/*
* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution.
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include "handshake_helper.h"
+#include "testutil.h"
+
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new()
+{
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ TEST_check(ret != NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result)
+{
+ if (result == NULL)
+ return;
+ OPENSSL_free(result->client_npn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result->server_npn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result->client_alpn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result->server_alpn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result);
+}
/*
* Since there appears to be no way to extract the sent/received alert
typedef struct handshake_ex_data {
int alert_sent;
int alert_received;
+ int session_ticket_do_not_call;
+ ssl_servername_t servername;
} HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA;
+typedef struct ctx_data {
+ unsigned char *npn_protocols;
+ size_t npn_protocols_len;
+ unsigned char *alpn_protocols;
+ size_t alpn_protocols_len;
+} CTX_DATA;
+
+/* |ctx_data| itself is stack-allocated. */
+static void ctx_data_free_data(CTX_DATA *ctx_data)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->npn_protocols);
+ ctx_data->npn_protocols = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->alpn_protocols);
+ ctx_data->alpn_protocols = NULL;
+}
+
static int ex_data_idx;
-static void info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
+static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
{
if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
}
}
+/* Select the appropriate server CTX.
+ * Returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if a match was found.
+ * If |ignore| is 1, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK on mismatch.
+ * Otherwise, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL on mismatch.
+ * An empty SNI extension also returns SSL_TSLEXT_ERR_NOACK.
+ */
+static int select_server_ctx(SSL *s, void *arg, int ignore)
+{
+ const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name);
+ HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
+ (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
+
+ if (servername == NULL) {
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(servername, "server2") == 0) {
+ SSL_CTX *new_ctx = (SSL_CTX*)arg;
+ SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, new_ctx);
+ /*
+ * Copy over all the SSL_CTX options - reasonable behavior
+ * allows testing of cases where the options between two
+ * contexts differ/conflict
+ */
+ SSL_clear_options(s, 0xFFFFFFFFL);
+ SSL_set_options(s, SSL_CTX_get_options(new_ctx));
+
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER2;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ } else if (strcmp(servername, "server1") == 0) {
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ } else if (ignore) {
+ ex_data->servername = SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_SERVER1;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ } else {
+ /* Don't set an explicit alert, to test library defaults. */
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * (RFC 6066):
+ * If the server understood the ClientHello extension but
+ * does not recognize the server name, the server SHOULD take one of two
+ * actions: either abort the handshake by sending a fatal-level
+ * unrecognized_name(112) alert or continue the handshake.
+ *
+ * This behaviour is up to the application to configure; we test both
+ * configurations to ensure the state machine propagates the result
+ * correctly.
+ */
+static int servername_ignore_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 1);
+}
+
+static int servername_reject_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg)
+{
+ return select_server_ctx(s, arg, 0);
+}
+
+static int verify_reject_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int verify_accept_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg) {
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name,
+ unsigned char *iv,
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+ HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
+{
+ HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA *ex_data =
+ (HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA*)(SSL_get_ex_data(s, ex_data_idx));
+ ex_data->session_ticket_do_not_call = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse the comma-separated list into TLS format. */
+static void parse_protos(const char *protos, unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen)
+{
+ size_t len, i, prefix;
+
+ len = strlen(protos);
+
+ /* Should never have reuse. */
+ TEST_check(*out == NULL);
+
+ /* Test values are small, so we omit length limit checks. */
+ *out = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+ TEST_check(*out != NULL);
+ *outlen = len + 1;
+
+ /*
+ * foo => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o'
+ * foo,bar => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o', '3', 'b', 'a', 'r'
+ */
+ memcpy(*out + 1, protos, len);
+
+ prefix = 0;
+ i = prefix + 1;
+ while (i <= len) {
+ if ((*out)[i] == ',') {
+ TEST_check(i - 1 - prefix > 0);
+ (*out)[prefix] = i - 1 - prefix;
+ prefix = i;
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ TEST_check(len - prefix > 0);
+ (*out)[prefix] = len - prefix;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * The client SHOULD select the first protocol advertised by the server that it
+ * also supports. In the event that the client doesn't support any of server's
+ * protocols, or the server doesn't advertise any, it SHOULD select the first
+ * protocol that it supports.
