X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frsa%2Frsa_sp800_56b_check.c;h=2cdc2fa5e6c749014d9ad8cf2b2dde40be561b0e;hp=662502190e9b9bf39ac9ee542684877190696edf;hb=23b2fc0b501d6635dd821014aec8ff16689cbb6a;hpb=f844f9eb44186df2f8b0cfd3264b4eb003d8c61a diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c index 662502190e..2cdc2fa5e6 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sp800_56b_check.c @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ * Copyright 2018-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2018-2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. * - * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ * 6.4.1.2.3: rsakpv1-crt Step 7 * 6.4.1.3.3: rsakpv2-crt Step 7 */ -int rsa_check_crt_components(const RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) +int ossl_rsa_check_crt_components(const RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *r = NULL, *p1 = NULL, *q1 = NULL; @@ -37,7 +37,15 @@ int rsa_check_crt_components(const RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = (q1 != NULL) + if (q1 != NULL) { + BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(p1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + ret = 1; + } else { + ret = 0; + } + ret = ret /* p1 = p -1 */ && (BN_copy(p1, rsa->p) != NULL) && BN_sub_word(p1, 1) @@ -62,6 +70,7 @@ int rsa_check_crt_components(const RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) /* (f) 1 = (qInv . q) mod p */ && BN_mod_mul(r, rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, rsa->p, ctx) && BN_is_one(r); + BN_clear(r); BN_clear(p1); BN_clear(q1); BN_CTX_end(ctx); @@ -76,7 +85,7 @@ int rsa_check_crt_components(const RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) * * (√2)(2^(nbits/2 - 1) = (√2/2)(2^(nbits/2)) */ -int rsa_check_prime_factor_range(const BIGNUM *p, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) +int ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor_range(const BIGNUM *p, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *low; @@ -124,7 +133,7 @@ err: * * See SP800-56Br1 6.4.1.2.3 Step 5 (a to d) & (e to h). */ -int rsa_check_prime_factor(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *e, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) +int ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *e, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = 0; BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *gcd = NULL; @@ -132,13 +141,20 @@ int rsa_check_prime_factor(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *e, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) /* (Steps 5 a-b) prime test */ if (BN_check_prime(p, ctx, NULL) != 1 /* (Step 5c) (√2)(2^(nbits/2 - 1) <= p <= 2^(nbits/2 - 1) */ - || rsa_check_prime_factor_range(p, nbits, ctx) != 1) + || ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor_range(p, nbits, ctx) != 1) return 0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); p1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = (gcd != NULL) + if (gcd != NULL) { + BN_set_flags(p1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(gcd, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + ret = 1; + } else { + ret = 0; + } + ret = ret /* (Step 5d) GCD(p-1, e) = 1 */ && (BN_copy(p1, p) != NULL) && BN_sub_word(p1, 1) @@ -156,7 +172,7 @@ int rsa_check_prime_factor(BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *e, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) * (Step 6a) 2^(nBit/2) < d < LCM(p–1, q–1). * (Step 6b) 1 = (d*e) mod LCM(p–1, q–1) */ -int rsa_check_private_exponent(const RSA *rsa, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) +int ossl_rsa_check_private_exponent(const RSA *rsa, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret; BIGNUM *r, *p1, *q1, *lcm, *p1q1, *gcd; @@ -172,15 +188,28 @@ int rsa_check_private_exponent(const RSA *rsa, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) lcm = BN_CTX_get(ctx); p1q1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); gcd = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - ret = (gcd != NULL + if (gcd != NULL) { + BN_set_flags(r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(p1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(lcm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(p1q1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(gcd, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + ret = 1; + } else { + ret = 0; + } + ret = (ret /* LCM(p - 1, q - 1) */ - && (rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1) == 1) + && (ossl_rsa_get_lcm(ctx, rsa->p, rsa->q, lcm, gcd, p1, q1, + p1q1) == 1) /* (Step 6a) d < LCM(p - 1, q - 1) */ && (BN_cmp(rsa->d, lcm) < 0) /* (Step 6b) 1 = (e . d) mod LCM(p - 1, q - 1) */ && BN_mod_mul(r, rsa->e, rsa->d, lcm, ctx) && BN_is_one(r)); + BN_clear(r); BN_clear(p1); BN_clear(q1); BN_clear(lcm); @@ -189,19 +218,37 @@ int rsa_check_private_exponent(const RSA *rsa, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx) return ret; } +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +static int bn_is_three(const BIGNUM *bn) +{ + BIGNUM *num = BN_dup(bn); + int ret = (num != NULL && BN_sub_word(num, 3) && BN_is_zero(num)); + + BN_free(num); + return ret; +} +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ + /* Check exponent is odd, and has a bitlen ranging from [17..256] */ -int rsa_check_public_exponent(const BIGNUM *e) +int ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(const BIGNUM *e) { - int bitlen = BN_num_bits(e); + int bitlen; - return (BN_is_odd(e) && bitlen > 16 && bitlen < 257); + /* For legacy purposes RSA_3 is allowed in non fips mode */ +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + if (bn_is_three(e)) + return 1; +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ + + bitlen = BN_num_bits(e); + return (BN_is_odd(e) && bitlen > 16 && bitlen < 257); } /* * SP800-56Br1 6.4.1.2.1 (Step 5i): |p - q| > 2^(nbits/2 - 100) * i.e- numbits(p-q-1) > (nbits/2 -100) */ -int rsa_check_pminusq_diff(BIGNUM *diff, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, +int ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(BIGNUM *diff, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, int nbits) { int bitlen = (nbits >> 1) - 100; @@ -218,10 +265,15 @@ int rsa_check_pminusq_diff(BIGNUM *diff, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, return (BN_num_bits(diff) > bitlen); } -/* return LCM(p-1, q-1) */ -int rsa_get_lcm(BN_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, - BIGNUM *lcm, BIGNUM *gcd, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *q1, - BIGNUM *p1q1) +/* + * return LCM(p-1, q-1) + * + * Caller should ensure that lcm, gcd, p1, q1, p1q1 are flagged with + * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. + */ +int ossl_rsa_get_lcm(BN_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, + BIGNUM *lcm, BIGNUM *gcd, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *q1, + BIGNUM *p1q1) { return BN_sub(p1, p, BN_value_one()) /* p-1 */ && BN_sub(q1, q, BN_value_one()) /* q-1 */ @@ -235,7 +287,7 @@ int rsa_get_lcm(BN_CTX *ctx, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, * SP800-89 5.3.3 (Explicit) Partial Public Key Validation for RSA * caveat is that the modulus must be as specified in SP800-56Br1 */ -int rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa) +int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa) { int ret = 0, status; #ifdef FIPS_MODULE @@ -253,19 +305,18 @@ int rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa) * NOTE: changed to allow keys >= 2048 */ nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); - if (!rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, -1)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC, RSA_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); + if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, -1)) { + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; } #endif if (!BN_is_odd(rsa->n)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS); return 0; } /* (Steps b-c): 2^16 < e < 2^256, n and e must be odd */ - if (!rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC, - RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); + if (!ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) { + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } @@ -279,13 +330,13 @@ int rsa_sp800_56b_check_public(const RSA *rsa) * The modulus has no factors smaller than 752. */ if (!BN_gcd(gcd, rsa->n, bn_get0_small_factors(), ctx) || !BN_is_one(gcd)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS); goto err; } ret = bn_miller_rabin_is_prime(rsa->n, 0, ctx, NULL, 1, &status); if (ret != 1 || status != BN_PRIMETEST_COMPOSITE_NOT_POWER_OF_PRIME) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_PUBLIC, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_INVALID_MODULUS); ret = 0; goto err; } @@ -300,7 +351,7 @@ err: /* * Perform validation of the RSA private key to check that 0 < D < N. */ -int rsa_sp800_56b_check_private(const RSA *rsa) +int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_private(const RSA *rsa) { if (rsa->d == NULL || rsa->n == NULL) return 0; @@ -318,8 +369,8 @@ int rsa_sp800_56b_check_private(const RSA *rsa) * 6.4.1.2.3 "rsakpv1 - crt" * 6.4.1.3.3 "rsakpv2 - crt" */ -int rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed, - int strength, int nbits) +int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed, + int strength, int nbits) { int ret = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; @@ -330,31 +381,30 @@ int rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed, || rsa->e == NULL || rsa->d == NULL || rsa->n == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST); return 0; } /* (Step 1): Check Ranges */ - if (!rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, strength)) + if (!ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_validate_strength(nbits, strength)) return 0; /* If the exponent is known */ if (efixed != NULL) { /* (2): Check fixed exponent matches public exponent. */ if (BN_cmp(efixed, rsa->e) != 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST); return 0; } } /* (Step 1.c): e is odd integer 65537 <= e < 2^256 */ - if (!rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) { + if (!ossl_rsa_check_public_exponent(rsa->e)) { /* exponent out of range */ - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, - RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); return 0; } /* (Step 3.b): check the modulus */ if (nbits != BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR); return 0; } @@ -368,20 +418,20 @@ int rsa_sp800_56b_check_keypair(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM *efixed, goto err; /* (Step 4.c): Check n = pq */ if (BN_cmp(rsa->n, r) != 0) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_INVALID_REQUEST); goto err; } /* (Step 5): check prime factors p & q */ - ret = rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->p, rsa->e, nbits, ctx) - && rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->q, rsa->e, nbits, ctx) - && (rsa_check_pminusq_diff(r, rsa->p, rsa->q, nbits) > 0) + ret = ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->p, rsa->e, nbits, ctx) + && ossl_rsa_check_prime_factor(rsa->q, rsa->e, nbits, ctx) + && (ossl_rsa_check_pminusq_diff(r, rsa->p, rsa->q, nbits) > 0) /* (Step 6): Check the private exponent d */ - && rsa_check_private_exponent(rsa, nbits, ctx) + && ossl_rsa_check_private_exponent(rsa, nbits, ctx) /* 6.4.1.2.3 (Step 7): Check the CRT components */ - && rsa_check_crt_components(rsa, ctx); + && ossl_rsa_check_crt_components(rsa, ctx); if (ret != 1) - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SP800_56B_CHECK_KEYPAIR, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR); + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_INVALID_KEYPAIR); err: BN_clear(r);