X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fs3_srvr.c;h=f6102123d43a7bf28b0ea6da102ff7739f4cb0dc;hp=7742f3b8bc03d918e0811f4fed445e246d5eca84;hb=21c4b259598efe3ea8c834c1568e8b762be120c4;hpb=e78f137899af768e1e9335f080826dc9f18eb882 diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c index 7742f3b8bc..f6102123d4 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -117,19 +117,6 @@ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * - * In addition, Sun covenants to all licensees who provide a reciprocal - * covenant with respect to their own patents if any, not to sue under - * current and future patent claims necessarily infringed by the making, - * using, practicing, selling, offering for sale and/or otherwise - * disposing of the Contribution as delivered hereunder - * (or portions thereof), provided that such covenant shall not apply: - * 1) for code that a licensee deletes from the Contribution; - * 2) separates from the Contribution; or - * 3) for infringements caused by: - * i) the modification of the Contribution or - * ii) the combination of the Contribution with other software or - * devices where such combination causes the infringement. - * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * @@ -145,23 +132,18 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +#include +#endif +#include +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 #include +#endif #include -#include "cryptlib.h" static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); -static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s); -static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s); - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH static int nid2curve_id(int nid); #endif @@ -174,32 +156,16 @@ static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) return(NULL); } -SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void) - { - static int init=1; - static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data; - - if (init) - { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD); - - memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(), - sizeof(SSL_METHOD)); - SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept; - SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method; - init=0; - - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD); - } - return(&SSLv3_server_data); - } +IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, + ssl3_accept, + ssl_undefined_function, + ssl3_get_server_method) int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf; - unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL); + unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; - long num1; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; @@ -269,6 +235,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) } s->init_num=0; + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { @@ -281,6 +248,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } + else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) + { + /* Server attempting to renegotiate with + * client that doesn't support secure + * renegotiation. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + ret = -1; + goto end; + } else { /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, @@ -323,9 +302,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; - +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->hit) - s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + { + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + } +#else + if (s->hit) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; +#endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num=0; @@ -333,15 +321,30 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: - /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */ - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) + /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */ + if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) { ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } + else + { + skip = 1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + } +#else } else skip=1; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; +#endif s->init_num=0; break; @@ -444,15 +447,24 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: - /* number of bytes to be flushed */ - num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL); - if (num1 > 0) + + /* This code originally checked to see if + * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO + * and then flushed. This caused problems + * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed + * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue + * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING + * still exist. So instead we just flush + * unconditionally. + */ + + s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; + if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { - s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; - num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio); - if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; + ret= -1; + goto end; } + s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; @@ -466,10 +478,11 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) if (ret == 2) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; else { - /* could be sent for a DH cert, even if we - * have not asked for it :-) */ - ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) goto end; + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) + { + ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + } s->init_num=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; } @@ -525,11 +538,34 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) s->state=SSL_ST_OK; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; +#endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: + ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: + case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: + ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); + if (ret <= 0) goto end; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num=0; + break; + +#endif + case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: @@ -635,7 +671,7 @@ end: return(ret); } -static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) +int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; @@ -657,14 +693,22 @@ static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } -static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) +int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) { int ok; long n; + /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per + * negotiation. */ + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); + return -1; + } + /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, * so permit appropriate message length */ - n=ssl3_get_message(s, + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, @@ -675,9 +719,7 @@ static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, - * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) - * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared - * when a handshake is not completed ... */ + * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { @@ -685,19 +727,30 @@ static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; } #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) + { + EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); + s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; + } +#endif + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; return 2; } return 1; } -static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) +int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) { int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; + unsigned int cookie_len; long n; unsigned long id; unsigned char *p,*d,*q; SSL_CIPHER *c; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; +#endif STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. @@ -708,10 +761,10 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { - s->first_packet=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; } - n=ssl3_get_message(s, + s->first_packet=1; + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, @@ -719,6 +772,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); + s->first_packet=0; d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header @@ -726,7 +780,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; p+=2; - if (s->client_version < s->version) + if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || + (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) @@ -738,6 +793,21 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) goto f_err; } + /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't + * contain one, just return since we do not want to + * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... + */ + if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) + { + unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; + + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); + + if (cookie_length == 0) + return 1; + } + /* load the client random */ memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; @@ -754,14 +824,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with * an earlier library version) */ - if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) + if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) goto err; } else { - i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j); + i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ s->hit=1; @@ -776,6 +846,58 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) } p+=j; + + if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + { + /* cookie stuff */ + cookie_len = *(p++); + + /* + * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the + * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it + * does not cause an overflow. + */ + if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) + { + /* too much data */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ + if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && + cookie_len > 0) + { + memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); + + if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) + { + if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, + cookie_len) == 0) + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + /* else cookie verification succeeded */ + } + else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, + s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ + { + al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + ret = 2; + } + + p += cookie_len; + } + n2s(p,i); if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) { @@ -820,23 +942,33 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) break; } } - if (j == 0) - { - if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) - { - /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */ - s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, - 0); - } - else +/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade + * attack: CVE-2010-4180. + */ +#if 0 + if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) + { + /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may + * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to + * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server + * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not + * enabled, though. */ + c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); + if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { - /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher - * list if we are asked to reuse it */ - al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); - goto f_err; + s->session->cipher = c; + j = 1; } } +#endif + if (j == 0) + { + /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher + * list if we are asked to reuse it */ + al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); + goto f_err; + } } /* compression */ @@ -863,10 +995,27 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) goto f_err; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions*/ + if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) + { + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) + { + /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + goto f_err; + } + } + if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } +#endif /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL) { /* See if we have a match */ int m,nn,o,v,done=0; @@ -891,8 +1040,12 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) else comp=NULL; } +#endif /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */ +#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test + * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b, + * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { if (p < (d+n)) @@ -904,13 +1057,18 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) goto f_err; } } +#endif /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must * pick a cipher */ if (!s->hit) { +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + s->session->compress_meth=0; +#else s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; +#endif if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers=ciphers; @@ -974,7 +1132,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */ - ret=1; + if (ret < 0) ret=1; if (0) { f_err: @@ -985,7 +1143,7 @@ err: return(ret); } -static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) +int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p,*d; @@ -996,9 +1154,10 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p=s->s3->server_random; - Time=time(NULL); /* Time */ + Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ l2n(Time,p); - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time)); + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) + return -1; /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[4]); @@ -1016,12 +1175,20 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) * session-id if we want it to be single use. * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. + * + * We also have an additional case where stateless session + * resumption is successful: we always send back the old + * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can + * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful + * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality + * is unaffected. */ - if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) + if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) + && !s->hit) s->session->session_id_length=0; sl=s->session->session_id_length; - if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id) + if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; @@ -1035,28 +1202,38 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) p+=i; /* put the compression method */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + *(p++)=0; +#else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) *(p++)=0; else *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; - +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } +#endif /* do the header */ l=(p-d); d=buf; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; l2n3(l,d); - s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; } - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } -static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) +int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; @@ -1076,11 +1253,11 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) s->init_off=0; } - /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } -static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) +int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; @@ -1167,7 +1344,6 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { - DH_free(dh); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -1210,6 +1386,8 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { + const EC_GROUP *group; + ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { @@ -1226,7 +1404,6 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { - EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } @@ -1237,16 +1414,15 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } - if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp)) + if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } - ecdh = ecdhp; s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; - if ((ecdh->pub_key == NULL) || - (ecdh->priv_key == NULL) || + if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) @@ -1256,16 +1432,16 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } } - if ((ecdh->group == NULL) || - (ecdh->pub_key == NULL) || - (ecdh->priv_key == NULL)) + if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || + (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || + (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && - (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163)) + (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto err; @@ -1276,7 +1452,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. */ if ((curve_id = - nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh->group))) + nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); @@ -1287,8 +1463,8 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) * First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ - encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group, - ecdh->pub_key, + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); @@ -1302,8 +1478,8 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) } - encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group, - ecdh->pub_key, + encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); @@ -1317,11 +1493,11 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. - * In this situation, we need three additional bytes + * In this situation, we need four additional bytes * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams * structure. */ - n = 3 + encodedlen; + n = 4 + encodedlen; /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs @@ -1329,6 +1505,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) r[0]=NULL; r[1]=NULL; r[2]=NULL; + r[3]=NULL; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ @@ -1359,7 +1536,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) kn=0; } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,n+4+kn)) + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; @@ -1379,12 +1556,14 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: - * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName] + * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by * the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; + *p = 0; + p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; @@ -1393,6 +1572,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif @@ -1409,6 +1589,8 @@ static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) j=0; for (num=2; num > 0; num--) { + EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, + EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); @@ -1499,7 +1681,7 @@ err: return(-1); } -static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) +int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int i,j,nl,off,n; @@ -1532,7 +1714,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i); j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,4+n+j+2)) + if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; @@ -1579,6 +1761,7 @@ static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) s->init_num += 4; #endif + s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ @@ -1587,7 +1770,7 @@ err: return(-1); } -static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) +int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { int i,al,ok; long n; @@ -1612,7 +1795,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif - n=ssl3_get_message(s, + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, @@ -1656,8 +1839,9 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; } - /* TLS */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && + s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { n2s(p,i); if (n != i+2) @@ -1681,7 +1865,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ } if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) @@ -1697,37 +1881,36 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); - goto f_err; + /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ + + /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack + * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version + * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would + * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext + * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except + * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, + * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ } } if (al != -1) { -#if 0 - goto f_err; -#else /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding - * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). - * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the - * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher: - * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA - * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12). - */ + * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ ERR_clear_error(); i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; - RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ -#endif + if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ + goto err; } s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p,i); - memset(p,0,i); + OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); } else #endif @@ -1779,6 +1962,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); + BN_clear_free(pub); goto err; } @@ -1790,7 +1974,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,p,i); - memset(p,0,i); + OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); } else #endif @@ -1817,11 +2001,27 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) n2s(p,i); enc_ticket.length = i; + + if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; p+=enc_ticket.length; n2s(p,i); authenticator.length = i; + + if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + authenticator.data = (char *)p; p+=authenticator.length; @@ -1840,8 +2040,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto err; } - if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + - enc_pms.length + 6) + if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + + enc_pms.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); @@ -1857,7 +2057,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (kssl_err.text) printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } @@ -1874,14 +2074,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (kssl_err.text) printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); goto err; } @@ -1893,7 +2093,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (enc == NULL) goto err; - memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); /* per RFC 1510 */ + memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) { @@ -1927,6 +2127,24 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } + if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) + { + /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the + * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the + * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). + * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of + * the protocol version. + * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. + * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) + */ + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); s->session->master_key_length= @@ -1935,7 +2153,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { - int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); + size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) { s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; @@ -1957,6 +2175,10 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE)) { int ret = 1; + int field_size = 0; + const EC_KEY *tkey; + const EC_GROUP *group; + const BIGNUM *priv_key; /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) @@ -1970,23 +2192,29 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) if (l & SSL_kECDH) { /* use the certificate */ - srvr_ecdh->group = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \ - pkey.eckey->group; - srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \ - pkey.eckey->priv_key; + tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; } else { /* use the ephermeral values we saved when * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. */ - srvr_ecdh->group = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->group; - srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->priv_key; + tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; + } + + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); + priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); + + if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || + !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; } /* Let's get client's public key */ - if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh->group)) - == NULL) + if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); @@ -2024,8 +2252,13 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) goto f_err; } - EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, - clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key); + if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ } else @@ -2043,7 +2276,13 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) /* Get encoded point length */ i = *p; p += 1; - if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh->group, + if (n != 1 + i) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, @@ -2057,7 +2296,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) } /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ - i = ECDH_compute_key(p, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh); + field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); + if (field_size <= 0) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, @@ -2068,18 +2314,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) - { - srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL; - srvr_ecdh->group = NULL; EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); - } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); /* Compute the master secret */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); - memset(p, 0, i); + OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); return (ret); } else @@ -2097,21 +2339,17 @@ f_err: #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) err: #endif -#ifndef NO_OPENSSL_ECDH +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) - { - srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL; - srvr_ecdh->group = NULL; EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); - } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif return(-1); } -static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) +int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; unsigned char *p; @@ -2120,11 +2358,11 @@ static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) int type=0,i,j; X509 *peer; - n=ssl3_get_message(s, + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, - 512, /* 512? */ + 514, /* 514? */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); @@ -2236,7 +2474,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) { j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.eckey); + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ @@ -2266,15 +2504,16 @@ end: return(ret); } -static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) +int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) { int i,ok,al,ret= -1; X509 *x=NULL; unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; - unsigned char *p,*d,*q; + const unsigned char *p,*q; + unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; - n=ssl3_get_message(s, + n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, @@ -2309,7 +2548,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } - d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { @@ -2377,7 +2616,7 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) else { i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); - if (!i) + if (i <= 0) { al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); @@ -2454,7 +2693,8 @@ int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */ static int nid2curve_id(int nid) { - /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) */ + /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) + * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */ switch (nid) { case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ return 1; @@ -2511,3 +2751,146 @@ static int nid2curve_id(int nid) } } #endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) + { + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) + { + unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; + int len, slen; + unsigned int hlen; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + HMAC_CTX hctx; + SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char key_name[16]; + + /* get session encoding length */ + slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); + /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is + * too long + */ + if (slen > 0xFF00) + return -1; + /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length + * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session + * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). + */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, + 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) + return -1; + senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); + if (!senc) + return -1; + p = senc; + i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + /* do the header */ + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; + /* Skip message length for now */ + p += 3; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present + * it does all the work otherwise use generated values + * from parent ctx. + */ + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) + { + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, + &hctx, 1) < 0) + { + OPENSSL_free(senc); + return -1; + } + } + else + { + RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); + memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); + } + l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); + /* Skip ticket length for now */ + p += 2; + /* Output key name */ + macstart = p; + memcpy(p, key_name, 16); + p += 16; + /* output IV */ + memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); + p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); + /* Encrypt session data */ + EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); + p += len; + EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); + p += len; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + + HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); + HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + + p += hlen; + /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ + /* Total length */ + len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; + l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ + p += 4; + s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ + + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num= len; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; + s->init_off=0; + OPENSSL_free(senc); + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } + +int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) + { + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) + { + unsigned char *p; + /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as + * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) + * + (ocsp response) + */ + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) + return -1; + + p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + /* do the header */ + *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; + /* message length */ + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); + /* status type */ + *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; + /* length of OCSP response */ + l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); + /* actual response */ + memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); + /* number of bytes to write */ + s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; + s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ + return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); + } +#endif