Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). Although these aren't used

[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index ce53e50aeb58d2cef39bffc025b5735717cbb06d..9ee7e7d71786f14b176ff7690d7b01500176e273 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -275,8 +275,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        int extdatalen=0;
        unsigned char *ret = p;
 
-       /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 */
-       if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
+       /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+       if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
+                                       && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
                return p;
 
        ret+=2;
@@ -315,8 +316,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                ret+=size_str;
                }
 
-        /* Add the renegotiation option: TODOEKR switch */
-        {
+        /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+        if (s->new_session)
+          {
           int el;
           
           if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
@@ -504,8 +506,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        int extdatalen=0;
        unsigned char *ret = p;
 
-       /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 */
-       if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+       /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
+       if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
                return p;
        
        ret+=2;
@@ -633,24 +635,13 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 
        s->servername_done = 0;
        s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-       s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
 
        if (data >= (d+n-2))
-               {
-               if (s->new_session
-                       && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-                       {
-                       /* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
-                       *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-                       return 0;
-                       }
-               return 1;
-               }
+               goto ri_check;
        n2s(data,len);
 
        if (data > (d+n-len)) 
-               return 1;
+               goto ri_check;
 
        while (data <= (d+n-4))
                {
@@ -658,7 +649,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                n2s(data,size);
 
                if (data+size > (d+n))
-                       return 1;
+                       goto ri_check;
 #if 0
                fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
 #endif
@@ -971,17 +962,22 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                /* session ticket processed earlier */
                data+=size;
                }
-  
-       if (s->new_session && !renegotiate_seen
-               && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-               {
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-               *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
-               return 0;
-               }
- 
                                
        *p = data;
+
+       ri_check:
+
+       /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+
+       if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
+               !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+               {
+               *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                               SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+               return 0;
+               }
+
        return 1;
        }
 
@@ -995,19 +991,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
        int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 
        if (data >= (d+n-2))
-               {
-               /* Because the client does not see any renegotiation during an
-                  attack, we must enforce this on all server hellos, even the
-                  first */
-               if (!(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-                       {
-                       /* We should always see one extension: the renegotiate extension */
-                       *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-                       return 0;
-                       }
-               return 1;
-               }
+               goto ri_check;
 
        n2s(data,len);
 
@@ -1017,7 +1001,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                n2s(data,size);
 
                if (data+size > (d+n))
-                       return 1;
+                       goto ri_check;
 
                if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
                        s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
@@ -1141,14 +1125,6 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                return 0;
                }
 
-       if (!renegotiate_seen
-               && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-               {
-               *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; /* is this the right alert? */
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-               return 0;
-               }
-
        if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
                {
                if (s->tlsext_hostname)
@@ -1171,6 +1147,26 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                }
 
        *p = data;
+
+       ri_check:
+
+       /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
+        * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
+        * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
+        * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
+        * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
+        * absence on initial connect only.
+        */
+       if (!renegotiate_seen
+               && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+               && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+               {
+               *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                               SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+               return 0;
+               }
+
        return 1;
        }