X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=apps%2Fs_cb.c;h=550fa6cc33b5df0014cc196e6e332884f211d843;hp=21aab25d7e05667f7ad8ee2fa55a30a2be9bf82a;hb=a4aafeeef496681f631e6014e03871634d23f443;hpb=826a42a0888624780f6758df1282288cb34a570f

diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c
index 21aab25d7e..550fa6cc33 100644
--- a/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 /* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@@ -117,16 +117,21 @@
 #undef NON_MAIN
 #undef USE_SOCKETS
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 #include "s_apps.h"
 
+#define	COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH	16
+
 int verify_depth=0;
 int verify_error=X509_V_OK;
+int verify_return_error=0;
+unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH];
+int cookie_initialized=0;
 
 int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	{
-	char buf[256];
 	X509 *err_cert;
 	int err,depth;
 
@@ -134,15 +139,23 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 	err=	X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
 	depth=	X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
 
-	X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),buf,sizeof buf);
-	BIO_printf(bio_err,"depth=%d %s\n",depth,buf);
+	BIO_printf(bio_err,"depth=%d ",depth);
+	if (err_cert)
+		{
+		X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
+					0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+		BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+		}
+	else
+		BIO_puts(bio_err, "<no cert>\n");
 	if (!ok)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
 			X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
 		if (verify_depth >= depth)
 			{
-			ok=1;
+			if (!verify_return_error)
+				ok=1;
 			verify_error=X509_V_OK;
 			}
 		else
@@ -151,25 +164,33 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 			verify_error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
 			}
 		}
-	switch (ctx->error)
+	switch (err)
 		{
 	case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
-		X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),buf,sizeof buf);
-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"issuer= %s\n",buf);
+		BIO_puts(bio_err,"issuer= ");
+		X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert),
+					0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+		BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
 		break;
 	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
 	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"notBefore=");
-		ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
+		ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notBefore(err_cert));
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
 		break;
 	case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
 	case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"notAfter=");
-		ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
+		ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err,X509_get_notAfter(err_cert));
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"\n");
 		break;
+	case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY:
+		policies_print(bio_err, ctx);
+		break;
 		}
+	if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2)
+		policies_print(bio_err, ctx);
+
 	BIO_printf(bio_err,"verify return:%d\n",ok);
 	return(ok);
 	}
@@ -216,8 +237,8 @@ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
 
 		/* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
 		 * the private key */
-		
-		
+
+
 		/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
 		 * the SSL context */
 		if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx))
@@ -229,34 +250,222 @@ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
 	return(1);
 	}
 
