};
/* The default curves */
-static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
- 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
- 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
+ 29, /* X25519 (29) */
+ 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
};
-static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
- 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
- 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
+ TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+ TLSEXT_curve_P_384
};
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
- if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
+ if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
return 0;
cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
if (pflags)
return cinfo->nid;
}
-int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
+uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
- return (int)(i + 1);
+ return i + 1;
}
return 0;
}
* Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
* The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
* lists in the first place.
- * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
- * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
- * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
*/
-int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
+int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const uint16_t **pcurves,
size_t *num_curves)
{
size_t pcurveslen = 0;
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
- pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
+ pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
- pcurveslen = 2;
+ pcurveslen = 1;
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
- pcurveslen = 2;
+ pcurveslen = 1;
break;
default:
*pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
}
if (!*pcurves) {
*pcurves = eccurves_default;
- pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
+ pcurveslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
}
}
- /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
- if (pcurveslen & 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *num_curves = 0;
- return 0;
- }
- *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
+ *num_curves = pcurveslen;
return 1;
}
/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
-int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
+int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
- if (curve[0])
+ unsigned char ctmp[2];
+ if (curve > 0xff)
return 1;
- if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
+ if (curve < 1 || curve > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
return 0;
- cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
+ cinfo = &nid_list[curve - 1];
# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
return 0;
# endif
- return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
+ ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
+ ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
+ return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
}
/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
{
- const unsigned char *curves;
+ const uint16_t *curves;
+ uint16_t curve_id;
size_t num_curves, i;
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
return 0;
+ curve_id = (p[1] << 8) | p[2];
/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
if (suiteb_flags) {
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
- if (p[1])
- return 0;
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
- if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
return 0;
} else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
- if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ if (curve_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
return 0;
} else /* Should never happen */
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
- if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
- return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
+ if (curve_id == curves[i])
+ return tls_curve_allowed(s, curve_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
}
return 0;
}
*/
int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
{
- const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
+ const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
int k;
&pref, &num_pref))
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
- for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
- const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
+ for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
+ uint16_t id = pref[i];
- for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
- if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
- if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
+ for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++) {
+ if (id == supp[j]) {
+ if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
continue;
- if (nmatch == k) {
- int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
-
+ if (nmatch == k)
return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
- }
k++;
}
}
return NID_undef;
}
-int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
int *groups, size_t ngroups)
{
- unsigned char *glist, *p;
+ uint16_t *glist;
size_t i;
/*
* Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
* ids < 32
*/
unsigned long dup_list = 0;
- glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
+ glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist));
if (glist == NULL)
return 0;
- for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
unsigned long idmask;
- int id;
+ uint16_t id;
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
idmask = 1L << id;
return 0;
}
dup_list |= idmask;
- s2n(id, p);
+ glist[i] = id;
}
OPENSSL_free(*pext);
*pext = glist;
- *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
+ *pextlen = ngroups;
return 1;
}
}
/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
-int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
+int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
{
nid_cb_st ncb;
ncb.nidcnt = 0;
}
/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
-static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
+static int tls1_set_ec_id(uint16_t *pcurve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
EC_KEY *ec)
{
int id;
return 0;
/* Determine curve ID */
id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
- id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
+ *pcurve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
/* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
- if (id == 0)
+ if (*pcurve_id == 0)
return 0;
- curve_id[0] = 0;
- curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
if (comp_id) {
if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
return 0;
}
/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
-static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
- unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
+static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
{
- const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
+ const unsigned char *pformats;
+ const uint16_t *pcurves;
size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
int j;
/*
if (i == num_formats)
return 0;
}
- if (!curve_id)
+ if (curve_id == 0)
return 1;
/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
*/
break;
}
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
- if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
+ if (pcurves[i] == curve_id)
break;
}
if (i == num_curves)
*/
static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
{
- unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
+ unsigned char comp_id;
+ uint16_t curve_id;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int rv;
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
/* If not EC nothing to do */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
return 1;
- rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
+ rv = tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
if (!rv)
return 0;
/*
* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
* curves extension.
*/
- rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
+ rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : 0, &comp_id);
if (!rv)
return 0;
/*
int check_md;
size_t i;
CERT *c = s->cert;
- if (curve_id[0])
- return 0;
+
/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
- if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+ if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
- else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+ else if (curve_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
else
return 0; /* Should never happen */
* curves permitted.
*/
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- unsigned char curve_id[2];
+ uint16_t curve_id;
+
/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
- curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+ curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
- curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+ curve_id = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
else
return 0;
- curve_id[0] = 0;
/* Check this curve is acceptable */
if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
return 0;
return 0;
}
} else {
- unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+ unsigned char comp_id;
+ uint16_t curve_id;
/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
- if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
+ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
return 0;
if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 1;
}
-/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-
-int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
{
- CERT *c = s->cert;
unsigned int stmp;
size_t size, i;
-
- /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- return 1;
- /* Should never happen */
- if (!c)
- return 0;
+ uint16_t *buf;
size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
size >>= 1;
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
- * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf));
+ if (buf == NULL)
return 0;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
+ buf[i] = stmp;
- if (i != size)
+ if (i != size) {
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
+ *pdest = buf;
+ *pdestlen = size;
return 1;
}
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ return 1;
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
+ &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
+
int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
size_t i;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff