break; case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: - return tls_construct_client_verify(s); - - case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); - else - return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_client_verify; + *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; + break; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: - return tls_construct_next_proto(s); + *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto; + *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; + break; #endif case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: - return tls_construct_finished(s, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); - - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ + *confunc = tls_construct_finished; + *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED; break; } - return 0; + return 1; } /* * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ -unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) +size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return 0; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; @@ -598,12 +758,9 @@ unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH; } - - return 0; } /* @@ -614,6 +771,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); @@ -644,12 +805,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; + case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt); } - - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* @@ -661,6 +819,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return WORK_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); @@ -678,39 +840,31 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; #endif - - default: - break; } - - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WORK_ERROR; } -int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { unsigned char *p; - int i; - int protverr; + size_t sess_id_len; + int i, protverr; int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; - WPACKET pkt; - if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf) - || !WPACKET_set_max_size(&pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { /* Should not happen */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); if (protverr != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); - goto err; + return 0; } if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) || @@ -721,7 +875,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || (sess->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) - goto err; + return 0; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ @@ -744,13 +898,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) i = 1; if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) - goto err; - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } + return 0; /*- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from @@ -781,108 +929,90 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. + * + * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the + * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions. */ - if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(&pkt, s->client_version, 2) - || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } /* Session ID */ if (s->new_session) - i = 0; + sess_id_len = 0; else - i = s->session->session_id_length; - if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id) - || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(&pkt, 1) - || (i != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, s->session->session_id, i)) - || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) { + sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length; + if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id, + sess_id_len)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) - || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(&pkt, 1) - || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len) - || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) { + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } } /* Ciphers supported */ - if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(&pkt, 2)) { + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */ - if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &pkt)) - goto err; - if (!WPACKET_close(&pkt)) { + if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) + return 0; + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } /* COMPRESSION */ - if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(&pkt, 1)) { + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); - if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(&pkt, comp->id, 1)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } } } #endif /* Add the NULL method */ - if (!WPACKET_put_bytes(&pkt, 0, 1) || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } /* TLS extensions */ - if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_len(&pkt, 2) - /* - * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the - * extensions length bytes - */ - || !WPACKET_set_flags(&pkt, - OPENSSL_WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH) - || !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, &pkt, &al) - || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) { + if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if (!WPACKET_close(&pkt) || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + return 0; } return 1; - err: - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return 0; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; - unsigned int cookie_len; + size_t cookie_len; PACKET cookiepkt; if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) @@ -917,13 +1047,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; - PACKET session_id; + PACKET session_id, extpkt; size_t session_id_len; const unsigned char *cipherchars; int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; unsigned int compression; unsigned int sversion; + unsigned int context; int protverr; + RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif @@ -952,17 +1084,23 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->hit = 0; /* Get the session-id. */ - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); - if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id - || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id); + if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id + || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + PACKET_null_init(&session_id); + session_id_len = 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) { @@ -983,14 +1121,21 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the * server wants to resume. */ - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && - s->session->tlsext_tick) { + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->tlsext_tick) { const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; - s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); + /* + * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for + * backwards compat reasons + */ + int master_key_length; + master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &s->session->master_key_length, + &master_key_length, NULL, &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { + s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg) + && master_key_length > 0) { + s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length; s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); } else { @@ -1030,8 +1175,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->session->ssl_version = s->version; s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; /* session_id_len could be 0 */ - memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), - session_id_len); + if (session_id_len > 0) + memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), + session_id_len); } /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ @@ -1091,11 +1237,16 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; /* lets get the compression algorithm */ /* COMPRESSION */ - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } else { + compression = 0; } + #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (compression != 0) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; @@ -1139,17 +1290,20 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) #endif /* TLS extensions */ - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - /* wrong packet length */ + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) { + PACKET_null_init(&extpkt); + } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto f_err; } + + context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO + : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO; + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al)) + goto f_err; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; @@ -1166,7 +1320,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) - goto err; + goto f_err; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, @@ -1174,11 +1328,27 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } #endif + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise + * we're done with this message + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s) + || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) + || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); + OPENSSL_free(extensions); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } @@ -1190,19 +1360,23 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + size_t chain; + unsigned int context = 0; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { + if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context)) + || context != 0 + || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + for (chain = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chain++) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -1224,6 +1398,23 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + PACKET extensions; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, + &rawexts, &al) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, + rawexts, x, chain, &al)) + goto f_err; + } + if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; @@ -1232,7 +1423,21 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); - if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && i <= 0) { + /* + * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order + * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place. + * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set + * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes + * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was + * reverted because at least one application *only* set + * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused + * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did + * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags + * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the + * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is + * set. The *documented* interface remains the same. + */ + if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); @@ -1363,18 +1568,19 @@ static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) return 0; } + /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */ if ((s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), - PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL + (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), - PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL + (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), - PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL + (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL || (s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), - PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { + (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); return 0; @@ -1424,10 +1630,12 @@ static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) goto err; } - p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); - g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL); - bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), - NULL); + /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ + p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); + g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), + NULL); + bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), + (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL); if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); @@ -1715,8 +1923,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), - PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) { + (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature), + pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; @@ -1785,7 +1995,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto err; } memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num); - s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num; + s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num; ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; } for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++) @@ -1886,6 +2096,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) int al; unsigned int ticklen; unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; + unsigned int sess_len; if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) @@ -1950,12 +2161,17 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. */ + /* + * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int + * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t + */ if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen, - s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, + s->session->session_id, &sess_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } + s->session->session_id_length = sess_len; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -1964,71 +2180,74 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +/* + * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to + * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure + * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code. + */ +int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { - int al; - unsigned long resplen; + size_t resplen; unsigned int type; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); - goto f_err; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); + return 0; } - if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen) + if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; - return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + + return 1; } + -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { - /* should contain no data */ - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + int al; + + if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { - if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; - } - } -#endif + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; +} + +/* + * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the + * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message. + * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0 + * on failure. + */ +int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al) +{ /* * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from * the server */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + return 0; } /* @@ -2036,32 +2255,61 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise */ - if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) { + if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing + && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) { int ret; ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (ret == 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, - SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, + *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + return 0; } if (ret < 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + return 0; + } + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + /* should contain no data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { + if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); + goto err; } } #endif + /* + * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function + */ + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) + goto err; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only applies to renegotiation */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) @@ -2070,10 +2318,14 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) else #endif return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; + + err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, - size_t *pskhdrlen, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int ret = 0; @@ -2134,10 +2386,12 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; tmpidentity = NULL; - s2n(identitylen, *p); - memcpy(*p, identity, identitylen); - *pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen; - *p += identitylen; + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + } ret = 1; @@ -2155,10 +2409,10 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, #endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q; + unsigned char *encdata = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; size_t enclen; @@ -2189,25 +2443,27 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; - if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) { + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */ + if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) { goto err; } - q = *p; /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) - *p += 2; + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } - if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } - *len = enclen; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = NULL; # ifdef PKCS1_CHECK @@ -2218,9 +2474,9 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) # endif /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { - s2n(*len, q); - *len += 2; + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; @@ -2239,49 +2495,51 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) #endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh_clnt = NULL; const BIGNUM *pub_key; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; + unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; - if (skey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } + if (skey == NULL) + goto err; + ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); + if (ckey == NULL) + goto err; + dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); - if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - return 0; - } + if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) + goto err; /* send off the data */ DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); - *len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key); - s2n(*len, *p); - BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p); - *len += 2; + if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes)) + goto err; + + BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes); EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); return 1; -#else + err: + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); +#endif SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; -#endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; + size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; + int ret = 0; skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; if (skey == NULL) { @@ -2290,8 +2548,12 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) } ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); + if (ckey == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } - if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) { + if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } @@ -2304,25 +2566,16 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) goto err; } - EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - ckey = NULL; - - *len = encoded_pt_len; - - /* length of encoded point */ - **p = *len; - *p += 1; - /* copy the point */ - memcpy(*p, encodedPoint, *len); - /* increment len to account for length field */ - *len += 1; - - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } - return 1; + ret = 1; err: + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - return 0; + return ret; #else SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2330,7 +2583,7 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) #endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST /* GOST key exchange message creation */ @@ -2380,24 +2633,14 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 - /* Generate session key */ - || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + /* Generate session key + * TODO(size_t): Convert this function + */ + || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; }; - /* - * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) { - /* - * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key - * * would be used - */ - ERR_clear_error(); - } - } /* * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context * data @@ -2426,28 +2669,21 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) /* * Encapsulate it into sequence */ - *((*p)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; msglen = 255; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); goto err; } - if (msglen >= 0x80) { - *((*p)++) = 0x81; - *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff; - *len = msglen + 3; - } else { - *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff; - *len = msglen + 2; - } - memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen); - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, - NULL) > 0) { - /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */ - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) + || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; @@ -2465,19 +2701,19 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) #endif } -static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) +static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { - /* send off the data */ - *len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); - s2n(*len, *p); - BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p); - *len += 2; - } else { + unsigned char *abytes = NULL; + + if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), + &abytes)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } + BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { @@ -2493,48 +2729,33 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al) #endif } -int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *p; - int len; - size_t pskhdrlen = 0; unsigned long alg_k; int al = -1; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) - && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al)) + && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; - if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { - len = 0; - } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &p, &len, &al)) + if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al)) goto err; - } else { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - len += pskhdrlen; - - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, len)) { + } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; @@ -2550,7 +2771,6 @@ int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif - ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } @@ -2619,24 +2839,21 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) return 0; } -int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *p; EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; - EVP_MD_CTX *mctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; unsigned u = 0; - unsigned long n = 0; long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; + unsigned char *sig = NULL; mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); @@ -2644,24 +2861,26 @@ int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += 2; - n = 2; + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif + sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)); + if (sig == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, - s->session->master_key_length, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key)) - || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { + || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } @@ -2671,24 +2890,26 @@ int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) - BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u); + BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u); } #endif - s2n(u, p); - n += u + 2; - /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) - goto err; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) { + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } + /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) + goto err; + + OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return 1; err: + OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -2789,14 +3010,21 @@ WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return WORK_ERROR; } -int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, - (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == - 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) { + int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in + * later + */ + if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) + || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, + (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL + : s->cert->key, + &al)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ossl_statem_set_error(s); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } @@ -2879,27 +3107,57 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned int len, padding_len; - unsigned char *d; + size_t len, padding_len; + unsigned char *padding = NULL; len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); - d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - d[4] = len; - memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); - d[5 + len] = padding_len; - memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); - *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; - l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); - s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; - s->init_off = 0; + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len) + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + memset(padding, 0, padding_len); return 1; + err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } #endif +static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + PACKET extensions; + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + &rawexts, &al) + || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, + rawexts, NULL, 0, &al)) + goto err; + + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + + err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; +} + int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0;