int extdatalen=0;
unsigned char *ret = p;
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
+ && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
return p;
ret+=2;
ret+=size_str;
}
- /* Add the renegotiation option: TODOEKR switch */
- {
+ /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ {
int el;
if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
}
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
skip_ext:
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
}
#endif
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
int i;
long extlen, idlen, itmp;
int extdatalen=0;
unsigned char *ret = p;
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
return p;
ret+=2;
s2n(0,ret);
}
- if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+ if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
{
int el;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
long lenmax;
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+ if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
if (data >= (d+n-2))
- {
- if (s->new_session
- && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- /* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
+ goto ri_check;
n2s(data,len);
if (data > (d+n-len))
- return 1;
+ goto ri_check;
while (data <= (d+n-4))
{
n2s(data,size);
if (data+size > (d+n))
- return 1;
+ goto ri_check;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
}
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
}
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
- && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
{
if (size < 5)
/* session ticket processed earlier */
data+=size;
}
-
- if (s->new_session && !renegotiate_seen
- && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
- return 0;
- }
-
*p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
if (data >= (d+n-2))
- {
- /* Because the client does not see any renegotiation during an
- attack, we must enforce this on all server hellos, even the
- first */
- if (!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- /* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
+ goto ri_check;
n2s(data,len);
n2s(data,size);
if (data+size > (d+n))
- return 1;
+ goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
}
}
#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
/* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
* a status request message.
return 0;
}
- if (!renegotiate_seen
- && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
{
if (s->tlsext_hostname)
}
*p = data;
+
+ ri_check:
+
+ /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
+ * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
+ * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
+ * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
+ * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
+ * absence on initial connect only.
+ */
+ if (!renegotiate_seen
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+ {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff