X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_lib.c;h=8bf872beec09ea6fd1de0f5dddaf0d8486a1fb23;hp=d598f91eb79c5d66ec6c96cc0fb9701ca44cc03f;hb=b50052dbe822271c9d7b2559a38a127fca87e4ab;hpb=6977e8ee4a718a76351ba5275a9f0be4e530eab5

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index d598f91eb7..8bf872beec 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1,115 +1,12 @@
 /*
- * ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions.
- */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
+
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
  * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
@@ -142,9 +39,7 @@
  * OTHERWISE.
  */
 
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-# include <assert.h>
-#endif
+#include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
@@ -152,13 +47,10 @@
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-# include <openssl/engine.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
 #include <openssl/async.h>
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
 
 const char SSL_version_str[] = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
 
@@ -167,8 +59,8 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
      * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library
      * bug
      */
-    (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
-    (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+    (int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned int, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+    (int (*)(SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
     ssl_undefined_function,
     (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))
         ssl_undefined_function,
@@ -190,13 +82,356 @@ struct ssl_async_args {
     SSL *s;
     void *buf;
     int num;
-    int type;
+    enum { READFUNC, WRITEFUNC, OTHERFUNC } type;
     union {
-        int (*func1)(SSL *, void *, int);
-        int (*func2)(SSL *, const void *, int);
+        int (*func_read) (SSL *, void *, int);
+        int (*func_write) (SSL *, const void *, int);
+        int (*func_other) (SSL *);
     } f;
 };
 
+static const struct {
+    uint8_t mtype;
+    uint8_t ord;
+    int nid;
+} dane_mds[] = {
+    {
+        DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef
+    },
+    {
+        DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256
+    },
+    {
+        DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512
+    },
+};
+
+static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx)
+{
+    const EVP_MD **mdevp;
+    uint8_t *mdord;
+    uint8_t mdmax = DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST;
+    int n = ((int)mdmax) + 1;   /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */
+    size_t i;
+
+    if (dctx->mdevp != NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    mdevp = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdevp));
+    mdord = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdord));
+
+    if (mdord == NULL || mdevp == NULL) {
+        OPENSSL_free(mdord);
+        OPENSSL_free(mdevp);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Install default entries */
+    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(dane_mds); ++i) {
+        const EVP_MD *md;
+
+        if (dane_mds[i].nid == NID_undef ||
+            (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dane_mds[i].nid)) == NULL)
+            continue;
+        mdevp[dane_mds[i].mtype] = md;
+        mdord[dane_mds[i].mtype] = dane_mds[i].ord;
+    }
+
+    dctx->mdevp = mdevp;
+    dctx->mdord = mdord;
+    dctx->mdmax = mdmax;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void dane_ctx_final(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdevp);
+    dctx->mdevp = NULL;
+
+    OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdord);
+    dctx->mdord = NULL;
+    dctx->mdmax = 0;
+}
+
+static void tlsa_free(danetls_record *t)
+{
+    if (t == NULL)
+        return;
+    OPENSSL_free(t->data);
+    EVP_PKEY_free(t->spki);
+    OPENSSL_free(t);
+}
+
+static void dane_final(SSL_DANE *dane)
+{
+    sk_danetls_record_pop_free(dane->trecs, tlsa_free);
+    dane->trecs = NULL;
+
+    sk_X509_pop_free(dane->certs, X509_free);
+    dane->certs = NULL;
+
+    X509_free(dane->mcert);
+    dane->mcert = NULL;
+    dane->mtlsa = NULL;
+    dane->mdpth = -1;
+    dane->pdpth = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * dane_copy - Copy dane configuration, sans verification state.
+ */
+static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from)
+{
+    int num;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(&from->dane))
+        return 1;
+
+    dane_final(&to->dane);
+    to->dane.flags = from->dane.flags;
+    to->dane.dctx = &to->ctx->dane;
+    to->dane.trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null();
+
+    if (to->dane.trecs == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs);
+    for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+        danetls_record *t = sk_danetls_record_value(from->dane.trecs, i);
+
+        if (SSL_dane_tlsa_add(to, t->usage, t->selector, t->mtype,
+                              t->data, t->dlen) <= 0)
+            return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int dane_mtype_set(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx,
+                          const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL && md != NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (mtype > dctx->mdmax) {
+        const EVP_MD **mdevp;
+        uint8_t *mdord;
+        int n = ((int)mtype) + 1;
+
+        mdevp = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdevp, n * sizeof(*mdevp));
+        if (mdevp == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        dctx->mdevp = mdevp;
+
+        mdord = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdord, n * sizeof(*mdord));
+        if (mdord == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return -1;
+        }
+        dctx->mdord = mdord;
+
+        /* Zero-fill any gaps */
+        for (i = dctx->mdmax + 1; i < mtype; ++i) {
+            mdevp[i] = NULL;
+            mdord[i] = 0;
+        }
+
+        dctx->mdmax = mtype;
+    }
+
+    dctx->mdevp[mtype] = md;
+    /* Coerce ordinal of disabled matching types to 0 */
+    dctx->mdord[mtype] = (md == NULL) ? 0 : ord;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t mtype)
+{
+    if (mtype > dane->dctx->mdmax)
+        return NULL;
+    return dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype];
+}
+
+static int dane_tlsa_add(SSL_DANE *dane,
+                         uint8_t usage,
+                         uint8_t selector,
+                         uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen)
+{
+    danetls_record *t;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+    int ilen = (int)dlen;
+    int i;
+    int num;
+
+    if (dane->trecs == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (ilen < 0 || dlen != (size_t)ilen) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (usage > DANETLS_USAGE_LAST) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (selector > DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
+        md = tlsa_md_get(dane, mtype);
+        if (md == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (md != NULL && dlen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!data) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if ((t = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*t))) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    t->usage = usage;
+    t->selector = selector;
+    t->mtype = mtype;
+    t->data = OPENSSL_malloc(ilen);
+    if (t->data == NULL) {
+        tlsa_free(t);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    memcpy(t->data, data, ilen);
+    t->dlen = ilen;
+
+    /* Validate and cache full certificate or public key */
+    if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
+        const unsigned char *p = data;
+        X509 *cert = NULL;
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+        switch (selector) {
+        case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
+            if (!d2i_X509(&cert, &p, dlen) || p < data ||
+                dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) {
+                tlsa_free(t);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            if (X509_get0_pubkey(cert) == NULL) {
+                tlsa_free(t);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_TA_MASK) == 0) {
+                X509_free(cert);
+                break;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 0 0" TLSA
+             * records that contain full certificates of trust-anchors that are
+             * not present in the wire chain.  For usage PKIX-TA(0), we augment
+             * the chain with untrusted Full(0) certificates from DNS, in case
+             * they are missing from the chain.
+             */
+            if ((dane->certs == NULL &&
+                 (dane->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+                !sk_X509_push(dane->certs, cert)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                X509_free(cert);
+                tlsa_free(t);
+                return -1;
+            }
+            break;
+
+        case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
+            if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&pkey, &p, dlen) || p < data ||
+                dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) {
+                tlsa_free(t);
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 1 0" TLSA
+             * records that contain full bare keys of trust-anchors that are
+             * not present in the wire chain.
+             */
+            if (usage == DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA)
+                t->spki = pkey;
+            else
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /*-
+     * Find the right insertion point for the new record.
+     *
+     * See crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c.  We sort DANE-EE(3) records first, so that
+     * they can be processed first, as they require no chain building, and no
+     * expiration or hostname checks.  Because DANE-EE(3) is numerically
+     * largest, this is accomplished via descending sort by "usage".
+     *
+     * We also sort in descending order by matching ordinal to simplify
+     * the implementation of digest agility in the verification code.
+     *
+     * The choice of order for the selector is not significant, so we
+     * use the same descending order for consistency.
+     */
+    num = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
+    for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+        danetls_record *rec = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
+
+        if (rec->usage > usage)
+            continue;
+        if (rec->usage < usage)
+            break;
+        if (rec->selector > selector)
+            continue;
+        if (rec->selector < selector)
+            break;
+        if (dane->dctx->mdord[rec->mtype] > dane->dctx->mdord[mtype])
+            continue;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_danetls_record_insert(dane->trecs, t, i)) {
+        tlsa_free(t);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    dane->umask |= DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 static void clear_ciphers(SSL *s)
 {
     /* clear the current cipher */
@@ -237,6 +472,16 @@ int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
     clear_ciphers(s);
     s->first_packet = 0;
 
