X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Fasn1%2Fx_req.c;h=b3f18ebc12fb19f978f5ec999a1dc72e190a1426;hp=ff0be13d379aa579ed71d6de1ef1865acdb76966;hb=155bd1137e3c87c64be1f09ddfa2120adcd25e67;hpb=58964a492275ca9a59a0cd9c8155cb2491b4b909 diff --git a/crypto/asn1/x_req.c b/crypto/asn1/x_req.c index ff0be13d37..b3f18ebc12 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/x_req.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/x_req.c @@ -58,190 +58,55 @@ #include #include "cryptlib.h" -#include "asn1_mac.h" -#include "x509.h" - -/* - * ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_REQ,ASN1_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - * ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_REQ_INFO,ASN1_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - * ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_REQ_NEW,ASN1_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - * ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_REQ_INFO_NEW,ASN1_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); +#include +#include + +/* X509_REQ_INFO is handled in an unusual way to get round + * invalid encodings. Some broken certificate requests don't + * encode the attributes field if it is empty. This is in + * violation of PKCS#10 but we need to tolerate it. We do + * this by making the attributes field OPTIONAL then using + * the callback to initialise it to an empty STACK. + * + * This means that the field will be correctly encoded unless + * we NULL out the field. + * + * As a result we no longer need the req_kludge field because + * the information is now contained in the attributes field: + * 1. If it is NULL then it's the invalid omission. + * 2. If it is empty it is the correct encoding. + * 3. If it is not empty then some attributes are present. + * */ -int i2d_X509_REQ_INFO(a,pp) -X509_REQ_INFO *a; -unsigned char **pp; - { - M_ASN1_I2D_vars(a); - - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->version, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->subject, i2d_X509_NAME); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->pubkey, i2d_X509_PUBKEY); - - /* this is a *nasty* hack reported to be required to - * allow some CA Software to accept the cert request. - * It is not following the PKCS standards ... - * PKCS#10 pg 5 - * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attibutes - * NOTE: no OPTIONAL ... so it *must* be there - */ - if (a->req_kludge) - { - M_ASN1_I2D_len_IMP_set_opt(a->attributes,i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE,0); - } - else - { - M_ASN1_I2D_len_IMP_set(a->attributes, i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE,0); - } - - M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total(); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->version, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->subject, i2d_X509_NAME); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->pubkey, i2d_X509_PUBKEY); - - /* this is a *nasty* hack reported to be required by some CA's. - * It is not following the PKCS standards ... - * PKCS#10 pg 5 - * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attibutes - * NOTE: no OPTIONAL ... so it *must* be there - */ - if (a->req_kludge) - { - M_ASN1_I2D_put_IMP_set_opt(a->attributes,i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE,0); - } - else - { - M_ASN1_I2D_put_IMP_set(a->attributes,i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE,0); - } +static int rinf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) +{ + X509_REQ_INFO *rinf = (X509_REQ_INFO *)*pval; - M_ASN1_I2D_finish(); + if(operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_POST) { + rinf->attributes = sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_new_null(); + if(!rinf->attributes) return 0; } - -X509_REQ_INFO *d2i_X509_REQ_INFO(a,pp,length) -X509_REQ_INFO **a; -unsigned char **pp; -long length; - { - M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a,X509_REQ_INFO *,X509_REQ_INFO_new); - - M_ASN1_D2I_Init(); - M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence(); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->version,d2i_ASN1_INTEGER); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->subject,d2i_X509_NAME); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->pubkey,d2i_X509_PUBKEY); - - /* this is a *nasty* hack to allow for some CA's that - * have been reported as requiring it. - * It is not following the PKCS standards ... - * PKCS#10 pg 5 - * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attibutes - * NOTE: no OPTIONAL ... so it *must* be there + return 1; +} + +ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, enc, rinf_cb) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, subject, X509_NAME), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ_INFO, pubkey, X509_PUBKEY), + /* This isn't really OPTIONAL but it gets round invalid + * encodings */ - if (asn1_Finish(&c)) - ret->req_kludge=1; - else - { - M_ASN1_D2I_get_IMP_set(ret->attributes,d2i_X509_ATTRIBUTE,0); - } - - M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,X509_REQ_INFO_free,ASN1_F_D2I_X509_REQ_INFO); - } - -X509_REQ_INFO *X509_REQ_INFO_new() - { - X509_REQ_INFO *ret=NULL; + ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(X509_REQ_INFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0) +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_REQ_INFO, X509_REQ_INFO) - M_ASN1_New_Malloc(ret,X509_REQ_INFO); - M_ASN1_New(ret->version,ASN1_INTEGER_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->subject,X509_NAME_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->pubkey,X509_PUBKEY_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->attributes,sk_new_null); - ret->req_kludge=0; - return(ret); - M_ASN1_New_Error(ASN1_F_X509_REQ_INFO_NEW); - } - -void X509_REQ_INFO_free(a) -X509_REQ_INFO *a; - { - if (a == NULL) return; - ASN1_INTEGER_free(a->version); - X509_NAME_free(a->subject); - X509_PUBKEY_free(a->pubkey); - sk_pop_free(a->attributes,X509_ATTRIBUTE_free); - Free((char *)a); - } - -int i2d_X509_REQ(a,pp) -X509_REQ *a; -unsigned char **pp; - { - M_ASN1_I2D_vars(a); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->req_info, i2d_X509_REQ_INFO); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->sig_alg, i2d_X509_ALGOR); - M_ASN1_I2D_len(a->signature, i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING); - - M_ASN1_I2D_seq_total(); - - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->req_info, i2d_X509_REQ_INFO); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->sig_alg, i2d_X509_ALGOR); - M_ASN1_I2D_put(a->signature, i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING); - - M_ASN1_I2D_finish(); - } - -X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ(a,pp,length) -X509_REQ **a; -unsigned char **pp; -long length; - { - M_ASN1_D2I_vars(a,X509_REQ *,X509_REQ_new); - - M_ASN1_D2I_Init(); - M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence(); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->req_info,d2i_X509_REQ_INFO); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->sig_alg,d2i_X509_ALGOR); - M_ASN1_D2I_get(ret->signature,d2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING); - M_ASN1_D2I_Finish(a,X509_REQ_free,ASN1_F_D2I_X509_REQ); - } - -X509_REQ *X509_REQ_new() - { - X509_REQ *ret=NULL; - - M_ASN1_New_Malloc(ret,X509_REQ); - ret->references=1; - M_ASN1_New(ret->req_info,X509_REQ_INFO_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->sig_alg,X509_ALGOR_new); - M_ASN1_New(ret->signature,ASN1_BIT_STRING_new); - return(ret); - M_ASN1_New_Error(ASN1_F_X509_REQ_NEW); - } - -void X509_REQ_free(a) -X509_REQ *a; - { - int i; - - if (a == NULL) return; - - i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_REQ); -#ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("X509_REQ",a); -#endif - if (i > 0) return; -#ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 0) - { - fprintf(stderr,"X509_REQ_free, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); - } -#endif - - X509_REQ_INFO_free(a->req_info); - X509_ALGOR_free(a->sig_alg); - ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(a->signature); - Free((char *)a); - } +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ_INFO) +ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_REQ, 0, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_INFO) = { + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, req_info, X509_REQ_INFO), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), + ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REQ, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING) +} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_REQ, X509_REQ) +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ) +IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_REQ)