X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frand%2Fmd_rand.c;h=67ac5ac92721293bbaeb41efa7b41cdfa969e33d;hp=ab7e41c8ec37ef285c4bbf122415e8fe8958ecc7;hb=f74fa33bcee6bc84f41442bdd256d838c2cb3c14;hpb=a1e464f94abb0ccfda284a96c358a5b32c7e72ac diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c index ab7e41c8ec..67ac5ac927 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c +++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c @@ -55,71 +55,95 @@ * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +#define OPENSSL_FIPSAPI + +#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG +# ifndef NDEBUG +# define NDEBUG +# endif +#endif + +#include #include -#include -#include #include -#include -#include -#if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND) -#ifndef NO_MD5 -#define USE_MD5_RAND -#elif !defined(NO_SHA1) -#define USE_SHA1_RAND -#elif !defined(NO_MDC2) -#define USE_MDC2_RAND -#elif !defined(NO_MD2) -#define USE_MD2_RAND -#else -We need a message digest of some type +#include "e_os.h" + +#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_DSPBIOS)) +# include #endif +#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) +# include #endif -/* Changed how the state buffer used. I now attempt to 'wrap' such - * that I don't run over the same locations the next time go through - * the 1023 bytes - many thanks to - * Robert J. LeBlanc for his comments - */ +#include +#include +#include "rand_lcl.h" -#if defined(USE_MD5_RAND) -#include -#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH -#define MD_CTX MD5_CTX -#define MD_Init(a) MD5_Init(a) -#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD5_Update(a,b,c) -#define MD_Final(a,b) MD5_Final(a,b) -#define MD(a,b,c) MD5(a,b,c) -#elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) -#include -#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH -#define MD_CTX SHA_CTX -#define MD_Init(a) SHA1_Init(a) -#define MD_Update(a,b,c) SHA1_Update(a,b,c) -#define MD_Final(a,b) SHA1_Final(a,b) -#define MD(a,b,c) SHA1(a,b,c) -#elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) -#include -#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH -#define MD_CTX MDC2_CTX -#define MD_Init(a) MDC2_Init(a) -#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MDC2_Update(a,b,c) -#define MD_Final(a,b) MDC2_Final(a,b) -#define MD(a,b,c) MDC2(a,b,c) -#elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND) -#include -#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH -#define MD_CTX MD2_CTX -#define MD_Init(a) MD2_Init(a) -#define MD_Update(a,b,c) MD2_Update(a,b,c) -#define MD_Final(a,b) MD2_Final(a,b) -#define MD(a,b,c) MD2(a,b,c) +#include + +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +#include #endif -#include +#ifdef BN_DEBUG +# define PREDICT +#endif -/* #define NORAND 1 */ /* #define PREDICT 1 */ #define STATE_SIZE 1023 @@ -127,17 +151,39 @@ static int state_num=0,state_index=0; static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; static long md_count[2]={0,0}; +static double entropy=0; +static int initialized=0; -const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; +static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread + * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND + * (to prevent double locking) */ +/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */ +static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid; /* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */ -static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); -static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); -static void ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); -RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={ +#ifdef PREDICT +int rand_predictable=0; +#endif + +const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; + +static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); + +static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void); +static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); +static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy); +static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo); +static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static int ssleay_rand_status(void); + +static RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={ ssleay_rand_seed, - ssleay_rand_bytes, + ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes, ssleay_rand_cleanup, + ssleay_rand_add, + ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes, + ssleay_rand_status }; RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) @@ -147,28 +193,70 @@ RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void) static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void) { - memset(state,0,sizeof(state)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state)); state_num=0; state_index=0; - memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); md_count[0]=0; md_count[1]=0; + entropy=0; + initialized=0; } -static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) +static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add) { - int i,j,k,st_idx,st_num; - MD_CTX m; - -#ifdef NORAND - return; -#endif + int i,j,k,st_idx; + long md_c[2]; + unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + EVP_MD_CTX m; + int do_not_lock; + int rv = 0; + + if (!num) + return; + + /* + * (Based on the rand(3) manpage) + * + * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for + * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash + * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function + * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state' + * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as + * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count' + * (which is incremented after each use). + * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the + * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the + * hash function. + */ + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m); + /* check if we already have the lock */ + if (crypto_lock_rand) + { + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); + } + else + do_not_lock = 0; - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); + if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); st_idx=state_index; - st_num=state_num; - state_index=(state_index+num); + /* use our own copies of the counters so that even + * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the + * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_ + * difference */ + md_c[0] = md_count[0]; + md_c[1] = md_count[1]; + + memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); + + /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ + state_index += num; if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) { state_index%=STATE_SIZE; @@ -179,249 +267,481 @@ static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) if (state_index > state_num) state_num=state_index; } - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); + /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */ + + /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] + * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them + * as well */ + + md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0); + + if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); for (i=0; i MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j; - MD_Init(&m); - MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + if (!MD_Init(&m)) + goto err; + if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + goto err; k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE; if (k > 0) { - MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k); - MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); + if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k)) + goto err; + if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k)) + goto err; } else - MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); - - MD_Update(&m,buf,j); - MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_count[0]),sizeof(md_count)); - MD_Final(md,&m); - md_count[1]++; + if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j)) + goto err; + + /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ + if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j)) + goto err; + /* We know that line may cause programs such as + purify and valgrind to complain about use of + uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's + with the caller. Removing that line will make + sure you get really bad randomness and thereby + other problems such as very insecure keys. */ + + if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c))) + goto err; + if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md)) + goto err; + md_c[1]++; buf=(const char *)buf + j; for (k=0; k= STATE_SIZE) - { st_idx=0; - st_num=STATE_SIZE; - } } } - memset((char *)&m,0,sizeof(m)); + + if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); + /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that + * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for + * the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as + * much entropy as fits into md. */ + for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) + { + md[k] ^= local_md[k]; + } + if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */ + entropy += add; + if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) + assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]); +#endif + rv = 1; + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); + return rv; } -static void ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) +static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) { + return ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num); + } + +static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo) + { + static volatile int stirred_pool = 0; int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx; - MD_CTX m; - static int init=1; - unsigned long l; -#ifdef DEVRANDOM - FILE *fh; + int num_ceil; + int ok; + long md_c[2]; + unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + EVP_MD_CTX m; +#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS + pid_t curr_pid = getpid(); +#endif + time_t curr_time = time(NULL); + int do_stir_pool = 0; +/* time value for various platforms */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 + FILETIME tv; +# ifdef _WIN32_WCE + SYSTEMTIME t; + GetSystemTime(&t); + SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv); +# else + GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv); +# endif +#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) + struct timespec tv; + clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); +#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_DSPBIOS) + unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc(); + tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); +#else + struct timeval tv; + gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); #endif #ifdef PREDICT - { - static unsigned char val=0; + if (rand_predictable) + { + static unsigned char val=0; - for (i=0; i= ENTROPY_NEEDED); + if (!ok) + { + /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing + * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new + * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate. + * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to + * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious + * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness. + * + * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before + * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected + * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the + * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached. */ - if ((fh = fopen(DEVRANDOM, "r")) != NULL) + entropy -= num; + if (entropy < 0) + entropy = 0; + } + + if (do_stir_pool) + { + /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, + * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets + * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. + * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', + * which makes it more suitable for this purpose. + */ + + int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */ + while (n > 0) { - unsigned char tmpbuf[32]; - - fread((unsigned char *)tmpbuf,1,32,fh); - /* we don't care how many bytes we read, - * we will just copy the 'stack' if there is - * nothing else :-) */ - fclose(fh); - RAND_seed(tmpbuf,32); - memset(tmpbuf,0,32); - } -/* #endif */ -#ifdef PURIFY - memset(state,0,STATE_SIZE); - memset(md,0,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); +#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20 +# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED." #endif - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); - init=0; +#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */ + /* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that + * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */ + ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0); + n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH; + } + if (ok) + stirred_pool = 1; } st_idx=state_index; st_num=state_num; - state_index+=num; + md_c[0] = md_count[0]; + md_c[1] = md_count[1]; + memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md); + + state_index+=num_ceil; if (state_index > state_num) - state_index=(state_index%state_num); + state_index %= state_num; + + /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] + * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */ + md_count[0] += 1; + + /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ + crypto_lock_rand = 0; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); while (num > 0) { + /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */ j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num; num-=j; - MD_Init(&m); - MD_Update(&m,&(md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2); - MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_count[0]),sizeof(md_count)); -#ifndef PURIFY - MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* purify complains */ + if (!MD_Init(&m)) + goto err; +#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS + if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */ + { + if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid, + sizeof curr_pid)) + goto err; + curr_pid = 0; + } +#endif + if (curr_time) /* just in the first iteration to save time */ + { + if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_time, + sizeof curr_time)) + goto err; + if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&tv, + sizeof tv)) + goto err; + curr_time = 0; + rand_hw_seed(&m); + } + if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + goto err; + if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c))) + goto err; + +#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */ + /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small + * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised + * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to + * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal + * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on + * security. + */ + if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j)) + goto err; #endif - k=(st_idx+j)-st_num; + + k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num; if (k > 0) { - MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k); - MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k); + if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k)) + goto err; + if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k)) + goto err; } else - MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j); - MD_Final(md,&m); + if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) + goto err; + if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md)) + goto err; - for (i=0; i= st_num) st_idx=0; - state[st_idx++]^=md[i]; - *(buf++)=md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]; + if (i < j) + *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2]; } } - MD_Init(&m); - MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_count[0]),sizeof(md_count)); - md_count[0]++; - MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); - MD_Final(md,&m); - memset(&m,0,sizeof(m)); + if (!MD_Init(&m) + || !MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)) + || !MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)) + goto err; + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); + if (!MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(&m,md)) + { + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); + goto err; + } + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); + + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); + if (ok) + return(1); + else if (pseudo) + return 0; + else + { + RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED); + ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, " + "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html"); + return(0); + } + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m); + RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + return 0; + } -#ifdef WINDOWS -#include -#include +static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) + { + return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0); + } -/***************************************************************************** - * Initialisation function for the SSL random generator. Takes the contents - * of the screen as random seed. - * - * Created 960901 by Gertjan van Oosten, gertjan@West.NL, West Consulting B.V. - * - * Code adapted from - * ; - * the original copyright message is: - * - * (C) Copyright Microsoft Corp. 1993. All rights reserved. - * - * You have a royalty-free right to use, modify, reproduce and - * distribute the Sample Files (and/or any modified version) in - * any way you find useful, provided that you agree that - * Microsoft has no warranty obligations or liability for any - * Sample Application Files which are modified. - */ -/* - * I have modified the loading of bytes via RAND_seed() mechanism since - * the origional would have been very very CPU intensive since RAND_seed() - * does an MD5 per 16 bytes of input. The cost to digest 16 bytes is the same - * as that to digest 56 bytes. So under the old system, a screen of - * 1024*768*256 would have been CPU cost of approximatly 49,000 56 byte MD5 - * digests or digesting 2.7 mbytes. What I have put in place would - * be 48 16k MD5 digests, or efectivly 48*16+48 MD5 bytes or 816 kbytes - * or about 3.5 times as much. - * - eric +/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not + unpredictable */ +static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) + { + return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1); + } + +static int ssleay_rand_status(void) + { + CRYPTO_THREADID cur; + int ret; + int do_not_lock; + + CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); + /* check if we already have the lock + * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */ + if (crypto_lock_rand) + { + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); + do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur); + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); + } + else + do_not_lock = 0; + + if (!do_not_lock) + { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); + + /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */ + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); + CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur); + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2); + crypto_lock_rand = 1; + } + + if (!initialized) + { + RAND_poll(); + initialized = 1; + } + + ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED; + + if (!do_not_lock) + { + /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */ + crypto_lock_rand = 0; + + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND); + } + + return ret; + } + +/* rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. + * only currently supports rdrand. */ -void RAND_screen(void) -{ - HDC hScrDC; /* screen DC */ - HDC hMemDC; /* memory DC */ - HBITMAP hBitmap; /* handle for our bitmap */ - HBITMAP hOldBitmap; /* handle for previous bitmap */ - BITMAP bm; /* bitmap properties */ - unsigned int size; /* size of bitmap */ - char *bmbits; /* contents of bitmap */ - int w; /* screen width */ - int h; /* screen height */ - int y; /* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */ - int n = 16; /* number of screen lines to grab at a time */ - - /* Create a screen DC and a memory DC compatible to screen DC */ - hScrDC = CreateDC("DISPLAY", NULL, NULL, NULL); - hMemDC = CreateCompatibleDC(hScrDC); - - /* Get screen resolution */ - w = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, HORZRES); - h = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, VERTRES); - - /* Create a bitmap compatible with the screen DC */ - hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n); - - /* Select new bitmap into memory DC */ - hOldBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hBitmap); - - /* Get bitmap properties */ - GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR)&bm); - size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes; - - bmbits = Malloc(size); - if (bmbits) { - /* Now go through the whole screen, repeatedly grabbing n lines */ - for (y = 0; y < h-n; y += n) - { - unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - - /* Bitblt screen DC to memory DC */ - BitBlt(hMemDC, 0, 0, w, n, hScrDC, 0, y, SRCCOPY); - - /* Copy bitmap bits from memory DC to bmbits */ - GetBitmapBits(hBitmap, size, bmbits); - - /* Get the MD5 of the bitmap */ - MD(bmbits,size,md); - - /* Seed the random generator with the MD5 digest */ - RAND_seed(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + +/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */ + +#if (defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(_M_IX86) || \ + defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ) + +#define RDRAND_CALLS 4 + +size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void); +extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[]; + +static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + int i; + if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1<<(62-32)))) + return; + for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) + { + size_t rnd; + rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); + if (rnd == 0) + return; + MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t)); + } + } + +/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */ + +void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) + { + size_t rnd; + if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1<<(62-32)))) + return; + while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) + { + rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); + if (rnd == 0) + return; + *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd; + buf += sizeof(size_t); + num -= sizeof(size_t); + } + if (num) + { + rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(); + if (rnd == 0) + return; + while(num) + { + *buf ^= rnd & 0xff; + rnd >>= 8; + buf++; + num--; + } + } } - Free(bmbits); - } - /* Select old bitmap back into memory DC */ - hBitmap = SelectObject(hMemDC, hOldBitmap); +#else + +static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) + { + return; + } + +void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num) + { + return; + } - /* Clean up */ - DeleteObject(hBitmap); - DeleteDC(hMemDC); - DeleteDC(hScrDC); -} #endif