+    /* Reset DANE verification result state */
+    s->dane.mdpth = -1;
+    s->dane.pdpth = -1;
+    X509_free(s->dane.mcert);
+    s->dane.mcert = NULL;
+    s->dane.mtlsa = NULL;
+
+    /* Clear the verification result peername */
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, NULL);
+
     /*
      * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
      * back if we are not doing session-id reuse.
@@ -266,8 +511,7 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
                                 &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
                                 SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
     if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,
-               SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
         return (0);
     }
     return (1);
@@ -290,9 +534,19 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     if (s == NULL)
         goto err;
 
+    s->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (s->lock == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(s);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
     RECORD_LAYER_init(&s->rlayer, s);
 
     s->options = ctx->options;
+    s->dane.flags = ctx->dane.flags;
+    s->min_proto_version = ctx->min_proto_version;
+    s->max_proto_version = ctx->max_proto_version;
     s->mode = ctx->mode;
     s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
     s->references = 1;
@@ -327,25 +581,31 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
     s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
     s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
-
-    CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    s->split_send_fragment = ctx->split_send_fragment;
+    s->max_pipelines = ctx->max_pipelines;
+    if (s->max_pipelines > 1)
+        RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1);
+    if (ctx->default_read_buf_len > 0)
+        SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(s, ctx->default_read_buf_len);
+
+    SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
     s->ctx = ctx;
     s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
     s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
     s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-    s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+    s->tlsext_status_type = ctx->tlsext_status_type;
     s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
     s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
     s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
     s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
     s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
-    CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
     s->initial_ctx = ctx;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
         s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
-            BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
-                       ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+            OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+                           ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
         if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
             goto err;
         s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
@@ -353,17 +613,17 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     }
     if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
         s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
-            BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
-                       ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+            OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                           ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
         if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
             goto err;
         s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
             ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
     }
-# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
     s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
-# endif
+#endif
 
     if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
         s->alpn_client_proto_list =
@@ -375,6 +635,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
         s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
     }
 
+    s->verified_chain = NULL;
     s->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
 
     s->default_passwd_callback = ctx->default_passwd_callback;
@@ -390,7 +651,8 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
     if (!SSL_clear(s))
         goto err;
 
-    CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data))
+        goto err;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
     s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
@@ -399,11 +661,34 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
 
     s->job = NULL;
 
-    return (s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    if (!SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ctx->ct_validation_callback,
+                                        ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg))
+        goto err;
+#endif
+
+    return s;
  err:
     SSL_free(s);
     SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-    return (NULL);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, 1, &i, s->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
 }
 
 int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
@@ -436,17 +721,17 @@ int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
 
 int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
 {
-    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
     ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
-    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
     return 1;
 }
 
 int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
 {
-    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ssl->lock);
     ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
-    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock);
     return 1;
 }
 
@@ -469,9 +754,9 @@ int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
     r.session_id_length = id_len;
     memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
 
-    CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-    p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
-    CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->session_ctx->lock);
+    p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->session_ctx->sessions, &r);
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->session_ctx->lock);
     return (p != NULL);
 }
 
@@ -495,6 +780,160 @@ int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
     return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
 }
 
+int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, hostname, 0);
+}
+
+int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(s->param, hostname, 0);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(s->param, flags);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(s->param);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return dane_ctx_enable(&ctx->dane);
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags;
+
+    ctx->dane.flags |= flags;
+    return orig;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags;
+
+    ctx->dane.flags &= ~flags;
+    return orig;
+}
+
+int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
+
+    if (s->ctx->dane.mdmax == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (dane->trecs != NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Default SNI name.  This rejects empty names, while set1_host below
+     * accepts them and disables host name checks.  To avoid side-effects with
+     * invalid input, set the SNI name first.
+     */
+    if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+        if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, basedomain)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN);
+            return -1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Primary RFC6125 reference identifier */
+    if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, basedomain, 0)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    dane->mdpth = -1;
+    dane->pdpth = -1;
+    dane->dctx = &s->ctx->dane;
+    dane->trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null();
+
+    if (dane->trecs == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags;
+
+    ssl->dane.flags |= flags;
+    return orig;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags;
+
+    ssl->dane.flags &= ~flags;
+    return orig;
+}
+
+int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
+
+    if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
+        return -1;
+    if (dane->mtlsa) {
+        if (mcert)
+            *mcert = dane->mcert;
+        if (mspki)
+            *mspki = (dane->mcert == NULL) ? dane->mtlsa->spki : NULL;
+    }
+    return dane->mdpth;
+}
+
+int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector,
+                       uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data, size_t *dlen)
+{
+    SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
+
+    if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK)
+        return -1;
+    if (dane->mtlsa) {
+        if (usage)
+            *usage = dane->mtlsa->usage;
+        if (selector)
+            *selector = dane->mtlsa->selector;
+        if (mtype)
+            *mtype = dane->mtlsa->mtype;
+        if (data)
+            *data = dane->mtlsa->data;
+        if (dlen)
+            *dlen = dane->mtlsa->dlen;
+    }
+    return dane->mdpth;
+}
+
+SSL_DANE *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *s)
+{
+    return &s->dane;
+}
+
+int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector,
+                      uint8_t mtype, unsigned char *data, size_t dlen)
+{
+    return dane_tlsa_add(&s->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype,
+                           uint8_t ord)
+{
+    return dane_mtype_set(&ctx->dane, md, mtype, ord);
+}
+
 int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
 {
     return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
@@ -527,33 +966,20 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
     if (s == NULL)
         return;
 
-    i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
-    REF_PRINT("SSL", s);
-#endif
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, -1, &i, s->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s);
     if (i > 0)
         return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-    if (i < 0) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
-        abort();                /* ok */
-    }
-#endif
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
 
     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+    dane_final(&s->dane);
     CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
 
-    if (s->bbio != NULL) {
-        /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
-        if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
-            s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
-        }
-        BIO_free(s->bbio);
-        s->bbio = NULL;
-    }
+    ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+
+    BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
     BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
-    if (s->wbio != s->rbio)
-        BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
 
     BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
 
@@ -577,14 +1003,22 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
     OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-#endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
     sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
     sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    SCT_LIST_free(s->scts);
+    OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
+#endif
     OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
     OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list);
 
     sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
 
+    sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free);
+
     if (s->method != NULL)
         s->method->ssl_free(s);
 
@@ -592,6 +1026,8 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
 
     SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
 
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(s->waitctx);
+
 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
     OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
 #endif
@@ -600,51 +1036,93 @@ void SSL_free(SSL *s)
     sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
 #endif
 
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(s->lock);
+
     OPENSSL_free(s);
 }
 
-void SSL_set_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio)
+void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio)
 {
-    if (s->rbio != rbio)
-        BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+    BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
     s->rbio = rbio;
 }
 
-void SSL_set_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio)
+void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio)
 {
     /*
      * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
      */
-    if (s->bbio != NULL) {
-        if (s->wbio == s->bbio) {
-            s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio;
-            s->bbio->next_bio = NULL;
-        }
-    }
-    if (s->wbio != wbio && s->rbio != s->wbio)
-        BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+    if (s->bbio != NULL)
+        s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+
+    BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
     s->wbio = wbio;
+
+    /* Re-attach |bbio| to the new |wbio|. */
+    if (s->bbio != NULL)
+        s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
 }
 
 void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio)
 {
-    SSL_set_wbio(s, wbio);
-    SSL_set_rbio(s, rbio);
+    /*
+     * For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in
+     * ownership handling.
+     */
+
+    /* If nothing has changed, do nothing */
+    if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s))
+        return;
+
+    /*
+     * If the two arguments are equal then one fewer reference is granted by the
+     * caller than we want to take
+     */
+    if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio)
+        BIO_up_ref(rbio);
+
+    /*
+     * If only the wbio is changed only adopt one reference.
+     */
+    if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s)) {
+        SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio);
+        return;
+    }
+    /*
+     * There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is
+     * changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only
+     * adopt one reference.
+     */
+    if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s) && SSL_get_rbio(s) != SSL_get_wbio(s)) {
+        SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    /* Otherwise, adopt both references. */
+    SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio);
+    SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio);
 }
 
 BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
 {
-    return (s->rbio);
+    return s->rbio;
 }
 
 BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
 {
-    return (s->wbio);
+    if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * If |bbio| is active, the true caller-configured BIO is its
+         * |next_bio|.
+         */
+        return BIO_next(s->bbio);
+    }
+    return s->wbio;
 }
 
 int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
 {
-    return (SSL_get_rfd(s));
+    return SSL_get_rfd(s);
 }
 
 int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
@@ -692,46 +1170,45 @@ int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
 
 int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd)
 {
-    int ret = 0;
-    BIO *bio = NULL;
+    BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
 
-    if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
-        || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) {
-        bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+    if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET
+        || (int)BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) {
+        BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
 
         if (bio == NULL) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-            goto err;
+            return 0;
         }
         BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-        SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio);
-    } else
-        SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s));
-    ret = 1;
- err:
-    return (ret);
+        SSL_set0_wbio(s, bio);
+    } else {
+        BIO_up_ref(rbio);
+        SSL_set0_wbio(s, rbio);
+    }
+    return 1;
 }
 
 int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd)
 {
-    int ret = 0;
-    BIO *bio = NULL;
+    BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
 
-    if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
-        || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
-        bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+    if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET
+        || ((int)BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
+        BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
 
         if (bio == NULL) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-            goto err;
+            return 0;
         }
         BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
-        SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s));
-    } else
-        SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s));
-    ret = 1;
- err:
-    return (ret);
+        SSL_set0_rbio(s, bio);
+    } else {
+        BIO_up_ref(wbio);
+        SSL_set0_rbio(s, wbio);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -826,6 +1303,22 @@ int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
     return (s->method->ssl_pending(s));
 }
 
+int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s)
+{
+    /*
+     * Similar to SSL_pending() but returns a 1 to indicate that we have
+     * unprocessed data available or 0 otherwise (as opposed to the number of
+     * bytes available). Unlike SSL_pending() this will take into account
+     * read_ahead data. A 1 return simply indicates that we have unprocessed
+     * data. That data may not result in any application data, or we may fail
+     * to parse the records for some reason.
+     */
+    if (SSL_pending(s))
+        return 1;
+
+    return RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer);
+}
+
 X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
 {
     X509 *r;
@@ -866,6 +1359,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
  */
 int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
 {
+    int i;
     /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
     if (!SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f))) {
         return 0;
@@ -875,12 +1369,13 @@ int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
      * what if we are setup for one protocol version but want to talk another
      */
     if (t->method != f->method) {
-        t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
-        t->method = f->method;  /* change method */
-        t->method->ssl_new(t);  /* setup new */
+        t->method->ssl_free(t);
+        t->method = f->method;
+        if (t->method->ssl_new(t) == 0)
+            return 0;
     }
 
-    CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&f->cert->references, 1, &i, f->cert->lock);
     ssl_cert_free(t->cert);
     t->cert = f->cert;
     if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length)) {
@@ -893,15 +1388,12 @@ int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
 /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
 int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
 {
-    if ((ctx == NULL) ||
-        (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
-               SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+    if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
         return (0);
     }
     if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
-               SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
         return (0);
     }
     return (X509_check_private_key
@@ -929,23 +1421,35 @@ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
 
 int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s)
 {
-    if(s->job)
+    if (s->job)
         return 1;
 
     return 0;
 }
 
-int SSL_get_async_wait_fd(SSL *s)
+int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds, size_t *numfds)
 {
-    if (!s->job)
-        return -1;
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx;
 
-    return ASYNC_get_wait_fd(s->job);
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, fds, numfds);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds,
+                              OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds)
+{
+    ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ctx, addfd, numaddfds, delfd,
+                                          numdelfds);
 }
 
 int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
 {
-    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
         /* Not properly initialized yet */
         SSL_set_accept_state(s);
     }
@@ -955,7 +1459,7 @@ int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
 
 int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
 {
-    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
         /* Not properly initialized yet */
         SSL_set_connect_state(s);
     }
@@ -969,10 +1473,16 @@ long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
 }
 
 static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args,
-                          int (*func)(void *)) {
+                               int (*func) (void *))
+{
     int ret;
-    switch(ASYNC_start_job(&s->job, &ret, func, args,
-        sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) {
+    if (s->waitctx == NULL) {
+        s->waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new();
+        if (s->waitctx == NULL)
+            return -1;
+    }
+    switch (ASYNC_start_job(&s->job, s->waitctx, &ret, func, args,
+                            sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) {
     case ASYNC_ERR:
         s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC);
@@ -980,6 +1490,9 @@ static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args,
     case ASYNC_PAUSE:
         s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED;
         return -1;
+    case ASYNC_NO_JOBS:
+        s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS;
+        return -1;
     case ASYNC_FINISH:
         s->job = NULL;
         return ret;
@@ -1002,15 +1515,20 @@ static int ssl_io_intern(void *vargs)
     s = args->s;
     buf = args->buf;
     num = args->num;
-    if (args->type == 1)
-        return args->f.func1(s, buf, num);
-    else
-        return args->f.func2(s, buf, num);
+    switch (args->type) {
+    case READFUNC:
+        return args->f.func_read(s, buf, num);
+    case WRITEFUNC:
+        return args->f.func_write(s, buf, num);
+    case OTHERFUNC:
+        return args->f.func_other(s);
+    }
+    return -1;
 }
 
 int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
 {
-    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
         return -1;
     }
@@ -1020,14 +1538,14 @@ int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
         return (0);
     }
 
