}
}
#endif
- if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
s2n(0, ret);
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
- if (!s->hit)
- s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
- }
+ /*
+ * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
+ * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
+ */
+
/*
* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
* nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#endif
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
goto ri_check;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
}
return 0;
}
+ if (s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
+ * original session.
+ */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
+ !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
return 1;
}
/*-
* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
- * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
+ * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
+ * need to be handled at the same time.
+ *
+ * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
+ * secret.
*
* session_id: ClientHello session ID.
* ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
* a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
* s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
* Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
+ *
+ * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
+ *
*/
-int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id,
- SSL_SESSION **ret)
+int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
+ const PACKET *session_id,
+ SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
unsigned int i;
PACKET local_ext = *ext;
int retv = -1;
+ int have_ticket = 0;
+ int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
+
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
- if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
- return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
return 0;
retv = 0;
goto end;
}
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
int r;
unsigned char *etick;
+ /* Duplicate extension */
+ if (have_ticket != 0) {
+ retv = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ have_ticket = 1;
+
if (size == 0) {
/*
* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
retv = 1;
- goto end;
+ continue;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
/*
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
retv = 2;
- goto end;
+ continue;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
/* Shouldn't ever happen */
retv = -1;
break;
}
- goto end;
+ continue;
} else {
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
retv = -1;
goto end;
}
}
}
- retv = 0;
+ if (have_ticket == 0)
+ retv = 0;
end:
return retv;
}
* point to the resulting session.
*
* Returns:
+ * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
* 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
if (eticklen < 48)
return 2;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ if (hctx == NULL)
+ return -2;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
- &ctx, &hctx, 0);
+ &ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
return -1;
if (rv == 0)
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
return 2;
- if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
- mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+ mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
if (mlen < 0) {
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
- || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+ || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return 2;
return 2;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return -1;
}