X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frsa%2Frsa_gen.c;h=e52bce63551d8e1ea121cdba268e59e2264d3f54;hp=aed2351cfbfdd94689267254713cc2a325a88703;hb=8bf37709a471bb31d2e1f5b4b3796fb3e6dce4df;hpb=58964a492275ca9a59a0cd9c8155cb2491b4b909 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c index aed2351cfb..e52bce6355 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c @@ -1,187 +1,506 @@ -/* crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. +/* + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ +/* + * NB: these functions have been "upgraded", the deprecated versions (which + * are compatibility wrappers using these functions) are in rsa_depr.c. - + * Geoff + */ + +/* + * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for + * internal use. + */ +#include "internal/deprecated.h" + #include #include -#include "cryptlib.h" -#include "bn.h" -#include "rsa.h" - -RSA *RSA_generate_key(bits, e_value, callback,cb_arg) -int bits; -unsigned long e_value; -void (*callback)(P_I_I_P); -char *cb_arg; - { - RSA *rsa=NULL; - BIGNUM *r0=NULL,*r1=NULL,*r2=NULL,*r3=NULL,*tmp; - int bitsp,bitsq,ok= -1,n=0; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL,*ctx2=NULL; - - ctx=BN_CTX_new(); - if (ctx == NULL) goto err; - ctx2=BN_CTX_new(); - if (ctx2 == NULL) goto err; - r0=ctx->bn[0]; - r1=ctx->bn[1]; - r2=ctx->bn[2]; - r3=ctx->bn[3]; - ctx->tos+=4; - - bitsp=(bits+1)/2; - bitsq=bits-bitsp; - rsa=RSA_new(); - if (rsa == NULL) goto err; - - /* set e */ - rsa->e=BN_new(); - if (rsa->e == NULL) goto err; - if (!BN_set_word(rsa->e,e_value)) goto err; - - /* generate p and q */ - for (;;) - { - rsa->p=BN_generate_prime(bitsp,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg); - if (rsa->p == NULL) goto err; - if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; - if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err; - if (BN_is_one(r1)) break; - if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg); - BN_free(rsa->p); - } - if (callback != NULL) callback(3,0,cb_arg); - for (;;) - { - rsa->q=BN_generate_prime(bitsq,0,NULL,NULL,callback,cb_arg); - if (rsa->q == NULL) goto err; - if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; - if (!BN_gcd(r1,r2,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err; - if (BN_is_one(r1) && (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) != 0)) - break; - if (callback != NULL) callback(2,n++,cb_arg); - BN_free(rsa->q); - } - if (callback != NULL) callback(3,1,cb_arg); - if (BN_cmp(rsa->p,rsa->q) < 0) - { - tmp=rsa->p; - rsa->p=rsa->q; - rsa->q=tmp; - } - - /* calculate n */ - rsa->n=BN_new(); - if (rsa->n == NULL) goto err; - if (!BN_mul(rsa->n,rsa->p,rsa->q)) goto err; - - /* calculate d */ - if (!BN_sub(r1,rsa->p,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* p-1 */ - if (!BN_sub(r2,rsa->q,BN_value_one())) goto err; /* q-1 */ - if (!BN_mul(r0,r1,r2)) goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */ - -/* should not be needed, since gcd(p-1,e) == 1 and gcd(q-1,e) == 1 */ -/* for (;;) - { - if (!BN_gcd(r3,r0,rsa->e,ctx)) goto err; - if (BN_is_one(r3)) break; - - if (1) - { - if (!BN_add_word(rsa->e,2L)) goto err; - continue; - } - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); - goto err; - } -*/ - rsa->d=(BIGNUM *)BN_mod_inverse(rsa->e,r0,ctx2); /* d */ - if (rsa->d == NULL) goto err; - - /* calculate d mod (p-1) */ - rsa->dmp1=BN_new(); - if (rsa->dmp1 == NULL) goto err; - if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1,rsa->d,r1,ctx)) goto err; - - /* calculate d mod (q-1) */ - rsa->dmq1=BN_new(); - if (rsa->dmq1 == NULL) goto err; - if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmq1,rsa->d,r2,ctx)) goto err; - - /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ - rsa->iqmp=BN_mod_inverse(rsa->q,rsa->p,ctx2); - if (rsa->iqmp == NULL) goto err; - - ok=1; +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include +#include +#include "rsa_local.h" + +static int rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg); +static int rsa_keygen(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, + BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb, int pairwise_test); + +/* + * NB: this wrapper would normally be placed in rsa_lib.c and the static + * implementation would probably be in rsa_eay.c. Nonetheless, is kept here + * so that we don't introduce a new linker dependency. Eg. any application + * that wasn't previously linking object code related to key-generation won't + * have to now just because key-generation is part of RSA_METHOD. + */ +int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) +{ + if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) + return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + + return RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, bits, RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM, + e_value, cb); +} + +int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, + BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) +{ +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + /* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */ + if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) { + return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, + e_value, cb); + } else if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) { + /* + * However, if rsa->meth implements only rsa_keygen, then we + * have to honour it in 2-prime case and assume that it wouldn't + * know what to do with multi-prime key generated by builtin + * subroutine... + */ + if (primes == 2) + return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); + else + return 0; + } +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ + return rsa_keygen(NULL, rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb, 0); +} + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +static int rsa_multiprime_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, + BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb) +{ + BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime; + int n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0; + int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0; + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; + STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + BN_ULONG bitst = 0; + unsigned long error = 0; + int ok = -1; + + if (bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { + ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + goto err; + } + + /* A bad value for e can cause infinite loops */ + if (e_value != NULL && !rsa_check_public_exponent(e_value)) { + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_PUB_EXPONENT_OUT_OF_RANGE); + return 0; + } + + if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) { + ok = 0; /* we set our own err */ + RSAerr(0, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID); + goto err; + } + + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto err; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (r2 == NULL) + goto err; + + /* divide bits into 'primes' pieces evenly */ + quo = bits / primes; + rmd = bits % primes; + + for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) + bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo; + + rsa->dirty_cnt++; + + /* We need the RSA components non-NULL */ + if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->d && ((rsa->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->e && ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->p && ((rsa->p = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->q && ((rsa->q = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->dmp1 && ((rsa->dmp1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->dmq1 && ((rsa->dmq1 = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)) + goto err; + + /* initialize multi-prime components */ + if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) { + rsa->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; + prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, primes - 2); + if (prime_infos == NULL) + goto err; + if (rsa->prime_infos != NULL) { + /* could this happen? */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); + } + rsa->prime_infos = prime_infos; + + /* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); + if (pinfo == NULL) + goto err; + (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); + } + } + + if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL) + goto err; + + /* generate p, q and other primes (if any) */ + for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) { + adj = 0; + retries = 0; + + if (i == 0) { + prime = rsa->p; + } else if (i == 1) { + prime = rsa->q; + } else { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + prime = pinfo->r; + } + BN_set_flags(prime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + for (;;) { + redo: + if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(prime, bitsr[i] + adj, 0, NULL, NULL, cb)) + goto err; + /* + * prime should not be equal to p, q, r_3... + * (those primes prior to this one) + */ + { + int j; + + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { + BIGNUM *prev_prime; + + if (j == 0) + prev_prime = rsa->p; + else if (j == 1) + prev_prime = rsa->q; + else + prev_prime = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, + j - 2)->r; + + if (!BN_cmp(prime, prev_prime)) { + goto redo; + } + } + } + if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + ERR_set_mark(); + BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) { + /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */ + break; + } + error = ERR_peek_last_error(); + if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN + && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) { + /* GCD != 1 */ + ERR_pop_to_mark(); + } else { + goto err; + } + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) + goto err; + } + + bitse += bitsr[i]; + + /* calculate n immediately to see if it's sufficient */ + if (i == 1) { + /* we get at least 2 primes */ + if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + } else if (i != 0) { + /* modulus n = p * q * r_3 * r_4 ... */ + if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, prime, ctx)) + goto err; + } else { + /* i == 0, do nothing */ + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i)) + goto err; + continue; + } + /* + * if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected + * (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than + * 0xF). If so, re-generate the last prime. + * + * NOTE: This actually can't happen in two-prime case, because of + * the way factors are generated. + * + * Besides, another consideration is, for multi-prime case, even the + * length modulus is as long as expected, the modulus could start at + * 0x8, which could be utilized to distinguish a multi-prime private + * key by using the modulus in a certificate. This is also covered + * by checking the length should not be less than 0x9. + */ + if (!BN_rshift(r2, r1, bitse - 4)) + goto err; + bitst = BN_get_word(r2); + + if (bitst < 0x9 || bitst > 0xF) { + /* + * For keys with more than 4 primes, we attempt longer factor to + * meet length requirement. + * + * Otherwise, we just re-generate the prime with the same length. + * + * This strategy has the following goals: + * + * 1. 1024-bit factors are efficient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key + * 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key + */ + bitse -= bitsr[i]; + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++)) + goto err; + if (primes > 4) { + if (bitst < 0x9) + adj++; + else + adj--; + } else if (retries == 4) { + /* + * re-generate all primes from scratch, mainly used + * in 4 prime case to avoid long loop. Max retry times + * is set to 4. + */ + i = -1; + bitse = 0; + continue; + } + retries++; + goto redo; + } + /* save product of primes for further use, for multi-prime only */ + if (i > 1 && BN_copy(pinfo->pp, rsa->n) == NULL) + goto err; + if (BN_copy(rsa->n, r1) == NULL) + goto err; + if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i)) + goto err; + } + + if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) { + tmp = rsa->p; + rsa->p = rsa->q; + rsa->q = tmp; + } + + /* calculate d */ + + /* p - 1 */ + if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + /* q - 1 */ + if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + /* (p - 1)(q - 1) */ + if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx)) + goto err; + /* multi-prime */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + /* save r_i - 1 to pinfo->d temporarily */ + if (!BN_sub(pinfo->d, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) + goto err; + if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, pinfo->d, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + { + BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new(); + + if (pr0 == NULL) + goto err; + + BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) { + BN_free(pr0); + goto err; /* d */ + } + /* We MUST free pr0 before any further use of r0 */ + BN_free(pr0); + } + + { + BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); + + if (d == NULL) + goto err; + + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + /* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */ + if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx) + || !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) { + BN_free(d); + goto err; + } + + /* calculate CRT exponents */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + /* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */ + if (!BN_mod(pinfo->d, d, pinfo->d, ctx)) { + BN_free(d); + goto err; + } + } + + /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */ + BN_free(d); + } + + { + BIGNUM *p = BN_new(); + + if (p == NULL) + goto err; + BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + /* calculate inverse of q mod p */ + if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, rsa->q, p, ctx)) { + BN_free(p); + goto err; + } + + /* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */ + for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2); + BN_with_flags(p, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo->t, pinfo->pp, p, ctx)) { + BN_free(p); + goto err; + } + } + + /* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */ + BN_free(p); + } + + ok = 1; + err: + if (ok == -1) { + RSAerr(0, ERR_LIB_BN); + ok = 0; + } + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + return ok; +} +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ + +static int rsa_keygen(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, + BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb, int pairwise_test) +{ + int ok = 0; + + /* + * Only multi-prime keys or insecure keys with a small key length will use + * the older rsa_multiprime_keygen(). + */ + if (primes == 2 && bits >= 2048) + ok = rsa_sp800_56b_generate_key(rsa, bits, e_value, cb); +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + else + ok = rsa_multiprime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb); +#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */ + +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + pairwise_test = 1; /* FIPS MODE needs to always run the pairwise test */ +#endif + if (pairwise_test && ok > 0) { + OSSL_CALLBACK *stcb = NULL; + void *stcbarg = NULL; + + OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &stcb, &stcbarg); + ok = rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(rsa, stcb, stcbarg); + if (!ok) { + /* Clear intermediate results */ + BN_clear_free(rsa->d); + BN_clear_free(rsa->p); + BN_clear_free(rsa->q); + BN_clear_free(rsa->dmp1); + BN_clear_free(rsa->dmq1); + BN_clear_free(rsa->iqmp); + } + } + return ok; +} + +/* + * For RSA key generation it is not known whether the key pair will be used + * for key transport or signatures. FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 states that in this case + * either a signature verification OR an encryption operation may be used to + * perform the pairwise consistency check. The simpler encrypt/decrypt operation + * has been chosen for this case. + */ +static int rsa_keygen_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg) +{ + int ret = 0; + unsigned int ciphertxt_len; + unsigned char *ciphertxt = NULL; + const unsigned char plaintxt[16] = {0}; + unsigned char decoded[256]; + unsigned int decoded_len; + unsigned int plaintxt_len = (unsigned int)sizeof(plaintxt_len); + int padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; + OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL; + + st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg); + if (st == NULL) + goto err; + OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT, + OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_RSA_PKCS1); + + ciphertxt_len = RSA_size(rsa); + ciphertxt = OPENSSL_zalloc(ciphertxt_len); + if (ciphertxt == NULL) + goto err; + + ciphertxt_len = RSA_public_encrypt(plaintxt_len, plaintxt, ciphertxt, rsa, + padding); + if (ciphertxt_len <= 0) + goto err; + if (ciphertxt_len == plaintxt_len + && memcmp(ciphertxt, plaintxt, plaintxt_len) == 0) + goto err; + + OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, ciphertxt); + + decoded_len = RSA_private_decrypt(ciphertxt_len, ciphertxt, decoded, rsa, + padding); + if (decoded_len != plaintxt_len + || memcmp(decoded, plaintxt, decoded_len) != 0) + goto err; + + ret = 1; err: - if (ok == -1) - { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_GENERATE_KEY,ERR_LIB_BN); - ok=0; - } - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx2); - - if (!ok) - { - if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa); - return(NULL); - } - else - return(rsa); - } + OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret); + OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st); + OPENSSL_free(ciphertxt); + return ret; +}