-int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key)
+int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key,
+		       STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int build_chain)
 	{
+	if (cert == NULL)
+		return 1;
 	if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx,cert) <= 0)
 		{
 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting certificate\n");
 		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 		return 0;
 		}
-	if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx,key) <= 0)
+
+ 	if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx,key) <= 0)
+ 		{
+ 		BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting private key\n");
+ 		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+ 		return 0;
+ 		}
+		 
+	/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
+ 	 * the SSL context */
+	if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx))
 		{
-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting private key\n");
+		BIO_printf(bio_err,"Private key does not match the certificate public key\n");
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (chain && !SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ctx, chain))
+		{
+		BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting certificate chain\n");
 		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 		return 0;
 		}
-
-		
-		/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
-		 * the SSL context */
-	if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx))
+	if (!chain && build_chain && !SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ctx, 0))
 		{
-		BIO_printf(bio_err,"Private key does not match the certificate public key\n");
+		BIO_printf(bio_err,"error building certificate chain\n");
+		ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
 		return 0;
 		}
+		
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+static void ssl_print_client_cert_types(BIO *bio, SSL *s)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *p;
+	int i;
+	int cert_type_num = SSL_get0_certificate_types(s, &p);
+	if (!cert_type_num)
+		return;
+	BIO_puts(bio, "Client Certificate Types: ");
+	for (i = 0; i < cert_type_num; i++)
+		{
+		unsigned char cert_type = p[i];
+		char *cname;
+		switch(cert_type)
+			{
+		case TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN:
+			cname = "RSA sign";
+			break;
+
+		case TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN:
+			cname = "DSA sign";
+			break;
+
+		case TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH:
+			cname = "RSA fixed DH";
+			break;
+
+		case TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH:
+			cname = "DSS fixed DH";
+			break;
+
+		case TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN:
+			cname = "ECDSA sign";
+			break;
+
+		case TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH:
+			cname = "RSA fixed ECDH";
+			break;
+
+		case TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH:
+			cname = "ECDSA fixed ECDH";
+			break;
+
+		case TLS_CT_GOST94_SIGN:
+			cname = "GOST94 Sign";
+			break;
+
+		case TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN:
+			cname = "GOST01 Sign";
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			 cname = NULL;
+			}
+
+		if (i)
+			BIO_puts(bio, ", ");
+
+		if (cname)
+			BIO_puts(bio, cname);
+		else
+			BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN (%d),", cert_type);
+		}
+	BIO_puts(bio, "\n");
+	}
+
+static int do_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s, int shared)
+	{
+	int i, nsig, client;
+	client = SSL_is_server(s) ? 0 : 1;
+	if (shared)
+		nsig = SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+							NULL, NULL);
+	else
+		nsig = SSL_get_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if (nsig == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (shared)
+		BIO_puts(out, "Shared ");
+
+	if (client)
+		BIO_puts(out, "Requested ");
+	BIO_puts(out, "Signature Algorithms: ");
+	for (i = 0; i < nsig; i++)
+		{
+		int hash_nid, sign_nid;
+		unsigned char rhash, rsign;
+		const char *sstr = NULL;
+		if (shared)
+			SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL,
+							&rsign, &rhash);
+		else
+			SSL_get_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL,
+							&rsign, &rhash);
+		if (i)
+			BIO_puts(out, ":");
+		if (sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+			sstr = "RSA";
+		else if(sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
+			sstr = "DSA";
+		else if(sign_nid == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+			sstr = "ECDSA";
+		if (sstr)
+			BIO_printf(out,"%s+", sstr);
+		else
+			BIO_printf(out,"0x%02X+", (int)rsign);
+		if (hash_nid != NID_undef)
+			BIO_printf(out, "%s", OBJ_nid2sn(hash_nid));
+		else
+			BIO_printf(out,"0x%02X", (int)rhash);
+		}
+	BIO_puts(out, "\n");
 	return 1;
 	}
 
+int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s)
+	{
+	if (!SSL_is_server(s))
+		ssl_print_client_cert_types(out, s);
+	do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 0);
+	do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 1);
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int ssl_print_curves(BIO *out, SSL *s)
+	{
+	int i, ncurves, *curves, nid;
+	const char *cname;
+	ncurves = SSL_get1_curves(s, NULL);
+	if (ncurves <= 0)
+		return 1;
+	curves = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(int));
+	SSL_get1_curves(s, curves);
+
+	BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curves: ");
+	for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++)
+		{
+		if (i)
+			BIO_puts(out, ":");
+		nid = curves[i];
+		/* If unrecognised print out hex version */
+		if (nid & TLSEXT_nid_unknown)
+			BIO_printf(out, "0x%04X", nid & 0xFFFF);
+		else
+			{
+			/* Use NIST name for curve if it exists */
+			cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+			if (!cname)
+				cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+			BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname);
+			}
+		}
+	BIO_puts(out, "\nShared Elliptic curves: ");
+	OPENSSL_free(curves);
+	ncurves = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, -1);
+	for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++)
+		{
+		if (i)
+			BIO_puts(out, ":");
+		nid = SSL_get_shared_curve(s, i);
+		cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid);
+		if (!cname)
+			cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
+		BIO_printf(out, "%s", cname);
+		}
+	if (ncurves == 0)
+		BIO_puts(out, "NONE");
+	BIO_puts(out, "\n");
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+
 long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
-	int argi, long argl, long ret)
+				   int argi, long argl, long ret)
 	{
 	BIO *out;
 
@@ -265,15 +474,15 @@ long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
 
 	if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ|BIO_CB_RETURN))
 		{
-		BIO_printf(out,"read from %p [%p] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
- 			(void *)bio,argp,argi,ret,ret);
+		BIO_printf(out,"read from %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
+ 			(void *)bio,argp,(unsigned long)argi,ret,ret);
 		BIO_dump(out,argp,(int)ret);
 		return(ret);
 		}
 	else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE|BIO_CB_RETURN))
 		{
-		BIO_printf(out,"write to %p [%p] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
-			(void *)bio,argp,argi,ret,ret);
+		BIO_printf(out,"write to %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n",
+			(void *)bio,argp,(unsigned long)argi,ret,ret);
 		BIO_dump(out,argp,(int)ret);
 		}
 	return(ret);
@@ -281,7 +490,7 @@ long MS_CALLBACK bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp,
 
 void MS_CALLBACK apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
 	{
-	char *str;
+	const char *str;
 	int w;
 
 	w=where& ~SSL_ST_MASK;
@@ -334,6 +543,18 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 	case TLS1_VERSION:
 		str_version = "TLS 1.0 ";
 		break;
+	case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+		str_version = "TLS 1.1 ";
+		break;
+	case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+		str_version = "TLS 1.2 ";
+		break;
+	case DTLS1_VERSION:
+		str_version = "DTLS 1.0 ";
+		break;
+	case DTLS1_BAD_VER:
+		str_version = "DTLS 1.0 (bad) ";
+		break;
 	default:
 		str_version = "???";
 		}
@@ -344,14 +565,14 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 
 		if (len > 0)
 			{
-			switch (((unsigned char*)buf)[0])
+			switch (((const unsigned char*)buf)[0])
 				{
 				case 0:
 					str_details1 = ", ERROR:";
 					str_details2 = " ???";
 					if (len >= 3)
 						{
-						unsigned err = (((unsigned char*)buf)[1]<<8) + ((unsigned char*)buf)[2];
+						unsigned err = (((const unsigned char*)buf)[1]<<8) + ((const unsigned char*)buf)[2];
 						
 						switch (err)
 							{
@@ -399,7 +620,12 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 			}
 		}
 
-	if (version == SSL3_VERSION || version == TLS1_VERSION)
+	if (version == SSL3_VERSION ||
+	    version == TLS1_VERSION ||
+	    version == TLS1_1_VERSION ||
+	    version == TLS1_2_VERSION ||
+	    version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
+	    version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 		{
 		switch (content_type)
 			{
@@ -420,7 +646,7 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 			
 			if (len == 2)
 				{
-				switch (((unsigned char*)buf)[0])
+				switch (((const unsigned char*)buf)[0])
 					{
 				case 1:
 					str_details1 = ", warning";
@@ -431,7 +657,7 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 					}
 
 				str_details2 = " ???";
-				switch (((unsigned char*)buf)[1])
+				switch (((const unsigned char*)buf)[1])
 					{
 				case 0:
 					str_details2 = " close_notify";
@@ -502,6 +728,24 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 				case 100:
 					str_details2 = " no_renegotiation";
 					break;
+				case 110:
+					str_details2 = " unsupported_extension";
+					break;
+				case 111:
+					str_details2 = " certificate_unobtainable";
+					break;
+				case 112:
+					str_details2 = " unrecognized_name";
+					break;
+				case 113:
+					str_details2 = " bad_certificate_status_response";
+					break;
+				case 114:
+					str_details2 = " bad_certificate_hash_value";
+					break;
+				case 115:
+					str_details2 = " unknown_psk_identity";
+					break;
 					}
 				}
 			}
@@ -512,7 +756,7 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 
 			if (len > 0)
 				{
-				switch (((unsigned char*)buf)[0])
+				switch (((const unsigned char*)buf)[0])
 					{
 				case 0:
 					str_details1 = ", HelloRequest";
@@ -523,6 +767,9 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 				case 2:
 					str_details1 = ", ServerHello";
 					break;
+				case 3:
+					str_details1 = ", HelloVerifyRequest";
+					break;
 				case 11:
 					str_details1 = ", Certificate";
 					break;
@@ -547,6 +794,26 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 					}
 				}
 			}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+		if (content_type == 24) /* Heartbeat */
+			{
+			str_details1 = ", Heartbeat";
+			
+			if (len > 0)
+				{
+				switch (((const unsigned char*)buf)[0])
+					{
+				case 1:
+					str_details1 = ", HeartbeatRequest";
+					break;
+				case 2:
+					str_details1 = ", HeartbeatResponse";
+					break;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+#endif
 		}
 
 	BIO_printf(bio, "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n", str_write_p, str_version, str_content_type, (unsigned long)len, str_details1, str_details2);
@@ -565,11 +832,593 @@ void MS_CALLBACK msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *
 			{
 			if (i % 16 == 0 && i > 0)
 				BIO_printf(bio, "\n   ");
-			BIO_printf(bio, " %02x", ((unsigned char*)buf)[i]);
+			BIO_printf(bio, " %02x", ((const unsigned char*)buf)[i]);
 			}
 		if (i < len)
 			BIO_printf(bio, " ...");
 		BIO_printf(bio, "\n");
 		}
-	BIO_flush(bio);
+	(void)BIO_flush(bio);
+	}
+
+void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
+					unsigned char *data, int len,
+					void *arg)
+	{
+	BIO *bio = arg;
+	char *extname;
+
+	switch(type)
+		{
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name:
+		extname = "server name";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length:
+		extname = "max fragment length";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url:
+		extname = "client certificate URL";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys:
+		extname = "trusted CA keys";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac:
+		extname = "truncated HMAC";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request:
+		extname = "status request";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping:
+		extname = "user mapping";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz:
+		extname = "client authz";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz:
+		extname = "server authz";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type:
+		extname = "cert type";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves:
+		extname = "elliptic curves";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats:
+		extname = "EC point formats";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_srp:
+		extname = "SRP";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms:
+		extname = "signature algorithms";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp:
+		extname = "use SRTP";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat:
+		extname = "heartbeat";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket:
+		extname = "session ticket";
+		break;
+
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate: 
+		extname = "renegotiation info";
+		break;
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input:
+		extname = "opaque PRF input";
+		break;
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
+		case TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg:
+		extname = "next protocol";
+		break;
+#endif
+
+		default:
+		extname = "unknown";
+		break;
+
+		}
+	
+	BIO_printf(bio, "TLS %s extension \"%s\" (id=%d), len=%d\n",
+			client_server ? "server": "client",
+			extname, type, len);
+	BIO_dump(bio, (char *)data, len);
+	(void)BIO_flush(bio);
+	}
+
+int MS_CALLBACK generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned int length, resultlength;
+	union {
+		struct sockaddr sa;
+		struct sockaddr_in s4;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+		struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
+#endif
+	} peer;
+
+	/* Initialize a random secret */
+	if (!cookie_initialized)
+		{
+		if (!RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH))
+			{
+			BIO_printf(bio_err,"error setting random cookie secret\n");
+			return 0;
+			}
+		cookie_initialized = 1;
+		}
+
+	/* Read peer information */
+	(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
+
+	/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
+	length = 0;
+	switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+		{
+	case AF_INET:
+		length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
+		length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
+		break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+	case AF_INET6:
+		length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+		length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		OPENSSL_assert(0);
+		break;
+		}
+	buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+
+	if (buffer == NULL)
+		{
+		BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+		{
+	case AF_INET:
+		memcpy(buffer,
+		       &peer.s4.sin_port,
+		       sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
+		memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
+		       &peer.s4.sin_addr,
+		       sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+	case AF_INET6:
+		memcpy(buffer,
+		       &peer.s6.sin6_port,
+		       sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
+		memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
+		       &peer.s6.sin6_addr,
+		       sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		OPENSSL_assert(0);
+		break;
+		}
+
+	/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
+	HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
