X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fextensions_clnt.c;h=bbe94d002084d83803bc78e04e0a397cf4fd63d0;hp=4975c7a831c9ca81774d95e4c79b8abd2cd468ec;hb=d8028b202bfe337200a0cc89b80983ea1838cb30;hpb=f97d4c370844081e5e735711bd8b91979313ce7b diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c index 4975c7a831..bbe94d0020 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -12,12 +12,13 @@ #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" -int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (!s->renegotiate) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) @@ -25,17 +26,18 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) - return 1; + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) @@ -44,23 +46,24 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname, - strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname, + strlen(s->ext.hostname)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */ @@ -73,10 +76,10 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif @@ -101,20 +104,21 @@ static int use_ecc(SSL *s) if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) - break; + return 1; } - return i < end; + return 0; } -int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { const unsigned char *pformats; size_t num_formats; if (!use_ecc(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); @@ -125,30 +129,30 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL, *pcurvestmp; size_t num_curves = 0, i; if (!use_ecc(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */ - pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } pcurvestmp = pcurves; @@ -158,79 +162,82 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* Copy curve ID if supported */ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) { - if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurvestmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0]) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t ticklen; if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL - && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL) { - ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; - } else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket != NULL - && s->tlsext_session_ticket->data != NULL) { - ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) { + && s->session->ext.tick != NULL + && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen; + } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL + && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) { + ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length; + s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; + memcpy(s->session->ext.tick, + s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen); + s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; } else { ticklen = 0; } - if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket != NULL && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) - return 1; + if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && + s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) { + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t salglen; - const unsigned char *salg; + const uint16_t *salg; if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; - salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); + salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) @@ -240,20 +247,25 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { int i; - if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) - return 1; + /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */ + if (x != NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) /* Sub-packet for status request extension */ @@ -262,11 +274,11 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, /* Sub-packet for the ids */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) { unsigned char *idbytes; - OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); + OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i); int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); if (idlen <= 0 @@ -275,45 +287,46 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { + if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) { unsigned char *extbytes; - int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); + int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL); if (extlen < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes) - || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes) + || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes) != extlen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL || s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) - return 1; + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support @@ -322,50 +335,46 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; - /* - * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so - * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation - */ - if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL || s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) - return 1; + if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list, - s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); int i, end; if (clnt == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */ @@ -373,7 +382,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); @@ -383,7 +392,7 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) @@ -391,56 +400,64 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT -int tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + /* Not defined for client Certificates */ + if (x != NULL) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif -int tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } -int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, - size_t chain, int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { int currv, min_version, max_version, reason; @@ -449,17 +466,17 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version); + reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version); if (reason != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter + * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether * we should include versions ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; +#endif + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 +static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id) +{ + unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; + size_t encodedlen; + + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { + assert(s->hello_retry_request); + if (!s->hello_retry_request) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + /* + * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share + */ + key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey; + } else { + key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); + if (key_share_key == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + return 0; + } + } + + /* Encode the public key. */ + encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, + &encoded_point); + if (encodedlen == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* Create KeyShareEntry */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; } + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're + * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now + * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey + */ + s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; + s->s3->group_id = curve_id; + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + return 1; + err: + if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); + OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); + return 0; } +#endif -int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 - size_t i, sharessent = 0, num_curves = 0; + size_t i, num_curves = 0; const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL; + unsigned int curve_id = 0; /* key_share extension */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) @@ -500,105 +607,162 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, /* KeyShare list sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } - pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist; if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For * now, just send one */ - for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) { - unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - unsigned int curve_id = 0; - EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; - size_t encodedlen; - - if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) - continue; - - if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { - /* Shouldn't happen! */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - - /* Generate a key for this key_share */ - curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1]; - key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id); - if (key_share_key == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - return 0; - } + if (s->s3->group_id != 0) { + curve_id = s->s3->group_id; + } else { + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { - /* Encode the public key. */ - encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, - &encodedPoint); - if (encodedlen == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); - return 0; - } + if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) + continue; - /* Create KeyShareEntry */ - if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) - || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - return 0; + curve_id = bytestogroup(pcurves); + break; } + } - /* - * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're - * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now - * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey - */ - s->s3->group_id = curve_id; - s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; - sharessent++; - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + if (curve_id == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } + if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } #endif - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + + /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */ + if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) + /* Extension data sub-packet */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie, + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto end; + } + + ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; + end: + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); + s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL; + s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0; + + return ret; +} + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) { + s->max_early_data = 0; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + s->max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the + * extension, we set it to accepted. + */ + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; + + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 -int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +/* + * PSK pre binder overhead = + * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk + * 2 bytes for extension length + * 2 bytes for identities list length + * 2 bytes for identity length + * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age + * 2 bytes for binder list length + * 1 byte for binder length + * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the + * subsequent binder bytes + */ +#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1) + +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned char *padbytes; size_t hlen; if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0) - return 1; + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* - * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this - * code calculates the length of all existing extensions it MUST always - * appear last. + * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685. + * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but + * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore + * this extension MUST always appear second to last. */ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + } + + /* + * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this + * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION + && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0 + && s->session->cipher != NULL) { + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + + if (md != NULL) { + /* + * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder + * length. + */ + hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen + + EVP_MD_size(md); + } } if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { - /* Calculate the amond of padding we need to add */ + /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */ hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; /* @@ -618,14 +782,140 @@ int tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, memset(padbytes, 0, hlen); } + return EXT_RETURN_SENT; +} + +/* + * Construct the pre_shared_key extension + */ +EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + uint32_t now, agesec, agems; + size_t hashsize, binderoffset, msglen; + unsigned char *binder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md; + EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; + + s->session->ext.tick_identity = TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY; + + /* + * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single + * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length + * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted. + */ + + /* + * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume + * so don't add this extension. + */ + if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || s->session->ext.ticklen == 0) + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + + if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); + if (md == NULL) { + /* Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. Ignore it */ + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request && md != ssl_handshake_md(s)) { + /* + * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session so + * we can't use it. + */ + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + + /* + * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says + * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most implementations + * follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in seconds since epoch. + * We've already made the assumption that we can do this in multiple places + * in the code, so portability shouldn't be an issue. + */ + now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); + agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; + + if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { + /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + + /* + * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be + * good enough. + */ + agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; + + if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { + /* + * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. If + * so we just ignore it. + */ + return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; + } + + /* + * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed to + * be mod 2^32. + */ + agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; + + hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); + + /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, + s->session->ext.ticklen) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, hashsize, &binder) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen) + /* + * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can + * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders + */ + || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen; + + if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, binder, + s->session, 1) != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + s->session->ext.tick_identity = 0; + + ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; + err: + return ret; +#else return 1; +#endif } /* * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ -int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; @@ -682,21 +972,21 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { + if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); + if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -706,10 +996,10 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; + unsigned int ecpointformats_len; PACKET ecptformatlist; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) { @@ -717,22 +1007,21 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, return 0; } if (!s->hit) { - ecpointformatlist_length = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; + ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); + s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0; - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length); - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.ecpointformats); + s->session->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); + if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; + s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len; if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist, - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - ecpointformatlist_length)) { + s->session->ext.ecpointformats, + ecpointformats_len)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -742,13 +1031,13 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, } #endif -int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb != NULL && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), - PACKET_remaining(pkt), - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { + if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && + !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), + PACKET_remaining(pkt), + s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -758,26 +1047,36 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, return 0; } - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP -int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* - * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status - * request message. + * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status + * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. */ - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing - || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { + if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp + || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0)) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in + * the chain. We ignore any other responses. + */ + if (chainidx != 0) + return 1; + return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, al); + } + /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; + s->ext.status_expected = 1; return 1; } @@ -785,7 +1084,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT -int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation @@ -796,21 +1096,37 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts); - s->tlsext_scts = NULL; + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); + s->ext.scts = NULL; - s->tlsext_scts_len = size; + s->ext.scts_len = size; if (size > 0) { - s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); - if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL - || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_scts, size)) { + s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); + if (s->ext.scts == NULL + || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } } else { - if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, - PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), al) <= 0) + ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0 + ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH; + + /* + * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension, + * otherwise this is unsolicited. + */ + if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, + NULL) == NULL) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + return 0; + } + + if (custom_ext_parse(s, context, + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, + PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), + x, chainidx, al) <= 0) return 0; } @@ -838,18 +1154,19 @@ static int ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; PACKET tmppkt; /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */ - if (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0) + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } @@ -860,10 +1177,10 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, - PACKET_data(pkt), - PACKET_remaining(pkt), - s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != + if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, + PACKET_data(pkt), + PACKET_remaining(pkt), + s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; @@ -873,22 +1190,23 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in * a single Serverhello */ - OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); - s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); + s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); + if (s->ext.npn == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; + memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len); + s->ext.npn_len = selected_len; + s->s3->npn_seen = 1; return 1; } #endif -int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { size_t len; @@ -925,7 +1243,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP -int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { unsigned int id, ct, mki; int i; @@ -978,18 +1297,20 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) } #endif -int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; + s->ext.use_etm = 1; return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) @@ -998,8 +1319,8 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, int *al) return 1; } -int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, - int *al) +int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; @@ -1007,24 +1328,66 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL; /* Sanity check */ - if (ckey == NULL) { + if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } + if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { + unsigned const char *pcurves = NULL; + size_t i, num_curves; + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + /* + * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we + * already sent in the first ClientHello + */ + if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ + if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { + if (group_id == bytestogroup(pcurves)) + break; + } + if (i >= num_curves + || !tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); + return 0; + } + + s->s3->group_id = group_id; + EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); + s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; + return 1; + } + if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) { /* * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original * key_share! */ - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } @@ -1056,7 +1419,87 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chain, EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } - EVP_PKEY_free(skey); + s->s3->peer_tmp = skey; +#endif + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + PACKET cookie; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie) + || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie, + &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, + X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ + if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { + unsigned long max_early_data; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, + SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; + + return 1; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED + || !s->hit + || s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0) { + /* + * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume + * using the first identity so the server should not be accepting it. + */ + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 0; + } + + s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; + + return 1; +} + +int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, + size_t chainidx, int *al) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + unsigned int identity; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return 0; + } + + if (s->session->ext.tick_identity != (int)identity) { + *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); + return 0; + } + + s->hit = 1; #endif return 1;