X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_lib.c;h=e4eec4a949a4ca72b6594c0acb606721912ee73b;hp=e07fa07de722f628a40cd4e7c7cbd09f68274f3a;hb=c19b863e8194df2bbaea7b6e1b57b817297d10be;hpb=fc7f190c732729c1d0eb9dcdb7ff05ed6b06056f diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index e07fa07de7..e4eec4a949 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -1,115 +1,12 @@ /* - * ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions. - */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ + /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by @@ -162,15 +59,14 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library * bug */ - (int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned int, int))ssl_undefined_function, + (int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, size_t, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function, - (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int)) + (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, size_t, size_t *)) ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function, - (int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *)) + (size_t (*)(SSL *, const char *, size_t, unsigned char *)) ssl_undefined_function, - 0, /* finish_mac_length */ NULL, /* client_finished_label */ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ NULL, /* server_finished_label */ @@ -184,23 +80,29 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { struct ssl_async_args { SSL *s; void *buf; - int num; - enum { READFUNC, WRITEFUNC, OTHERFUNC} type; + size_t num; + enum { READFUNC, WRITEFUNC, OTHERFUNC } type; union { - int (*func_read)(SSL *, void *, int); - int (*func_write)(SSL *, const void *, int); - int (*func_other)(SSL *); + int (*func_read) (SSL *, void *, size_t, size_t *); + int (*func_write) (SSL *, const void *, size_t, size_t *); + int (*func_other) (SSL *); } f; }; static const struct { uint8_t mtype; uint8_t ord; - int nid; + int nid; } dane_mds[] = { - { DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef }, - { DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256 }, - { DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512 }, + { + DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef + }, + { + DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256 + }, + { + DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512 + }, }; static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) @@ -208,9 +110,12 @@ static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) const EVP_MD **mdevp; uint8_t *mdord; uint8_t mdmax = DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST; - int n = ((int) mdmax) + 1; /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */ + int n = ((int)mdmax) + 1; /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */ size_t i; + if (dctx->mdevp != NULL) + return 1; + mdevp = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdevp)); mdord = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdord)); @@ -285,6 +190,7 @@ static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from) return 1; dane_final(&to->dane); + to->dane.flags = from->dane.flags; to->dane.dctx = &to->ctx->dane; to->dane.trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null(); @@ -293,7 +199,7 @@ static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from) return 0; } - num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs); + num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { danetls_record *t = sk_danetls_record_value(from->dane.trecs, i); @@ -304,24 +210,20 @@ static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from) return 1; } -static int dane_mtype_set( - struct dane_ctx_st *dctx, - const EVP_MD *md, - uint8_t mtype, - uint8_t ord) +static int dane_mtype_set(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx, + const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord) { int i; if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL && md != NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, - SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL); return 0; } if (mtype > dctx->mdmax) { const EVP_MD **mdevp; uint8_t *mdord; - int n = ((int) mtype) + 1; + int n = ((int)mtype) + 1; mdevp = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdevp, n * sizeof(*mdevp)); if (mdevp == NULL) { @@ -338,7 +240,7 @@ static int dane_mtype_set( dctx->mdord = mdord; /* Zero-fill any gaps */ - for (i = dctx->mdmax+1; i < mtype; ++i) { + for (i = dctx->mdmax + 1; i < mtype; ++i) { mdevp[i] = NULL; mdord[i] = 0; } @@ -360,13 +262,10 @@ static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t mtype) return dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype]; } -static int dane_tlsa_add( - SSL_DANE *dane, - uint8_t usage, - uint8_t selector, - uint8_t mtype, - unsigned char *data, - size_t dlen) +static int dane_tlsa_add(SSL_DANE *dane, + uint8_t usage, + uint8_t selector, + uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen) { danetls_record *t; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; @@ -419,14 +318,14 @@ static int dane_tlsa_add( t->usage = usage; t->selector = selector; t->mtype = mtype; - t->data = OPENSSL_malloc(ilen); + t->data = OPENSSL_malloc(dlen); if (t->data == NULL) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } - memcpy(t->data, data, ilen); - t->dlen = ilen; + memcpy(t->data, data, dlen); + t->dlen = dlen; /* Validate and cache full certificate or public key */ if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { @@ -436,7 +335,7 @@ static int dane_tlsa_add( switch (selector) { case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: - if (!d2i_X509(&cert, &p, dlen) || p < data || + if (!d2i_X509(&cert, &p, ilen) || p < data || dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE); @@ -471,7 +370,7 @@ static int dane_tlsa_add( break; case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: - if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&pkey, &p, dlen) || p < data || + if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&pkey, &p, ilen) || p < data || dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY); @@ -611,8 +510,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, - SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return (0); } return (1); @@ -645,6 +543,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) RECORD_LAYER_init(&s->rlayer, s); s->options = ctx->options; + s->dane.flags = ctx->dane.flags; s->min_proto_version = ctx->min_proto_version; s->max_proto_version = ctx->max_proto_version; s->mode = ctx->mode; @@ -690,49 +589,46 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); s->ctx = ctx; - s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; - s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; + s->ext.debug_cb = 0; + s->ext.debug_arg = NULL; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + s->ext.status_type = ctx->ext.status_type; + s->ext.status_expected = 0; + s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL; + s->ext.ocsp.exts = NULL; + s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL; + s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0; SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); - s->initial_ctx = ctx; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); - if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) + s->session_ctx = ctx; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (ctx->ext.ecpointformats) { + s->ext.ecpointformats = + OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.ecpointformats, + ctx->ext.ecpointformats_len); + if (!s->ext.ecpointformats) goto err; - s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = - ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - } - if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { - s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = - OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); - if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) + s->ext.ecpointformats_len = + ctx->ext.ecpointformats_len; + } + if (ctx->ext.supportedgroups) { + s->ext.supportedgroups = + OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.supportedgroups, + ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len); + if (!s->ext.supportedgroups) goto err; - s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = - ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; + s->ext.supportedgroups_len = ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len; } -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL; -# endif +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + s->ext.npn = NULL; +#endif - if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) { - s->alpn_client_proto_list = - OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); - if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) + if (s->ctx->ext.alpn) { + s->ext.alpn = OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->ext.alpn_len); + if (s->ext.alpn == NULL) goto err; - memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, - s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len); - s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len; + memcpy(s->ext.alpn, s->ctx->ext.alpn, s->ctx->ext.alpn_len); + s->ext.alpn_len = s->ctx->ext.alpn_len; } s->verified_chain = NULL; @@ -763,7 +659,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (!SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ctx->ct_validation_callback, - ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg)) + ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg)) goto err; #endif @@ -774,10 +670,21 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) return NULL; } -void SSL_up_ref(SSL *s) +int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *s) +{ + return SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? 1 : 0; +} + +int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s) { int i; - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, 1, &i, s->lock); + + if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock) <= 0) + return 0; + + REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s); + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); + return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, @@ -843,9 +750,9 @@ int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, r.session_id_length = id_len; memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); - CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->ctx->lock); - p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); - CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->ctx->lock); + CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->session_ctx->lock); + p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->session_ctx->sessions, &r); + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->session_ctx->lock); return (p != NULL); } @@ -894,6 +801,22 @@ int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx) return dane_ctx_enable(&ctx->dane); } +unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) +{ + unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags; + + ctx->dane.flags |= flags; + return orig; +} + +unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) +{ + unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags; + + ctx->dane.flags &= ~flags; + return orig; +} + int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain) { SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; @@ -912,10 +835,10 @@ int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain) * accepts them and disables host name checks. To avoid side-effects with * invalid input, set the SNI name first. */ - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, basedomain)) { + if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) { + if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, basedomain)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN); - return -1; + return -1; } } @@ -937,6 +860,22 @@ int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain) return 1; } +unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags) +{ + unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags; + + ssl->dane.flags |= flags; + return orig; +} + +unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags) +{ + unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags; + + ssl->dane.flags &= ~flags; + return orig; +} + int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki) { SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; @@ -985,7 +924,8 @@ int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, return dane_tlsa_add(&s->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen); } -int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord) +int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, + uint8_t ord) { return dane_mtype_set(&ctx->dane, md, mtype, ord); } @@ -1022,7 +962,7 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) if (s == NULL) return; - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, -1, &i, s->lock); + CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s); if (i > 0) return; @@ -1032,17 +972,10 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) dane_final(&s->dane); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); - if (s->bbio != NULL) { - /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ - if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { - s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); - } - BIO_free(s->bbio); - s->bbio = NULL; - } + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + + BIO_free_all(s->wbio); BIO_free_all(s->rbio); - if (s->wbio != s->rbio) - BIO_free_all(s->wbio); BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); @@ -1061,22 +994,22 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); /* Free up if allocated */ - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); - SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); + SSL_CTX_free(s->session_ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ecpointformats); + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.supportedgroups); +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP - sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); + sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT SCT_LIST_free(s->scts); - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts); + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); #endif - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list); + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp); + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.alpn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free); @@ -1092,7 +1025,7 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(s->waitctx); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP @@ -1104,48 +1037,88 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s) OPENSSL_free(s); } -void SSL_set_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio) +void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio) { - if (s->rbio != rbio) - BIO_free_all(s->rbio); + BIO_free_all(s->rbio); s->rbio = rbio; } -void SSL_set_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio) +void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio) { /* * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it */ - if (s->bbio != NULL) { - if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { - s->wbio = BIO_next(s->wbio); - BIO_set_next(s->bbio, NULL); - } - } - if (s->wbio != wbio && s->rbio != s->wbio) - BIO_free_all(s->wbio); + if (s->bbio != NULL) + s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); + + BIO_free_all(s->wbio); s->wbio = wbio; + + /* Re-attach |bbio| to the new |wbio|. */ + if (s->bbio != NULL) + s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { - SSL_set_wbio(s, wbio); - SSL_set_rbio(s, rbio); + /* + * For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in + * ownership handling. + */ + + /* If nothing has changed, do nothing */ + if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s)) + return; + + /* + * If the two arguments are equal then one fewer reference is granted by the + * caller than we want to take + */ + if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) + BIO_up_ref(rbio); + + /* + * If only the wbio is changed only adopt one reference. + */ + if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s)) { + SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio); + return; + } + /* + * There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is + * changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only + * adopt one reference. + */ + if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s) && SSL_get_rbio(s) != SSL_get_wbio(s)) { + SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio); + return; + } + + /* Otherwise, adopt both references. */ + SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio); + SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio); } BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { - return (s->rbio); + return s->rbio; } BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { - return (s->wbio); + if (s->bbio != NULL) { + /* + * If |bbio| is active, the true caller-configured BIO is its + * |next_bio|. + */ + return BIO_next(s->bbio); + } + return s->wbio; } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { - return (SSL_get_rfd(s)); + return SSL_get_rfd(s); } int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) @@ -1193,46 +1166,45 @@ int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) { - int ret = 0; - BIO *bio = NULL; + BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) - || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) { - bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); + if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET + || (int)BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) { + BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; + return 0; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); - SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio); - } else - SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s)); - ret = 1; - err: - return (ret); + SSL_set0_wbio(s, bio); + } else { + BIO_up_ref(rbio); + SSL_set0_wbio(s, rbio); + } + return 1; } int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) { - int ret = 0; - BIO *bio = NULL; + BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); - if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) - || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) { - bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); + if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET + || ((int)BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd)) { + BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; + return 0; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); - SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s)); - } else - SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s)); - ret = 1; - err: - return (ret); + SSL_set0_rbio(s, bio); + } else { + BIO_up_ref(wbio); + SSL_set0_rbio(s, wbio); + } + + return 1; } #endif @@ -1317,14 +1289,19 @@ int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { + size_t pending = s->method->ssl_pending(s); + /* * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.) + * + * SSL_pending also cannot work properly if the value >INT_MAX. In that case + * we just return INT_MAX. */ - return (s->method->ssl_pending(s)); + return pending < INT_MAX ? (int)pending : INT_MAX; } int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s) @@ -1399,10 +1376,10 @@ int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) return 0; } - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&f->cert->references, 1, &i, f->cert->lock); + CRYPTO_UP_REF(&f->cert->references, &i, f->cert->lock); ssl_cert_free(t->cert); t->cert = f->cert; - if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length)) { + if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, (int)f->sid_ctx_length)) { return 0; } @@ -1412,15 +1389,12 @@ int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { - if ((ctx == NULL) || - (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, - SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); + if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return (0); } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, - SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return (0); } return (X509_check_private_key @@ -1448,7 +1422,7 @@ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s) { - if(s->job) + if (s->job) return 1; return 0; @@ -1500,15 +1474,16 @@ long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) } static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args, - int (*func)(void *)) { + int (*func) (void *)) +{ int ret; if (s->waitctx == NULL) { s->waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(); if (s->waitctx == NULL) return -1; } - switch(ASYNC_start_job(&s->job, s->waitctx, &ret, func, args, - sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) { + switch (ASYNC_start_job(&s->job, s->waitctx, &ret, func, args, + sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) { case ASYNC_ERR: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC); @@ -1535,7 +1510,7 @@ static int ssl_io_intern(void *vargs) struct ssl_async_args *args; SSL *s; void *buf; - int num; + size_t num; args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs; s = args->s; @@ -1543,9 +1518,9 @@ static int ssl_io_intern(void *vargs) num = args->num; switch (args->type) { case READFUNC: - return args->f.func_read(s, buf, num); + return args->f.func_read(s, buf, num, &s->asyncrw); case WRITEFUNC: - return args->f.func_write(s, buf, num); + return args->f.func_write(s, buf, num, &s->asyncrw); case OTHERFUNC: return args->f.func_other(s); } @@ -1553,9 +1528,31 @@ static int ssl_io_intern(void *vargs) } int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) +{ + int ret; + size_t readbytes; + + if (num < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + + ret = SSL_read_ex(s, buf, (size_t)num, &readbytes); + + /* + * The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is + * <= INT_MAX + */ + if (ret > 0) + ret = (int)readbytes; + + return ret; +} + +int SSL_read_ex(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_EX, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } @@ -1564,8 +1561,9 @@ int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) return (0); } - if((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; + int ret; args.s = s; args.buf = buf; @@ -1573,24 +1571,49 @@ int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) args.type = READFUNC; args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_read; - return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); + ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); + *readbytes = s->asyncrw; + return ret; } else { - return s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num); + return s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num, readbytes); } } int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) +{ + int ret; + size_t readbytes; + + if (num < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + + ret = SSL_peek_ex(s, buf, (size_t)num, &readbytes); + + /* + * The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is + * <= INT_MAX + */ + if (ret > 0) + ret = (int)readbytes; + + return ret; +} + +int SSL_peek_ex(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK_EX, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return (0); } - if((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; + int ret; args.s = s; args.buf = buf; @@ -1598,26 +1621,51 @@ int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) args.type = READFUNC; args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_peek; - return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); + ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); + *readbytes = s->asyncrw; + return ret; } else { - return s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num); + return s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num, readbytes); } } int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) +{ + int ret; + size_t written; + + if (num < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + + ret = SSL_write_ex(s, buf, (size_t)num, &written); + + /* + * The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is + * <= INT_MAX + */ + if (ret > 0) + ret = (int)written; + + return ret; +} + +int SSL_write_ex(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_EX, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_EX, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); return (-1); } - if((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { + int ret; struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; @@ -1626,9 +1674,11 @@ int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) args.type = WRITEFUNC; args.f.func_write = s->method->ssl_write; - return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); + ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); + *written = s->asyncrw; + return ret; } else { - return s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num); + return s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num, written); } } @@ -1647,7 +1697,7 @@ int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) } if (!SSL_in_init(s)) { - if((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; @@ -1666,6 +1716,13 @@ int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): Return an error for now. Perhaps we should do a KeyUpdate + * instead when we support that? + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return 0; + if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; @@ -1676,6 +1733,13 @@ int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) { + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): Return an error for now. Perhaps we should do a KeyUpdate + * instead when we support that? + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return 0; + if (s->renegotiate == 0) s->renegotiate = 1; @@ -1714,11 +1778,13 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (s->mode &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: - return (s->max_cert_list); + return (long)(s->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: - l = s->max_cert_list; - s->max_cert_list = larg; - return (l); + if (larg < 0) + return 0; + l = (long)s->max_cert_list; + s->max_cert_list = (size_t)larg; + return l; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; @@ -1727,7 +1793,7 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) s->split_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT: - if ((unsigned int)larg > s->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) + if ((size_t)larg > s->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) return 0; s->split_send_fragment = larg; return 1; @@ -1759,8 +1825,8 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) } case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT: if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) - return -1; - if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) + return -1; + if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) return 1; else return 0; @@ -1802,8 +1868,8 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) if (ctx == NULL) { switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST: - return tls1_set_curves_list(NULL, NULL, parg); + case SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS_LIST: + return tls1_set_groups_list(NULL, NULL, parg); #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: @@ -1826,18 +1892,22 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: - return (ctx->max_cert_list); + return (long)(ctx->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: - l = ctx->max_cert_list; - ctx->max_cert_list = larg; - return (l); + if (larg < 0) + return 0; + l = (long)ctx->max_cert_list; + ctx->max_cert_list = (size_t)larg; + return l; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: - l = ctx->session_cache_size; - ctx->session_cache_size = larg; - return (l); + if (larg < 0) + return 0; + l = (long)ctx->session_cache_size; + ctx->session_cache_size = (size_t)larg; + return l; case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: - return (ctx->session_cache_size); + return (long)(ctx->session_cache_size); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: l = ctx->session_cache_mode; ctx->session_cache_mode = larg; @@ -1881,7 +1951,7 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) ctx->split_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT: - if ((unsigned int)larg > ctx->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) + if ((size_t)larg > ctx->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) return 0; ctx->split_send_fragment = larg; return 1; @@ -2109,15 +2179,15 @@ const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) return NULL; - return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? - s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname; + return s->session && !s->ext.hostname ? + s->session->ext.hostname : s->ext.hostname; } int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) { if (s->session - && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session-> - tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) + && (!s->ext.hostname ? s->session-> + ext.hostname : s->ext.hostname)) return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; return -1; } @@ -2133,7 +2203,7 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client - * selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this + * selects the first protocol in its list, but indicates via the API that this * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol. * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about @@ -2145,8 +2215,7 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, - const unsigned char *client, - unsigned int client_len) + const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) { unsigned int i, j; const unsigned char *result; @@ -2193,16 +2262,16 @@ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { - *data = s->next_proto_negotiated; + *data = s->ext.npn; if (!*data) { *len = 0; } else { - *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; + *len = (unsigned int)s->ext.npn_len; } } /* - * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when + * SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This @@ -2211,15 +2280,12 @@ void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the * ServerHello. */ -void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, - const unsigned char - **out, - unsigned int *outlen, - void *arg), void *arg) +void SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + SSL_CTX_npn_advertised_cb_func cb, + void *arg) { - ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb; - ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg; + ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb = cb; + ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg = arg; } /* @@ -2232,15 +2298,12 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. */ -void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, - unsigned char *outlen, - const unsigned char *in, - unsigned int inlen, - void *arg), void *arg) +void SSL_CTX_set_npn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, + SSL_CTX_npn_select_cb_func cb, + void *arg) { - ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb; - ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg; + ctx->ext.npn_select_cb = cb; + ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg = arg; } #endif @@ -2252,13 +2315,13 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len) { - OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list); - ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); - if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(ctx->ext.alpn); + ctx->ext.alpn = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); + if (ctx->ext.alpn == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 1; } - ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; + ctx->ext.alpn_len = protos_len; return 0; } @@ -2271,13 +2334,13 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len) { - OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list); - ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); - if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(ssl->ext.alpn); + ssl->ext.alpn = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); + if (ssl->ext.alpn == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 1; } - ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len; + ssl->ext.alpn_len = protos_len; return 0; } @@ -2288,15 +2351,11 @@ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, * from the client's list of offered protocols. */ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, - const unsigned char **out, - unsigned char *outlen, - const unsigned char *in, - unsigned int inlen, - void *arg), void *arg) + SSL_CTX_alpn_select_cb_func cb, + void *arg) { - ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb; - ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; + ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb = cb; + ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; } /* @@ -2314,16 +2373,15 @@ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, if (*data == NULL) *len = 0; else - *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; + *len = (unsigned int)ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; } - int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context) { - if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION) + if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) return -1; return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, @@ -2422,9 +2480,9 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) goto err; #endif if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, - &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, - SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert) - || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { + &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, + SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert) + || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } @@ -2455,10 +2513,13 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; ret->split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; - /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ - if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) - || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) - || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) + /* Setup RFC5077 ticket keys */ + if ((RAND_bytes(ret->ext.tick_key_name, + sizeof(ret->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->ext.tick_hmac_key, + sizeof(ret->ext.tick_hmac_key)) <= 0) + || (RAND_bytes(ret->ext.tick_aes_key, + sizeof(ret->ext.tick_aes_key)) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP @@ -2496,6 +2557,8 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION; + ret->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; + return ret; err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -2504,10 +2567,16 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) return NULL; } -void SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) +int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) { int i; - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ctx->references, 1, &i, ctx->lock); + + if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&ctx->references, &i, ctx->lock) <= 0) + return 0; + + REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", ctx); + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); + return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) @@ -2517,7 +2586,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) if (a == NULL) return; - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&a->references, -1, &i, a->lock); + CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&a->references, &i, a->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", a); if (i > 0) return; @@ -2561,10 +2630,10 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); + OPENSSL_free(a->ext.ecpointformats); + OPENSSL_free(a->ext.supportedgroups); #endif - OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list); + OPENSSL_free(a->ext.alpn); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock); @@ -2631,8 +2700,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } -void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), - void *arg) +void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); } @@ -2769,6 +2837,15 @@ int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s) { int idx; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + return s->s3->tmp.cert_idx; + } + idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509) idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; @@ -2817,8 +2894,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth; c = s->cert; - if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && - (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) + if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) @@ -2904,7 +2980,7 @@ int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) if (s->method != meth) { const SSL_METHOD *sm = s->method; - int (*hf)(SSL *) = s->handshake_func; + int (*hf) (SSL *) = s->handshake_func; if (sm->version == meth->version) s->method = meth; @@ -2942,68 +3018,69 @@ int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i) return (SSL_ERROR_SSL); } - if (i < 0) { - if (SSL_want_read(s)) { - bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); - if (BIO_should_read(bio)) - return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); - else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) - /* - * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write - * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio - * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for. - * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have - * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and - * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it - * might be safer to keep it. - */ - return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); - else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { - reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); - if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) - return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); - else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) - return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); - else - return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ - } + if (SSL_want_read(s)) { + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + if (BIO_should_read(bio)) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); + else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) + /* + * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write + * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio + * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for. + * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have + * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and + * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it + * might be safer to keep it. + */ + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); + else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { + reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); + if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); + else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); + else + return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ } + } - if (SSL_want_write(s)) { - bio = SSL_get_wbio(s); - if (BIO_should_write(bio)) - return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); - else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) - /* - * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) - */ - return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); - else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { - reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); - if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) - return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); - else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) - return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); - else - return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); - } - } - if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { - return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); - } - if (SSL_want_async(s)) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC; - } - if (SSL_want_async_job(s)) { - return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB; + if (SSL_want_write(s)) { + /* + * Access wbio directly - in order to use the buffered bio if + * present + */ + bio = s->wbio; + if (BIO_should_write(bio)) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); + else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) + /* + * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) + */ + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); + else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { + reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); + if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); + else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); + else + return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } } - - if (i == 0) { - if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && - (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) - return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); + if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { + return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); + } + if (SSL_want_async(s)) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC; } + if (SSL_want_async_job(s)) { + return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB; + } + + if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && + (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) + return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); + return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } @@ -3027,10 +3104,10 @@ int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) return -1; } - s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); + s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s, 0); if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { - if((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; @@ -3087,22 +3164,35 @@ const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version) { - if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION) + switch(version) + { + case TLS1_3_VERSION: + return "TLSv1.3"; + + case TLS1_2_VERSION: return "TLSv1.2"; - else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION) + + case TLS1_1_VERSION: return "TLSv1.1"; - else if (version == TLS1_VERSION) + + case TLS1_VERSION: return "TLSv1"; - else if (version == SSL3_VERSION) + + case SSL3_VERSION: return "SSLv3"; - else if (version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + + case DTLS1_BAD_VER: return "DTLSv0.9"; - else if (version == DTLS1_VERSION) + + case DTLS1_VERSION: return "DTLSv1"; - else if (version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) + + case DTLS1_2_VERSION: return "DTLSv1.2"; - else - return ("unknown"); + + default: + return "unknown"; + } } const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) @@ -3119,7 +3209,7 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) /* If we're not quiescent, just up_ref! */ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || !SSL_in_before(s)) { - CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, 1, &i, s->lock); + CRYPTO_UP_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock); return s; } @@ -3153,7 +3243,8 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) goto err; } - if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) + if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, + (int)s->sid_ctx_length)) goto err; } @@ -3185,8 +3276,10 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio)) goto err; - } else + } else { + BIO_up_ref(ret->rbio); ret->wbio = ret->rbio; + } } ret->server = s->server; @@ -3309,34 +3402,25 @@ const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) #endif } -int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push) +int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { BIO *bbio; - if (s->bbio == NULL) { - bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); - if (bbio == NULL) - return (0); - s->bbio = bbio; - } else { - bbio = s->bbio; - if (s->bbio == s->wbio) - s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); + if (s->bbio != NULL) { + /* Already buffered. */ + return 1; } - (void)BIO_reset(bbio); -/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ - if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { + + bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); + if (bbio == NULL || !BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { + BIO_free(bbio); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - return (0); - } - if (push) { - if (s->wbio != bbio) - s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); - } else { - if (s->wbio == bbio) - s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio); + return 0; } - return (1); + s->bbio = bbio; + s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); + + return 1; } void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) @@ -3345,11 +3429,8 @@ void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) if (s->bbio == NULL) return; - if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { - /* remove buffering */ - s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); - assert(s->wbio != NULL); - } + s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); + assert(s->wbio != NULL); BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio = NULL; } @@ -3381,17 +3462,22 @@ void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { - return (s->shutdown); + return s->shutdown; } int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { - return (s->version); + return s->version; +} + +int SSL_client_version(const SSL *s) +{ + return s->client_version; } SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { - return (ssl->ctx); + return ssl->ctx; } SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) @@ -3400,7 +3486,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) if (ssl->ctx == ctx) return ssl->ctx; if (ctx == NULL) - ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; + ctx = ssl->session_ctx; new_cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (new_cert == NULL) { return NULL; @@ -3428,7 +3514,7 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) } SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); - SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ + SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ ssl->ctx = ctx; return ssl->ctx; @@ -3523,15 +3609,11 @@ size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) } size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, - unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { - if (session->master_key_length < 0) { - /* Should never happen */ - return 0; - } if (outlen == 0) return session->master_key_length; - if (outlen > (size_t)session->master_key_length) + if (outlen > session->master_key_length) outlen = session->master_key_length; memcpy(out, session->master_key, outlen); return outlen; @@ -3573,6 +3655,13 