X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frsa%2Frsa_eay.c;h=16f000ff48af7261940c3bd89d5265539d6f5769;hp=6954f36d5d431da70577c11f6c0f51761e811712;hb=271fef0ef39a1c0cb5233a5adf3ff8733abb375e;hpb=a28a5d9c626c8b48d55f64ad77304578d1bd2a03 diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c index 6954f36d5d..16f000ff48 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -109,11 +109,16 @@ * */ +#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI + #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +#include +#endif #ifndef RSA_NULL @@ -138,7 +143,7 @@ static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={ BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */ RSA_eay_init, RSA_eay_finish, - 0, /* flags */ + RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */ NULL, 0, /* rsa_sign */ 0, /* rsa_verify */ @@ -150,16 +155,6 @@ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); } -/* Usage example; - * MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); - */ -#define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \ - if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \ - !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \ - CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, \ - (rsa)->m, (ctx))) \ - err_instr - static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { @@ -168,6 +163,43 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if(FIPS_selftest_failed()) + { + FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) + && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + return -1; + } +#endif + + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) + { + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + } + if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); @@ -205,13 +237,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err; if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) - { + { /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); goto err; } - MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; @@ -238,88 +272,133 @@ err: return(r); } -static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM **r, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) +static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_BLINDING *ret; + int got_write_lock = 0; + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + got_write_lock = 1; + if (rsa->blinding == NULL) - { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - if (rsa->blinding == NULL) - rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); - } + rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); } ret = rsa->blinding; if (ret == NULL) - return NULL; + goto err; - if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) != CRYPTO_thread_id()) + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); + if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) { - *local = 0; + /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ + + *local = 1; + } + else + { + /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ + + *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() + * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses + * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be + * stored outside the BN_BLINDING + */ + if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + if (!got_write_lock) + { + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + got_write_lock = 1; + } + if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); } ret = rsa->mt_blinding; } - else - *local = 1; + err: + if (got_write_lock) + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); + else + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); return ret; } -static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f, - BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - if (local) +static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, + BN_CTX *ctx) + { + if (unblind == NULL) + /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor + * in BN_BLINDING. */ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); else { + /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor + * outside BN_BLINDING. */ int ret; CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx); + ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); return ret; } -} + } -static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f, - BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx) -{ - if (local) - return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); - else - { - int ret; - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx); - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); - return ret; - } -} +static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, + BN_CTX *ctx) + { + /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex + * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. + * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: + * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, + * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. + * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock. + */ + return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); + } /* signing */ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { - BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br; + BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; int local_blinding = 0; + /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store + * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ + BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if(FIPS_selftest_failed()) + { + FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) + && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + return -1; + } +#endif + if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - br = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); @@ -334,6 +413,9 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); break; + case RSA_X931_PADDING: + i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen); + break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); break; @@ -355,7 +437,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &br, &local_blinding, ctx); + blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -364,8 +446,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, } if (blinding != NULL) - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx)) + { + if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; + } if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || ((rsa->p != NULL) && @@ -381,29 +470,42 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { BN_init(&local_d); d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else - d = rsa->d; + d= rsa->d; - MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx)) + if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; + if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) + { + BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); + if (BN_cmp(ret, f)) + res = f; + else + res = ret; + } + else + res = ret; + /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the * length of the modulus */ - j=BN_num_bytes(ret); - i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j])); + j=BN_num_bytes(res); + i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j])); for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) to[k]=0; @@ -425,18 +527,36 @@ err: static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { - BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br; + BIGNUM *f, *ret; int j,num=0,r= -1; unsigned char *p; unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; int local_blinding = 0; + /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind + * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store + * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */ + BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if(FIPS_selftest_failed()) + { + FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) + && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + return -1; + } +#endif + if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - br = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num); @@ -465,7 +585,7 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { - blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &br, &local_blinding, ctx); + blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); if (blinding == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -474,8 +594,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, } if (blinding != NULL) - if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx)) + { + if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) goto err; + } /* do the decrypt */ if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || @@ -492,22 +619,24 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; - MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; } if (blinding) - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx)) + if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) goto err; p=buf; @@ -519,9 +648,9 @@ static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); - break; + break; #endif case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); @@ -560,6 +689,43 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *buf=NULL; BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if(FIPS_selftest_failed()) + { + FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); + goto err; + } + + if (FIPS_module_mode() && !(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) + && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + return -1; + } +#endif + + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) + { + if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); + return -1; + } + } + if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; BN_CTX_start(ctx); f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); @@ -588,11 +754,16 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, goto err; } - MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; + if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12)) + if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err; + p=buf; i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); @@ -601,6 +772,9 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); break; + case RSA_X931_PADDING: + r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num); + break; case RSA_NO_PADDING: r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); break; @@ -628,8 +802,8 @@ err: static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy; - BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1; - BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1; + BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1; + BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1; int ret=0; BN_CTX_start(ctx); @@ -637,26 +811,82 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); - MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err); - MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err); + { + BIGNUM local_p, local_q; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; + + /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the + * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) + */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + BN_init(&local_p); + p = &local_p; + BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + BN_init(&local_q); + q = &local_q; + BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + { + p = rsa->p; + q = rsa->q; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) + { + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) + goto err; + } + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* compute I mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + c = &local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmq1 = &local_dmq1; - BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; - if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + /* compute I mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + c = &local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { dmp1 = &local_dmp1; - BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; @@ -670,14 +900,24 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; - if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + + /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + pr1 = &local_r1; + BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + pr1 = r1; + if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of - * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still + * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because - * they ensure p > q [steve] - */ + * they ensure p > q [steve] + */ if (BN_is_negative(r0)) if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; @@ -703,10 +943,10 @@ static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) BIGNUM local_d; BIGNUM *d = NULL; - if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME)) + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) { d = &local_d; - BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME); + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); } else d = rsa->d; @@ -722,6 +962,13 @@ err: static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) { +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS + if(FIPS_selftest_failed()) + { + FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_INIT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); + return 0; + } +#endif rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; return(1); }