+ */
+static int client_npn_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen,
+ ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ /* Accept both OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED and OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP. */
+ TEST_check(ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED || ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP);
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int server_npn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned int *len, void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ *data = ctx_data->npn_protocols;
+ *len = ctx_data->npn_protocols_len;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The server SHOULD select the most highly preferred protocol that it supports
+ * and that is also advertised by the client. In the event that the server
+ * supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL
+ * respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
+ */
+static int server_alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ int ret;
+
+ /* SSL_select_next_proto isn't const-correct... */
+ unsigned char *tmp_out;
+
+ /*
+ * The result points either to |in| or to |ctx_data->alpn_protocols|.
+ * The callback is allowed to point to |in| or to a long-lived buffer,
+ * so we can return directly without storing a copy.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_select_next_proto(&tmp_out, outlen,
+ ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+ ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len, in, inlen);
+
+ *out = tmp_out;
+ /* Unlike NPN, we don't tolerate a mismatch. */
+ return ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+ : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly
+ * in the server/client CONF.
+ */
+static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
+ SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
+ const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra,
+ CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data,
+ CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data,
+ CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data)
+{
+ unsigned char *ticket_keys;
+ size_t ticket_key_len;
+
+ switch (extra->client.verify_callback) {
+ case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL:
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_accept_cb,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_REJECT_ALL:
+ SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(client_ctx, &verify_reject_cb,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* link the two contexts for SNI purposes */
+ switch (extra->server.servername_callback) {
+ case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_IGNORE_MISMATCH:
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_ignore_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_REJECT_MISMATCH:
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(server_ctx, servername_reject_cb);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(server_ctx, server2_ctx);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The initial_ctx/session_ctx always handles the encrypt/decrypt of the
+ * session ticket. This ticket_key callback is assigned to the second
+ * session (assigned via SNI), and should never be invoked
+ */
+ if (server2_ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server2_ctx,
+ do_not_call_session_ticket_cb);
+
+ if (extra->server.broken_session_ticket) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ if (extra->server.npn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(extra->server.npn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server_ctx, server_npn_cb,
+ server_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->server2.npn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(extra->server2.npn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server2_ctx, server_npn_cb,
+ server2_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->client.npn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(extra->client.npn_protocols,
+ &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(client_ctx, client_npn_cb,
+ client_ctx_data);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (extra->server.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(extra->server.alpn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->server2.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+ TEST_check(server2_ctx != NULL);
+ parse_protos(extra->server2.alpn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server2_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server2_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (extra->client.alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+ unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL;
+ size_t alpn_protos_len;
+ parse_protos(extra->client.alpn_protocols,
+ &alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len);
+ /* Reversed return value convention... */
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(client_ctx, alpn_protos,
+ alpn_protos_len) == 0);
+ OPENSSL_free(alpn_protos);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Use fixed session ticket keys so that we can decrypt a ticket created with
+ * one CTX in another CTX. Don't address server2 for the moment.
+ */
+ ticket_key_len = SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, NULL, 0);
+ ticket_keys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ticket_key_len);
+ TEST_check(ticket_keys != NULL);
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_keys(server_ctx, ticket_keys,
+ ticket_key_len) == 1);
+ OPENSSL_free(ticket_keys);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(client_ctx));
+ switch (extra->client.ct_validation) {
+ case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE:
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE));
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT:
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_enable_ct(client_ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT));
+ break;
+ case SSL_TEST_CT_VALIDATION_NONE:
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Configure per-SSL callbacks and other properties. */
+static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client,
+ const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra)
+{
+ if (extra->client.servername != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE)
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client,
+ ssl_servername_name(extra->client.servername));
+}
+
+
typedef enum {
PEER_SUCCESS,
PEER_RETRY,
PEER_ERROR
} peer_status_t;
-static peer_status_t do_handshake_step(SSL *ssl)
+/*
+ * RFC 5246 says:
+ *
+ * Note that as of TLS 1.1,
+ * failure to properly close a connection no longer requires that a
+ * session not be resumed. This is a change from TLS 1.0 to conform
+ * with widespread implementation practice.
+ *
+ * However,
+ * (a) OpenSSL requires that a connection be shutdown for all protocol versions.
+ * (b) We test lower versions, too.
+ * So we just implement shutdown. We do a full bidirectional shutdown so that we
+ * can compare sent and received close_notify alerts and get some test coverage
+ * for SSL_shutdown as a bonus.
+ */
+static peer_status_t do_handshake_step(SSL *ssl, int shutdown)
{
int ret;
- ret = SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
+ ret = shutdown ? SSL_shutdown(ssl) : SSL_do_handshake(ssl);
if (ret == 1) {
return PEER_SUCCESS;
} else if (ret == 0) {
- return PEER_ERROR;
+ return shutdown ? PEER_RETRY : PEER_ERROR;
} else {
int error = SSL_get_error(ssl, ret);
/* Memory bios should never block with SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE. */
return INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-HANDSHAKE_RESULT do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx)
+/* Convert unsigned char buf's that shouldn't contain any NUL-bytes to char. */
+static char *dup_str(const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ if(len == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Assert that the string does not contain NUL-bytes. */
+ TEST_check(OPENSSL_strnlen((const char*)(in), len) == len);
+ ret = OPENSSL_strndup((const char*)(in), len);
+ TEST_check(ret != NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake_internal(
+ SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx, SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
+ const SSL_TEST_EXTRA_CONF *extra, SSL_SESSION *session_in,
+ SSL_SESSION **session_out)
{
SSL *server, *client;
BIO *client_to_server, *server_to_client;
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA server_ex_data, client_ex_data;
- HANDSHAKE_RESULT ret;
- int client_turn = 1;
+ CTX_DATA client_ctx_data, server_ctx_data, server2_ctx_data;
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new();
+ int client_turn = 1, shutdown = 0;
peer_status_t client_status = PEER_RETRY, server_status = PEER_RETRY;
handshake_status_t status = HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
+ unsigned char* tick = NULL;
+ size_t tick_len = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION* sess = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *proto = NULL;
+ /* API dictates unsigned int rather than size_t. */
+ unsigned int proto_len = 0;
+
+ memset(&server_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server_ctx_data));
+ memset(&server2_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server2_ctx_data));
+ memset(&client_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(client_ctx_data));
+
+ configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, extra,
+ &server_ctx_data, &server2_ctx_data, &client_ctx_data);
server = SSL_new(server_ctx);
client = SSL_new(client_ctx);
- OPENSSL_assert(server != NULL && client != NULL);
+ TEST_check(server != NULL);
+ TEST_check(client != NULL);
+
+ configure_handshake_ssl(server, client, extra);
+ if (session_in != NULL) {
+ /* In case we're testing resumption without tickets. */
+ TEST_check(SSL_CTX_add_session(server_ctx, session_in));
+ TEST_check(SSL_set_session(client, session_in));
+ }
memset(&server_ex_data, 0, sizeof(server_ex_data));
memset(&client_ex_data, 0, sizeof(client_ex_data));
- memset(&ret, 0, sizeof(ret));
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- OPENSSL_assert(client_to_server != NULL && server_to_client != NULL);
+ TEST_check(client_to_server != NULL && server_to_client != NULL);
/* Non-blocking bio. */
BIO_set_nbio(client_to_server, 1);
/* The bios are now owned by the SSL object. */
SSL_set_bio(client, server_to_client, client_to_server);
- OPENSSL_assert(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0);
- OPENSSL_assert(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0);
+ TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(server_to_client) > 0);
+ TEST_check(BIO_up_ref(client_to_server) > 0);
SSL_set_bio(server, client_to_server, server_to_client);
ex_data_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "ex data", NULL, NULL, NULL);
- OPENSSL_assert(ex_data_idx >= 0);
+ TEST_check(ex_data_idx >= 0);
- OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_ex_data(server, ex_data_idx,
+ TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(server, ex_data_idx,
&server_ex_data) == 1);
- OPENSSL_assert(SSL_set_ex_data(client, ex_data_idx,
+ TEST_check(SSL_set_ex_data(client, ex_data_idx,
&client_ex_data) == 1);
- SSL_set_info_callback(server, &info_callback);
- SSL_set_info_callback(client, &info_callback);
+ SSL_set_info_callback(server, &info_cb);
+ SSL_set_info_callback(client, &info_cb);
/*
* Half-duplex handshake loop.
