X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fssl_cert.c;h=222f703284355ba821c09a32f2bd07d960e239c2;hp=d78584715a7589a175a708b5c2a8a225c25ab04f;hb=c46ecc3a55bcbbe4ff31da3864d015e343b0189f;hpb=a3faebd1041576a59bffe01bbd2c68495870ec5e diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c index d78584715a..222f703284 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -73,12 +73,12 @@ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. + * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE @@ -102,6 +102,16 @@ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #include @@ -111,46 +121,60 @@ # include #endif -#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && !defined(NeXT) && !defined(MAC_OS_pre_X) -#include -#endif - -#if defined(WIN32) -#include -#endif - -#ifdef NeXT -#include -#define dirent direct -#endif - +#include "o_dir.h" #include #include #include #include +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include +#endif +#include #include "ssl_locl.h" int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1; + int got_write_lock = 0; + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) { - /* any write lock will do; usually this branch - * will only be taken once anyway */ + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + got_write_lock = 1; if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0) { ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index( 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL); } - - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); } + + if (got_write_lock) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + else + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); + return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; } +static void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert) + { + /* Set digest values to defaults */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1(); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); + cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa(); +#endif + } + CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) { CERT *ret; @@ -165,7 +189,7 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) ret->key= &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); ret->references=1; - + ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret); return(ret); } @@ -188,8 +212,10 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) * if you find that more readable */ ret->valid = cert->valid; - ret->mask = cert->mask; - ret->export_mask = cert->export_mask; + ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k; + ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a; + ret->export_mask_k = cert->export_mask_k; + ret->export_mask_a = cert->export_mask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (cert->rsa_tmp != NULL) @@ -203,7 +229,6 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { - /* DH parameters don't have a reference count */ ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp); if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) { @@ -234,19 +259,34 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (cert->ecdh_tmp) + { + ret->ecdh_tmp = EC_KEY_dup(cert->ecdh_tmp); + if (ret->ecdh_tmp == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + ret->ecdh_tmp_cb = cert->ecdh_tmp_cb; + ret->ecdh_tmp_auto = cert->ecdh_tmp_auto; +#endif + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { - if (cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) + CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i; + CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i; + if (cpk->x509 != NULL) { - ret->pkeys[i].x509 = cert->pkeys[i].x509; - CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].x509->references, 1, - CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + rpk->x509 = cpk->x509; + CRYPTO_add(&rpk->x509->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); } - if (cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) + if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) { - ret->pkeys[i].privatekey = cert->pkeys[i].privatekey; - CRYPTO_add(&ret->pkeys[i].privatekey->references, 1, + rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey; + CRYPTO_add(&cpk->privatekey->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EVP_PKEY); switch(i) @@ -268,22 +308,46 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: /* We have a DH key. */ break; - + + case SSL_PKEY_ECC: + /* We have an ECC key */ + break; + default: /* Can't happen. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); } } + + if (cpk->chain) + { + int j; + rpk->chain = sk_X509_dup(cpk->chain); + if (!rpk->chain) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(rpk->chain); j++) + { + X509 *x = sk_X509_value(rpk->chain, j); + CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + } + } } - /* ret->extra_certs *should* exist, but currently the own certificate - * chain is held inside SSL_CTX */ - ret->references=1; + /* Set digests to defaults. NB: we don't copy existing values as they + * will be set during handshake. + */ + ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret); + /* Sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */ + ret->sigalgs = NULL; + ret->sigalgslen = 0; return(ret); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH /* avoid 'unreferenced label' warning if OPENSSL_NO_DH is defined */ +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) err: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA @@ -294,15 +358,23 @@ err: if (ret->dh_tmp != NULL) DH_free(ret->dh_tmp); #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (ret->ecdh_tmp != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp); +#endif for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { - if (ret->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) - X509_free(ret->pkeys[i].x509); - if (ret->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) - EVP_PKEY_free(ret->pkeys[i].privatekey); + CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i; + if (rpk->x509 != NULL) + X509_free(rpk->x509); + if (rpk->privatekey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(rpk->privatekey); + if (rpk->chain) + sk_X509_pop_free(rpk->chain, X509_free); } + return NULL; } @@ -333,18 +405,26 @@ void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (c->dh_tmp) DH_free(c->dh_tmp); #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp); +#endif for (i=0; ipkeys[i].x509 != NULL) - X509_free(c->pkeys[i].x509); - if (c->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL) - EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].privatekey); + CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; + if (cpk->x509 != NULL) + X509_free(cpk->x509); + if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey); + if (cpk->chain) + sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); #if 0 if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey); #endif } + if (c->sigalgs) + OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs); OPENSSL_free(c); } @@ -376,6 +456,59 @@ int ssl_cert_inst(CERT **o) return(1); } +int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) + { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; + if (!cpk) + return 0; + if (cpk->chain) + sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); + cpk->chain = chain; + return 1; + } + +int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) + { + STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; + X509 *x; + int i; + if (!chain) + return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL); + dchain = sk_X509_dup(chain); + if (!dchain) + return 0; + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dchain); i++) + { + x = sk_X509_value(dchain, i); + CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + } + if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain)) + { + sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); + return 0; + } + return 1; + } + +int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) + { + CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; + if (!cpk) + return 0; + if (!cpk->chain) + cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); + if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x)) + return 0; + return 1; + } + +int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *c, X509 *x) + { + if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(c, x)) + return 0; + CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + return 1; + } SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void) { @@ -439,6 +572,10 @@ void ssl_sess_cert_free(SESS_CERT *sc) if (sc->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) DH_free(sc->peer_dh_tmp); #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (sc->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(sc->peer_ecdh_tmp); +#endif OPENSSL_free(sc); } @@ -464,26 +601,33 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB); return(0); } +#if 0 if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0) X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); +#endif X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),s); - /* We need to set the verify purpose. The purpose can be determined by + /* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates * or vice versa. */ - if (s->server) - i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT; - else - i = X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER; - X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(&ctx, i, s->purpose, s->trust); + X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, + s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); + /* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the + * ctx. + */ + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param); if (s->verify_callback) X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback); if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) +#if 1 /* new with OpenSSL 0.9.7 */ + i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); +#else i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx); /* should pass app_verify_arg */ +#endif else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY @@ -501,12 +645,12 @@ int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk) return(i); } -static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) +static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { if (*ca_list != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list,X509_NAME_free); - *ca_list=list; + *ca_list=name_list; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) @@ -528,22 +672,22 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) return(ret); } -void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) +void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { - set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),list); + set_client_CA_list(&(s->client_CA),name_list); } -void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) +void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { - set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),list); + set_client_CA_list(&(ctx->client_CA),name_list); } -STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx) +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->client_CA); } -STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(SSL *s) +STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) { if (s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) { /* we are in the client */ @@ -610,14 +754,13 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) BIO *in; X509 *x=NULL; X509_NAME *xn=NULL; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret,*sk; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL,*sk; - ret=sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(xname_cmp); in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal()); - if ((ret == NULL) || (sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) + if ((sk == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; @@ -630,6 +773,15 @@ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) { if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in,&x,NULL,NULL) == NULL) break; + if (ret == NULL) + { + ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); + if (ret == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } if ((xn=X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; /* check for duplicates */ xn=X509_NAME_dup(xn); @@ -652,6 +804,8 @@ err: if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_free(sk); if (in != NULL) BIO_free(in); if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); + if (ret != NULL) + ERR_clear_error(); return(ret); } #endif @@ -700,6 +854,8 @@ int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, sk_X509_NAME_push(stack,xn); } + ERR_clear_error(); + if (0) { err: @@ -710,7 +866,7 @@ err: if(x != NULL) X509_free(x); - sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp); + (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack,oldcmp); return ret; } @@ -726,101 +882,149 @@ err: * certs may have been added to \c stack. */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 -#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* XXXX This may be fixed in the future */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! */ - int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *dir) { - DIR *d; - struct dirent *dstruct; + OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL; + const char *filename; int ret = 0; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); - d = opendir(dir); /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ - if(!d) - { - SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error()); - ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')"); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); - goto err; - } - - while((dstruct=readdir(d))) + + while((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) { char buf[1024]; int r; - - if(strlen(dir)+strlen(dstruct->d_name)+2 > sizeof buf) + + if(strlen(dir)+strlen(filename)+2 > sizeof buf) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } - - r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,dstruct->d_name); - if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf) + +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS + r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s%s",dir,filename); +#else + r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,filename); +#endif + if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf)) goto err; if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf)) goto err; } + + if (errno) + { + SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error()); + ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')"); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; -err: +err: + if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); return ret; } -#endif -#endif +/* Add a certificate to a BUF_MEM structure */ -#else +static int ssl_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) + { + int n; + unsigned char *p; -int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, - const char *dir) + n=i2d_X509(x,NULL); + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3))) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return 0; + } + p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); + l2n3(n,p); + i2d_X509(x,&p); + *l+=n+3; + + return 1; + } + +/* Add certificate chain to internal SSL BUF_MEM strcuture */ +int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk, unsigned long *l) { - WIN32_FIND_DATA FindFileData; - HANDLE hFind; - int ret = 0; + BUF_MEM *buf = s->init_buf; + int no_chain; + int i; - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_READDIR); - - hFind = FindFirstFile(dir, &FindFileData); - /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ - if(hFind == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) + X509 *x; + STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; + + if (cpk) + x = cpk->x509; + else + x = NULL; + + /* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use + * parent ctx. + */ + if (cpk && cpk->chain) + extra_certs = cpk->chain; + else + extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) + no_chain = 1; + else + no_chain = 0; + + /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10)) { - SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error()); - ERR_add_error_data(3, "opendir('", dir, "')"); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); - goto err; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return 0; } - - do + if (x != NULL) { - char buf[1024]; - int r; - - if(strlen(dir)+strlen(FindFileData.cFileName)+2 > sizeof buf) + if (no_chain) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK,SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) + return 0; + } + else + { + X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; + + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return(0); + } + X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); + /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ + ERR_clear_error(); + for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) + { + x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); + + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_buf(buf, l, x)) + { + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); + return 0; + } + } + X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); } - - r = BIO_snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%s/%s",dir,FindFileData.cFileName); - if (r <= 0 || r >= sizeof buf) - goto err; - if(!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack,buf)) - goto err; } - while (FindNextFile(hFind, &FindFileData) != FALSE); - FindClose(hFind); - ret = 1; + for (i=0; i