X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=CHANGES;h=946d2a03627126e0732433cb047ea1c645d3fcf5;hp=34a85b23d1489fdb24da8c5a52b11a673101d88a;hb=50e735f9e5d220cdad7db690188b82a69ddcb39e;hpb=bd2bd374b37a3718be4a6c0c198be8ff3123c81a;ds=sidebyside

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 34a85b23d1..946d2a0362 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -28,7 +28,21 @@
 
   *) Remove various unsupported platforms:
 	Sony NEWS4
-	Remove BEOS and BEOS_R5
+	BEOS and BEOS_R5
+	NeXT
+	SUNOS
+	MPE/iX
+	Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400
+	DGUX
+	NCR
+	Tandem
+	Cray
+	WIN16
+     [Rich Salz]
+
+  *) Start cleaning up OPENSSL_NO_xxx #define's
+	OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
+	OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
      [Rich Salz]
 
   *) Experimental support for a new, fast, unbiased prime candidate generator,
@@ -332,6 +346,14 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
+     ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
+     So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
+     and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on
+     ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing
+     near-optimal performance even on newer platforms.
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
   *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64
      (other platforms pending).
      [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov]
@@ -654,6 +676,67 @@
 
  Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral
+     ECDH ciphersuites.
+
+     Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for
+     reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2014-3572)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code
+     violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in
+     non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively
+     downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server
+     certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at
+     INRIA or reporting this issue.
+     (CVE-2015-0204)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
+  *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its
+     SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX.
+
+     The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX,
+     and can vary with the CTX.
+     [Adam Langley]
+
+  *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
+
+     By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
+     certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
+     Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
+     this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
+     certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
+
+     1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
+
+     If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
+     the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
+
+     2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
+
+     Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
+     certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
+     errors for some broken certificates.
+
+     Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue.
+
+     3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
+
+     Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
+     signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
+
+     This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
+     (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
+     program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
+     (negative or with leading zeroes).
+
+     Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson
+     of the OpenSSL core team.
+
+     (CVE-2014-8275)
+     [Steve Henson]
+
    *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol
       version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
       version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable