Revert another size_t change.

[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 39629c273c7af3f3e29a50e46a87c73756d23380..dc0396cfaab26fe317f73b36799ae8f1add9181f 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -637,6 +637,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                                s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
                                                if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
                                                        OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
+                                                       s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
                                                        *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
                                                        return 0;
                                                }
@@ -1387,6 +1388,13 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
        /* Point after session ID in client hello */
        const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
        unsigned short i;
+
+       /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
+        * to permit stateful resumption.
+        */
+       if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+               return 1;
+
        if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
                return 1;
        if (p >= limit)
@@ -1418,8 +1426,8 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
                         * trigger a full handshake
                         */
                        if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-                               return 0;
-                       /* If zero length not client will accept a ticket
+                               return 1;
+                       /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
                         * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
                         */
                        if (size == 0)
@@ -1442,39 +1450,53 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
        SSL_SESSION *sess;
        unsigned char *sdec;
        const unsigned char *p;
-       int slen, mlen;
+       int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
        unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
        HMAC_CTX hctx;
        EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+       /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
+       if (eticklen < 48)
+               goto tickerr;
+       /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+       HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+       EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+       if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+               {
+               unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
+               int rv = s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
+                                                       &ctx, &hctx, 0);
+               if (rv < 0)
+                       return -1;
+               if (rv == 0)
+                       goto tickerr;
+               if (rv == 2)
+                       renew_ticket = 1;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               /* Check key name matches */
+               if (memcmp(etick, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
+                       goto tickerr;
+               HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+                                       tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+               EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+                               s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
+               }
        /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
         * integrity checks on ticket.
         */
-       mlen = EVP_MD_size(tlsext_tick_md());
+       mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
        eticklen -= mlen;
-       /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
-       if (eticklen < 48)
-               goto tickerr;
-       /* Check key name matches */
-       if (memcmp(etick, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
-               goto tickerr;
        /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
-       HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-       HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
-                               tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
        HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
        HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
        if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
                goto tickerr;
-       /* Set p to start of IV */
-       p = etick + 16;
-       EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
        /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
-       EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-                                       s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, p);
        /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
-       p += 16;
-       eticklen -= 32;
+       p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+       eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
        sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
        if (!sdec)
                {
@@ -1501,7 +1523,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
                        memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
                sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
                *psess = sess;
-               s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+               s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
                return 1;
                }
        /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to