+	     buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
+	OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+	memcpy(cookie, result, resultlength);
+	*cookie_len = resultlength;
+
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int MS_CALLBACK verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)
+	{
+	unsigned char *buffer, result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	unsigned int length, resultlength;
+	union {
+		struct sockaddr sa;
+		struct sockaddr_in s4;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+		struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
+#endif
+	} peer;
+
+	/* If secret isn't initialized yet, the cookie can't be valid */
+	if (!cookie_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Read peer information */
+	(void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), &peer);
+
+	/* Create buffer with peer's address and port */
+	length = 0;
+	switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+		{
+	case AF_INET:
+		length += sizeof(struct in_addr);
+		length += sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port);
+		break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+	case AF_INET6:
+		length += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+		length += sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port);
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		OPENSSL_assert(0);
+		break;
+		}
+	buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(length);
+	
+	if (buffer == NULL)
+		{
+		BIO_printf(bio_err,"out of memory\n");
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	switch (peer.sa.sa_family)
+		{
+	case AF_INET:
+		memcpy(buffer,
+		       &peer.s4.sin_port,
+		       sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port));
+		memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s4.sin_port),
+		       &peer.s4.sin_addr,
+		       sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		break;
+#if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6
+	case AF_INET6:
+		memcpy(buffer,
+		       &peer.s6.sin6_port,
+		       sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port));
+		memcpy(buffer + sizeof(peer.s6.sin6_port),
+		       &peer.s6.sin6_addr,
+		       sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		OPENSSL_assert(0);
+		break;
+		}
+
+	/* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */
+	HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH,
+	     buffer, length, result, &resultlength);
+	OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+	if (cookie_len == resultlength && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* Example of extended certificate handling. Where the standard support
+ * of one certificate per algorithm is not sufficient an application
+ * can decide which certificate(s) to use at runtime based on whatever
+ * criteria it deems appropriate.
+ */
+
+/* Linked list of certificates, keys and chains */
+struct  ssl_excert_st
+	{
+	int certform;
+	const char *certfile;
+	int keyform;
+	const char *keyfile;
+	const char *chainfile;
+	X509 *cert;
+	EVP_PKEY *key;
+	STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
+	int build_chain;
+	struct ssl_excert_st *next, *prev;
+	};
+
+struct chain_flags
+	{
+	int flag;
+	const char *name;
+	};
+
+struct chain_flags chain_flags_list[] =
+	{
+		{CERT_PKEY_VALID, "Overall Validity"},
+		{CERT_PKEY_SIGN,  "Sign with EE key"},
+		{CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE, "EE signature"},
+		{CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE, "CA signature"},
+		{CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM, "EE key parameters"},
+		{CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM, "CA key parameters"},
+		{CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN,  "Explicity sign with EE key"},
+		{CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME,  "Issuer Name"},
+		{CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE,  "Certificate Type"},
+		{0, NULL}
+	};
+
+
+static void print_chain_flags(BIO *out, int flags)
+	{
+	struct chain_flags *ctmp = chain_flags_list;
+	while(ctmp->name)
+		{
+		BIO_printf(out, "\t%s: %s\n", ctmp->name,
+				flags & ctmp->flag ? "OK" : "NOT OK");
+		ctmp++;
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Very basic selection callback: just use any certificate chain
+ * reported as valid. More sophisticated could prioritise according
+ * to local policy.
+ */
+static int set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg)
+	{
+	int i, rv;
+	SSL_EXCERT *exc = arg;
+	SSL_certs_clear(ssl);
+
+	if (!exc)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Go to end of list and traverse backwards since we prepend
+	 * newer entries this retains the original order.
+	 */
+	while (exc->next)
+		exc = exc->next;
+
+	i = 0;	
+
+	while(exc)
+		{
+		i++;
+		rv = SSL_check_chain(ssl, exc->cert, exc->key, exc->chain);
+		BIO_printf(bio_err, "Checking cert chain %d:\nSubject: ", i);
+		X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(exc->cert), 0,
+							XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
+		BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n");
+		
+		print_chain_flags(bio_err, rv);
+		if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
+			{
+			SSL_use_certificate(ssl, exc->cert);
+			SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, exc->key);
+			/* NB: we wouldn't normally do this as it is
+			 * not efficient building chains on each connection
+			 * better to cache the chain in advance.
+			 */
+			if (exc->build_chain)
+				{
+				if (!SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, 0))
+					return 0;
+				}
+			else if (exc->chain)
+				SSL_set1_chain(ssl, exc->chain);
+			}
+		exc = exc->prev;
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc)
+	{
+	SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, set_cert_cb, exc);
+	}
+
+static int ssl_excert_prepend(SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+	{
+	SSL_EXCERT *exc;
+	exc = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_EXCERT));
+	if (!exc)
+		return 0;
+	exc->certfile = NULL;
+	exc->keyfile = NULL;
+	exc->chainfile = NULL;
+	exc->cert = NULL;
+	exc->key = NULL;
+	exc->chain = NULL;
+	exc->prev = NULL;
+	exc->build_chain = 0;
+
+	exc->next = *pexc;
+	*pexc = exc;
+			
+	if (exc->next)
+		{
+		exc->certform = exc->next->certform;
+		exc->keyform = exc->next->keyform;
+		exc->next->prev = exc;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		exc->certform = FORMAT_PEM;
+		exc->keyform = FORMAT_PEM;
+		}
+	return 1;
+
+	}
+
+void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc)
+	{
+	SSL_EXCERT *curr;
+	while (exc)
+		{
+		if (exc->cert)
+			X509_free(exc->cert);
+		if (exc->key)
+			EVP_PKEY_free(exc->key);
+		if (exc->chain)
+			sk_X509_pop_free(exc->chain, X509_free);
+		curr = exc;
+		exc = exc->next;
+		OPENSSL_free(curr);
+		}
+	}
+
+int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc, BIO *err)
+	{
+	SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
+	if (!exc)
+		return 1;
+	/* If nothing in list, free and set to NULL */
+	if (!exc->certfile && !exc->next)
+		{
+		ssl_excert_free(exc);
+		*pexc = NULL;
+		return 1;
+		}
+	for(; exc; exc=exc->next)
+		{
+		if (!exc->certfile)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(err, "Missing filename\n");
+			return 0;
+			}
+		exc->cert = load_cert(err, exc->certfile, exc->certform,
+					NULL, NULL, "Server Certificate");
+		if (!exc->cert)
+			return 0;
+		if (exc->keyfile)
+			exc->keyfile = exc->certfile;
+		exc->key = load_key(err, exc->certfile, exc->certform, 0,
+					NULL, NULL, "Server Certificate");
+		if (!exc->key)
+			return 0;
+		if (exc->chainfile)
+			{
+			exc->chain = load_certs(err,
+						exc->chainfile, FORMAT_PEM,
+						NULL, NULL,
+						"Server Chain");
+			if (!exc->chainfile)
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	return 1;
+	}
+		
+
+int args_excert(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
+			int *badarg, BIO *err, SSL_EXCERT **pexc)
+	{
+	char *arg = **pargs, *argn = (*pargs)[1];
+	SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc;
+	int narg = 2;
+	if (!exc)
+		{
+		if (ssl_excert_prepend(&exc))
+			*pexc = exc;
+		else
+			{
+			BIO_printf(err, "Error initialising xcert\n");
+			*badarg = 1;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	if (strcmp(arg, "-xcert") == 0)
+		{
+		if (!argn)
+			{
+			*badarg = 1;
+			return 1;
+			}
+		if (exc->certfile && !ssl_excert_prepend(&exc))
+			{
+			BIO_printf(err, "Error adding xcert\n");
+			*badarg = 1;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		exc->certfile = argn;
+		}
+	else if (strcmp(arg,"-xkey") == 0)
+		{
+		if (!argn)
+			{
+			*badarg = 1;
+			return 1;
+			}
+		if (exc->keyfile)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(err, "Key already specified\n");
+			*badarg = 1;
+			return 1;
+			}
+		exc->keyfile = argn;
+		}
+	else if (strcmp(arg,"-xchain") == 0)
+		{
+		if (!argn)
+			{
+			*badarg = 1;
+			return 1;
+			}
+		if (exc->chainfile)
+			{
+			BIO_printf(err, "Chain already specified\n");
+			*badarg = 1;
+			return 1;
+			}
+		exc->chainfile = argn;
+		}
+	else if (strcmp(arg,"-xchain_build") == 0)
+		{
+		narg = 1;
+		exc->build_chain = 1;
+		}
+	else if (strcmp(arg,"-xcertform") == 0)
+		{
+		if (!argn)
+			{
+			*badarg = 1;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		exc->certform = str2fmt(argn);
+		}
+	else if (strcmp(arg,"-xkeyform") == 0)
+		{
+		if (!argn)
+			{
+			*badarg = 1;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		exc->keyform = str2fmt(argn);
+		}
+	else
+		return 0;
+
+	(*pargs) += narg;
+
+	if (pargc)
+		*pargc -= narg;
+
+	*pexc = exc;
+
+	return 1;
+
+	err:
+	ERR_print_errors(err);
+	ssl_excert_free(exc);
+	*pexc = NULL;
+	return 1;
 	}
+