X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Fx509%2Fx509_cmp.c;h=123709902a80db5288638a9ec98ff08bf4a52c76;hp=7c2aaee2e9a2a81264f3d1e67dbe59adfd9ed48a;hb=aace6dbcb34ba40e9b5ef2da11d3d3e724599ca9;hpb=247c3f60494e11c038595d7e5ae9e4edac181cc7

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 7c2aaee2e9..123709902a 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -86,10 +86,9 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
 
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
 	f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
-	ret=strlen(f);
 	if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
 		goto err;
-	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,ret))
+	if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
 		goto err;
 	OPENSSL_free(f);
 	if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
@@ -179,11 +178,24 @@ unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
  */
 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
+	int rv;
 	/* ensure hash is valid */
 	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
 	X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
 
-	return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+	if (rv)
+		return rv;
+	/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
+	if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified)
+		{
+		rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
+		if (rv)
+			return rv;
+		return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
+				a->cert_info->enc.len);
+		}
+	return rv;
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -249,14 +261,14 @@ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
 	i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
 	EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-	EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL);
-	EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length);
-	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL);
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+	    && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+	    && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
+		ret=(((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
+		     ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
+		     )&0xffffffffL;
 	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
 
-	ret=(	((unsigned long)md[0]     )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
-		((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
-		)&0xffffffffL;
 	return(ret);
 	}
 #endif
@@ -311,6 +323,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
 	return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
 	}
 
+
 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
 	{
 	EVP_PKEY *xk;
@@ -342,3 +355,158 @@ int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
 		return 1;
 	return 0;
 	}
+
+/* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and
+ * the NID of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is
+ * a pointer to a flags field which must contain the suite B verification
+ * flags.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
+	{
+	const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
+	int curve_nid;
+	if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+		grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
+	if (!grp)
+		return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+	curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+	/* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
+	if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) /* P-384 */
+		{
+		/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with
+		 * curve.
+		 */
+		if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
+			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+		if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
+			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+		/* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
+		*pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+		}
+	else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) /* P-256 */
+		{
+		if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+		if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
+			return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+		}
+	else
+		return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
+
+	return X509_V_OK;
+	}
+
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+							unsigned long flags)
+	{
+	int rv, i, sign_nid;
+	EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+	unsigned long tflags;
+	if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+		return X509_V_OK;
+	tflags = flags;
+	/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
+	if (x == NULL)
+		{
+		x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+		i = 1;
+		}
+	else
+		i = 0;
+
+	if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
+		{
+		rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+		/* Correct error depth */
+		i = 0;
+		goto end;
+		}
+
+	pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+	/* Check EE key only */
+	rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+	if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+		{
+		/* Correct error depth */
+		i = 0;
+		goto end;
+		}
+	for(; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+		{
+		sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+		x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+		if (X509_get_version(x) != 2)
+			{
+			rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+			goto end;
+			}
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+		pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+		rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
+		if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+			goto end;
+		}
+
+	/* Final check: root CA signature */
+	rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
+	end:
+	if (pk)
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+	if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+		{
+		/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
+		if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
+		    || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
+			i--;
+		/* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing
+		 * P-384 with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
+		 */
+		if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
+			rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
+		if (perror_depth)
+			*perror_depth = i;
+		}
+	return rv;
+	}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+	{
+	int sign_nid;
+	if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+		return X509_V_OK;
+	sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
+	return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
+	}
+
+#else
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+							unsigned long flags)
+	{
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+	{
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+#endif
+/* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
+ * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref
+ * of each X509 structure.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+	{
+	STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
+	int i;
+	ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
+		{
+		X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
+		CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+		}
+	return ret;
+	}