X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Frecord%2Fssl3_record.c;h=d58e5bcdb10e894254f15b6436794415d69a499d;hp=ad240bc52d2a3e6b97759adbb3c60102f1505f23;hb=2688e7a0beb0f5e76a98749f25b978ddfb40ac7f;hpb=0647719d809abdfe6b871949f4f75ce82da6616a diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c index ad240bc52d..d58e5bcdb1 100644 --- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c +++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c @@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { /* * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated */ -void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs) +void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) { unsigned char *comp; - unsigned int i; + size_t i; for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { comp = r[i].comp; @@ -46,9 +46,9 @@ void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs) } } -void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs) +void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) { - unsigned int i; + size_t i; for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); @@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); } - /* * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting * for us in the buffer. @@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) { SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; - int left, len; + size_t left, len; unsigned char *p; rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); @@ -126,17 +125,18 @@ static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; - int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; + int enc_err, rret, ret = -1; + int i; + size_t more, n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; short version; - unsigned mac_size; - unsigned int num_recs = 0; - unsigned int max_recs; - unsigned int j; + size_t mac_size; + int imac_size; + size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); @@ -150,29 +150,20 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, - SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0); - if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ + rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, + num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n); + if (rret <= 0) + return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); /* - * Check whether this is a regular record or an SSLv2 style record. - * The latter can only be used in the first record of an initial - * ClientHello for old clients. Initial ClientHello means - * s->first_packet is set and s->server is true. The first record - * means we've not received any data so far (s->init_num == 0) and - * have had no empty records. We check s->read_hash and - * s->enc_read_ctx to ensure this does not apply during - * renegotiation. + * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. */ - if (s->first_packet && s->server - && s->init_num == 0 - && RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) == 0 - && s->read_hash == NULL && s->enc_read_ctx == NULL - && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { + if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) + && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { /* * SSLv2 style record * @@ -188,7 +179,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) rr[num_recs].length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; @@ -227,7 +218,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just * end. */ - goto err; + goto err; } /* * Send back error using their minor version number :-) @@ -239,7 +230,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) } if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { - if (s->first_packet) { + if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) { /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes * that we have. */ p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); @@ -254,13 +245,21 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); goto err; } + + /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + goto err; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; } - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - goto err; } if (rr[num_recs].length > - SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; @@ -276,17 +275,17 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) * record */ if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { - i = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + more = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { - i = rr[num_recs].length; + more = rr[num_recs].length; } - if (i > 0) { + if (more > 0) { /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ - n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 0); - if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ + rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n); + if (rret <= 0) + return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */ } /* set state for later operations */ @@ -335,22 +334,29 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); } while (num_recs < max_recs - && rr[num_recs-1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && rr[num_recs - 1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) - & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); - /* * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. */ if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { unsigned char *mac; - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */ + imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (imac_size < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); + goto f_err; + } + mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { if (rr[j].length < mac_size) { @@ -361,7 +367,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) rr[j].length -= mac_size; mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length; i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); - if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { + if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); @@ -383,9 +389,9 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG - printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); + printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length); { - unsigned int z; + size_t z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } @@ -403,7 +409,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - for (j=0; j < num_recs; j++) { + for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, @@ -440,7 +446,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ ); - if (i < 0 || mac == NULL + if (i == 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) @@ -496,7 +502,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) if (rr[j].length == 0) { RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) - > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { + > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; @@ -527,9 +533,9 @@ int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) if (rr->comp == NULL) return 0; + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, - (int)rr->length); + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); if (i < 0) return 0; else @@ -544,6 +550,7 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, wr->input, (int)wr->length); @@ -567,12 +574,13 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error * occurred. */ -int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) +int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int send) { SSL3_RECORD *rec; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; - unsigned long l; - int bs, i, mac_size = 0; + size_t l, i; + size_t bs, mac_size = 0; + int imac_size; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; rec = inrecs; @@ -600,12 +608,13 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) rec->input = rec->data; } else { l = rec->length; + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); /* COMPRESS */ if ((bs != 1) && send) { - i = bs - ((int)l % bs); + i = bs - (l % bs); /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ l += i; @@ -615,7 +624,7 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) */ memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); rec->length += i; - rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1); + rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1); } if (!send) { @@ -624,17 +633,24 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ } - if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1) + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ + if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) return -1; - if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { + /* TODO(size_t): convert me */ + imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (imac_size < 0) + return -1; + mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; + } if ((bs != 1) && !send) return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); } return (1); } +#define MAX_PADDING 256 /*- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. * @@ -645,14 +661,16 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, * an internal error occurred. */ -int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) +int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int send) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; - int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; + int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr; + size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop; + unsigned char padval; + int imac_size; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; - unsigned int ctr; if (send) { if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { @@ -710,7 +728,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) if (n_recs > 1) { if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) - & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { /* * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the * cipher doesn't support pipelining @@ -723,7 +741,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) - & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { unsigned char *seq; seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) @@ -749,8 +767,8 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); - buf[ctr][11] = recs[ctr].length >> 8; - buf[ctr][12] = recs[ctr].length & 0xff; + buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8); + buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff); pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); if (pad <= 0) @@ -762,16 +780,18 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) } } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { - i = bs - ((int)reclen[ctr] % bs); + padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ - /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ - j = i - 1; - for (k = (int)reclen[ctr]; k < (int)(reclen[ctr] + i); k++) - recs[ctr].input[k] = j; - reclen[ctr] += i; - recs[ctr].length += i; + if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) + return -1; + /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */ + padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1); + for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++) + recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval; + reclen[ctr] += padnum; + recs[ctr].length += padnum; } if (!send) { @@ -787,7 +807,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, - n_recs, data) <= 0) { + (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); } /* Set the input buffers */ @@ -795,19 +815,21 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, - n_recs, data) <= 0 + (int)n_recs, data) <= 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, - n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { + (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return -1; } } - i = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, reclen[0]); + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ + tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, + (unsigned int)reclen[0]); if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) - & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) - ? (i < 0) - : (i == 0)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) + ? (tmpr < 0) + : (tmpr == 0)) return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ if (send == 0) { if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { @@ -826,15 +848,25 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, unsigned int n_recs, int send) } ret = 1; - if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { + imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (imac_size < 0) + return -1; + mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; + } if ((bs != 1) && !send) { int tmpret; for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); - if (tmpret == -1) - return -1; - ret &= tmpret; + /* + * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can + * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant + * time behaviour. + */ + if (tmpret == 0) + return 0; + ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1), + ret, -1); } } if (pad && !send) { @@ -852,7 +884,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; unsigned char *p, rec_char; size_t md_size; - int npad; + size_t npad; int t; if (send) { @@ -867,7 +899,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); if (t < 0) - return -1; + return 0; md_size = t; npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; @@ -889,7 +921,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) * total size. */ unsigned char header[75]; - unsigned j = 0; + size_t j = 0; memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); j += md_size; memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); @@ -897,8 +929,8 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); j += 8; header[j++] = rec->type; - header[j++] = rec->length >> 8; - header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; + header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); + header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, @@ -906,41 +938,40 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) header, rec->input, rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) - return -1; + return 0; } else { unsigned int md_size_u; /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) - return -1; + return 0; rec_char = rec->type; p = md; s2n(rec->length, p); if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx); - return -1; + return 0; } - md_size = md_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); } ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); - return (md_size); + return 1; } int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) @@ -972,9 +1003,8 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) mac_ctx = hash; } else { hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (hmac == NULL - || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) - return -1; + if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) + return 0; mac_ctx = hmac; } @@ -992,8 +1022,8 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) header[8] = rec->type; header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); - header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; - header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; + header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); + header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && @@ -1004,6 +1034,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, md, &md_size, header, rec->input, @@ -1014,19 +1045,20 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) return -1; } } else { + /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { + || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); - return -1; + return 0; } if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode()) if (!tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, rec->orig_len)) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); - return -1; - } + return 0; + } } EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); @@ -1041,7 +1073,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) } fprintf(stderr, "rec="); { - unsigned int z; + size_t z; for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); @@ -1063,7 +1095,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif - return (md_size); + return 1; } /*- @@ -1077,10 +1109,11 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int send) * -1: otherwise. */ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, - unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) + size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) { - unsigned padding_length, good; - const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; + size_t padding_length; + size_t good; + const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. @@ -1089,11 +1122,11 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, return 0; padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; - good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); + good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ - good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1); + good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); - return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); + return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); } /*- @@ -1111,10 +1144,11 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, */ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, - unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) + size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) { - unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i; - const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; + size_t good; + size_t padding_length, to_check, i; + const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { /* @@ -1133,13 +1167,14 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; - if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { /* padding is already verified */ rec->length -= padding_length + 1; return 1; } - good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); + good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); /* * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length @@ -1149,12 +1184,12 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record * is public information so we can use it.) */ - to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */ - if (to_check > rec->length - 1) - to_check = rec->length - 1; + to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */ + if (to_check > rec->length) + to_check = rec->length; for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { - unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i); + unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i); unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; /* * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value @@ -1167,10 +1202,10 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. */ - good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff); + good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); - return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); + return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); } /*- @@ -1194,7 +1229,7 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, - const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size) + const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size) { #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; @@ -1206,16 +1241,16 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, /* * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */ - unsigned mac_end = rec->length; - unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size; + size_t mac_end = rec->length; + size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size; /* * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ - unsigned scan_start = 0; - unsigned i, j; - unsigned div_spoiler; - unsigned rotate_offset; + size_t scan_start = 0; + size_t i, j; + size_t div_spoiler; + size_t rotate_offset; OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size); OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); @@ -1241,11 +1276,11 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { - unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start); - unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end); + unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8_s(i, mac_start); + unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8_s(i, mac_end); unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended; - j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size); + j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size); } /* Now rotate the MAC */ @@ -1255,28 +1290,29 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; - rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); } #else memset(out, 0, md_size); rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; - rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) - out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset); + out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset); rotate_offset++; - rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); } #endif } -int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) +int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int i, al; int enc_err; SSL_SESSION *sess; SSL3_RECORD *rr; - unsigned int mac_size; + int imac_size; + size_t mac_size; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); @@ -1311,6 +1347,26 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) rr->data = rr->input; rr->orig_len = rr->length; + if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { + unsigned char *mac; + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + rr->length -= mac_size; + mac = rr->data + rr->length; + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); + if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + goto f_err; + } + } + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); /*- * enc_err is: @@ -1325,9 +1381,9 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) goto err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG - printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); + printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length); { - unsigned int z; + size_t z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } @@ -1335,12 +1391,20 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ - if ((sess != NULL) && + if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */ + imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (imac_size < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); + goto f_err; + } + mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* @@ -1379,8 +1443,8 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); - if (i < 0 || mac == NULL - || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) + if (i == 0 || mac == NULL + || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; @@ -1426,6 +1490,10 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + + /* Mark receipt of record. */ + dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); + return (1); f_err: @@ -1434,7 +1502,6 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) return (0); } - /* * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, * processed @@ -1456,7 +1523,8 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor; - int i, n; + int rret; + size_t more, n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned short version; @@ -1465,11 +1533,12 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); + again: /* * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. * This is a non-blocking operation. */ - if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0) + if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) return -1; /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ @@ -1477,18 +1546,19 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) return 1; /* get something from the wire */ - again: + /* check if we have the header */ if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, - SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1); + rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n); /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ - if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ + if (rret <= 0) + return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ - if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } @@ -1547,10 +1617,10 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) if (rr->length > RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ - i = rr->length; - n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 1); + more = rr->length; + rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n); /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ - if (n != i) { + if (rret <= 0 || n != more) { rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; @@ -1568,7 +1638,7 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { rr->length = 0; - RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP @@ -1576,6 +1646,10 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { #endif /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ + /* + * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where + * we have no integrity negotiated yet? + */ if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ @@ -1598,22 +1672,19 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), - rr->seq_num) < 0) + rr->seq_num) < 0) return -1; - /* Mark receipt of record. */ - dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); } rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } - if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) { + if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; - RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } - dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */ return (1);