X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=doc%2Fapps%2Fs_client.pod;h=e9f3280e3ee542ead108ea69cb7e2dc39cdb30c4;hp=85e5b9cecb016a1eda145501f04460ddb4e0aae0;hb=cc5a9ba485b988b036974cf682cda35180788446;hpb=36086186a9b90cdad0d2cd0a598a10f03f8f4bcc diff --git a/doc/apps/s_client.pod b/doc/apps/s_client.pod index 85e5b9cecb..e9f3280e3e 100644 --- a/doc/apps/s_client.pod +++ b/doc/apps/s_client.pod @@ -9,7 +9,10 @@ s_client - SSL/TLS client program B B [B<-connect host:port>] +[B<-proxy host:port>] +[B<-servername name>] [B<-verify depth>] +[B<-verify_return_error>] [B<-cert filename>] [B<-certform DER|PEM>] [B<-key filename>] @@ -17,8 +20,38 @@ B B [B<-pass arg>] [B<-CApath directory>] [B<-CAfile filename>] +[B<-no-CAfile>] +[B<-no-CApath>] +[B<-dane_tlsa_domain domain>] +[B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata rrdata>] +[B<-attime timestamp>] +[B<-check_ss_sig>] +[B<-crl_check>] +[B<-crl_check_all>] +[B<-explicit_policy>] +[B<-extended_crl>] +[B<-ignore_critical>] +[B<-inhibit_any>] +[B<-inhibit_map>] +[B<-issuer_checks>] +[B<-partial_chain>] +[B<-policy arg>] +[B<-policy_check>] +[B<-policy_print>] +[B<-purpose purpose>] +[B<-suiteB_128>] +[B<-suiteB_128_only>] +[B<-suiteB_192>] +[B<-trusted_first>] +[B<-no_alt_chains>] +[B<-use_deltas>] +[B<-verify_depth num>] +[B<-verify_email email>] +[B<-verify_hostname hostname>] +[B<-verify_ip ip>] +[B<-verify_name name>] +[B<-x509_strict>] [B<-reconnect>] -[B<-pause>] [B<-showcerts>] [B<-debug>] [B<-msg>] @@ -27,15 +60,21 @@ B B [B<-nbio>] [B<-crlf>] [B<-ign_eof>] +[B<-no_ign_eof>] [B<-quiet>] -[B<-ssl2>] [B<-ssl3>] [B<-tls1>] -[B<-no_ssl2>] [B<-no_ssl3>] [B<-no_tls1>] +[B<-no_tls1_1>] +[B<-no_tls1_2>] +[B<-fallback_scsv>] +[B<-async>] [B<-bugs>] +[B<-comp>] +[B<-no_comp>] [B<-cipher cipherlist>] +[B<-serverpref>] [B<-starttls protocol>] [B<-xmpphost hostname>] [B<-engine id>] @@ -45,8 +84,8 @@ B B [B<-sess_in filename>] [B<-rand file(s)>] [B<-serverinfo types>] -[B<-auth>] -[B<-auth_require_reneg>] +[B<-status>] +[B<-nextprotoneg protocols>] =head1 DESCRIPTION @@ -68,6 +107,16 @@ manual page. This specifies the host and optional port to connect to. If not specified then an attempt is made to connect to the local host on port 4433. +=item B<-proxy host:port> + +When used with the B<-connect> flag, the program uses the host and port +specified with this flag and issues an HTTP CONNECT command to connect +to the desired server. + +=item B<-servername name> + +Set the TLS SNI (Server Name Indication) extension in the ClientHello message. + =item B<-cert certname> The certificate to use, if one is requested by the server. The default is @@ -89,7 +138,7 @@ The private format to use: DER or PEM. PEM is the default. =item B<-pass arg> the private key password source. For more information about the format of B -see the B section in L. +see the B section in L. =item B<-verify depth> @@ -99,6 +148,11 @@ Currently the verify operation continues after errors so all the problems with a certificate chain can be seen. As a side effect the connection will never fail due to a server certificate verify failure. +=item B<-verify_return_error> + +Return verification errors instead of continuing. This will typically +abort the handshake with a fatal error. + =item B<-CApath directory> The directory to use for server certificate verification. This directory @@ -110,20 +164,69 @@ also used when building the client certificate chain. A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain. -=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig> - -Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the -L|verify(1)> manual page for details. +=item B<-no-CAfile> + +Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location + +=item B<-no-CApath> + +Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location + +=item B<-dane_tlsa_domain domain> + +Enable RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA authentication and specify the +TLSA base domain which becomes the default SNI hint and the primary +reference identifier for hostname checks. This must be used in +combination with at least one instance of the B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata> +option below. + +When DANE authentication succeeds, the diagnostic output will include +the lowest (closest to 0) depth at which a TLSA record