X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_lib.c;h=f8207fa4238b03bb90dae8154e1b7dd030ea0967;hp=866cd182d4c6ceafa0ff532f45bde4327f954318;hb=e34cfcf7e19b5e5d39c8ba97e6e5f65f23b99ad6;hpb=f9b3bff6f7e38960bb87a5623fbcbc45ee952c49 diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index 866cd182d4..f8207fa423 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s) #else if (s->new_session) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #endif @@ -191,9 +191,9 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) if (s == NULL) goto err; memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL)); -#ifndef NO_KRB5 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); -#endif /* NO_KRB5 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (ctx->cert != NULL) { @@ -218,6 +218,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode; s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth; s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; + s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; s->purpose = ctx->purpose; s->trust = ctx->trust; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); @@ -282,6 +283,52 @@ int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, return 1; } +int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + ctx->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return 1; + } + +int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + ssl->generate_session_id = cb; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); + return 1; + } + +int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, + unsigned int id_len) + { + /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how + * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to + * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with + * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in + * use by this SSL. */ + SSL_SESSION r, *p; + r.ssl_version = ssl->version; + r.session_id_length = id_len; + memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); + /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a + * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it + * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be + * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ + if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && + (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) + { + memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, + SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); + r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; + } + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + p = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return (p != NULL); + } + int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { @@ -425,7 +472,7 @@ int SSL_get_fd(SSL *s) return(ret); } -#ifndef NO_SOCK +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; @@ -719,7 +766,7 @@ long SSL_get_default_timeout(SSL *s) return(s->method->get_timeout()); } -int SSL_read(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) +int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { @@ -735,8 +782,14 @@ int SSL_read(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num)); } -int SSL_peek(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) +int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { + if (s->handshake_func == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + return -1; + } + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return(0); @@ -744,7 +797,7 @@ int SSL_peek(SSL *s,char *buf,int num) return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num)); } -int SSL_write(SSL *s,const char *buf,int num) +int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { @@ -1092,6 +1145,11 @@ unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(SSL_SESSION *a) return(l); } +/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of + * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure + * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being + * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session + * with a matching session ID. */ int SSL_SESSION_cmp(SSL_SESSION *a,SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) @@ -1101,6 +1159,13 @@ int SSL_SESSION_cmp(SSL_SESSION *a,SSL_SESSION *b) return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); } +/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring + * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each + * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via + * ssl.h. */ +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash, SSL_SESSION *) +static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp, SSL_SESSION *) + SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret=NULL; @@ -1136,6 +1201,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->new_session_cb=NULL; ret->remove_session_cb=NULL; ret->get_session_cb=NULL; + ret->generate_session_id=NULL; memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats)); @@ -1164,7 +1230,8 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL; ret->client_cert_cb=NULL; - ret->sessions=lh_new(SSL_SESSION_hash,SSL_SESSION_cmp); + ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash), + LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp)); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; @@ -1211,8 +1278,10 @@ err2: return(NULL); } +#if 0 static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp) { OPENSSL_free(comp); } +#endif void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { @@ -1306,14 +1375,14 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); -#ifndef NO_RSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl)); #else rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0; #endif -#ifndef NO_DH +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl)); @@ -1387,7 +1456,7 @@ void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) mask|=SSL_aNULL; emask|=SSL_aNULL; -#ifndef NO_KRB5 +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 mask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; #endif @@ -1431,7 +1500,7 @@ X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(SSL *s) } else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */ { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } if (c->pkeys[i].x509 == NULL) return(NULL); @@ -1460,7 +1529,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher) } else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */ { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } } @@ -1708,6 +1777,10 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) if (s->cert != NULL) { + if (ret->cert != NULL) + { + ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); + } ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; @@ -1932,7 +2005,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl) return(ssl->ctx); } -#ifndef NO_STDIO +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); @@ -2034,7 +2107,7 @@ int SSL_want(SSL *s) * \param cb the callback */ -#ifndef NO_RSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) @@ -2071,7 +2144,7 @@ RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength) * \param dh the callback */ -#ifndef NO_DH +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { @@ -2085,7 +2158,7 @@ void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, } #endif -#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(WIN16) +#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) #include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" #endif