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) ctx->cert_store = store; } +void SSL_CTX_set1_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) +{ + if (store != NULL) + X509_STORE_up_ref(store); + SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, store); +} + int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return (s->rwstate); @@ -3603,8 +3692,7 @@ void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint); @@ -3650,48 +3738,22 @@ const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) return (s->session->psk_identity); } -void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, - unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, - const char *hint, - char *identity, - unsigned int - max_identity_len, - unsigned char *psk, - unsigned int - max_psk_len)) +void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_client_cb_func cb) { s->psk_client_callback = cb; } -void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, - const char *hint, - char *identity, - unsigned int - max_identity_len, - unsigned char *psk, - unsigned int - max_psk_len)) +void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_client_cb_func cb) { ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; } -void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, - unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, - const char *identity, - unsigned char *psk, - unsigned int - max_psk_len)) +void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_server_cb_func cb) { s->psk_server_callback = cb; } -void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, - const char *identity, - unsigned char *psk, - unsigned int - max_psk_len)) +void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_server_cb_func cb) { ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; } @@ -3733,8 +3795,8 @@ void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, /* * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer * variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any. - * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly - * allocated ctx; + * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md. + * Returns the newly allocated ctx; */ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) @@ -3752,29 +3814,33 @@ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) { - if (*hash) - EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash); *hash = NULL; } /* Retrieve handshake hashes */ -int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, int outlen) +int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, + size_t *hashlen) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst; - int ret = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hdgst); - if (ret < 0 || ret > outlen) { - ret = 0; + int hashleni = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hdgst); + int ret = 0; + + if (hashleni < 0 || (size_t)hashleni > outlen) goto err; - } + ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (ctx == NULL) { - ret = 0; + if (ctx == NULL) goto err; - } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, hdgst) || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL) <= 0) - ret = 0; + goto err; + + *hashlen = hashleni; + + ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; @@ -3799,7 +3865,6 @@ void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) } #endif - void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level) { s->cert->sec_level = level; @@ -3811,16 +3876,17 @@ int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s) } void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s, - int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, void *other, - void *ex)) + int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, + void *other, void *ex)) { s->cert->sec_cb = cb; } -int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, - void *other, void *ex) { +int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s, + const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, + int bits, int nid, void *other, + void *ex) { return s->cert->sec_cb; } @@ -3845,9 +3911,9 @@ int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx) } void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, - int bits, int nid, void *other, - void *ex)) + int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, + int op, int bits, int nid, + void *other, void *ex)) { ctx->cert->sec_cb = cb; } @@ -3871,7 +3937,6 @@ void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) return ctx->cert->sec_ex; } - /* * Get/Set/Clear options in SSL_CTX or SSL, formerly macros, now functions that * can return unsigned long, instead of the generic long return value from the @@ -3881,22 +3946,27 @@ unsigned long SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; } -unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL* s) + +unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL *s) { return s->options; } + unsigned long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op) { return ctx->options |= op; } + unsigned long SSL_set_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op) { return s->options |= op; } + unsigned long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op) { return ctx->options &= ~op; } + unsigned long SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op) { return s->options &= ~op; @@ -3918,7 +3988,8 @@ IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); * the caller. * Returns the number of SCTs moved, or a negative integer if an error occurs. */ -static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src, sct_source_t origin) +static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src, + sct_source_t origin) { int scts_moved = 0; SCT *sct = NULL; @@ -3941,23 +4012,23 @@ static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src, sct_source_t or } return scts_moved; -err: + err: if (sct != NULL) - sk_SCT_push(src, sct); /* Put the SCT back */ - return scts_moved; + sk_SCT_push(src, sct); /* Put the SCT back */ + return -1; } /* -* Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found. -* Return 1 on success, 0 on failure. -*/ + * Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found. + * Returns the number of SCTs extracted. + */ static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL *s) { int scts_extracted = 0; - if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) { - const unsigned char *p = s->tlsext_scts; - STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = o2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, &p, s->tlsext_scts_len); + if (s->ext.scts != NULL) { + const unsigned char *p = s->ext.scts; + STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = o2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, &p, s->ext.scts_len); scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION); @@ -3977,7 +4048,7 @@ static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL *s) */ static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int scts_extracted = 0; const unsigned char *p; OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL; @@ -3985,11 +4056,11 @@ static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s) STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL; int i; - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL || s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen == 0) + if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL || s->ext.ocsp.resp_len == 0) goto err; - p = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp; - rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); + p = s->ext.ocsp.resp; + rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, (int)s->ext.ocsp.resp_len); if (rsp == NULL) goto err; @@ -4003,21 +4074,22 @@ static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s) if (single == NULL) continue; - scts = OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL); - scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, - SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE); + scts = + OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL); + scts_extracted = + ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE); if (scts_extracted < 0) goto err; } -err: + err: SCT_LIST_free(scts); OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return scts_extracted; -#else +# else /* Behave as if no OCSP response exists */ return 0; -#endif +# endif } /* @@ -4059,17 +4131,17 @@ const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s) s->scts_parsed = 1; } return s->scts; -err: + err: return NULL; } -static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, +static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) { return 1; } -static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx, +static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) { int count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; @@ -4094,14 +4166,17 @@ int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, * for this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. */ if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(s->ctx, - TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) + { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); return 0; } if (callback != NULL) { - /* If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP */ + /* + * If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP + */ if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(s, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)) return 0; } @@ -4113,15 +4188,15 @@ int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, } int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, - ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, - void *arg) + ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg) { /* * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look for * this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. */ if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(ctx, - TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { + TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) + { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); return 0; @@ -4164,8 +4239,7 @@ int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s) */ if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL || cert == NULL || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK || - s->verified_chain == NULL || - sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1) + s->verified_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1) return 1; /* @@ -4187,9 +4261,10 @@ int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s) } issuer = sk_X509_value(s->verified_chain, 1); - CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set0_cert(ctx, cert); - CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set0_issuer(ctx, issuer); - CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set0_log_store(ctx, s->ctx->ctlog_store); + CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ctx, cert); + CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ctx, issuer); + CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(ctx, s->ctx->ctlog_store); + CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time(ctx, SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_get0_session(s))); scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s); @@ -4202,7 +4277,7 @@ int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s) * value is negative. * * XXX: One might well argue that the return value of this function is an - * unforunate design choice. Its job is only to determine the validation + * unfortunate design choice. Its job is only to determine the validation * status of each of the provided SCTs. So long as it correctly separates * the wheat from the chaff it should return success. Failure in this case * ought to correspond to an inability to carry out its duties. @@ -4214,10 +4289,27 @@ int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s) ret = s->ct_validation_callback(ctx, scts, s->ct_validation_callback_arg); if (ret < 0) - ret = 0; /* This function returns 0 on failure */ + ret = 0; /* This function returns 0 on failure */ -end: + end: CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ctx); + /* + * With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and re-used despite a + * failure return code here. Also the application may wish the complete + * the handshake, and then disconnect cleanly at a higher layer, after + * checking the verification status of the completed connection. + * + * We therefore force a certificate verification failure which will be + * visible via SSL_get_verify_result() and cached as part of any resumed + * session. + * + * Note: the permissive callback is for information gathering only, always + * returns success, and does not affect verification status. Only the + * strict callback or a custom application-specified callback can trigger + * connection failure or record a verification error. + */ + if (ret <= 0) + s->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS; return ret; } @@ -4257,7 +4349,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path) return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(ctx->ctlog_store, path); } -void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE *logs) +void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE * logs) { CTLOG_STORE_free(ctx->ctlog_store); ctx->ctlog_store = logs; @@ -4269,3 +4361,99 @@ const CTLOG_STORE *SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) } #endif + +void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func cb) +{ + ctx->keylog_callback = cb; +} + +SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx) +{ + return ctx->keylog_callback; +} + +static int nss_keylog_int(const char *prefix, + SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t *parameter_1, + size_t parameter_1_len, + const uint8_t *parameter_2, + size_t parameter_2_len) +{ + char *out = NULL; + char *cursor = NULL; + size_t out_len = 0; + size_t i; + size_t prefix_len; + + if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) return 1; + + /* + * Our output buffer will contain the following strings, rendered with + * space characters in between, terminated by a NULL character: first the + * prefix, then the first parameter, then the second parameter. The + * meaning of each parameter depends on the specific key material being + * logged. Note that the first and second parameters are encoded in + * hexadecimal, so we need a buffer that is twice their lengths. + */ + prefix_len = strlen(prefix); + out_len = prefix_len + (2*parameter_1_len) + (2*parameter_2_len) + 3; + if ((out = cursor = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_NSS_KEYLOG_INT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + + strcpy(cursor, prefix); + cursor += prefix_len; + *cursor++ = ' '; + + for (i = 0; i < parameter_1_len; i++) { + sprintf(cursor, "%02x", parameter_1[i]); + cursor += 2; + } + *cursor++ = ' '; + + for (i = 0; i < parameter_2_len; i++) { + sprintf(cursor, "%02x", parameter_2[i]); + cursor += 2; + } + *cursor = '\0'; + + ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out); + OPENSSL_free(out); + return 1; + +} + +int ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl, + const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster, + size_t encrypted_premaster_len, + const uint8_t *premaster, + size_t premaster_len) +{ + if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOG_RSA_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* We only want the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster as a tag. */ + return nss_keylog_int("RSA", + ssl, + encrypted_premaster, + 8, + premaster, + premaster_len); +} + +int ssl_log_secret(SSL *ssl, + const char *label, + const uint8_t *secret, + size_t secret_len) +{ + return nss_keylog_int(label, + ssl, + ssl->s3->client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + secret, + secret_len); +} +