-    if((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
         struct ssl_async_args args;
 
         args.s = s;
         args.buf = buf;
         args.num = num;
-        args.type = 1;
-        args.f.func1 = s->method->ssl_read;
+        args.type = READFUNC;
+        args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_read;
 
         return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
     } else {
@@ -1037,7 +1555,7 @@ int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
 
 int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
 {
-    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
         return -1;
     }
@@ -1045,14 +1563,14 @@ int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
     if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
         return (0);
     }
-    if((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
         struct ssl_async_args args;
 
         args.s = s;
         args.buf = buf;
         args.num = num;
-        args.type = 1;
-        args.f.func1 = s->method->ssl_peek;
+        args.type = READFUNC;
+        args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_peek;
 
         return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
     } else {
@@ -1062,7 +1580,7 @@ int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
 
 int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
 {
-    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
         return -1;
     }
@@ -1073,14 +1591,14 @@ int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
         return (-1);
     }
 
-    if((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
         struct ssl_async_args args;
 
         args.s = s;
         args.buf = (void *)buf;
         args.num = num;
-        args.type = 2;
-        args.f.func2 = s->method->ssl_write;
+        args.type = WRITEFUNC;
+        args.f.func_write = s->method->ssl_write;
 
         return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
     } else {
@@ -1097,15 +1615,27 @@ int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
      * (see ssl3_shutdown).
      */
 
-    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
         return -1;
     }
 
-    if (!SSL_in_init(s))
-        return (s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
-    else
-        return (1);
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s)) {
+        if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+            struct ssl_async_args args;
+
+            args.s = s;
+            args.type = OTHERFUNC;
+            args.f.func_other = s->method->ssl_shutdown;
+
+            return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern);
+        } else {
+            return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s);
+        }
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT);
+        return -1;
+    }
 }
 
 int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
@@ -1153,10 +1683,6 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
         s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
         return 1;
 
-    case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
-        return (s->options |= larg);
-    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
-        return (s->options &= ~larg);
     case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
         return (s->mode |= larg);
     case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
@@ -1171,6 +1697,20 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
         if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
             return 0;
         s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+        if (s->max_send_fragment < s->split_send_fragment)
+            s->split_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+        if ((unsigned int)larg > s->max_send_fragment || larg == 0)
+            return 0;
+        s->split_send_fragment = larg;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES:
+        if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
+            return 0;
+        s->max_pipelines = larg;
+        if (larg > 1)
+            RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1);
         return 1;
     case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
         if (s->s3)
@@ -1193,11 +1733,17 @@ long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
         }
     case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT:
         if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))
-		return -1;
-	if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)
+            return -1;
+        if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)
             return 1;
         else
             return 0;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
+                                     &s->min_proto_version);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
+                                     &s->max_proto_version);
     default:
         return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg));
     }
@@ -1297,10 +1843,6 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
         return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
     case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
         return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
-    case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
-        return (ctx->options |= larg);
-    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
-        return (ctx->options &= ~larg);
     case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
         return (ctx->mode |= larg);
     case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
@@ -1309,11 +1851,29 @@ long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
         if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
             return 0;
         ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+        if (ctx->max_send_fragment < ctx->split_send_fragment)
+            ctx->split_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+        if ((unsigned int)larg > ctx->max_send_fragment || larg == 0)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->split_send_fragment = larg;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES:
+        if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->max_pipelines = larg;
         return 1;
     case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
         return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
     case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
         return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
+                                     &ctx->min_proto_version);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION:
+        return ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg,
+                                     &ctx->max_proto_version);
     default:
         return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg));
     }
@@ -1415,7 +1975,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
 /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
 const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
 {
-    SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 
     if (s == NULL)
@@ -1429,6 +1989,15 @@ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
     return (c->name);
 }
 
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL_CTX and in order of
+ * preference */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx != NULL)
+        return ctx->cipher_list;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
 /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
 int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
 {
@@ -1473,7 +2042,7 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
 {
     char *p;
     STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
-    SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
     int i;
 
     if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
@@ -1496,7 +2065,7 @@ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
             *p = '\0';
             return buf;
         }
-        strcpy(p, c->name);
+        memcpy(p, c->name, n + 1);
         p += n;
         *(p++) = ':';
         len -= n + 1;
@@ -1538,7 +2107,7 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
  * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to
  * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If
  * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client
- * selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
+ * selects the first protocol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
  * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first
  * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol.
  * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about
@@ -1550,8 +2119,7 @@ int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
 int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
                           const unsigned char *server,
                           unsigned int server_len,
-                          const unsigned char *client,
-                          unsigned int client_len)
+                          const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
 {
     unsigned int i, j;
     const unsigned char *result;
@@ -1655,13 +2223,14 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
  * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
  */
 int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
-                            unsigned protos_len)
+                            unsigned int protos_len)
 {
     OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
-    ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
-    if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+    ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len);
+    if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 1;
-    memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
+    }
     ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
 
     return 0;
@@ -1673,13 +2242,14 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
  * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
  */
 int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos,
-                        unsigned protos_len)
+                        unsigned int protos_len)
 {
     OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
-    ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
-    if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+    ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len);
+    if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 1;
-    memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
+    }
     ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
 
     return 0;
@@ -1709,7 +2279,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
  * respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero.
  */
 void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
-                            unsigned *len)
+                            unsigned int *len)
 {
     *data = NULL;
     if (ssl->s3)
@@ -1720,13 +2290,12 @@ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
         *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
 }
 
-
 int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
                                const char *label, size_t llen,
                                const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
                                int use_context)
 {
-    if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
+    if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
         return -1;
 
     return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
@@ -1768,8 +2337,6 @@ static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
  * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed
  * via ssl.h.
  */
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
-static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
 
 SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 {
@@ -1780,8 +2347,11 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
         return (NULL);
     }
 
+    if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
     if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
         return NULL;
     }
 
@@ -1794,27 +2364,39 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
         goto err;
 
     ret->method = meth;
+    ret->min_proto_version = 0;
+    ret->max_proto_version = 0;
     ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
     ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
     /* We take the system default. */
     ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout();
     ret->references = 1;
+    ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
+    if (ret->lock == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        OPENSSL_free(ret);
+        return NULL;
+    }
     ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
     ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
     if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
-    ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
+    ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp);
     if (ret->sessions == NULL)
         goto err;
     ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
     if (ret->cert_store == NULL)
         goto err;
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    ret->ctlog_store = CTLOG_STORE_new();
+    if (ret->ctlog_store == NULL)
+        goto err;
+#endif
     if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
-                           &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
-                           SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert)
-       || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
+                                &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
+                                SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert)
+        || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
         goto err2;
     }
@@ -1835,18 +2417,23 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
     if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
         goto err;
 
-    CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+    if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data))
+        goto err;
 
     /* No compression for DTLS */
     if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS))
         ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
 
     ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
-
-    /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
-    if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
-        || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
-        || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
+    ret->split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+    /* Setup RFC5077 ticket keys */
+    if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name,
+                    sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0)
+        || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
+                       sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key)) <= 0)
+        || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+                       sizeof(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key)) <= 0))
         ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
@@ -1876,13 +2463,34 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
      * deployed might change this.
      */
     ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+    /*
+     * Disable compression by default to prevent CRIME. Applications can
+     * re-enable compression by configuring
+     * SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+     * or by using the SSL_CONF library.
+     */
+    ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
 
-    return (ret);
+    ret->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+
+    return ret;
  err:
     SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
  err2:
     SSL_CTX_free(ret);
-    return (NULL);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&ctx->references, 1, &i, ctx->lock) <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", ctx);
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
+    return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
 }
 
 void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
@@ -1892,20 +2500,14 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
     if (a == NULL)
         return;
 
-    i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-#ifdef REF_PRINT
-    REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a);
-#endif
+    CRYPTO_atomic_add(&a->references, -1, &i, a->lock);
+    REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", a);
     if (i > 0)
         return;
-#ifdef REF_CHECK
-    if (i < 0) {
-        fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
-        abort();                /* ok */
-    }
-#endif
+    REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
 
     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+    dane_ctx_final(&a->dane);
 
     /*
      * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
@@ -1922,6 +2524,9 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
     CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
     lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
     X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+    CTLOG_STORE_free(a->ctlog_store);
+#endif
     sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
     sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
     ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
@@ -1935,8 +2540,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
     SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-    if (a->client_cert_engine)
-        ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
+    ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
@@ -1945,6 +2549,8 @@ void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
 #endif
     OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list);
 
+    CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock);
+
     OPENSSL_free(a);
 }
 
@@ -1958,6 +2564,16 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u)
     ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
 }
 
+pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->default_passwd_callback;
+}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+}
+
 void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb)
 {
     s->default_passwd_callback = cb;
@@ -1968,6 +2584,16 @@ void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u)
     s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
 }
 
+pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->default_passwd_callback;
+}
+
+void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->default_passwd_callback_userdata;
+}
+
 void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                       int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
                                       void *arg)
@@ -1988,8 +2614,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
     X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
 }
 
-void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg),
-                         void *arg)
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
 {
     ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg);
 }
@@ -1999,73 +2624,40 @@ void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
     ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg);
 }
 
-void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s)
 {
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST)
     CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+#endif
     CERT *c = s->cert;
     uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
-    int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign;
-    int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export;
-    int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl;
-    unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
+    int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dsa_sign;
+    unsigned long mask_k, mask_a;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-    int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
-    int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok;
+    int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok;
     X509 *x = NULL;
-    EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
-    int pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
 #endif
     if (c == NULL)
         return;
 
-    kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-    rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
-    rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
-                      (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
-#else
-    rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0;
-#endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
     dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || c->dh_tmp_auto);
-    dh_tmp_export = !c->dh_tmp_auto && (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
-                                        (dh_tmp
-                                         && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
 #else
-    dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0;
+    dh_tmp = 0;
 #endif
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-    have_ecdh_tmp = c->ecdh_tmp_auto;
-#endif
-    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
     rsa_enc = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
-    rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
-    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
     rsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
-    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
     dsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
-    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
-    dh_rsa = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
-    dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
-    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
-    dh_dsa = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
-    dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
-    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
     have_ecc_cert = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
 #endif
     mask_k = 0;
     mask_a = 0;
-    emask_k = 0;
-    emask_a = 0;
 
 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
-    fprintf(stderr,
-            "rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
-            rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc,
-            rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa);
+    fprintf(stderr, "dht=%d re=%d rs=%d ds=%d\n",
+            dh_tmp, rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dsa_sign);
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
@@ -2086,42 +2678,21 @@ void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
     }
 #endif
 
-    if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
+    if (rsa_enc)
         mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
-    if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
-        emask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
-
-    if (dh_tmp_export)
-        emask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
 
     if (dh_tmp)
         mask_k |= SSL_kDHE;
 
-    if (dh_rsa)
-        mask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
-    if (dh_rsa_export)
-        emask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
-
-    if (dh_dsa)
-        mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
-    if (dh_dsa_export)
-        emask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
-
-    if (mask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
-        mask_a |= SSL_aDH;
-
     if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
         mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
-        emask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
     }
 
     if (dsa_sign) {
         mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
-        emask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
     }
 
     mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
-    emask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
 
     /*
      * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites
@@ -2133,53 +2704,21 @@ void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
         cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC];
         x = cpk->x509;
         ex_kusage = X509_get_key_usage(x);
-        ecdh_ok = ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT;
         ecdsa_ok = ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
         if (!(pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
             ecdsa_ok = 0;
-        ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-        ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
-        EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
-        OBJ_find_sigid_algs(X509_get_signature_nid(x), &md_nid, &pk_nid);
-        if (ecdh_ok) {
-
-            if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) {
-                mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
-                mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
-                if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
-                    emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
-                    emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
-                }
-            }
-
-            if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
-                mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
-                mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
-                if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
-                    emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
-                    emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        if (ecdsa_ok) {
+        if (ecdsa_ok)
             mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
-            emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
-        }
     }
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-    if (have_ecdh_tmp) {
-        mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
-        emask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
-    }
+    mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
     mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
     mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
-    emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
-    emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
     if (mask_k & SSL_kRSA)
         mask_k |= SSL_kRSAPSK;
     if (mask_k & SSL_kDHE)
@@ -2190,71 +2729,20 @@ void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
 
     s->s3->tmp.mask_k = mask_k;
     s->s3->tmp.mask_a = mask_a;
-    s->s3->tmp.export_mask_k = emask_k;
-    s->s3->tmp.export_mask_a = emask_a;
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 
 int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
 {
-    unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
-    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-    int keysize = 0;
-    int md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
-    const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
-    uint32_t ex_kusage = X509_get_key_usage(x);
-
-    alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
-    alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
-
-    if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) {
-        /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
-        pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-        if (pkey == NULL)
-            return 0;
-        keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
-        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-        if (keysize > 163)
-            return 0;
-    }
-
-    OBJ_find_sigid_algs(X509_get_signature_nid(x), &md_nid, &pk_nid);
-
-    if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) {
-        /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
-        if (!(ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
-            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
-                   SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-            /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
-            if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
-                       SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
-                return 0;
-            }
-        }
-        if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
-            /* signature alg must be RSA */
-
-            if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) {
-                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
-                       SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
-                return 0;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
+    if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) {
         /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
-        if (!(ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
+        if (!(X509_get_key_usage(x) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
                    SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
             return 0;
         }
     }
-
     return 1;                   /* all checks are ok */
 }
 
@@ -2289,16 +2777,7 @@ CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(SSL *s)
     c = s->cert;
     if (!s->s3 || !s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
         return NULL;
-    ssl_set_masks(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
-    /*
-     * Broken protocol test: return last used certificate: which may mismatch
-     * the one expected.
-     */
-    if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
-        return c->key;
-#endif
+    ssl_set_masks(s);
 
     i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
 
@@ -2320,18 +2799,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
     alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
     c = s->cert;
 
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
-    /*
-     * Broken protocol test: use last key: which may mismatch the one
-     * expected.
-     */
-    if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
-        idx = c->key - c->pkeys;
-    else
-#endif
-
-    if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
-            (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
+    if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
         idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
     else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
         if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
@@ -2386,7 +2854,7 @@ void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
         && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
             || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session))
         && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) {
-        CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+        SSL_SESSION_up_ref(s->session);
         if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
             SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
     }
@@ -2413,24 +2881,23 @@ const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
 
 int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
 {
-    int conn = -1;
     int ret = 1;
 
     if (s->method != meth) {
-        if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
-            conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
+        const SSL_METHOD *sm = s->method;
+        int (*hf) (SSL *) = s->handshake_func;
 
-        if (s->method->version == meth->version)
+        if (sm->version == meth->version)
             s->method = meth;
         else {
-            s->method->ssl_free(s);
+            sm->ssl_free(s);
             s->method = meth;
             ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
         }
 
-        if (conn == 1)
+        if (hf == sm->ssl_connect)
             s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
-        else if (conn == 0)
+        else if (hf == sm->ssl_accept)
             s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
     }
     return (ret);
@@ -2456,56 +2923,65 @@ int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
             return (SSL_ERROR_SSL);
     }
 
-    if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) {
-        bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
-        if (BIO_should_read(bio))
-            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
-        else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
-            /*
-             * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
-             * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
-             * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
-             * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
-             * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
-             * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
-             * might be safer to keep it.
-             */
-            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
-        else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
-            reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
-            if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
-                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
-            else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
-                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
-            else
-                return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
+    if (i < 0) {
+        if (SSL_want_read(s)) {
+            bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+            if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+            else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+                /*
+                 * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
+                 * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
+                 * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
+                 * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
+                 * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
+                 * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
+                 * might be safer to keep it.
+                 */
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+            else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+                reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+                if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+                else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+                else
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
+            }
         }
-    }
 
-    if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) {
-        bio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
-        if (BIO_should_write(bio))
-            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
-        else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+        if (SSL_want_write(s)) {
             /*
-             * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
+             * Access wbio directly - in order to use the buffered bio if
+             * present
              */
-            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
-        else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
-            reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
-            if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
-                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
-            else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
-                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
-            else
-                return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+            bio = s->wbio;
+            if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+            else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+                /*
+                 * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
+                 */
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+            else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+                reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+                if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+                else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+                else
+                    return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+            }
+        }
+        if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) {
+            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
+        }
+        if (SSL_want_async(s)) {
+            return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC;
+        }
+        if (SSL_want_async_job(s)) {
+            return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB;
         }
-    }
-    if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) {
-        return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
-    }
-    if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_async(s)) {
-        return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC;
     }
 
     if (i == 0) {
@@ -2539,7 +3015,7 @@ int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
     s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
 
     if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
-        if((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
+        if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
             struct ssl_async_args args;
 
             args.s = s;
@@ -2588,32 +3064,37 @@ int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
     return (0);
 }
 
-SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
+const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
 {
     SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
     return (NULL);
 }
 
-const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
-{
-    if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
-        return ("TLSv1.2");
-    else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
-        return ("TLSv1.1");
-    else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
-        return ("TLSv1");
-    else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
-        return ("SSLv3");
-    else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
-        return ("DTLSv0.9");
-    else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
-        return ("DTLSv1");
-    else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
-        return ("DTLSv1.2");
+const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version)
+{
+    if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+        return "TLSv1.2";
+    else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+        return "TLSv1.1";
+    else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
+        return "TLSv1";
+    else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
+        return "SSLv3";
+    else if (version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return "DTLSv0.9";
+    else if (version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+        return "DTLSv1";
+    else if (version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
+        return "DTLSv1.2";
     else
         return ("unknown");
 }
 
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return ssl_protocol_to_string(s->version);
+}
+
 SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
 {
     STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
@@ -2621,14 +3102,23 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
     SSL *ret;
     int i;
 
+    /* If we're not quiescent, just up_ref! */
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s) || !SSL_in_before(s)) {
+        CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->references, 1, &i, s->lock);
+        return s;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Otherwise, copy configuration state, and session if set.
+     */
     if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
         return (NULL);
 
-    ret->version = s->version;
-    ret->method = s->method;
-
     if (s->session != NULL) {
-        /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
+        /*
+         * Arranges to share the same session via up_ref.  This "copies"
+         * session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert'
+         */
         if (!SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s))
             goto err;
     } else {
@@ -2638,10 +3128,8 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
          * point to the same object, and thus we can't use
          * SSL_copy_session_id.
          */
-
-        ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
-        ret->method = s->method;
-        ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
+        if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(ret, s->method))
+            goto err;
 
         if (s->cert != NULL) {
             ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
@@ -2654,6 +3142,9 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
             goto err;
     }
 
+    if (!ssl_dane_dup(ret, s))
+        goto err;
+    ret->version = s->version;
     ret->options = s->options;
     ret->mode = s->mode;
     SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
@@ -2666,8 +3157,6 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
 
     SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s));
 
-    ret->debug = s->debug;
-
     /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
     if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
         goto err;
@@ -2681,22 +3170,20 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
         if (s->wbio != s->rbio) {
             if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio))
                 goto err;
-        } else
+        } else {
+            BIO_up_ref(ret->rbio);
             ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
+        }
     }
-    ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
-    ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+
     ret->server = s->server;
-    ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
-    ret->new_session = s->new_session;
-    ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+    if (s->handshake_func) {
+        if (s->server)
+            SSL_set_accept_state(ret);
+        else
+            SSL_set_connect_state(ret);
+    }
     ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
-    ret->statem = s->statem;      /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state,
-                                   * though */
-    RECORD_LAYER_dup(&ret->rlayer, &s->rlayer);
-    ret->init_num = 0;          /* would have to copy ret->init_buf,
-                                 * ret->init_msg, ret->init_num,
-                                 * ret->init_off */
     ret->hit = s->hit;
 
     ret->default_passwd_callback = s->default_passwd_callback;
@@ -2737,13 +3224,11 @@ SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
 void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
 {
     if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
-        OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
         s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
     }
     if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
-        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
-        OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
         s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
     }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
@@ -2811,34 +3296,25 @@ const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
 #endif
 }
 
-int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push)
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
 {
     BIO *bbio;
 
-    if (s->bbio == NULL) {
-        bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
-        if (bbio == NULL)
-            return (0);
-        s->bbio = bbio;
-    } else {
-        bbio = s->bbio;
-        if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
-            s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+    if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+        /* Already buffered. */
+        return 1;
     }
-    (void)BIO_reset(bbio);
-/*      if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
-    if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
+
+    bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+    if (bbio == NULL || !BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
+        BIO_free(bbio);
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
-        return (0);
-    }
-    if (push) {
-        if (s->wbio != bbio)
-            s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
-    } else {
-        if (s->wbio == bbio)
-            s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio);
+        return 0;
     }
-    return (1);
+    s->bbio = bbio;
+    s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
+
+    return 1;
 }
 
 void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
@@ -2847,14 +3323,8 @@ void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
     if (s->bbio == NULL)
         return;
 
-    if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
-        /* remove buffering */
-        s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
-#ifdef REF_CHECK                /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids
-                                 * adding one more preprocessor symbol */
-        assert(s->wbio != NULL);
-#endif
-    }
+    s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+    assert(s->wbio != NULL);
     BIO_free(s->bbio);
     s->bbio = NULL;
 }
@@ -2886,17 +3356,22 @@ void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
 
 int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
 {
-    return (s->shutdown);
+    return s->shutdown;
 }
 
 int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
 {
-    return (s->version);
+    return s->version;
+}
+
+int SSL_client_version(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->client_version;
 }
 
 SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
 {
-    return (ssl->ctx);
+    return ssl->ctx;
 }
 
 SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
@@ -2932,11 +3407,11 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
         memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
     }
 
-    CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-    SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+    SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx);     /* decrement reference count */
     ssl->ctx = ctx;
 
-    return (ssl->ctx);
+    return ssl->ctx;
 }
 
 int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
@@ -3028,7 +3503,7 @@ size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
 }
 
 size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session,
-                               unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+                                  unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
 {
     if (session->master_key_length < 0) {
         /* Should never happen */
@@ -3078,48 +3553,17 @@ void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
     ctx->cert_store = store;
 }
 
-int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
-{
-    return (s->rwstate);
-}
-
-/**
- * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
- * \param ctx the SSL context.
- * \param cb the callback
- */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-                                                            int is_export,
-                                                            int keylength))
-{
-    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
-}
-
-void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
-                                                    int is_export,
-                                                    int keylength))
+void SSL_CTX_set1_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
 {
-    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
+    if (store != NULL)
+        X509_STORE_up_ref(store);
+    SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, store);
 }
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DOXYGEN
-/**
- * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
- * \param ssl the SSL session.
- * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
- * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
- * of the required key in bits.
- * \return the temporary RSA key.
- * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
- */
 
-RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)
+int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
 {
+    return (s->rwstate);
 }
-#endif
 
 /**
  * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
@@ -3146,13 +3590,12 @@ void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
 int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
 {
     if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
-        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT,
-               SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
         return 0;
     }
     OPENSSL_free(ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint);
     if (identity_hint != NULL) {
-        ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+        ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint);
         if (ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
             return 0;
     } else
@@ -3171,7 +3614,7 @@ int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
     }
     OPENSSL_free(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
     if (identity_hint != NULL) {
-        s->cert->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+        s->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint);
         if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
             return 0;
     } else
@@ -3200,8 +3643,7 @@ void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
                                                      unsigned int
                                                      max_identity_len,
                                                      unsigned char *psk,
-                                                     unsigned int
-                                                     max_psk_len))
+                                                     unsigned int max_psk_len))
 {
     s->psk_client_callback = cb;
 }
@@ -3223,8 +3665,7 @@ void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
                                  unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
                                                      const char *identity,
                                                      unsigned char *psk,
-                                                     unsigned int
-                                                     max_psk_len))
+                                                     unsigned int max_psk_len))
 {
     s->psk_server_callback = cb;
 }
@@ -3275,7 +3716,7 @@ void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl,
 
 /*
  * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
- * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
+ * variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
  * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
  * allocated ctx;
  */
@@ -3283,9 +3724,9 @@ void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl,
 EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
 {
     ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
-    *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+    *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
     if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
-        EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash);
         *hash = NULL;
         return NULL;
     }
@@ -3296,35 +3737,34 @@ void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
 {
 
     if (*hash)
-        EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash);
     *hash = NULL;
 }
 
 /* Retrieve handshake hashes */
 int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, int outlen)
 {
-    EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
     EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst;
     int ret = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hdgst);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
     if (ret < 0 || ret > outlen) {
         ret = 0;
         goto err;
     }
-    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst)
-        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, NULL) <= 0)
+    ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        ret = 0;
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, hdgst)
+        || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL) <= 0)
         ret = 0;
  err:
-    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
     return ret;
 }
 
-void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
-{
-    s->debug = debug;
-}
-
-int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
+int SSL_session_reused(SSL *s)
 {
     return s->hit;
 }
@@ -3334,6 +3774,15 @@ int SSL_is_server(SSL *s)
     return s->server;
 }
 
+#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
+void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
+{
+    /* Old function was do-nothing anyway... */
+    (void)s;
+    (void)debug;
+}
+#endif
+
 void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level)
 {
     s->cert->sec_level = level;
@@ -3345,16 +3794,17 @@ int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s)
 }
 
 void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s,
-                               int (*cb) (SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
-                                          int bits, int nid, void *other,
-                                          void *ex))
+                               int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                          int op, int bits, int nid,
+                                          void *other, void *ex))
 {
     s->cert->sec_cb = cb;
 }
 
-int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
-                                                int bits, int nid,
-                                                void *other, void *ex) {
+int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s,
+                                                const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
+                                                int bits, int nid, void *other,
+                                                void *ex) {
     return s->cert->sec_cb;
 }
 
@@ -3379,15 +3829,15 @@ int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
 }
 
 void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
-                                   int (*cb) (SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int op,
-                                              int bits, int nid, void *other,
-                                              void *ex))
+                                   int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                              int op, int bits, int nid,
+                                              void *other, void *ex))
 {
     ctx->cert->sec_cb = cb;
 }
 
-int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (SSL *s,
-                                                          SSL_CTX *ctx,
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *s,
+                                                          const SSL_CTX *ctx,
                                                           int op, int bits,
                                                           int nid,
                                                           void *other,
@@ -3405,4 +3855,426 @@ void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
     return ctx->cert->sec_ex;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Get/Set/Clear options in SSL_CTX or SSL, formerly macros, now functions that
+ * can return unsigned long, instead of the generic long return value from the
+ * control interface.
+ */
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->options;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->options;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op)
+{
+    return ctx->options |= op;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_set_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op)
+{
+    return s->options |= op;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op)
+{
+    return ctx->options &= ~op;
+}
+
+unsigned long SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op)
+{
+    return s->options &= ~op;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->verified_chain;
+}
+
 IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+
+/*
+ * Moves SCTs from the |src| stack to the |dst| stack.
+ * The source of each SCT will be set to |origin|.
+ * If |dst| points to a NULL pointer, a new stack will be created and owned by
+ * the caller.
+ * Returns the number of SCTs moved, or a negative integer if an error occurs.
+ */
+static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src,
+                        sct_source_t origin)
+{
+    int scts_moved = 0;
+    SCT *sct = NULL;
+
+    if (*dst == NULL) {
+        *dst = sk_SCT_new_null();
+        if (*dst == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    while ((sct = sk_SCT_pop(src)) != NULL) {
+        if (SCT_set_source(sct, origin) != 1)
+            goto err;
+
+        if (sk_SCT_push(*dst, sct) <= 0)
+            goto err;
+        scts_moved += 1;
+    }
+
+    return scts_moved;
+ err:
+    if (sct != NULL)
+        sk_SCT_push(src, sct);  /* Put the SCT back */
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found.
+ * Returns the number of SCTs extracted.
+ */
+static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL *s)
+{
+    int scts_extracted = 0;
+
+    if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
+        const unsigned char *p = s->tlsext_scts;
+        STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = o2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, &p, s->tlsext_scts_len);
+
+        scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION);
+
+        SCT_LIST_free(scts);
+    }
+
+    return scts_extracted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks for an OCSP response and then attempts to extract any SCTs found if it
+ * contains an SCT X509 extension. They will be stored in |s->scts|.
+ * Returns:
+ * - The number of SCTs extracted, assuming an OCSP response exists.
+ * - 0 if no OCSP response exists or it contains no SCTs.
+ * - A negative integer if an error occurs.
+ */
+static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s)
+{
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+    int scts_extracted = 0;
+    const unsigned char *p;
+    OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
+    OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL || s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen == 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    p = s->tlsext_ocsp_resp;
+    rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+    if (rsp == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
+    if (br == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); ++i) {
+        OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i);
+
+        if (single == NULL)
+            continue;
+
+        scts =
+            OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL);
+        scts_extracted =
+            ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE);
+        if (scts_extracted < 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+ err:
+    SCT_LIST_free(scts);
+    OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
+    OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
+    return scts_extracted;
+# else
+    /* Behave as if no OCSP response exists */
+    return 0;
+# endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempts to extract SCTs from the peer certificate.
+ * Return the number of SCTs extracted, or a negative integer if an error
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static int ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(SSL *s)
+{
+    int scts_extracted = 0;
+    X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
+
+    if (cert != NULL) {
+        STACK_OF(SCT) *scts =
+            X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, NULL, NULL);
+
+        scts_extracted =
+            ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION);
+
+        SCT_LIST_free(scts);
+    }
+
+    return scts_extracted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempts to find all received SCTs by checking TLS extensions, the OCSP
+ * response (if it exists) and X509v3 extensions in the certificate.
+ * Returns NULL if an error occurs.
+ */
+const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (!s->scts_parsed) {
+        if (ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(s) < 0 ||
+            ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(s) < 0 ||
+            ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(s) < 0)
+            goto err;
+
+        s->scts_parsed = 1;
+    }
+    return s->scts;
+ err:
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx,
+                         const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx,
+                     const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg)
+{
+    int count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+        SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i);
+        int status = SCT_get_validation_status(sct);
+
+        if (status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID)
+            return 1;
+    }
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_STRICT, SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback,
+                                   void *arg)
+{
+    /*
+     * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look
+     * for this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT.
+     */
+    if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(s->ctx,
+                                                          TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp))
+    {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK,
+               SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (callback != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP
+         */
+        if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(s, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp))
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    s->ct_validation_callback = callback;
+    s->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                       ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg)
+{
+    /*
+     * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look for
+     * this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT.
+     */
+    if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(ctx,
+                                                          TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp))
+    {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK,
+               SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ctx->ct_validation_callback = callback;
+    ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->ct_validation_callback != NULL;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->ct_validation_callback != NULL;
+}
+
+int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL;
+    X509 *issuer;
+    SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane;
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+    const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts;
+
+    /*
+     * If no callback is set, the peer is anonymous, or its chain is invalid,
+     * skip SCT validation - just return success.  Applications that continue
+     * handshakes without certificates, with unverified chains, or pinned leaf
+     * certificates are outside the scope of the WebPKI and CT.
+     *
+     * The above exclusions notwithstanding the vast majority of peers will
+     * have rather ordinary certificate chains validated by typical
+     * applications that perform certificate verification and therefore will
+     * process SCTs when enabled.
+     */
+    if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL || cert == NULL ||
+        s->verify_result != X509_V_OK ||
+        s->verified_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1)
+        return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * CT not applicable for chains validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3)
+     * trust-anchors.  See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-4.2
+     */
+    if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mtlsa != NULL) {
+        switch (dane->mtlsa->usage) {
+        case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA:
+        case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE:
+            return 1;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new();
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    issuer = sk_X509_value(s->verified_chain, 1);
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ctx, cert);
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ctx, issuer);
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(ctx, s->ctx->ctlog_store);
+
+    scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s);
+
+    /*
+     * This function returns success (> 0) only when all the SCTs are valid, 0
+     * when some are invalid, and < 0 on various internal errors (out of
+     * memory, etc.).  Having some, or even all, invalid SCTs is not sufficient
+     * reason to abort the handshake, that decision is up to the callback.
+     * Therefore, we error out only in the unexpected case that the return
+     * value is negative.
+     *
+     * XXX: One might well argue that the return value of this function is an
+     * unfortunate design choice.  Its job is only to determine the validation
+     * status of each of the provided SCTs.  So long as it correctly separates
+     * the wheat from the chaff it should return success.  Failure in this case
+     * ought to correspond to an inability to carry out its duties.
+     */
+    if (SCT_LIST_validate(scts, ctx) < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT, SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    ret = s->ct_validation_callback(ctx, scts, s->ct_validation_callback_arg);
+    if (ret < 0)
+        ret = 0;                /* This function returns 0 on failure */
+
+ end:
+    CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ctx);
+    /*
+     * With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and re-used despite a
+     * failure return code here.  Also the application may wish the complete
+     * the handshake, and then disconnect cleanly at a higher layer, after
+     * checking the verification status of the completed connection.
+     *
+     * We therefore force a certificate verification failure which will be
+     * visible via SSL_get_verify_result() and cached as part of any resumed
+     * session.
+     *
+     * Note: the permissive callback is for information gathering only, always
+     * returns success, and does not affect verification status.  Only the
+     * strict callback or a custom application-specified callback can trigger
+     * connection failure or record a verification error.
+     */
+    if (ret <= 0)
+        s->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS;
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode)
+{
+    switch (validation_mode) {
+    default:
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE:
+        return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_permissive, NULL);
+    case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT:
+        return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_strict, NULL);
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode)
+{
+    switch (validation_mode) {
+    default:
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE);
+        return 0;
+    case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE:
+        return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_permissive, NULL);
+    case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT:
+        return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_strict, NULL);
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(ctx->ctlog_store);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path)
+{
+    return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(ctx->ctlog_store, path);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE * logs)
+{
+    CTLOG_STORE_free(ctx->ctlog_store);
+    ctx->ctlog_store = logs;
+}
+
+const CTLOG_STORE *SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->ctlog_store;
+}
+
+#endif