Fix bug in signature algorithm copy.
[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
index 4553468..9308aed 100644 (file)
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#endif
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
@@ -123,7 +127,7 @@ const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
                                const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
                                SSL_SESSION **psess);
-static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 #endif
 
@@ -140,6 +144,49 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
        TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
        tls1_alert_code,
        tls1_export_keying_material,
+       0,
+       SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+       ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+       ssl3_handshake_write
+       };
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
+       tls1_enc,
+       tls1_mac,
+       tls1_setup_key_block,
+       tls1_generate_master_secret,
+       tls1_change_cipher_state,
+       tls1_final_finish_mac,
+       TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+       tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+       TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       tls1_alert_code,
+       tls1_export_keying_material,
+       SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+       SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+       ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+       ssl3_handshake_write
+       };
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
+       tls1_enc,
+       tls1_mac,
+       tls1_setup_key_block,
+       tls1_generate_master_secret,
+       tls1_change_cipher_state,
+       tls1_final_finish_mac,
+       TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+       tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+       TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+       tls1_alert_code,
+       tls1_export_keying_material,
+       SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+               |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+       SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+       ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+       ssl3_handshake_write
        };
 
 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
@@ -175,33 +222,46 @@ void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 
-static int nid_list[] =
-       {
-               NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
-               NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
-               NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
-               NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
-               NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
-               NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
-               NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
-               NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
-               NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
-               NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
-               NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
-               NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
-               NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
-               NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
-               NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
-               NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
-               NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
-               NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
-               NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
-               NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
-               NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
-               NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
-               NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
-               NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
-               NID_secp521r1  /* secp521r1 (25) */     
+typedef struct
+       {
+       int nid;                /* Curve NID */
+       int secbits;            /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
+       unsigned int flags;     /* Flags: currently just field type */
+       } tls_curve_info;
+
+#define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2                0x1
+#define TLS_CURVE_PRIME                0x0
+
+static tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
+       {
+               {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
+               {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
+               {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
+               {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */ 
+               {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */ 
+               {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
+               {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */ 
+               {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */ 
+               {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
+               {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+               {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */ 
+               {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
+               {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */ 
+               {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */ 
+               {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
+               {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */ 
+               {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */ 
+               {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
+               {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */ 
+               {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */ 
+               {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
+               {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */ 
+               {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+               {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
+               {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */      
+               {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ 
+               {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 
+               {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */   
        };
 
 
@@ -217,11 +277,14 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
                0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
                0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
                0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */      
+               0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ 
                0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
                0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+               0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */        
                0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
                0,9,  /* sect283k1 (9) */
                0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+               0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */        
                0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
                0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
                0,8,  /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
@@ -241,13 +304,19 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
                0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
        };
 
+static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
+       {
+               0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+               0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+       };
+
 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
        {
        /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
        if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
                                sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
                return 0;
-       return nid_list[curve_id-1];
+       return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
        }
 
 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
@@ -305,6 +374,12 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
                return 24;
        case NID_secp521r1:  /* secp521r1 (25) */       
                return 25;
+       case NID_brainpoolP256r1:  /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+               return 26;
+       case NID_brainpoolP384r1:  /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+               return 27;
+       case NID_brainpoolP512r1:  /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+               return 28;
        default:
                return 0;
                }
@@ -320,13 +395,29 @@ static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
                {
                *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
                *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+               return;
                }
-       else
+       /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
+       switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
                {
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+               *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+               *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
+               break;
+
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+               *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+               *pcurveslen = 2;
+               break;
+
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+               *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
+               *pcurveslen = 2;
+               break;
+       default:
                *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
                *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
                }
-       /* If not set use default: for now static structure */
        if (!*pcurves)
                {
                *pcurves = eccurves_default;
@@ -334,8 +425,58 @@ static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
                }
        }
 
+/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
+static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
+       {
+       tls_curve_info *cinfo;
+       if (curve[0])
+               return 1;
+       if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
+                               sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
+               return 0;
+       cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
+       return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
+       }
+
+/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
+int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *curves;
+       size_t curveslen, i;
+       unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+       if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
+               return 0;
+       /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
+       if (suiteb_flags)
+               {
+               unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+               if (p[1])
+                       return 0;
+               if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+                       {
+                       if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+                               return 0;
+                       }
+               else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+                       {
+                       if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+                               return 0;
+                       }
+               else    /* Should never happen */
+                       return 0;
+               }
+       tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
+       for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
+               {
+               if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
+                       return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
+               }
+       return 0;
+       }
+
 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
- * matches.
+ * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * an EC tmp key.
  */
 
 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
@@ -346,6 +487,25 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
        /* Can't do anything on client side */
        if (s->server == 0)
                return -1;
+       if (nmatch == -2)
+               {
+               if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+                       {
+                       /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we 
+                        * already know these are acceptable due to previous
+                        * checks.
+                        */
+                       unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+                       if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+                               return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
+                       if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+                               return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
+                       /* Should never happen */
+                       return NID_undef;
+                       }
+               /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
+               nmatch = 0;
+               }
        tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
                                &supp, &supplen);
        tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
@@ -360,6 +520,8 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
                        {
                        if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
                                {
+                               if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
+                                       continue;
                                if (nmatch == k)
                                        {
                                        int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
@@ -407,7 +569,7 @@ int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
        return 1;
        }
 
-#define MAX_CURVELIST  25
+#define MAX_CURVELIST  28
 
 typedef struct
        {
@@ -448,6 +610,8 @@ int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
        ncb.nidcnt = 0;
        if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
                return 0;
+       if (pext == NULL)
+               return 1;
        return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
        }
 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
@@ -456,14 +620,12 @@ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
        {
        int is_prime, id;
        const EC_GROUP *grp;
-       const EC_POINT *pt;
        const EC_METHOD *meth;
        if (!ec)
                return 0;
        /* Determine if it is a prime field */
        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
-        pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
-       if (!grp || !pt)
+       if (!grp)
                return 0;
         meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
        if (!meth)
@@ -491,6 +653,8 @@ static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
                }
        if (comp_id)
                {
+               if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
+                       return 0;
                if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
                        {
                        if (is_prime)
@@ -525,6 +689,8 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
                if (i == plen)
                        return 0;
                }
+       if (!curve_id)
+               return 1;
        /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
        for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
                {
@@ -536,14 +702,38 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
                        }
                if (i == plen)
                        return 0;
+               /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
+               if (!s->server)
+                       break;
                }
        return 1;
        }
 
+static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+                                       size_t *pformatslen)
+       {
+       /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
+        * use default */
+       if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+               {
+               *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+               *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               *pformats = ecformats_default;
+               /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
+               if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+                       *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
+               else
+                       *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
+               }
+       }
+
 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
  * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
  */
-static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
        {
        unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
@@ -561,13 +751,87 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x)
        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
        if (!rv)
                return 0;
-       return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
+       /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
+        * supported curves extension.
+        */
+       rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
+       if (!rv)
+               return 0;
+       /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
+        * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
+        */
+       if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
+               {
+               int check_md;
+               size_t i;
+               CERT *c = s->cert;
+               if (curve_id[0])
+                       return 0;
+               /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
+               if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+                       check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+               else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+                       check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
+               else
+                       return 0; /* Should never happen */
+               for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+                       if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+                               break;
+               if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
+                       return 0;
+               if (set_ee_md == 2)
+                       {
+                       if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
+                       else
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
+                       }
+               }
+       return rv;
        }
 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
-int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
        {
        unsigned char curve_id[2];
        EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+       /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
+       if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+               return 1;
+#endif
+       /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
+        * no other curves permitted.
+        */
+       if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+               {
+               /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
+               if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+                       curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+               else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+                       curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+               else
+                       return 0;
+               curve_id[0] = 0;
+               /* Check this curve is acceptable */
+               if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
+                       return 0;
+               /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
+               if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
+                       return 1;
+               /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
+               else 
+                       {
+                       unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
+                       if (!ec)
+                               return 0;
+                       if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
+                               return 0;
+                       if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
+                               return 1;
+                       return 0;
+                       }
+                       
+               }
        if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
                {
                /* Need a shared curve */
@@ -583,8 +847,20 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
                        return 0;
                }
        if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
-               return 1;
+               return 0;
+/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
+#if 0
+       return 1;
+#else
        return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
+#endif
+       }
+
+#else
+
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+       {
+       return 1;
        }
 
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
@@ -630,63 +906,214 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
        tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-       tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
-#endif
 };
-
-size_t tls12_get_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+       tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+       tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+};
+#endif
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
        {
-       const unsigned char *sigs;
-       size_t sigslen;
+       /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+        * preferences.
+        */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
+               {
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+               *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+               return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
+
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+               *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+               return 2;
+
+       case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+               *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
+               return 2;
+               }
+#endif
        /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
        if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
                {
-               sigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
-               sigslen = s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+               *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+               return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
                }
        else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
                {
-               sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
-               sigslen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+               *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+               return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
                }
        else
                {
-               sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
-               sigslen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-               /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
-               if (FIPS_mode())
-                       sigslen -= 2;
-#endif
+               *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+               return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+               }
+       }
+/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
+ * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
+ */
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+                               const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
+       size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+       int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+       /* Should never happen */
+       if (sigalg == -1)
+               return -1;
+       /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+       if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+               return 0;
+               }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+               {
+               unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+               /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+               if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
+                       return 0;
+               if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
+                       {
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+                       return 0;
+                       }
+               /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
+               if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+                       {
+                       if (curve_id[0])
+                               return 0;
+                       if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+                               {
+                               if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+                                       {
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+                                               SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+                                       return 0;
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+                               {
+                               if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+                                       {
+                                       SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+                                               SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+                                       return 0;
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       else
+                               return 0;
+                       }
                }
+       else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+               return 0;
+#endif
 
-       if (p)
-               memcpy(p, sigs, sigslen);
-       return sigslen;
+       /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+       sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
+       for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
+               {
+               if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+                       break;
+               }
+       /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
+       if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+               return 0;
+               }
+       *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
+       if (*pmd == NULL)
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+               return 0;
+               }
+       /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
+       if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
+                               EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
+                                                               (void *)sig))
+               {
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+               return 0;
+               }
+       /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
+        * wish.
+        */
+       if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
+               s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
+       return 1;
        }
 
-/* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
-static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
+/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
+ * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
+ * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
+ * session and not global settings.
+ * 
+ */
+void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
        {
-       unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
-       unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
+       CERT *c = s->cert;
+       c->mask_a = 0;
+       c->mask_k = 0;
+       /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
+       if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
+               c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+       else
+               c->mask_ssl = 0;
+       ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
+       /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
+        * signature algorithms.
+        */
+       if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
+       if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+       if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+       if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
+               {
+               c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+               }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+       /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+       if (!s->psk_client_callback)
+               {
+               c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+               c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+               }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+       c->valid = 1;
+       }
 
-       if (a > b)
+int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
+       {
+       CERT *ct = s->cert;
+       if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
                return 1;
-       else if (a < b)
-               return -1;
-       return 0;
-}
+       return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
+       }
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
+       {
+       if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+               return 0;
+       return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
+       }
+
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
        {
        int extdatalen=0;
        unsigned char *ret = p;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
        /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
        int using_ecc = 0;
-       if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
                {
                int i;
                unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
@@ -698,7 +1125,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 
                        alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
                        alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
-                       if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
+                       if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
                                || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
                                {
                                using_ecc = 1;
@@ -809,16 +1236,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                long lenmax; 
                const unsigned char *plist;
                size_t plistlen;
-               /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
-                * use default */
-               plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
-               if (plist)
-                       plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-               else
-                       {
-                       plist = ecformats_default;
-                       plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
-                       }
+               size_t i;
+               unsigned char *etmp;
+
+               tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
 
                if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
                if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
@@ -845,22 +1266,34 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return NULL;
                        }
+
                
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
-               s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
+               etmp = ret + 4;
+               /* Copy curve ID if supported */
+               for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
+                       {
+                       if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
+                               {
+                               *etmp++ = plist[0];
+                               *etmp++ = plist[1];
+                               }
+                       }
+
+               plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
 
                /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
                 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
                 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
                 * resolves this to two bytes.
                 */
+               s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
                s2n(plistlen, ret);
-               memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
                ret+=plistlen;
                }
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
-       if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
+       if (tls_use_ticket(s))
                {
                int ticklen;
                if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
@@ -896,22 +1329,27 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
                skip_ext:
 
-       if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+       if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                {
                size_t salglen;
-               salglen = tls12_get_sig_algs(s, NULL);
+               const unsigned char *salg;
+               unsigned char *etmp;
+               salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
                if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
                        return NULL; 
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
-               s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
-               s2n(salglen, ret);
-               tls12_get_sig_algs(s, ret);
+               etmp = ret;
+               /* Skip over lengths for now */
+               ret += 4;
+               salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
+               /* Fill in lengths */
+               s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
+               s2n(salglen, etmp);
                ret += salglen;
                }
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-       if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
                {
                size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
                
@@ -928,8 +1366,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
-       if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
                {
                int i;
                long extlen, idlen, itmp;
@@ -1003,6 +1440,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
+       if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
+               {
+               if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+               s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+               s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
+               memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
+                      s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+               ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+               }
+
         if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
                 {
                 int el;
@@ -1022,25 +1471,72 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                 ret += el;
                 }
 
-       /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
-       /* 2 bytes for extension type */
-       /* 2 bytes for extension length */
-       /* 1 byte for the list length */
-       /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
-       if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
+       /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
+       if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
                {
-               size_t lenmax;
-                const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
-                const unsigned char list_len = 1;
+               size_t i;
+               custom_cli_ext_record* record;
 
-               if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
+               for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
+                       {
+                       const unsigned char* out = NULL;
+                       unsigned short outlen = 0;
+
+                       record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
+                       /* NULL callback sends empty extension */ 
+                       /* -1 from callback omits extension */
+                       if (record->fn1)
+                               {
+                               int cb_retval = 0;
+                               cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
+                                                       &out, &outlen, al,
+                                                       record->arg);
+                               if (cb_retval == 0)
+                                       return NULL; /* error */
+                               if (cb_retval == -1)
+                                       continue; /* skip this extension */
+                               }
+                       if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
+                               return NULL;
+                       s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
+                       s2n(outlen, ret);
+                       memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+                       ret += outlen;
+                       }
+               }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+       s2n(0,ret);
+#endif
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
+       /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
+        * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+        *
+        * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
+        * extensions it MUST always appear last.
+        */
+       {
+       int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+       /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
+        * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
+        * not. */
+       if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+               hlen -= 5;
+       if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+               {
+               hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+               if (hlen >= 4)
+                       hlen -= 4;
+               else
+                       hlen = 0;
 
-               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
-                /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
-               s2n(ext_len, ret);
-               *(ret++) = list_len;
-               *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+               s2n(hlen, ret);
+               memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+               ret += hlen;
                }
+       }
+#endif
 
        if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
                return p;
@@ -1049,14 +1545,21 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        return ret;
        }
 
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
        {
        int extdatalen=0;
        unsigned char *ret = p;
+       size_t i;
+       custom_srv_ext_record *record;
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
        int next_proto_neg_seen;
 #endif
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+       unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+       int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+       using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
+#endif
        /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
        if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
                return p;
@@ -1097,32 +1600,34 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-       if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (using_ecc)
                {
+               const unsigned char *plist;
+               size_t plistlen;
                /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
                long lenmax; 
 
+               tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
+
                if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
-               if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
-               if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
+               if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
+               if (plistlen > 255)
                        {
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return NULL;
                        }
                
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
-               s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
-               *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-               memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
-               ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+               s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
+               *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
+               memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
+               ret+=plistlen;
 
                }
        /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
-       if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
-               && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 
+       if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
                { 
                if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
@@ -1137,8 +1642,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-       if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
-           s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+       if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
                {
                size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
                
@@ -1229,77 +1733,60 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                }
 #endif
 
-       /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
-        * to it. */
-       if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
+       for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
                {
-               size_t authz_length;
-               /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
-                * to see whether the cert we are going to send
-                * has any authz data attached to it. */
-               const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
-               const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
-               size_t i;
-               unsigned authz_count = 0;
+               const unsigned char *out = NULL;
+               unsigned short outlen = 0;
+               int cb_retval = 0;
 
-               /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
-                *      uint8_t authz_type
-                *      uint16_t length
-                *      uint8_t data[length]
-                *
-                * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
-               for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
-                       {
-                       unsigned short length;
-                       unsigned char type;
+               record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
 
-                       type = *(authz++);
-                       if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                  type,
-                                  s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
-                               authz_count++;
-
-                       n2s(authz, length);
-                       /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
-                       i += 2;
-                       authz += length;
-                       i += length;
-                       }
-
-               if (authz_count)
+               /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
+               if (!record->fn2)
+                       continue;
+               cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
+                                                               &out, &outlen, al,
+                                                               record->arg);
+               if (cb_retval == 0)
+                       return NULL; /* error */
+               if (cb_retval == -1)
+                       continue; /* skip this extension */
+               if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
+               s2n(outlen, ret);
+               memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
+               ret += outlen;
+               }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+               {
+               /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
+                * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
+                */
+               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
+                       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+               else
                        {
-                       /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
-                        * 2 bytes for extension type
-                        * 2 bytes for extension length
-                        * 1 byte for the list length
-                        * n bytes for the list */
-                       const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
-
-                       if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
-                       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
-                       s2n(ext_len, ret);
-                       *(ret++) = authz_count;
-                       s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
+                       s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
+                       s2n(0,ret);
                        }
+               }
+#endif
 
-               authz = orig_authz;
-               for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
-                       {
-                       unsigned short length;
-                       unsigned char type;
+       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+               {
+               const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
+               unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
 
-                       authz_count++;
-                       type = *(authz++);
-                       if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                  type,
-                                  s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
-                               *(ret++) = type;
-                       n2s(authz, length);
-                       /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
-                       i += 2;
-                       authz += length;
-                       i += length;
-                       }
+               if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
+                       return NULL;
+               s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
+               s2n(3 + len,ret);
+               s2n(1 + len,ret);
+               *ret++ = len;
+               memcpy(ret, selected, len);
+               ret += len;
                }
 
        if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
@@ -1309,6 +1796,159 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
        return ret;
        }
 
+/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
+ * ClientHello.
+ *   data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
+ *   data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
+ *   al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
+ *       return.
+ *
+ *   returns: 0 on success. */
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
+                                        unsigned data_len, int *al)
+       {
+       unsigned i;
+       unsigned proto_len;
+       const unsigned char *selected;
+       unsigned char selected_len;
+       int r;
+
+       if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
+               return 0;
+
+       if (data_len < 2)
+               goto parse_error;
+
+       /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
+        * length-prefixed strings. */
+       i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
+           ((unsigned) data[1]);
+       data_len -= 2;
+       data += 2;
+       if (data_len != i)
+               goto parse_error;
+
+       if (data_len < 2)
+               goto parse_error;
+
+       for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
+               {
+               proto_len = data[i];
+               i++;
+
+               if (proto_len == 0)
+                       goto parse_error;
+
+               if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
+                       goto parse_error;
+
+               i += proto_len;
+               }
+
+       r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
+                                  s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+       if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+               if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                       OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+               if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                       {
+                       *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                       return -1;
+                       }
+               memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+       }
+       return 0;
+
+parse_error:
+       *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+       return -1;
+       }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ *   SNI,
+ *   elliptic_curves
+ *   ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+       unsigned short type, size;
+       static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+               0x00, 0x0a,  /* elliptic_curves extension */
+               0x00, 0x08,  /* 8 bytes */
+               0x00, 0x06,  /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+               0x00, 0x17,  /* P-256 */
+               0x00, 0x18,  /* P-384 */
+               0x00, 0x19,  /* P-521 */
+
+               0x00, 0x0b,  /* ec_point_formats */
+               0x00, 0x02,  /* 2 bytes */
+               0x01,        /* 1 point format */
+               0x00,        /* uncompressed */
+       };
+
+       /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+       static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+               0x00, 0x0d,  /* signature_algorithms */
+               0x00, 0x0c,  /* 12 bytes */
+               0x00, 0x0a,  /* 10 bytes */
+               0x05, 0x01,  /* SHA-384/RSA */
+               0x04, 0x01,  /* SHA-256/RSA */
+               0x02, 0x01,  /* SHA-1/RSA */
+               0x04, 0x03,  /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+               0x02, 0x03,  /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+       };
+
+       if (data >= (d+n-2))
+               return;
+       data += 2;
+
+       if (data > (d+n-4))
+               return;
+       n2s(data,type);
+       n2s(data,size);
+
+       if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+               return;
+
+       if (data+size > d+n)
+               return;
+       data += size;
+
+       if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+               {
+               const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+               const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+               if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+                       return;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+               if (data + len != d+n)
+                       return;
+               if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+                       return;
+               }
+
+       s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 
        {       
        unsigned short type;
@@ -1316,6 +1956,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
        unsigned short len;
        unsigned char *data = *p;
        int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+       size_t i;
 
        s->servername_done = 0;
        s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
@@ -1323,10 +1964,30 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
        s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
 #endif
 
+       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+               }
+
+       /* Clear observed custom extensions */
+       s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
+       if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
+               s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
+               }
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
        s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
                               SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+       if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+               ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
        /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
        if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
                {
@@ -1339,6 +2000,16 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
                s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
                }
+       /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+       for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+               {
+               s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
+               s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
+               }
+
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
 
        if (data >= (d+n-2))
                goto ri_check;
@@ -1493,13 +2164,13 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 #endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
                        int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
 
-                       if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+                       if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 
+                               ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                                return 0;
@@ -1528,14 +2199,14 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
                        }
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
                        int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
                        ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
 
-                       if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+                       if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+                               ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                                return 0;
@@ -1566,8 +2237,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        }
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -1642,8 +2312,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                return 0;
                                }
                        }
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-                        s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
                        {
                
                        if (size < 5) 
@@ -1773,7 +2442,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
+                        s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
                        {
                        /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
                         * renegotiation.
@@ -1794,6 +2464,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        }
 #endif
 
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
+                        s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
+                        s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+                       {
+                       if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
+                               return 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+                       /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+                       s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+                       }
+
                /* session ticket processed earlier */
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
                         {
@@ -1801,66 +2483,30 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                                              al))
                                return 0;
                         }
-
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
+               /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is 
+                * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a 
+                * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
+                * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
+                * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
+                */
+               else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
                        {
-                       unsigned char *sdata = data;
-                       unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
-
-                       if (size == 0)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-
-                       if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
+                       custom_srv_ext_record *record;
 
-                       /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
-                        * information as the original session so we ignore this
-                        * in the case of a session resumption. */
-                       if (!s->hit)
+                       for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
                                {
-                               size_t i;
-                               if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
-                                       OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
-                               s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
-                                       OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
-                               if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
+                               record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
+                               if (type == record->ext_type)
                                        {
-                                       *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                                       return 0;
-                                       }
-
-                               s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
-                                       server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
-                               memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                      sdata,
-                                      server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
-
-                               /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
-                               qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
-                                     server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
-                                     1 /* element size */,
-                                     byte_compare);
-
-                               for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
-                                       {
-                                       if (i > 0 &&
-                                           s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
-                                             s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
-                                               {
-                                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                                       if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
                                                return 0;
-                                               }
-                                       }
+                                       }                                               
                                }
                        }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+                       s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
 
                data+=size;
                }
@@ -1895,7 +2541,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                return 0;
                }
 
-       if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 
+       if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) 
                {
                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
                return 0;
@@ -1936,11 +2582,21 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
        s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
 #endif
 
+       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+               s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+               }
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
        s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
                               SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+       s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+#endif
+
        if (data >= (d+n-2))
                goto ri_check;
 
@@ -1974,8 +2630,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
                        int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -2012,8 +2667,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
                                return 0;
                                }
-                       if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-                               || (size > 0))
+                       if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
                                return 0;
@@ -2021,8 +2675,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
                        }
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
-                    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
                        {
                        unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -2052,8 +2705,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                }
                        }
 #endif
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
-                        s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
                        {
                        /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
                         * a status request message.
@@ -2074,7 +2726,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        unsigned char selected_len;
 
                        /* We must have requested it. */
-                       if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+                       if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
                                {
                                *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
                                return 0;
@@ -2101,6 +2753,52 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                        s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
                        }
 #endif
+
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
+                       {
+                       unsigned len;
+
+                       /* We must have requested it. */
+                       if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       if (size < 4)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       /* The extension data consists of:
+                        *   uint16 list_length
+                        *   uint8 proto_length;
+                        *   uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
+                       len = data[0];
+                       len <<= 8;
+                       len |= data[1];
+                       if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       len = data[2];
+                       if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                               OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+                       s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+                       if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
+                               {
+                               *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                               return 0;
+                               }
+                       memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
+                       s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
+                       }
+
                else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
                        {
                        if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
@@ -2130,45 +2828,33 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
                                                              al))
                                 return 0;
                         }
-
-               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
+               /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but 
+                * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
+                * callback */
+               else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
                        {
-                       /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
-                        * an authz hello extension if the client
-                        * didn't request a proof. */
-                       unsigned char *sdata = data;
-                       unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
-
-                       if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
+                       size_t i;
+                       custom_cli_ext_record* record;
 
-                       if (!size)
+                       for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
                                {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
-                       if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
-                        * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
-                       if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
-                               sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
-                               {
-                               *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
-                               return 0;
-                               }
-
-                       s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
+                               record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
+                               if (record->ext_type == type)
+                                       {
+                                       if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
+                                               return 0;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               }                       
                        }
+#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
+               else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+                       {
+                       /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
+                       if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
+                               s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+                       }
+#endif
  
                data += size;
                }
@@ -2267,36 +2953,10 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 
 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-       /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 
-        * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension.  Note that the server is not
-        * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
-        */
-
-       unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-       unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-       int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
-       using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-       
-       if (using_ecc)
-               {
-               if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-               if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
-                       {
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-                       return -1;
-                       }
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
-               s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
-               }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
        return 1;
        }
 
-static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
        {
        int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
        int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -2315,42 +2975,12 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)             
                ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
 
-       /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
-        * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
-        * the certificate has changed.
-        */
-       if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-               {
-               int r;
-               r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-               switch (r)
-                       {
-                       /* We don't want to send a status request response */
-                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-                               s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-                               break;
-                       /* status request response should be sent */
-                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
-                               if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-                                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
-                               else
-                                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-                               break;
-                       /* something bad happened */
-                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-                               ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-                               al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                               goto err;
-                       }
-               }
-       else
-               s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
        {
                /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
                 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
-                * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+                * so this has to happen here in
+                * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
 
                int r = 1;
        
@@ -2400,24 +3030,89 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
                        ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
                        al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
                        }
-       }
+       }
+
+ err:
+#endif
+       switch (ret)
+               {
+               case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+                       ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
+                       return -1;
+
+               case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+                       ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+                       return 1; 
+                                       
+               case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+                       s->servername_done=0;
+                       default:
+               return 1;
+               }
+       }
+
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+       {
+       int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+       int al;
+
+       /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+        * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
+        * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+        * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
+        */
+       if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+               {
+               int r;
+               CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+               certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+               /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+               if (certpkey == NULL)
+                       {
+                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+                       return 1;
+                       }
+               /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+                * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+                */
+               s->cert->key = certpkey;
+               r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+               switch (r)
+                       {
+                       /* We don't want to send a status request response */
+                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+                               s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+                               break;
+                       /* status request response should be sent */
+                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+                               if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+                                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+                               else
+                                       s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+                               break;
+                       /* something bad happened */
+                       case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+                               ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+                               al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                               goto err;
+                       }
+               }
+       else
+               s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
 
-#endif
  err:
        switch (ret)
                {
                case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-                       ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
+                       ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
                        return -1;
 
                case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
-                       ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
+                       ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
                        return 1; 
-                                       
-               case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-                       s->servername_done=0;
-                       default:
-               return 1;
+
+               default:
+                       return 1;
                }
        }
 
@@ -2435,7 +3130,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
        unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
        if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
            (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 
-           ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
+           ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
                {
                /* we are using an ECC cipher */
                size_t i;
@@ -2598,14 +3293,14 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
        /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
         * to permit stateful resumption.
         */
-       if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+       if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
                return 0;
        if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
                return 0;
        if (p >= limit)
                return -1;
        /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
-       if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+       if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
                {
                i = *(p++);
                p+= i;
@@ -2741,7 +3436,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
        HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
        HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-       if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+       if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
                return 2;
        /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
        /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
@@ -2852,40 +3547,60 @@ int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
                                sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
        }
 
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+typedef struct 
        {
-       switch(hash_alg)
-               {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-               case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-               if (FIPS_mode())
-                       return NULL;
+       int nid;
+       int secbits;
+       const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
+       } tls12_hash_info;
+
+static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+       {NID_md5, 64, 0},
+#else
+       {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
 #endif
-               return EVP_md5();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+       {NID_sha1, 80, 0},
+#else
+       {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
-               return EVP_sha1();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+       {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
+       {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
+#else
+       {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
+       {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
-               return EVP_sha224();
-
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
-               return EVP_sha256();
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+       {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
+       {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
+#else
+       {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
+       {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
 #endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
-               return EVP_sha384();
+};
 
-               case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
-               return EVP_sha512();
-#endif
-               default:
+static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
+       {
+       if (hash_alg == 0)
+               return NULL;
+       if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
                return NULL;
+       return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
+       }
 
-               }
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+       {
+       const tls12_hash_info *inf;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
+       if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
+               return NULL;
+#endif
+       inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
+       if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
+               return NULL; 
+       return inf->mfunc();
        }
 
 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
@@ -2912,7 +3627,7 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
                        int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
        {
-       int sign_nid, hash_nid;
+       int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
        if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
                return;
        if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
@@ -2938,8 +3653,86 @@ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
                        *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
                }
        }
+/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
+       {
+       /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
+       const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
+       if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
+               return 0;
+       /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
+       if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+               return 0;
+       /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
+       return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
+       }
+
+/* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
+ * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
+ * then RSA is disabled.
+ */
+
+void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
+       {
+       const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+       size_t i, sigalgslen;
+       int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
+       /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
+        * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
+        * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
+        * if we have to.
+        */
+       sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
+       for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
+               {
+               switch(sigalgs[1])
+                       {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+               case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+                       if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+                               have_rsa = 1;
+                       break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+               case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+                       if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+                               have_dsa = 1;
+                       break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+               case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+                       if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+                               have_ecdsa = 1;
+                       break;
+#endif
+                       }
+               }
+       if (!have_rsa)
+               *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+       if (!have_dsa)
+               *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+       if (!have_ecdsa)
+               *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+       }
+
+size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
+                               const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
+       {
+       unsigned char *tmpout = out;
+       size_t i;
+       for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
+               {
+               if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
+                       {
+                       *tmpout++ = psig[0];
+                       *tmpout++ = psig[1];
+                       }
+               }
+       return tmpout - out;
+       }
+
 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
-static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
+static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
                                const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
                                const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
        {
@@ -2948,9 +3741,7 @@ static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
        for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
                {
                /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
-               if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
-                       continue;
-               if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+               if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
                        continue;
                for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
                        {
@@ -2982,27 +3773,26 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
        size_t nmatch;
        TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
        CERT *c = s->cert;
+       unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
+       if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+               {
+               OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+               c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+               }
        /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
-       if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs)
+       if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
                {
                conf = c->client_sigalgs;
                conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
                }
-       else if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+       else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
                {
                conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
                conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
                }
        else
-               {
-               conf = tls12_sigalgs;
-               conflen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-               if (FIPS_mode())
-                       conflen -= 2;
-#endif
-               }
-       if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+               conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+       if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
                {
                pref = conf;
                preflen = conflen;
@@ -3016,13 +3806,13 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
                pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
                preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
                }
-       nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+       nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
        if (!nmatch)
                return 1;
        salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
        if (!salgs)
                return 0;
-       nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+       nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
        c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
        c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
        return 1;
@@ -3038,18 +3828,15 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
        const EVP_MD *md;
        CERT *c = s->cert;
        TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
-       /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
-       if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+       /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+       if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
                return 1;
        /* Should never happen */
        if (!c)
                return 0;
 
-       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
-       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
-       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
-       c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
-
+       if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+               OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
        c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
        if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
                return 0;
@@ -3058,6 +3845,32 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
 
        tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
 
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+       if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+               {
+               /* Use first set signature preference to force message
+                * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
+                */
+               const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
+               if (s->server)
+                       sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
+               else
+                       sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
+               if (sigs)
+                       {
+                       idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
+                       md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
+                       c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+                       c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                       if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+                               {
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+#endif
+
        for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
                        i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
                {
@@ -3066,15 +3879,19 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
                        {
                        md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
                        c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+                       c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
                        if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+                               {
+                               c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
                                c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+                               }
                        }
 
                }
        /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
         * use the certificate for signing.
         */
-       if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT))
+       if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
                {
                /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
                 * not supported it stays as NULL.
@@ -3152,16 +3969,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
        unsigned int payload;
        unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
 
-       /* Read type and payload length first */
-       hbtype = *p++;
-       n2s(p, payload);
-       pl = p;
-
        if (s->msg_callback)
                s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
                        &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
                        s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
+       /* Read type and payload length first */
+       if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+               return 0; /* silently discard */
+       hbtype = *p++;
+       n2s(p, payload);
+       if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+               return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+       pl = p;
+
        if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
                {
                unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
@@ -3349,6 +4170,8 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
        sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
        if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
                return 0;
+       if (c == NULL)
+               return 1;
        return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
        }
 
@@ -3411,40 +4234,107 @@ static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
                        return 1;
        return 0;
        }
+/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
+static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
+       {
+       X509_NAME *nm;
+       int i;
+       nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+       for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
+               {
+               if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
+                       return 1;
+               }
+       return 0;
+       }
 
 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
- * usable by server.
+ * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to 
+ * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
+ * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
  */
+
+/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
+
+#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
+       (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
+/* Strict mode flags */
+#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
+        (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
+        | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
+
 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
                                                                        int idx)
        {
        int i;
-       int rv = CERT_PKEY_INVALID;
+       int rv = 0;
+       int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
        CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
        CERT *c = s->cert;
+       unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+       /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
        if (idx != -1)
                {
-               cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+               /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
+               if (idx == -2)
+                       {
+                       cpk = c->key;
+                       idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+                       }
+               else
+                       cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
                x = cpk->x509;
                pk = cpk->privatekey;
                chain = cpk->chain;
+               strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
                /* If no cert or key, forget it */
                if (!x || !pk)
                        goto end;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+               /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
+               if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+                       {
+                       rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+                       cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+                       return rv;
+                       }
+#endif
                }
        else
                {
+               if (!x || !pk)
+                       goto end;
                idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
                if (idx == -1)
                        goto end;
+               cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+               if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+                       check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
+               else
+                       check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
+               strict_mode = 1;
+               }
+
+       if (suiteb_flags)
+               {
+               int ok;
+               if (check_flags)
+                       check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+               ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
+               if (ok != X509_V_OK)
+                       {
+                       if (check_flags)
+                               rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+                       else
+                               goto end;
+                       }
                }
 
