*pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
}
}
+/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
+int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *curves;
+ size_t curveslen, i;
+ if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
+ return 0;
+ tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
+ for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
+ {
+ if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
/* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
* matches.
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
- return 1;
+ return 0;
+/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
+#if 0
+ return 1;
+#else
return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
+#endif
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#endif
};
-size_t tls12_get_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
{
- const unsigned char *sigs;
- size_t sigslen;
- sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
-
- if (sigs)
- sigslen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
+ if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
+ {
+ *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+ return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+ }
+ else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
+ {
+ *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+ return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ }
else
{
- sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- sigslen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+ *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
/* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
if (FIPS_mode())
- sigslen -= 2;
+ return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
+ else
#endif
+ return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
}
-
- if (p)
- memcpy(p, sigs, sigslen);
- return sigslen;
+ }
+/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
+ * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
+ */
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+ const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
+ size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+ int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (sigalg == -1)
+ return -1;
+ /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+ if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
+ {
+ if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
+ if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
+ if (*pmd == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
+ * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
+ * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
+ * session and not global settings.
+ *
+ */
+void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
+ {
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+ size_t i, sigalgslen;
+ int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
+ c->mask_a = 0;
+ c->mask_k = 0;
+ /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+ else
+ c->mask_ssl = 0;
+ /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
+ * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
+ * TLS 1.2.
+ */
+ sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
+ {
+ switch(sigalgs[1])
+ {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ have_rsa = 1;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+ have_dsa = 1;
+ break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ have_ecdsa = 1;
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+ }
+ /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
+ * signature algorithms.
+ */
+ if (!have_rsa)
+ {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
+ }
+ if (!have_dsa)
+ {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+ }
+ if (!have_ecdsa)
+ {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
+ {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+ if (!s->psk_client_callback)
+ {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ c->valid = 1;
}
/* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
{
size_t salglen;
- salglen = tls12_get_sig_algs(s, NULL);
+ const unsigned char *salg;
+ salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
s2n(salglen, ret);
- tls12_get_sig_algs(s, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
ret += salglen;
}
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
{
- int sign_nid, hash_nid;
+ int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
return;
if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
size_t nmatch;
TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
- conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
- if (conf)
+ /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
+ if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs)
+ {
+ conf = c->client_sigalgs;
+ conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
+ }
+ else if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+ {
+ conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
+ }
else
{
conf = tls12_sigalgs;
/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
* of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
-int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str)
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
{
sig_cb_st sig;
sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
return 0;
- return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt);
+ return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
}
-int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen)
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
{
unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
int rhash, rsign;
*sptr++ = rsign;
}
- if (c->conf_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ if (client)
+ {
+ if (c->client_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ }
- c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
return 1;
err:
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
}
+/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
+int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+ {
+ return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
+ }
#endif