X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fd1_lib.c;h=b865ad42b27c0f08796ebda712eaecc4c65b742c;hp=eac271d27b0374eba366466e38352ab03d2bd74d;hb=36e79832d33a5e5ec11a21071c4889ff25d47075;hpb=24a1e2f2ec1553c2cc26574bdb48b5d8c1b913f7 diff --git a/ssl/d1_lib.c b/ssl/d1_lib.c index eac271d27b..b865ad42b2 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/d1_lib.c @@ -60,17 +60,27 @@ #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include +#include #include "ssl_locl.h" #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # include +#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_) +# include +#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) +# include +#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) +# include #endif static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t); static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len); static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s); -const char dtls1_version_str[] = "DTLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client); +static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void); + +/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */ +static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 }; const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, @@ -124,17 +134,16 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s) { DTLS1_STATE *d1; - if(!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) { + if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) { return 0; } if (!ssl3_new(s)) return (0); - if ((d1 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *d1)) == NULL) { + if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) { ssl3_free(s); return (0); } - memset(d1, 0, sizeof *d1); d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new(); d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new(); @@ -147,10 +156,8 @@ int dtls1_new(SSL *s) d1->mtu = 0; if (!d1->buffered_messages || !d1->sent_messages) { - if (d1->buffered_messages) - pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages); - if (d1->sent_messages) - pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages); + pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages); + pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages); OPENSSL_free(d1); ssl3_free(s); return (0); @@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ void dtls1_clear(SSL *s) dtls1_clear_queues(s); - memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*(s->d1))); + memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1)); if (s->server) { s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie); @@ -320,7 +327,7 @@ void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Disable timer for SCTP */ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { - memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); + memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout)); return; } #endif @@ -355,7 +362,7 @@ struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft) if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec || (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) { - memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); + memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft)); return timeleft; } @@ -373,7 +380,7 @@ struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft) * because of small devergences with socket timeouts. */ if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) { - memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); + memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft)); } return timeleft; @@ -408,8 +415,8 @@ void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s) void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s) { /* Reset everything */ - memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st)); - memset(&(s->d1->next_timeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval)); + memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout)); + memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout)); s->d1->timeout_duration = 1; BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0, &(s->d1->next_timeout)); @@ -497,23 +504,395 @@ static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) #endif } + +#define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2 +#define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1 + + int dtls1_listen(SSL *s, struct sockaddr *client) { - int ret; + int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0; + unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH]; + unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE]; + unsigned char *data, *p, *buf; + unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen; + unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen; + BIO *rbio, *wbio; + BUF_MEM *bufm; + struct sockaddr_storage tmpclient; + PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt; /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */ - if(!SSL_clear(s)) + if (!SSL_clear(s)) + return -1; + + ERR_clear_error(); + + rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); + + if(!rbio || !wbio) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); + return -1; + } + + /* + * We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to + * to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid + * cookie then we leave it in the BIO for dtls1_accept to handle. + */ + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL); + + /* + * Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version + * requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello + * (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be + * supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via + * SSL_accept) + */ + if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); return -1; + } + + if (s->init_buf == NULL) { + if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + BUF_MEM_free(bufm); + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + s->init_buf = bufm; + } + buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + do { + /* Get a packet */ + + clear_sys_error(); + /* + * Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + * + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store + * the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to + * be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever + * receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped + * in the record length check below. + */ + n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); + + if (n <= 0) { + if(BIO_should_retry(rbio)) { + /* Non-blocking IO */ + goto end; + } + return -1; + } + + /* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */ + clearpkt = 1; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just + * dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is + * resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting, + * length, MAC, etc.). In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently + * discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be + * logged for diagnostic purposes." + */ + + /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ + if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); + goto end; + } + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf, + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* Get the record header */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype) + || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto end; + } + + /* + * Check record version number. We only check that the major version is + * the same. + */ + if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); + goto end; + } + + if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1) + /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ + || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt) + || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + + /* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */ + if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto end; + } + + /* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */ + data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt); + + /* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype) + || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq) + || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff) + || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen) + || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, msglen) + || PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + + if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto end; + } + + /* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */ + if(msgseq > 2) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER); + goto end; + } + + /* We don't support a fragmented ClientHello whilst listening */ + if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen != msglen) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO); + goto end; + } + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data, + msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + + /* + * Verify client version is supported + */ + if ((clientvers > (unsigned int)s->method->version && + s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); + goto end; + } + + if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto end; + } + + /* + * Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a + * HelloVerifyRequest. + */ + if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) { + next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST; + } else { + /* + * We have a cookie, so lets check it. + */ + if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK); + /* This is fatal */ + return -1; + } + if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt), + PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) == + 0) { + /* + * We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as + * per RFC6347 + */ + next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST; + } else { + /* Cookie verification succeeded */ + next = LISTEN_SUCCESS; + } + } + + if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) { + /* + * There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a + * HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying + * to resend, we just drop it. + */ + + /* + * Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return + * value + */ + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL); + BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL); + + /* Generate the cookie */ + if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || + s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 || + cookielen > 255) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); + /* This is fatal */ + return -1; + } + + p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]; + msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, + cookie, cookielen); + + *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; + + /* Message length */ + l2n3(msglen, p); + + /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */ + s2n(0, p); + + /* + * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0 + * and fragment length is message length + */ + l2n3(0, p); + l2n3(msglen, p); + + /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */ + reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + + /* Add the record header */ + p = buf; + + *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + /* + * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we + * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version + * 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. + */ + if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { + *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; + *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff; + } else { + *(p++) = s->version >> 8; + *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; + } + + /* + * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received + * ClientHello + */ + memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); + p += SEQ_NUM_SIZE; + + /* Length */ + s2n(reclen, p); + + /* + * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record + * header + */ + reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf, + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* + * This is unneccessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but + * maybe they're not. + */ + if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, &tmpclient) <= 0 + || BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, &tmpclient) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto end; + } + + if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) { + if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) { + /* + * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just + * going to drop this packet. + */ + goto end; + } + return -1; + } + + if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) { + if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) { + /* + * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just + * going to drop this packet. + */ + goto end; + } + return -1; + } + } + } while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS); + + /* + * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake. + */ + s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1; + s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1; + s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq); + + /* + * We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the + * SSL object + */ SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE); - s->d1->listen = 1; - ret = SSL_accept(s); - if (ret <= 0) - return ret; + /* + * Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify + * exchange + */ + ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s); - (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(s), client); - return 1; + if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + ret = 1; + clearpkt = 0; +end: + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL); + if (clearpkt) { + /* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */ + BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); + } + return ret; } static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len) @@ -524,7 +903,7 @@ static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len) s->init_off = 0; /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ - if(!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0)) + if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0)) return 0; return 1; @@ -534,3 +913,230 @@ static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s) { return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS +int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length) +{ + unsigned char *pl; + unsigned short hbtype; + unsigned int payload; + unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, + p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + /* Read type and payload length first */ + if (1 + 2 + 16 > length) + return 0; /* silently discard */ + if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ + + hbtype = *p++; + n2s(p, payload); + if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length) + return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ + pl = p; + + if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { + unsigned char *buffer, *bp; + unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ + + 2 /* heartbeat length */ + + payload + padding; + int r; + + if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + return 0; + + /* + * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type, + * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding + */ + buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length); + if (buffer == NULL) + return -1; + bp = buffer; + + /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ + *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; + s2n(payload, bp); + memcpy(bp, pl, payload); + bp += payload; + /* Random padding */ + if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { + OPENSSL_free(buffer); + return -1; + } + + r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length); + + if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, + buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + OPENSSL_free(buffer); + + if (r < 0) + return r; + } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { + unsigned int seq; + + /* + * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 + * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number + */ + n2s(pl, seq); + + if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { + dtls1_stop_timer(s); + s->tlsext_hb_seq++; + s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *buf, *p; + int ret = -1; + unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ + unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ + + /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ + if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || + s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); + return -1; + } + + /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ + if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); + return -1; + } + + /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ + if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return -1; + } + + /*- + * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number + * as payload to distuingish different messages and add + * some random stuff. + * - Message Type, 1 byte + * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) + * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) + * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) + * - Padding + */ + buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); + if (buf == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return -1; + } + p = buf; + /* Message Type */ + *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; + /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ + s2n(payload, p); + /* Sequence number */ + s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); + /* 16 random bytes */ + if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + p += 16; + /* Random padding */ + if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); + if (ret >= 0) { + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, + buf, 3 + payload + padding, + s, s->msg_callback_arg); + + dtls1_start_timer(s); + s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; + } + + err: + OPENSSL_free(buf); + + return ret; +} +#endif + +int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s) +{ + int ret; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + BIO *wbio; + + wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); + if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) && + !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { + ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio); + if (ret < 0) + return -1; + + if (ret == 0) + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, + NULL); + } +#endif + ret = ssl3_shutdown(s); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL); +#endif + return ret; +} + +int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s) +{ + if (s->d1->link_mtu) { + s->d1->mtu = + s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s)); + s->d1->link_mtu = 0; + } + + /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ + if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) { + if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { + s->d1->mtu = + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); + + /* + * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know + * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number + */ + if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) { + /* Set to min mtu */ + s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s); + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, + s->d1->mtu, NULL); + } + } else + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void) +{ + return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / + sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]); +} + +unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s) +{ + return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s)); +}