*/
for(;;) {
if (client_turn) {
- client_status = do_handshake_step(client);
+ client_status = do_handshake_step(client, shutdown);
status = handshake_status(client_status, server_status,
1 /* client went last */);
} else {
- server_status = do_handshake_step(server);
+ server_status = do_handshake_step(server, shutdown);
status = handshake_status(server_status, client_status,
0 /* server went last */);
}
switch (status) {
case HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
- goto err;
+ if (shutdown) {
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ client_status = server_status = PEER_RETRY;
+ shutdown = 1;
+ client_turn = 1;
+ break;
+ }
case CLIENT_ERROR:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL;
goto err;
case SERVER_ERROR:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
goto err;
case INTERNAL_ERROR:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
case HANDSHAKE_RETRY:
/* Continue. */
}
}
err:
- ret.server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent;
- ret.server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received;
- ret.client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent;
- ret.client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received;
- ret.server_protocol = SSL_version(server);
- ret.client_protocol = SSL_version(client);
+ ret->server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent;
+ ret->server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received;
+ ret->client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent;
+ ret->client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received;
+ ret->server_protocol = SSL_version(server);
+ ret->client_protocol = SSL_version(client);
+ ret->servername = server_ex_data.servername;
+ if ((sess = SSL_get0_session(client)) != NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &tick_len);
+ if (tick == NULL || tick_len == 0)
+ ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO;
+ else
+ ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES;
+ ret->session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->client_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->server_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+#endif
+
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->client_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->server_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+ ret->client_resumed = SSL_session_reused(client);
+ ret->server_resumed = SSL_session_reused(server);
+
+ if (session_out != NULL)
+ *session_out = SSL_get1_session(client);
+
+ ctx_data_free_data(&server_ctx_data);
+ ctx_data_free_data(&server2_ctx_data);
+ ctx_data_free_data(&client_ctx_data);
SSL_free(server);
SSL_free(client);
return ret;
}
+
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
+ SSL_CTX *client_ctx, SSL_CTX *resume_server_ctx,
+ SSL_CTX *resume_client_ctx,
+ const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+{
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result;
+ SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
+
+ result = do_handshake_internal(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx,
+ &test_ctx->extra, NULL, &session);
+ if (test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_SIMPLE)
+ goto end;
+
+ TEST_check(test_ctx->handshake_mode == SSL_TEST_HANDSHAKE_RESUME);
+
+ if (result->result != SSL_TEST_SUCCESS) {
+ result->result = SSL_TEST_FIRST_HANDSHAKE_FAILED;
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(result);
+ /* We don't support SNI on second handshake yet, so server2_ctx is NULL. */
+ result = do_handshake_internal(resume_server_ctx, NULL, resume_client_ctx,
+ &test_ctx->resume_extra, session, NULL);
+ end:
+ SSL_SESSION_free(session);
+ return result;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff