X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_clnt.c;h=67f4ac43101596d219840bb2930f0db0d24c5bbc;hp=4527cce796ca8d72edf5c1dfd6388f108b8afd33;hb=f3b3d7f0033080f86ede5a53e8af2fb313091b5a;hpb=cae4136431e7298760cae50732226c64e438d8dd diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c index 4527cce796..67f4ac4310 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c @@ -1,113 +1,12 @@ -/* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ + /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * @@ -156,21 +55,15 @@ #include #include #include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -# include -#endif +#include #include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -# include -#endif +#include -static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); +static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s); static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s); -static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s); static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, - unsigned char *p); - + WPACKET *pkt); /* * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not? @@ -179,12 +72,12 @@ static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, * 1: Yes * 0: No */ -static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) +static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) { /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION - && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) - || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) + && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) + || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) return 0; return 1; @@ -196,7 +89,6 @@ static inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s) * Return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No - * -1: Error */ static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s) { @@ -229,7 +121,10 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; int ske_expected; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO; @@ -260,9 +155,9 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; return 1; } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION - && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL - && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL - && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL + && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL + && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on @@ -273,58 +168,54 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth - & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { + & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT; return 1; } } else { ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); - if (ske_expected < 0) - return 0; /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ if (ske_expected - || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) - && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { + || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) + && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST - && cert_req_allowed(s)) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; - return 1; + && cert_req_allowed(s)) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; + return 1; } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; - return 1; + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE; + return 1; } } } break; case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { - if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; - return 1; - } - return 0; + /* + * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if + * |tlsext_status_expected| is set + */ + if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS; + return 1; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s); - if (ske_expected < 0) - return 0; /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */ - if (ske_expected - || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) - && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { + if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) + && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } - return 0; + goto err; } /* Fall through */ @@ -334,7 +225,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ; return 1; } - return 0; + goto err; } /* Fall through */ @@ -346,9 +237,11 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) break; case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: - if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; - return 1; + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET; + return 1; + } } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE; return 1; @@ -368,12 +261,12 @@ int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) return 1; } break; - - default: - break; } + err: /* No valid transition found */ + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); return 0; } @@ -385,99 +278,99 @@ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { - case TLS_ST_OK: - /* Renegotiation - fall through */ - case TLS_ST_BEFORE: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; - case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: - /* - * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what - * we will be sent - */ - return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + case TLS_ST_OK: + /* Renegotiation - fall through */ + case TLS_ST_BEFORE: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: + /* + * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what + * we will be sent + */ + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; - else - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT; + else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: - /* - * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is - * sent, but no verify packet is sent - */ - /* - * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH - * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We - * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's - * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; - } else { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; - } - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; - } - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: + case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH: + /* + * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is + * sent, but no verify packet is sent + */ + /* + * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH + * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We + * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's + * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY; + } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + } + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + + case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: + case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #else - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; - else - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO; + else + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; #endif - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO: + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; #endif - case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: - if (s->hit) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } else { - return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; - } - - case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: - if (s->hit) { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } else { - st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; - ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); - return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; - } + case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED: + if (s->hit) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else { + return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; + } - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + if (s->hit) { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE; + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } else { + st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; + } } } @@ -489,18 +382,22 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No pre work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */ - ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + return WORK_ERROR; + } } break; - case TLS_ST_CW_CERT: - return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); - case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (s->hit) { @@ -515,14 +412,10 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); #endif } - return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + break; case TLS_ST_OK: return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); - - default: - /* No pre work to be done */ - break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; @@ -538,22 +431,15 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) s->init_num = 0; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* No post work to be done */ + break; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1) + if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - /* Disable buffering for SCTP */ - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { -#endif - /* - * turn on buffering for the next lot of output - */ - if (s->bbio != s->wbio) - s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP - } -#endif + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Treat the next message as the first packet */ s->first_packet = 1; @@ -612,10 +498,6 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_B; break; - - default: - /* No post work to be done */ - break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; @@ -632,7 +514,11 @@ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return 0; + case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_construct_client_hello(s); @@ -661,13 +547,7 @@ int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s) ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, s->method-> ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); - - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; } - - return 0; } /* @@ -678,43 +558,48 @@ unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: - return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return 0; - case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: - return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: - return s->max_cert_list; + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: - return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + return s->max_cert_list; - case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: - return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: - return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: + return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: - return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + /* + * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In + * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured + * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs + */ + return s->max_cert_list; - case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: - return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: + return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: - return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: + if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + return 3; + return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; - case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: - return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: + return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; } - - return 0; } /* @@ -724,43 +609,41 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: - return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; - case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: - return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO: + return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: - return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); + case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: + return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: - return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT: + return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: - return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS: + return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: - return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH: + return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: - return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: - return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: + return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: - return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE: + return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); - case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: - return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); + case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET: + return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt); - default: - /* Shouldn't happen */ - break; + case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED: + return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); } - - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* @@ -771,7 +654,14 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; - switch(st->hand_state) { + switch (st->hand_state) { + default: + /* Shouldn't happen */ + return WORK_ERROR; + + case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ: + return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst); + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE: /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */ @@ -786,134 +676,36 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; #endif - - default: - break; - } - - /* Shouldn't happen */ - return WORK_ERROR; -} - -/* - * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if - * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. - * Returns 1 on success - * Returns 0 on error - */ -static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned long mask, options = s->options; - - if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* - * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are - * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order - * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So - * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of - * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the - * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3. - */ - mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) - | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 -#endif - ; -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT) - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) { - if ((options & mask) != mask) { - s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); - return 0; - } - } else { - s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION; - } -#else - if ((options & mask) == mask) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); - return 0; - } - s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION; -#endif - - mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; - if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask) - s->version = TLS1_VERSION; - mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3) - if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask) - s->version = SSL3_VERSION; -#endif - - if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, - SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - return 0; - } - - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); - return 0; - } - - } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* Determine which DTLS version to use */ - /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) { - if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, - SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - return 0; - } - /* - * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. - */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - return 0; - } - /* - * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features. - */ - s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); - s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; - } else { - /* - * We only support one version: update method - */ - if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) - s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); - s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; - } } - - s->client_version = s->version; - - return 1; } int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) { - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p, *d; + unsigned char *p; int i; - unsigned long l; - int al = 0; + int protverr; + int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - int j; SSL_COMP *comp; #endif SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; + WPACKET pkt; - buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf) + || !WPACKET_set_max_size(&pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + /* Should not happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */ - if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0) + protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s); + if (protverr != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); goto err; + } - if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || + if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) || /* * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared * "ticket" without a session ID. @@ -943,12 +735,14 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) } else i = 1; - if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, - sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) + if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) goto err; - /* Do the message type and length last */ - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } /*- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from @@ -965,7 +759,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. - * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. + * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0. * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now * know that is maximum server supports. @@ -980,90 +774,90 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to * the negotiated version. */ - *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; - - /* Random stuff */ - memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, s->client_version) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } /* Session ID */ if (s->new_session) i = 0; else i = s->session->session_id_length; - *(p++) = i; - if (i != 0) { - if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); - p += i; + if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt) + || (i != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, s->session->session_id, i)) + || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { + if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; - memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); - p += s->d1->cookie_len; } /* Ciphers supported */ - i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2])); - if (i == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */ + if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &pkt)) + goto err; + if (!WPACKET_close(&pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } -#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH - /* - * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround - * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we - * use TLS v1.2 - */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION - && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) - i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; -#endif - s2n(i, p); - p += i; /* COMPRESSION */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - *(p++) = 1; -#else - - if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods) - j = 0; - else - j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); - *(p++) = 1 + j; - for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { - comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); - *(p++) = comp->id; + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { + int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); + for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) { + comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt, comp->id)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } } #endif - *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ + /* Add the NULL method */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } /* TLS extensions */ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } - if ((p = - ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - &al)) == NULL) { + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&pkt) + /* + * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the + * extensions length bytes + */ + || !WPACKET_set_flags(&pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH) + || !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, &pkt, &al) + || !WPACKET_close(&pkt)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - l = p - d; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) { + if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; @@ -1072,6 +866,7 @@ int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s) return 1; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); return 0; } @@ -1082,7 +877,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET cookiepkt; if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -1115,100 +910,26 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) const SSL_CIPHER *c; PACKET session_id; size_t session_id_len; - unsigned char *cipherchars; + const unsigned char *cipherchars; int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; unsigned int compression; + unsigned int sversion; + int protverr; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif - if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) { - unsigned int sversion; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - -#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION -#error Code needs updating for new TLS version -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 - if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { - if (FIPS_mode()) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->method = SSLv3_client_method(); - } else -#endif - if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { - s->method = TLSv1_client_method(); - } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) { - s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method(); - } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) { - s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method(); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; - - if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW); - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* Work out correct protocol version to use */ - unsigned int hversion; - int options; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - options = s->options; - if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) - s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); - else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, - SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - s->version = hversion; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) - s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); - else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version = hversion; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; - } else { - unsigned char *vers; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8)) - || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); - s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1]; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } + protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion); + if (protverr != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr); + goto f_err; } /* load the server hello data */ @@ -1255,7 +976,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && s->session->tlsext_tick) { - SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, @@ -1291,17 +1012,28 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. */ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++; if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { goto f_err; } } + s->session->ssl_version = s->version; s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len; /* session_id_len could be 0 */ memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id), session_id_len); } + /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */ + if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) { + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars); if (c == NULL) { /* unknown cipher */ @@ -1309,17 +1041,15 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } - /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */ - if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; - else - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0; - /* Skip TLS v1.0 ciphersuites if SSLv3 */ - if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1) && s->version == SSL3_VERSION) - s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1; /* - * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so - * return an error. + * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed + * version. + */ + s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version; + s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version; + /* + * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello, + * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error. */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; @@ -1411,7 +1141,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); goto f_err; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; @@ -1425,10 +1154,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), - labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, - 0) <= 0) + sizeof(sctpauthkey), + labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) goto err; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), @@ -1450,7 +1178,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx; unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len; X509 *x = NULL; - unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; + const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; @@ -1460,14 +1188,14 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -1495,7 +1223,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); - if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) { + if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && i <= 0) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); @@ -1511,7 +1239,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->session->peer_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, - * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c + * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c */ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); sk = NULL; @@ -1519,7 +1247,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end */ - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { x = NULL; @@ -1540,9 +1268,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx - && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC || - (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 - && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) { + && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC || + (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 + && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) { x = NULL; al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, @@ -1565,254 +1293,339 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return ret; } -MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { - EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; - int al, j; - long alg_k, alg_a; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + PACKET psk_identity_hint; + + /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in + * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of + * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK + * identity. + */ + if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + return 0; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, + &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + return 1; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if ((s->srp_ctx.N = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), + PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL + || (s->srp_ctx.g = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), + PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL + || (s->srp_ctx.s = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), + PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL + || (s->srp_ctx.B = + BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), + PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + return 0; + } + + if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + return 0; + } + + /* We must check if there is a certificate */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) + *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + + return 1; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; #endif +} + +static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; + EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL; + DH *dh = NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; - int curve_nid = 0; -#endif - PACKET save_param_start, signature; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL; - md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (md_ctx == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; } - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new(); + dh = DH_new(); - save_param_start = *pkt; + if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH_free(s->s3->peer_dh_tmp); - s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - EC_KEY_free(s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp); - s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL; -#endif + p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL); + g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL); + bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), + NULL); + if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); + goto err; + } - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p = g = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */ - if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { - PACKET psk_identity_hint; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } + if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + bnpub_key = NULL; - /* - * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in - * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of - * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK - * identity. - */ - if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } + if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; + } - if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); - s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; - } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint, - &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } + if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; } - /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - } else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ + s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp; + /* - * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_* - * options + * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with + * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this */ - if (0) { - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS)) + *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - if ((s->srp_ctx.N = - BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), - PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL - || (s->srp_ctx.g = - BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), - PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL - || (s->srp_ctx.s = - BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt), - PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL - || (s->srp_ctx.B = - BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub), - PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } + return 1; - if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } + err: + BN_free(p); + BN_free(g); + BN_free(bnpub_key); + DH_free(dh); + EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp); + + return 0; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; +#endif +} -/* We must check if there is a certificate */ - if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); +static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + PACKET encoded_pt; + const unsigned char *ecparams; + int curve_nid; + unsigned int curve_flags; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + + /* + * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH + * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and + * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + return 0; + } + /* + * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an + * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes. + */ + if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); + return 0; } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - PACKET prime, generator, pub_key; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } + curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags); - if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } + if (curve_nid == 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); + return 0; + } - if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), - PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL - || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), - PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL - || (dh->pub_key = - BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), - PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } + if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { + EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new(); - if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE); - goto f_err; + if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + EVP_PKEY_free(key); + return 0; } - - if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); - goto f_err; + s->s3->peer_tmp = key; + } else { + /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */ + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); + if (pctx == NULL + || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + return 0; } - if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS)) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + pctx = NULL; + } - s->s3->peer_dh_tmp = dh; - dh = NULL; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - PACKET encoded_pt; - unsigned char *ecparams; + if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, + PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), + PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + return 0; + } - /* - * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH - * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and - * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. - */ - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - /* - * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an - * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes. - */ - if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); - goto f_err; - } + /* + * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign + * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA + * and ECDSA. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) + *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA) + *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2))) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } + return 1; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; +#endif +} - ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + int al = -1; + long alg_k; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + PACKET save_param_start, signature; - if (ecdh == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } + save_param_start = *pkt; - if (EC_KEY_oct2key(ecdh, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), - PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); - goto f_err; - } +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); + s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; +#endif - /* - * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign - * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA - * and ECDSA. - */ - if (0) ; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); -# endif - /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ - s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; - ecdh = NULL; + if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { + if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } + + /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */ + if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al)) + goto err; } else if (alg_k) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; + goto err; } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { PACKET params; + int maxsig; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; + /* * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference * equals the length of the parameters. @@ -1822,26 +1635,29 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) PACKET_remaining(pkt))) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - unsigned char *sigalgs; + const unsigned char *sigalgs; int rv; if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; + goto err; } rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey); - if (rv == -1) + if (rv == -1) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + } else if (rv == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto err; - else if (rv == 0) { - goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif - } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { md = EVP_md5_sha1(); } else { md = EVP_sha1(); @@ -1849,73 +1665,82 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; + goto err; } - j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - if (j < 0) { + maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (maxsig < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; + goto err; } /* * Check signature length */ - if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) { + if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) { /* wrong packet length */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); - goto f_err; + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto err; } + + md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (md_ctx == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), - PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms), + PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - goto f_err; + goto err; } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature), PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; + goto err; } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); } else { /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */ - if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) + && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) { /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ - if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) + if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + } else { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + } goto err; } /* still data left over */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); - goto f_err; + goto err; } } - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA_free(rsa); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH_free(dh); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - EC_KEY_free(ecdh); -#endif - EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); + if (al != -1) + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } @@ -1925,8 +1750,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; - unsigned char *data; - unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; + const unsigned char *data; + const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { @@ -1936,7 +1761,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* get the certificate types */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; @@ -1959,7 +1784,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -1988,7 +1813,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) /* get the CA RDNs */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) { + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; @@ -1996,7 +1821,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len) - || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) { + || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); @@ -2022,6 +1847,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } + xn = NULL; } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ @@ -2031,11 +1857,12 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; ca_sk = NULL; - ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; goto done; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: + X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); return ret; } @@ -2052,8 +1879,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) { + || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; @@ -2072,16 +1899,9 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) { /* - * Remove the old session from the cache + * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails */ - if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) { - if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) - s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx, - s->session); - } else { - /* We carry on if this fails */ - SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); - } + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); } if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { @@ -2121,9 +1941,12 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. */ - EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen, - s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, - EVP_sha256(), NULL); + if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen, + s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, + EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -2139,18 +1962,17 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) unsigned int type; if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type) - || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen) - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2163,20 +1985,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) goto f_err; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; - if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int ret; - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (ret == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); - goto f_err; - } - if (ret < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); @@ -2193,7 +2001,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) { @@ -2215,586 +2022,503 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } + /* + * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and + * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status + * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise + */ + if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) { + int ret; + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (ret == 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, + SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, + SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (ret < 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { + /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */ + if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } +#endif + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only applies to renegotiation */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - && s->renegotiate != 0) + && s->renegotiate != 0) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; else #endif return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } -int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) +static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) { - unsigned char *p; - int n; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - size_t pskhdrlen = 0; -#endif - unsigned long alg_k; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; - const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; - unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encoded_pt_len = 0; -#endif - unsigned char *pms = NULL; - size_t pmslen = 0; - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + int ret = 0; + /* + * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a + * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating + * strnlen. + */ + char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; + size_t identitylen = 0; + unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; + unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL; + char *tmpidentity = NULL; + size_t psklen = 0; + + if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + } - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); + psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, + identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, + psk, sizeof(psk)); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { - int psk_err = 1; - /* - * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a - * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating - * strnlen. - */ - char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; - size_t identitylen; - unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; - size_t psklen; - - if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); - goto err; - } + if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto err; + } else if (psklen == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto err; + } - memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); + identitylen = strlen(identity); + if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + goto err; + } - psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, - identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, - psk, sizeof(psk)); + tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); + tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity); + if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + } - if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto psk_err; - } else if (psklen == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - goto psk_err; - } + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); + s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk; + s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; + tmppsk = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); + s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity; + tmpidentity = NULL; - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); - s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen); - OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + } - if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); - goto memerr; - } + ret = 1; - s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; + err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); + OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); + OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen); + OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen); - identitylen = strlen(identity); - if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto psk_err; - } - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); - s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); - if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { - OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); - goto memerr; - } - - s2n(identitylen, p); - memcpy(p, identity, identitylen); - pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen; - p += identitylen; - psk_err = 0; -psk_err: - OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); - if (psk_err != 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { - n = 0; - } else + return ret; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; #endif +} - /* Fool emacs indentation */ - if (0) { - } +static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { - RSA *rsa; - pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); - if (pms == NULL) - goto memerr; - - if (s->session->peer == NULL) { - /* - * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } + unsigned char *encdata = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + size_t enclen; + unsigned char *pms = NULL; + size_t pmslen = 0; - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) - || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - goto err; - } - rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (s->session->peer == NULL) { + /* + * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; - pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; - if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) - goto err; + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); + if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; + pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); + if (pms == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8; + pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; + if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) { + goto err; + } - q = p; - /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) - p += 2; - n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); + if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata) + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); + goto err; + } + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + pctx = NULL; # ifdef PKCS1_CHECK - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) - p[1]++; - if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) - tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) + (*p)[1]++; + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) + tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; # endif - if (n <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); - goto err; - } - /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { - s2n(n, q); - n += 2; - } + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } + + s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; + s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; + + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + + return 0; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; #endif +} + +static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { - DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; - if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) - dh_srvr = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp; - else { - /* we get them from the cert */ - EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL; - dh_srvr = NULL; - spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (spkey) { - dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); - } - if (dh_srvr == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { - /* Use client certificate key */ - EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; - dh_clnt = NULL; - if (clkey) - dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); - if (dh_clnt == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } else { - /* generate a new random key */ - if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } - } + DH *dh_clnt = NULL; + const BIGNUM *pub_key; + EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; + unsigned char *keybytes = NULL; - pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt); - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); - if (pms == NULL) - goto memerr; + skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; + if (skey == NULL) + goto err; - /* - * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to - * clear it out afterwards - */ + ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); + dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); - n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); - if (s->s3->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) - DH_free(dh_srvr); + if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) + goto err; - if (n <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - goto err; - } - pmslen = n; + /* send off the data */ + DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL); + if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes)) + goto err; - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) - n = 0; - else { - /* send off the data */ - n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); - s2n(n, p); - BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); - n += 2; - } + BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes); + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); - DH_free(dh_clnt); - } + return 1; + err: + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); #endif + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; +} +static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { - const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; - EC_KEY *tkey; - int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; - int field_size = 0; - /* - * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster - * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set - * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. - */ - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) { - /*- - * XXX: For now, we do not support client - * authentication using ECDH certificates. - * To add such support, one needs to add - * code that checks for appropriate - * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. - * For example, the cert have an ECC - * key on the same curve as the server's - * and the key should be authorized for - * key agreement. - * - * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect - * to skip sending the certificate verify - * message. - * - * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && - * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == - * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) - * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; - */ - } + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; + int encoded_pt_len = 0; + EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL; + int ret = 0; - if (s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { - tkey = s->s3->peer_ecdh_tmp; - } else { - /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ - srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) - || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) - || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } + skey = s->s3->peer_tmp; + if (skey == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; - } + ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey); - srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); - srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); + if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } - if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } + /* Generate encoding of client key */ + encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint); - if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } + if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } - if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { - /* - * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our - * private key to perform the ECDH computation. - */ - const BIGNUM *priv_key; - tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; - priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); - if (priv_key == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - } else { - /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ - if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - } + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } - /* - * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to - * clear it out afterwards - */ + ret = 1; + err: + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); + return ret; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; +#endif +} - field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); - if (field_size <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8; - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); - if (pms == NULL) - goto memerr; - n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); - if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } +static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + /* GOST key exchange message creation */ + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL; + X509 *peer_cert; + size_t msglen; + unsigned int md_len; + unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; + EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL; + int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; + unsigned char *pms = NULL; + size_t pmslen = 0; - if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { - /* Send empty client key exch message */ - n = 0; - } else { - /* - * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory - * accordingly. - */ - encoded_pt_len = - EC_KEY_key2buf(clnt_ecdh, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - &encodedPoint, NULL); + if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) + dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; - if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } + /* + * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it + */ + peer_cert = s->session->peer; + if (!peer_cert) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, + SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); + return 0; + } - n = encoded_pt_len; + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); + if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + /* + * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key + * parameters match those of server certificate, use + * certificate key for key exchange + */ - *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ - /* Encoded point will be copied here */ - p += 1; - /* copy the point */ - memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n); - /* increment n to account for length field */ - n += 1; - } + /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ + pmslen = 32; + pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); + if (pms == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } - /* Free allocated memory */ - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); + if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 + /* Generate session key */ + || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + }; + /* + * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context + * data + */ + ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (ukm_hash == NULL + || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); + ukm_hash = NULL; + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; + } + /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ + /* + * Encapsulate it into sequence + */ + msglen = 255; + if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { - /* GOST key exchange message creation */ - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; - X509 *peer_cert; - size_t msglen; - unsigned int md_len; - unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; - EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; - EVP_PKEY *pub_key; - int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94; - if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0) - dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256; - - - pmslen = 32; - pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); - if (pms == NULL) - goto memerr; - /* - * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it - */ - peer_cert = s->session->peer; - if (!peer_cert) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); - goto err; - } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) + || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81)) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } - pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key = - X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); - if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - /* - * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key - * parameters match those of server certificate, use - * certificate key for key exchange - */ + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; + s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; - /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ + return 1; + err: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); + return 0; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; +#endif +} - if (pkey_ctx == NULL - || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 - /* Generate session key */ - || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) { - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - }; - /* - * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer - (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) { - /* - * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key - * * would be used - */ - ERR_clear_error(); - } - } - /* - * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context - * data - */ - ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, - EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { - EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash); - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl - (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, - shared_ukm) < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); - goto err; - } - /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ - /* - * Encapsulate it into sequence - */ - *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; - msglen = 255; - if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); - goto err; - } - if (msglen >= 0x80) { - *(p++) = 0x81; - *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; - n = msglen + 3; - } else { - *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; - n = msglen + 2; - } - memcpy(p, tmp, msglen); - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl - (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) { - /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */ - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - } - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); +static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + unsigned char *abytes = NULL; + if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A), + &abytes)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { - /* send off the data */ - n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); - s2n(n, p); - BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p); - n += 2; - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); - s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } + BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes); + + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); + s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); + if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; } + + return 1; +#else + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; #endif - else { +} + +int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned long alg_k; + int al = -1; + WPACKET pkt; + + if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)) { + /* Should not happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - n += pskhdrlen; -#endif + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { + if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) + && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &pkt, &al)) + goto err; + + if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &pkt, &al)) + goto err; + } else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; - s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; + if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } return 1; - memerr: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: - OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); + if (al != -1) + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); - EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } @@ -2804,6 +2528,9 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; + pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; + pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Check for SRP */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { @@ -2815,8 +2542,6 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) return 1; } #endif - pms = s->s3->tmp.pms; - pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen; if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -2826,8 +2551,13 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */ + pms = NULL; + pmslen = 0; goto err; } + pms = NULL; + pmslen = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -2842,8 +2572,8 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, - sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, - sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) + sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, + sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) goto err; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, @@ -2860,22 +2590,31 @@ int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s) int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) { - unsigned char *p; EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; - EVP_MD_CTX *mctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; unsigned u = 0; - unsigned long n = 0; long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; + unsigned char *sig = NULL; + WPACKET pkt; + + if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)) { + /* Should not happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } - - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); @@ -2883,49 +2622,60 @@ int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += 2; - n = 2; + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(&pkt, pkey, md)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif + sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)); + if (sig == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key)) - || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { + || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 - || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 - || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { - BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u); + { + int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) + BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u); } #endif - s2n(u, p); - n += u + 2; + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&pkt, sig, u)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) goto err; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) { + + if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } + OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return 1; err: + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -2936,7 +2686,6 @@ int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s) */ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) { - unsigned long alg_k; if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) return 0; /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ @@ -2949,26 +2698,6 @@ static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) return 0; - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { - int i = s->session->peer_type; - EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL; - clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; - /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH) - return 1; - if (i >= 0) - spkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (spkey) { - /* Compare server and client parameters */ - i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); - if (i != 1) - return 0; - } - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - } return 1; } @@ -3071,9 +2800,6 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) #endif long alg_k, alg_a; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - DH *dh; -#endif int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; @@ -3082,9 +2808,6 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) /* we don't have a certificate */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) return (1); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - dh = s->s3->peer_dh_tmp; -#endif /* This is the passed certificate */ @@ -3102,14 +2825,10 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; - } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT); - goto f_err; } #endif - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { @@ -3133,24 +2852,11 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (dh == NULL)) { + if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; - } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && - !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); - goto f_err; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && - !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, - SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); - goto f_err; - } -# endif #endif return (1); @@ -3162,22 +2868,42 @@ int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s) { - unsigned int len, padding_len; - unsigned char *d; + size_t len, padding_len; + unsigned char *padding = NULL; + WPACKET pkt; + + if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)) { + /* Should not happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); - d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - d[4] = len; - memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); - d[5 + len] = padding_len; - memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); - *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; - l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); - s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; - s->init_off = 0; + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len) + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(&pkt, padding_len, &padding)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + memset(padding, 0, padding_len); + + if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } return 1; + err: + WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } #endif @@ -3198,60 +2924,79 @@ int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) return i; } -int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, - unsigned char *p) +int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt) { - int i, j = 0; - SSL_CIPHER *c; - unsigned char *q; + int i; + size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen; int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate; /* Set disabled masks for this session */ ssl_set_client_disabled(s); if (sk == NULL) return (0); - q = p; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { +#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH +# if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6 +# error Max cipher length too short +# endif + /* + * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround + * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we + * use TLS v1.2 + */ + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) + maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; + else +#endif + /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */ + maxlen = 0xfffe; + + if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) + maxlen -= 2; + if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) + maxlen -= 2; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); /* Skip disabled ciphers */ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED)) continue; -#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) { - if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv) - continue; - else - empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0; + + if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } -#endif - j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p); - p += j; + + totlen += len; } - /* - * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add - * applicable SCSVs. - */ - if (p != q) { + + if (totlen == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + return 0; + } + + if (totlen != 0) { if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; - j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); - p += j; -#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, - "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); -#endif + if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; - j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p); - p += j; + if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } } - return (p - q); + return 1; }