X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=dc7636e4d4277cda6abc1e8acd73abe06a30eff4;hp=7c31eadb7a1f93fe380b76bed5f828ffc0bd9b60;hb=34b61f5a25a4c408dcc44a6ac44bc0730b30c1d0;hpb=be71c37296b3ba43c944eaa220ac62413782bad3 diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 7c31eadb7a..dc7636e4d4 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -4,6 +4,28 @@ Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and + supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility + to print out received values. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert + between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance + ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different + chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both + server and client use DH certificates with common parameters. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server + certificates. + [Steve Henson] + *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle the new parameter format automatically. @@ -255,17 +277,30 @@ Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.1 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP + and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when + OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular + those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect + the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET + STRING form instead of a DigestInfo. + [Steve Henson] + + *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate + support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA + encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum pemitted + client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy + and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL. + [Steve Henson] + *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add support for SCTP. [Robin Seggelmann ] - *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. - Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw - and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) - [Rob Austein ] - *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] @@ -284,9 +319,6 @@ (removal of unnecessary code) [Peter Sylvester ] - *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities. - [Peter Eckersley , Ben Laurie and Steve Henson] - *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705. [Eric Rescorla] @@ -412,8 +444,8 @@ keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed. [Steve Henson] - *) Add -attime option to openssl verify. - [Peter Eckersley and Ben Laurie] + *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities. + [Peter Eckersley , Ben Laurie and Steve Henson] *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] @@ -526,7 +558,56 @@ Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] - Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [xx XXX xxxx] + + *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a + client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to + Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. + [Steve Henson] + + Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012] + + *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. + Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and + Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and + preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) + [Antonio Martin] + + Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012] + + *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension + of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption + which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against + the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing + differences arising during decryption processing. A research + paper describing this attack can be found at: + http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann + and Michael Tuexen + for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) + [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] + + *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. + (CVE-2011-4576) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George + Kadianakis for discovering this issue and + Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027) + [Andrey Kulikov ] + + *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. + Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw + and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) + [Rob Austein ] + + *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. + [Paul Green ] *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)] @@ -1455,8 +1536,47 @@ *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] + + Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012] + + *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. + Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and + Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and + preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) + [Antonio Martin] - Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012] + + *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension + of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption + which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against + the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing + differences arising during decryption processing. A research + paper describing this attack can be found at: + http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf + Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information + Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London + (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann + and Michael Tuexen + for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) + [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] + + *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109) + [Ben Laurie, Kasper ] + + *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. + (CVE-2011-4576) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George + Kadianakis for discovering this issue and + Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) + [Adam Langley (Google)] + + *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. + Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw + and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) + [Rob Austein ] *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)]