        /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
         * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
         * and strict mode.
         */
-       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
-               && c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
+       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
                {
                int default_nid;
                unsigned char rsign = 0;
@@ -3482,7 +4372,7 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
                 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
                 * sha1.
                 */
-               if (s->server && default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
+               if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
                        {
                        size_t j;
                        const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
@@ -3492,39 +4382,176 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
                                        break;
                                }
                        if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
-                               goto end;
+                               {
+                               if (check_flags)
+                                       goto skip_sigs;
+                               else
+                                       goto end;
+                               }
                        }
                /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
                if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
-                       goto end;
+                       {
+                       if (!check_flags) goto end;
+                       }
+               else
+                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
                for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
                        {
                        if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
                                                        default_nid))
-                               goto end;
+                               {
+                               if (check_flags)
+                                       {
+                                       rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               else
+                                       goto end;
+                               }
                        }
                }
-
+       /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
+       else if(check_flags)
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+       skip_sigs:
        /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
-       if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, x))
+       if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
+       else if (!check_flags)
                goto end;
+       if (!s->server)
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
        /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
-       if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT)
+       else if (strict_mode)
                {
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
                for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
                        {
-                       if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i)))
+                       X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+                       if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
+                               {
+                               if (check_flags)
+                                       {
+                                       rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               else
+                                       goto end;
+                               }
+                       }
+               }
+       if (!s->server && strict_mode)
+               {
+               STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
+               int check_type = 0;
+               switch (pk->type)
+                       {
+               case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+                       check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+                       break;
+               case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+                       check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+                       break;
+               case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+                       check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+                       break;
+               case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+               case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
+                               {
+                               int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
+                               if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
+                                       check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
+                               if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
+                                       check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
+                               }
+                       }
+               if (check_type)
+                       {
+                       const unsigned char *ctypes;
+                       int ctypelen;
+                       if (c->ctypes)
+                               {
+                               ctypes = c->ctypes;
+                               ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
+                               }
+                       else
+                               {
+                               ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+                               ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
+                               }
+                       for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
+                               {
+                               if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
+                                       {
+                                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
                                goto end;
                        }
+               else
+                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+
+               ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
+
+               if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
+                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+               if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+                       {
+                       if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
+                               rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+                       }
+               if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+                       {
+                       for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+                               {
+                               X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+                               if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
+                                       {
+                                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+                                       break;
+                                       }
+                               }
+                       }
+               if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+                       goto end;
                }
-       rv = CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+       else
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+       if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
 
        end:
-       if (cpk)
+
+       if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
                {
-               if (rv && cpk->digest)
+               if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
+                       rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+               else if (cpk->digest)
                        rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
-               cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+               }
+       else
+               rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+
+       /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
+        * if the chain is invalid.
+        */
+       if (!check_flags)
+               {
+               if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
+                       cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+               else
+                       {
+                       /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+                       cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+                       return 0;
+                       }
                }
        return rv;
        }
@@ -3546,3 +4573,131 @@ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
        }
 
 #endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
+       {
+       int dh_secbits = 80;
+       if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
+               return DH_get_1024_160();
+       if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+               {
+               if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
+                       dh_secbits = 128;
+               else
+                       dh_secbits = 80;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+               dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
+               }
+
+       if (dh_secbits >= 128)
+               {
+               DH *dhp = DH_new();
+               if (!dhp)
+                       return NULL;
+               dhp->g = BN_new();
+               if (dhp->g)
+                       BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
+               if (dh_secbits >= 192)
+                       dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
+               else
+                       dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
+               if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
+                       {
+                       DH_free(dhp);
+                       return NULL;
+                       }
+               return dhp;
+               }
+       if (dh_secbits >= 112)
+               return DH_get_2048_224();
+       return DH_get_1024_160();
+       }
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+       {
+       int secbits;
+       EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+       if (pkey)
+               {
+               secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
+               EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+               }
+       else
+               secbits = -1;
+       if (s)
+               return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
+       else
+               return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
+       }
+
+static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
+       {
+       /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
+       int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
+       sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+       if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
+               {
+               const EVP_MD *md;
+               if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
+                               secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+               }
+       if (s)
+               return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
+       else
+               return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
+       }
+
+int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
+       {
+       if (vfy)
+               vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
+       if (is_ee)
+               {
+               if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
+                       return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
+               }
+       else
+               {
+               if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
+                       return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
+               }
+       if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
+               return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
+       return 1;
+       }
+
+/* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
+ * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
+ * not sending one to the peer.
+ * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
+ */
+
+int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
+       {
+       int rv, start_idx, i;
+       if (x == NULL)
+               {
+               x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+               start_idx = 1;
+               }
+       else
+               start_idx = 0;
+
+       rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
+       if (rv != 1)
+               return rv;
+
+       for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
+               {
+               x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
+               rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
+               if (rv != 1)
+                       return rv;
+               }
+       return 1;
+       }