authenticated +a chain certificate. When that TLSA record is a "2 1 0" trust +anchor public key that signed (rather than matched) the top-most +certificate of the chain, the result is reported as "TA public key +verified". Otherwise, either the TLSA record "matched TA certificate" +at a positive depth or else "matched EE certificate" at depth 0. + +=item B<-dane_tlsa_rrdata rrdata> + +Use one or more times to specify the RRDATA fields of the DANE TLSA +RRset associated with the target service. The B value is +specied in "presentation form", that is four whitespace separated +fields that specify the usage, selector, matching type and associated +data, with the last of these encoded in hexadecimal. Optional +whitespace is ignored in the associated data field. For example: + + $ openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect smtp.example.com:25 \ + -dane_tlsa_domain smtp.example.com \ + -dane_tlsa_rrdata "2 1 1 + B111DD8A1C2091A89BD4FD60C57F0716CCE50FEEFF8137CDBEE0326E 02CF362B" \ + -dane_tlsa_rrdata "2 1 1 + 60B87575447DCBA2A36B7D11AC09FB24A9DB406FEE12D2CC90180517 616E8A18" + CONNECTED(00000003) + ... + DANE TLSA 2 1 1 matched TA certificate at depth 1 + Verified peername: smtp.example.com + ... + Verify return code: 0 (ok) + ... + +=item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>, +B, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>, +B<-inhibit_map>, B<-issuer_checks>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>, +B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>, +B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-no_alt_chains>, +B<-use_deltas>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, +B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict> + +Set various certificate chain validation options. See the +L manual page for details. =item B<-reconnect> reconnects to the same server 5 times using the same session ID, this can be used as a test that session caching is working. -=item B<-pause> - -pauses 1 second between each read and write call. - =item B<-showcerts> display the whole server certificate chain: normally only the server @@ -184,6 +287,11 @@ input. inhibit printing of session and certificate information. This implicitly turns on B<-ign_eof> as well. +=item B<-no_ign_eof> + +shut down the connection when end of file is reached in the input. +Can be used to override the implicit B<-ign_eof> after B<-quiet>. + =item B<-psk_identity identity> Use the PSK identity B when using a PSK cipher suite. @@ -194,22 +302,45 @@ Use the PSK key B when using a PSK cipher suite. The key is given as a hexadecimal number without leading 0x, for example -psk 1a2b3c4d. -=item B<-ssl2>, B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1> +=item B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2> these options disable the use of certain SSL or TLS protocols. By default the initial handshake uses a method which should be compatible with all -servers and permit them to use SSL v3, SSL v2 or TLS as appropriate. +servers and permit them to use SSL v3 or TLS as appropriate. -Unfortunately there are a lot of ancient and broken servers in use which +Unfortunately there are still ancient and broken servers in use which cannot handle this technique and will fail to connect. Some servers only -work if TLS is turned off with the B<-no_tls> option others will only -support SSL v2 and may need the B<-ssl2> option. +work if TLS is turned off. + +=item B<-fallback_scsv> + +Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. + +=item B<-async> + +switch on asynchronous mode. Cryptographic operations will be performed +asynchronously. This will only have an effect if an asynchronous capable engine +is also used via the B<-engine> option. For test purposes the dummy async engine +(dasync) can be used (if available). =item B<-bugs> there are several known bug in SSL and TLS implementations. Adding this option enables various workarounds. +=item B<-comp> + +Enables support for SSL/TLS compression. +This option was introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0. +TLS compression is not recommended and is off by default as of +OpenSSL 1.1.0. + +=item B<-no_comp> + +Disables support for SSL/TLS compression. +TLS compression is not recommended and is off by default as of +OpenSSL 1.1.0. + =item B<-brief> only provide a brief summary of connection parameters instead of the @@ -226,12 +357,13 @@ command for more information. send the protocol-specific message(s) to switch to TLS for communication. B is a keyword for the intended protocol. Currently, the only -supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", "ftp" and "xmpp". +supported keywords are "smtp", "pop3", "imap", "ftp", "xmpp", "xmpp-server", +and "irc." =item B<-xmpphost hostname> -This option, when used with "-starttls xmpp", specifies the host for the -"to" attribute of the stream element. +This option, when used with "-starttls xmpp" or "-starttls xmpp-server", +specifies the host for the "to" attribute of the stream element. If this option is not specified, then the host specified with "-connect" will be used. @@ -262,7 +394,7 @@ for all available algorithms. =item B<-rand file(s)> a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number -generator, or an EGD socket (see L). +generator, or an EGD socket (see L). Multiple files can be specified separated by a OS-dependent character. The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for all others. @@ -274,14 +406,21 @@ a list of comma-separated TLS Extension Types (numbers between 0 and The server's response (if any) will be encoded and displayed as a PEM file. -=item B<-auth> +=item B<-status> -send RFC 5878 client and server authorization extensions in the Client Hello as well as -supplemental data if the server also sent the authorization extensions in the Server Hello. +sends a certificate status request to the server (OCSP stapling). The server +response (if any) is printed out. -=item B<-auth_require_reneg> +=item B<-nextprotoneg protocols> -only send RFC 5878 client and server authorization extensions during renegotiation. +enable Next Protocol Negotiation TLS extension and provide a list of +comma-separated protocol names that the client should advertise +support for. The list should contain most wanted protocols first. +Protocol names are printable ASCII strings, for example "http/1.1" or +"spdy/3". +Empty list of protocols is treated specially and will cause the client to +advertise support for the TLS extension but disconnect just after +receiving ServerHello with a list of server supported protocols. =back @@ -305,8 +444,8 @@ would typically be used (https uses port 443). If the connection succeeds then an HTTP command can be given such as "GET /" to retrieve a web page. If the handshake fails then there are several possible causes, if it is -nothing obvious like no client certificate then the B<-bugs>, B<-ssl2>, -B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl2>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1> options can be tried +nothing obvious like no client certificate then the B<-bugs>, +B<-ssl3>, B<-tls1>, B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1> options can be tried in case it is a buggy server. In particular you should play with these options B submitting a bug report to an OpenSSL mailing list. @@ -328,9 +467,12 @@ on the command line is no guarantee that the certificate works. If there are problems verifying a server certificate then the B<-showcerts> option can be used to show the whole chain. -Since the SSLv23 client hello cannot include compression methods or extensions -these will only be supported if its use is disabled, for example by using the -B<-no_sslv2> option. +The B utility is a test tool and is designed to continue the +handshake after any certificate verification errors. As a result it will +accept any certificate chain (trusted or not) sent by the peer. None test +applications should B do this as it makes them vulnerable to a MITM +attack. This behaviour can be changed by with the B<-verify_return_error> +option: any verify errors are then returned aborting the handshake. =head1 BUGS @@ -339,14 +481,15 @@ the techniques used are rather old, the C source of s_client is rather hard to read and not a model of how things should be done. A typical SSL client program would be much simpler. -The B<-verify> option should really exit if the server verification -fails. - The B<-prexit> option is a bit of a hack. We should really report information whenever a session is renegotiated. =head1 SEE ALSO -L, L, L +L, L, L + +=head1 HISTORY + +The -no_alt_chains options was first added to OpenSSL 1.1.0. =cut