X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Frecord%2Fssl3_record.c;h=bd27290aa81aecaadcb72639f1eee16f1ce2cf34;hp=dbec5f1fc2344289792b585e6f70926c453fb3c8;hb=3519bae518f0ed576daf05057e4fc79e49cb2bee;hpb=2974e3d4641b80c76197e653a016e7c010eaf3a2 diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c index dbec5f1fc2..bd27290aa8 100644 --- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c +++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c @@ -1,112 +1,10 @@ -/* ssl/record/ssl3_record.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "../ssl_locl.h" @@ -135,33 +33,105 @@ static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { /* * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated */ -void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r) +void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) { - unsigned char *comp = r->comp; + unsigned char *comp; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { + comp = r[i].comp; - memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); - r->comp = comp; + memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r)); + r[i].comp = comp; + } } -void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r) +void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) { - OPENSSL_free(r->comp); - r->comp = NULL; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { + OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); + r[i].comp = NULL; + } } -int SSL3_RECORD_setup(SSL3_RECORD *r) +void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) { - if (r->comp == NULL) - r->comp = (unsigned char *) - OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); - if (r->comp == NULL) + memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); +} + +/* + * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting + * for us in the buffer. + */ +static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) +{ + SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; + size_t left, len; + unsigned char *p; + + rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); + + p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); + if (p == NULL) + return 0; + + left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); + + if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) + return 0; + + p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); + + /* + * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version + * etc later + */ + if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) return 0; + + p += 3; + n2s(p, len); + + if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) + return 0; + return 1; } -void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) +int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int *al) { - memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); + uint32_t max_early_data = s->max_early_data; + + /* + * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the + * session. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early data set in + * the session and the configured max_early_data. + */ + if (!s->server || (s->hit + && s->session->ext.max_early_data < s->max_early_data)) + max_early_data = s->session->ext.max_early_data; + + if (max_early_data == 0) { + if (al != NULL) + *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + + /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */ + max_early_data += overhead; + + if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) { + if (al != NULL) + *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + s->early_data_count += length; + + return 1; } /* @@ -174,232 +144,362 @@ void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 /*- - * Call this to get a new input record. + * Call this to get new input records. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. - * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in - * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data - * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes + * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i': + * rr[i].type - is the type of record + * rr[i].data, - data + * rr[i].length, - number of bytes + * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all + * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= + * |max_pipelines| */ /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { - int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al; - int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; + int al; + int enc_err, rret, ret = -1; + int i; + size_t more, n; + SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr; + SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - short version; - unsigned mac_size; - size_t extra; - unsigned empty_record_count = 0; + unsigned int version; + size_t mac_size; + int imac_size; + size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j; + PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt; + size_t first_rec_len; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); + rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); + max_recs = s->max_pipelines; + if (max_recs == 0) + max_recs = 1; sess = s->session; - if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) - extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; - else - extra = 0; - if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) { - /* - * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after - * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return -1; - } - - again: - /* check if we have the header */ - if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || - (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, - SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0); - if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ - RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); - - p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); - - /* - * Check whether this is a regular record or an SSLv2 style record. The - * latter is only used in an initial ClientHello for old clients. We - * check s->read_hash and s->enc_read_ctx to ensure this does not apply - * during renegotiation - */ - if (s->first_packet && s->server && !s->read_hash && !s->enc_read_ctx - && (p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { - /* SSLv2 style record */ - rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; - rr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; - - rr->length = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1]; - - if (rr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf) - - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + do { + thisrr = &rr[num_recs]; + + /* check if we have the header */ + if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || + (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) + < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + size_t sslv2len; + unsigned int type; + + rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, + num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n); + if (rret <= 0) + return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ + RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); + + p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer), + RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } - - if (rr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + sslv2pkt = pkt; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len) + || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } - } else { - /* SSLv3+ style record */ - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, - s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ - rr->type = *(p++); - ssl_major = *(p++); - ssl_minor = *(p++); - version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; - rr->rec_version = version; - n2s(p, rr->length); - - /* Lets check version */ - if (!s->first_packet && version != s->version) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) - && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { - if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + /* + * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. + */ + if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) + && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0 + && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { + /* + * SSLv2 style record + * + * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because + * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing + * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here + * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using + * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency + */ + thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; + + thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff; + + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) + - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + + if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + /* SSLv3+ style record */ + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version) + || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + thisrr->type = type; + thisrr->rec_version = version; + + /* Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we ignore this field */ + if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && version != (unsigned int)s->version) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) + && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { + if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + /* + * The record is using an incorrect version number, + * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We + * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a + * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably + * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just + * end. + */ + goto err; + } /* - * The record is using an incorrect version number, but - * what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't - * read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or - * not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't - * send a fatal alert back. We'll just end. + * Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ - goto err; + s->version = (unsigned short)version; } - /* - * Send back error using their minor version number :-) - */ - s->version = (unsigned short)version; + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + + if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { + if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) { + /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes + * that we have. */ + p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); + if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 || + strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 || + strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 || + strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); + goto err; + } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); + goto err; + } + + /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + goto err; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL + && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } + + if (thisrr->length > + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; } - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; } - if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - goto err; + /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; } + } else { + size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; - if (rr->length > - SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf) - - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + /* + * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + * does not include the compression overhead anyway. + */ + if (s->expand == NULL) + len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; +#endif + + if (thisrr->length > len) { al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } } - /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ - } + /* + * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. + * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the + * record + */ + if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { + more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + } else { + more = thisrr->length; + } + if (more > 0) { + /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ - /* - * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. - * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the record - */ - if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { - i = rr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; - } else { - i = rr->length; - } - if (i > 0) { - /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ + rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n); + if (rret <= 0) + return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */ + } - n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); - if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */ - } + /* set state for later operations */ + RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); - /* set state for later operations */ - RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); + /* + * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet + */ + if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { + thisrr->input = + &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); + } else { + thisrr->input = + &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); + } - /* - * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length, - * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length - * and we have that many bytes in s->packet - */ - if(rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { - rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); - } else { - rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); - } + /* + * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input + * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into + * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When + * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will + * be pointed at the new buffer + */ - /* - * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points - * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either - * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into - * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer - */ + /* + * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] + * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. + */ - /* - * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length - * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. - */ + /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */ + thisrr->data = thisrr->input; + thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length; - /* check is not needed I believe */ - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } + /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ + thisrr->read = 0; + + num_recs++; + + /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); + } while (num_recs < max_recs + && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) + && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL + && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) + && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); - /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ - rr->data = rr->input; - rr->orig_len = rr->length; /* * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. */ - if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { + if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { unsigned char *mac; - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - if (rr->length < mac_size) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; + /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */ + imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); + goto f_err; } - rr->length -= mac_size; - mac = rr->data + rr->length; - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); - if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); - goto f_err; + mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; + for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { + thisrr = &rr[j]; + + if (thisrr->length < mac_size) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + thisrr->length -= mac_size; + mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length; + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); + if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + goto f_err; + } } } - enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); + first_rec_len = rr[0].length; + + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); + /*- * enc_err is: - * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. + * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { + if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { + /* + * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as + * publicly invalid. We treat it like an empty record. + */ + + thisrr = &rr[0]; + + if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, + EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al)) + goto f_err; + + thisrr->length = 0; + thisrr->read = 1; + RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); + RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); + return 1; + } al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr[0].length); { - unsigned int z; - for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) - printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); + size_t z; + for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++) + printf("%02X%c", rr[0].data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif @@ -407,57 +507,90 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && - (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) { + (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - /* - * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was - * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, - * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount - * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. - */ - if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || - /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ - (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && - rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { + for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { + thisrr = &rr[j]; /* - * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be - * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in - * constant time from within the record, without leaking the - * contents of the padding bytes. + * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was + * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, + * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount + * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ - mac = mac_tmp; - ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size); - rr->length -= mac_size; - } else { - /* - * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals - * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for - * |mac_size| above. - */ - rr->length -= mac_size; - mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; - } + if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size || + /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ + (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && + thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); - if (i < 0 || mac == NULL - || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) - enc_err = -1; - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size) - enc_err = -1; + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { + /* + * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be + * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in + * constant time from within the record, without leaking the + * contents of the padding bytes. + */ + mac = mac_tmp; + if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + thisrr->length -= mac_size; + } else { + /* + * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals + * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for + * |mac_size| above. + */ + thisrr->length -= mac_size; + mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length]; + } + + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); + if (i == 0 || mac == NULL + || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) + enc_err = -1; + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) + enc_err = -1; + } } if (enc_err < 0) { + if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { + /* + * We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an + * empty record + */ + + /* + * The record length may have been modified by the mac check above + * so we use the previously saved value + */ + if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len, + EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al)) + goto f_err; + + thisrr = &rr[0]; + thisrr->length = 0; + thisrr->read = 1; + RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); + RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); + return 1; + } /* * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption @@ -471,86 +604,142 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) goto f_err; } - /* r->length is now just compressed */ - if (s->expand != NULL) { - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } - if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); - goto f_err; + for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { + thisrr = &rr[j]; + + /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */ + if (s->expand != NULL) { + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } } - } - if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { - al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto f_err; - } + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { + size_t end; - rr->off = 0; - /*- - * So at this point the following is true - * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record - * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record - * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte - * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment - * after use :-). - */ + if (thisrr->length == 0 + || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } - /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ - RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + /* Strip trailing padding */ + for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0; + end--) + continue; + + thisrr->length = end; + thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end]; + if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT + && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, + &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + } - /* just read a 0 length packet */ - if (rr->length == 0) { - empty_record_count++; - if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { + /* + * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in + * length. + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE + || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) + && thisrr->length == 0) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto f_err; } - goto again; + + if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { + al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + + thisrr->off = 0; + /*- + * So at this point the following is true + * thisrr->type is the type of record + * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record + * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte + * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). + */ + + /* just read a 0 length packet */ + if (thisrr->length == 0) { + RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); + if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) + > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); + } } - return (1); + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) { + thisrr = &rr[0]; + if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, &al)) + goto f_err; + } + + RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); + return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: - return (ret); + return ret; } -int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) +int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; - SSL3_RECORD *rr; - rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer); + if (rr->comp == NULL) { + rr->comp = (unsigned char *) + OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); + } + if (rr->comp == NULL) + return 0; + + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, - (int)rr->length); + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); if (i < 0) - return (0); + return 0; else rr->length = i; rr->data = rr->comp; #endif - return (1); + return 1; } -int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) +int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; - SSL3_RECORD *wr; - wr = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer); + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, - SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, + (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD), wr->input, (int)wr->length); if (i < 0) return (0); @@ -563,7 +752,7 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) } /*- - * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. + * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs| * * Returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too @@ -572,24 +761,29 @@ int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error * occurred. */ -int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) +int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending) { SSL3_RECORD *rec; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; - unsigned long l; - int bs, i, mac_size = 0; + size_t l, i; + size_t bs, mac_size = 0; + int imac_size; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; - if (send) { + rec = inrecs; + /* + * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case + */ + if (n_recs != 1) + return 0; + if (sending) { ds = s->enc_write_ctx; - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&s->rlayer); if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); } else { ds = s->enc_read_ctx; - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else @@ -601,12 +795,13 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) rec->input = rec->data; } else { l = rec->length; - bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ + bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); /* COMPRESS */ - if ((bs != 1) && send) { - i = bs - ((int)l % bs); + if ((bs != 1) && sending) { + i = bs - (l % bs); /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ l += i; @@ -616,28 +811,35 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) */ memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); rec->length += i; - rec->input[l - 1] = (i - 1); + rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1); } - if (!send) { + if (!sending) { if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) return 0; /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ } - if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l) < 1) + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ + if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) return -1; - if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - if ((bs != 1) && !send) - return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); + if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { + /* TODO(size_t): convert me */ + imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (imac_size < 0) + return -1; + mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; + } + if ((bs != 1) && !sending) + return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); } return (1); } +#define MAX_PADDING 256 /*- - * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. + * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. * * Returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too @@ -646,21 +848,29 @@ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, int send) * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, * an internal error occurred. */ -int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) +int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending) { - SSL3_RECORD *rec; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; - unsigned long l; - int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; + size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; + int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr; + size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop; + unsigned char padval; + int imac_size; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; - if (send) { + if (n_recs == 0) + return 0; + + if (sending) { if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); + if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } } ds = s->enc_write_ctx; - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&s->rlayer); if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else { @@ -673,25 +883,30 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) else ivlen = 0; if (ivlen > 1) { - if (rec->data != rec->input) - /* - * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever - * happen?? (steve) - */ - fprintf(stderr, - "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", - __FILE__, __LINE__); - else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0) - return -1; + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { + /* + * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever + * happen?? (steve) + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + } } } } else { if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); + if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } } ds = s->enc_read_ctx; - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else @@ -699,110 +914,180 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) } if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { - memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); - rec->input = rec->data; + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length); + recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data; + } ret = 1; } else { - l = rec->length; - bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); + bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)); + + if (n_recs > 1) { + if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { + /* + * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the + * cipher doesn't support pipelining + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + } + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; + + if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { + unsigned char *seq; + + seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) + : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ + unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; + + s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); + memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); + memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); + } else { + memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); + for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ + ++seq[i]; + if (seq[i] != 0) + break; + } + } - if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { - unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq; + buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; + buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); + buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); + buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8); + buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff); + pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, + EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); + if (pad <= 0) + return -1; - seq = send ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) - : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); + if (sending) { + reclen[ctr] += pad; + recs[ctr].length += pad; + } - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; + } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { + padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); - s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : - DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); - memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); - memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8); - } else { - memcpy(buf, seq, 8); - for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ - ++seq[i]; - if (seq[i] != 0) - break; - } - } + /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ - buf[8] = rec->type; - buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); - buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); - buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; - buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; - pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, - EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf); - if (pad <= 0) - return -1; - if (send) { - l += pad; - rec->length += pad; + if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) + return -1; + /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */ + padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1); + for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++) + recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval; + reclen[ctr] += padnum; + recs[ctr].length += padnum; } - } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { - i = bs - ((int)l % bs); - - /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ - /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ - j = i - 1; - if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) { - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) - j++; + if (!sending) { + if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) + return 0; } - for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) - rec->input[k] = j; - l += i; - rec->length += i; } + if (n_recs > 1) { + unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; - if (!send) { - if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) - return 0; + /* Set the output buffers */ + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; + } + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, + (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); + } + /* Set the input buffers */ + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; + } + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, + (int)n_recs, data) <= 0 + || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, + (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); + return -1; + } } - i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); - if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) - ? (i < 0) - : (i == 0)) + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ + tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, + (unsigned int)reclen[0]); + if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) + & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) + ? (tmpr < 0) + : (tmpr == 0)) return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) { - rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + if (sending == 0) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + } + } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; + } + } } ret = 1; - if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - if ((bs != 1) && !send) - ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); - if (pad && !send) - rec->length -= pad; + if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { + imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (imac_size < 0) + return -1; + mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; + } + if ((bs != 1) && !sending) { + int tmpret; + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); + /* + * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can + * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant + * time behaviour. + */ + if (tmpret == 0) + return 0; + ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1), + ret, -1); + } + } + if (pad && !sending) { + for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { + recs[ctr].length -= pad; + } + } } return ret; } -int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) +int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) { - SSL3_RECORD *rec; unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; unsigned char *p, rec_char; size_t md_size; - int npad; + size_t npad; int t; - if (send) { - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer); + if (sending) { mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->write_hash; } else { - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer); mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->read_hash; @@ -810,11 +1095,11 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); if (t < 0) - return -1; + return 0; md_size = t; npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; - if (!send && + if (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { /* @@ -832,7 +1117,7 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) * total size. */ unsigned char header[75]; - unsigned j = 0; + size_t j = 0; memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); j += md_size; memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); @@ -840,86 +1125,90 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); j += 8; header[j++] = rec->type; - header[j++] = rec->length >> 8; - header[j++] = rec->length & 0xff; + header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); + header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ - ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, - md, &md_size, - header, rec->input, - rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, - mac_sec, md_size, 1); + if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, + md, &md_size, + header, rec->input, + rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, + mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) + return 0; } else { unsigned int md_size_u; /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + + if (md_ctx == NULL) + return 0; - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, seq, 8); rec_char = rec->type; - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &rec_char, 1); p = md; s2n(rec->length, p); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, 2); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); - - EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&md_ctx, hash); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad); - EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, md, md_size); - EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, &md_size_u); - md_size = md_size_u; - - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_reset(md_ctx); + return 0; + } + + EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); } ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); - return (md_size); + return 1; } -int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) +int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) { - SSL3_RECORD *rec; unsigned char *seq; EVP_MD_CTX *hash; size_t md_size; int i; - EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; + EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; unsigned char header[13]; - int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) + int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); int t; - if (send) { - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer); + if (sending) { seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->write_hash; } else { - rec = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer); seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->read_hash; } t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); - OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); + if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0)) + return 0; md_size = t; /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ if (stream_mac) { mac_ctx = hash; } else { - if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) - return -1; - mac_ctx = &hmac; + hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) + return 0; + mac_ctx = hmac; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; - s2n(send ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : + s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); @@ -930,10 +1219,10 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) header[8] = rec->type; header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); - header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; - header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; + header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); + header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); - if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && + if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { /* @@ -942,26 +1231,28 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ - ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, - md, &md_size, - header, rec->input, - rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, - ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, - ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0); + if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, + md, &md_size, + header, rec->input, + rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, + ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); + return 0; + } } else { - EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)); - EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length); - t = EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size); - OPENSSL_assert(t > 0); - if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode()) - tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, - mac_ctx, rec->input, - rec->length, rec->orig_len); + /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); + return 0; + } } - if (!stream_mac) - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG + EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); + +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "seq="); { int z; @@ -971,7 +1262,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) } fprintf(stderr, "rec="); { - unsigned int z; + size_t z; for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); @@ -985,7 +1276,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) break; } } -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) @@ -993,7 +1284,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif - return (md_size); + return 1; } /*- @@ -1006,12 +1297,12 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) * 1: if the padding was valid * -1: otherwise. */ -int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, - SSL3_RECORD *rec, - unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) +int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, + size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) { - unsigned padding_length, good; - const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; + size_t padding_length; + size_t good; + const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. @@ -1020,11 +1311,11 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, return 0; padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; - good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); + good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ - good &= constant_time_ge(block_size, padding_length + 1); + good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); - return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); + return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); } /*- @@ -1042,10 +1333,11 @@ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, */ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, - unsigned block_size, unsigned mac_size) + size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) { - unsigned padding_length, good, to_check, i; - const unsigned overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; + size_t good; + size_t padding_length, to_check, i; + const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { /* @@ -1064,31 +1356,14 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; - /* - * NB: if compression is in operation the first packet may not be of even - * length so the padding bug check cannot be performed. This bug - * workaround has been around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either - * fixed now or no buggy implementation supports compression [steve] - */ - if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) && !s->expand) { - /* First packet is even in size, so check */ - if ((CRYPTO_memcmp(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer), - "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8) == 0) && - !(padding_length & 1)) { - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG; - } - if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) && padding_length > 0) { - padding_length--; - } - } - - if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { + if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & + EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { /* padding is already verified */ rec->length -= padding_length + 1; return 1; } - good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); + good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); /* * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length @@ -1098,12 +1373,12 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record * is public information so we can use it.) */ - to_check = 255; /* maximum amount of padding. */ - if (to_check > rec->length - 1) - to_check = rec->length - 1; + to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */ + if (to_check > rec->length) + to_check = rec->length; for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { - unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8(padding_length, i); + unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i); unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; /* * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value @@ -1116,10 +1391,10 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. */ - good = constant_time_eq(0xff, good & 0xff); + good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); - return constant_time_select_int(good, 1, -1); + return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); } /*- @@ -1142,8 +1417,8 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, */ #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE -void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, - const SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned md_size) +int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, + const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size) { #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; @@ -1155,19 +1430,20 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, /* * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */ - unsigned mac_end = rec->length; - unsigned mac_start = mac_end - md_size; + size_t mac_end = rec->length; + size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size; + size_t in_mac; /* * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ - unsigned scan_start = 0; - unsigned i, j; - unsigned div_spoiler; - unsigned rotate_offset; + size_t scan_start = 0; + size_t i, j; + size_t rotate_offset; - OPENSSL_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size); - OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size + && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) + return 0; #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63); @@ -1176,25 +1452,20 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); - /* - * div_spoiler contains a multiple of md_size that is used to cause the - * modulo operation to be constant time. Without this, the time varies - * based on the amount of padding when running on Intel chips at least. - * The aim of right-shifting md_size is so that the compiler doesn't - * figure out that it can remove div_spoiler as that would require it to - * prove that md_size is always even, which I hope is beyond it. - */ - div_spoiler = md_size >> 1; - div_spoiler <<= (sizeof(div_spoiler) - 1) * 8; - rotate_offset = (div_spoiler + mac_start - scan_start) % md_size; + in_mac = 0; + rotate_offset = 0; memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { - unsigned char mac_started = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_start); - unsigned char mac_ended = constant_time_ge_8(i, mac_end); + size_t mac_started = constant_time_eq_s(i, mac_start); + size_t mac_ended = constant_time_lt_s(i, mac_end); unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; - rotated_mac[j++] |= b & mac_started & ~mac_ended; - j &= constant_time_lt(j, md_size); + + in_mac |= mac_started; + in_mac &= mac_ended; + rotate_offset |= j & mac_started; + rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac; + j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size); } /* Now rotate the MAC */ @@ -1204,28 +1475,31 @@ void ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; - rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); } #else memset(out, 0, md_size); rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; - rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) - out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8(j, rotate_offset); + out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset); rotate_offset++; - rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt(rotate_offset, md_size); + rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); } #endif + + return 1; } -int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) +int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int i, al; int enc_err; SSL_SESSION *sess; SSL3_RECORD *rr; - unsigned int mac_size; + int imac_size; + size_t mac_size; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); @@ -1260,7 +1534,31 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) rr->data = rr->input; rr->orig_len = rr->length; - enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0); + if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { + unsigned char *mac; + mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + rr->length -= mac_size; + mac = rr->data + rr->length; + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); + if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, + SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); + goto f_err; + } + } + + enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. @@ -1273,10 +1571,10 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto err; } -#ifdef TLS_DEBUG - printf("dec %d\n", rr->length); +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length); { - unsigned int z; + size_t z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } @@ -1284,13 +1582,25 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ - if ((sess != NULL) && + if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_READ_ETM(s) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); - OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + + /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */ + imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); + if (imac_size < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); + goto f_err; + } + mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; + if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was @@ -1315,7 +1625,11 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; - ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size); + if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* @@ -1327,9 +1641,9 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ ); - if (i < 0 || mac == NULL - || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) + i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); + if (i == 0 || mac == NULL + || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; @@ -1350,7 +1664,7 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } - if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { + if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) { al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; @@ -1375,6 +1689,10 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); + + /* Mark receipt of record. */ + dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); + return (1); f_err: @@ -1383,10 +1701,8 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) return (0); } - /* - * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, - * processed + * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed */ #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ @@ -1405,7 +1721,8 @@ int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor; - int i, n; + int rret; + size_t more, n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned short version; @@ -1414,11 +1731,12 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); + again: /* * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. * This is a non-blocking operation. */ - if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0) + if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) return -1; /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ @@ -1426,18 +1744,19 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) return 1; /* get something from the wire */ - again: + /* check if we have the header */ if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, - SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0); + rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, + SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n); /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ - if (n <= 0) - return (n); /* error or non-blocking */ + if (rret <= 0) + return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ - if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } @@ -1496,10 +1815,10 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) if (rr->length > RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ - i = rr->length; - n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1); + more = rr->length; + rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n); /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ - if (n != i) { + if (rret <= 0 || n != more) { rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; @@ -1517,25 +1836,19 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { rr->length = 0; - RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { #endif + /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ /* - * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if - * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look - * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different - * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily. + * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where + * we have no integrity negotiated yet? */ - if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && - RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH && - RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] - == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && - !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { + if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ @@ -1551,29 +1864,25 @@ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) /* * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be - * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while - * listening. + * processed at this time. */ if (is_next_epoch) { - if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) { + if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), - rr->seq_num) < 0) + rr->seq_num) < 0) return -1; - /* Mark receipt of record. */ - dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); } rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } - if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) { + if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; - RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ + RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } - dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */ return (1);