tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
};
-/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
-static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
+/* The default curves */
+static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
/* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
/* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
}
if (!*pcurves) {
- if (!s->server || (s->cert && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)) {
- *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
- pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
- } else {
- *pcurves = eccurves_all;
- pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
- }
+ *pcurves = eccurves_default;
+ pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
}
}
}
/*-
- * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
- * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
+ * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
+ * if there is no match.
+ * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
* For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
* an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
*/
*/
unsigned long dup_list = 0;
clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
- if (!clist)
+ if (clist == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
unsigned long idmask;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
+/*
+ * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
+ * @s: SSL connection
+ * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
+ *
+ * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
+ * is compatible with the client extensions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
+ */
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
{
- unsigned char curve_id[2];
- EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
/* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
* curves permitted.
*/
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ unsigned char curve_id[2];
/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
/* Check this curve is acceptable */
if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
return 0;
- /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
- return 1;
- /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
- else {
- unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
- if (!ec)
- return 0;
- if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
- return 0;
- if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
- return 1;
- return 0;
- }
-
- }
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
- /* Need a shared curve */
- if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
- if (!ec) {
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
+ return 1;
}
- if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
- return 0;
-/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
-# if 0
- return 1;
-# else
- return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
-# endif
+ /* Need a shared curve */
+ if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
+#endif
};
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
else
s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
+ /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
+ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
/*
* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
return NULL;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
* for other cases too.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
+ || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
+ || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
+ || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
else {
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return -1;
}
* Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
* 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
*/
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
{
unsigned int type, size;
unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
+ PACKET tmppkt;
static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
};
- if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, size))
+ tmppkt = *pkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
+ || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
return;
if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock1, len1)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock2, len2)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt))
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
return;
if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
return;
} else {
const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &eblock1, len)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt))
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
return;
if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
return;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
goto err;
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
+ goto err;
+
while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
PACKET subpkt;
return 0;
}
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
/* Initialise digests to default values */
-static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
+void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
{
const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
+ else
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
#endif
}
* point to the resulting session.
*
* Returns:
+ * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
* 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
if (eticklen < 48)
return 2;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ if (hctx == NULL)
+ return -2;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
- &ctx, &hctx, 0);
+ &ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
return -1;
if (rv == 0)
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
return 2;
- HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- EVP_sha256(), NULL);
- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+ etick + 16) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
- mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+ mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
if (mlen < 0) {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
+ goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+ || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 2;
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (!sdec) {
+ if (sdec == NULL
+ || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return -1;
}
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return 2;
+err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ return -1;
}
/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
{NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
{NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
{NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
+ {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
};
static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
{EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
+ {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
+ {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
+ {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
+ {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
};
static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
typedef struct {
int nid;
int secbits;
- const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
+ int md_idx;
+ unsigned char tlsext_hash;
} tls12_hash_info;
static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- {NID_md5, 64, 0},
-#else
- {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
-#endif
- {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
- {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
- {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
+ {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+ {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+ {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+ {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+ {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+ {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
};
static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
{
+ unsigned int i;
if (hash_alg == 0)
return NULL;
- if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info))
- return NULL;
- return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
+
+ for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
+ {
+ if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
+ return tls12_md_info + i;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
}
const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
return NULL;
inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
- if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
+ if (!inf)
return NULL;
- return inf->mfunc();
+ return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
}
static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
+ return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+
+ case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
+ return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
+
+ case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
+ return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
+# endif
}
return -1;
}
{
/* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
- if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
+ if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
return 0;
/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
* disabled.
*/
-void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
+void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
{
const unsigned char *sigalgs;
size_t i, sigalgslen;
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (nmatch) {
salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
- if (!salgs)
+ if (salgs == NULL)
return 0;
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
} else {
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
#endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
+ if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
+ if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
+# endif
}
return 1;
}
}
/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
- /*
- * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
- * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
- */
- OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
-
/*-
* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
* as payload to distuingish different messages and add
idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
if (idx == -1)
return 0;
- cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
break;
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
+ rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
+ default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
+ rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
+ default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
+ rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
+ default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
+ break;
+
default:
default_nid = -1;
break;
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
}
/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
DH *dhp = DH_new();
- if (!dhp)
+ if (dhp == NULL)
return NULL;
dhp->g = BN_new();
- if (dhp->g)
+ if (dhp->g != NULL)
BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
if (dh_secbits >= 192)
dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
else
dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
- if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) {
+ if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
DH_free(dhp);
return NULL;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff