Check key_exchange data length is not 0
[openssl.git] / ssl / t1_lib.c
index d78ea684d863eb11971bb05827d811ef86342ebb..6474c6dbc2ad352e22faf5dadf32e32cc78101fc 100644 (file)
@@ -1648,6 +1648,53 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
         }
     }
 #endif
+
+    if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
+        unsigned char *encodedPoint;
+        size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
+        EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
+
+        ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+        if (ckey == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
+                || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+                || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
+
+        /* Generate encoding of server key */
+        encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
+        if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+            EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+            return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
+                || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+            OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+
+        s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
+
+        if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
+            *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
     if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         return 0;
@@ -1838,6 +1885,79 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
 }
 #endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
+
+/*
+ * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
+ * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
+ *
+ * Returns
+ * 1 on success
+ * 0 on failure
+ */
+static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    PACKET supported_groups_list;
+    RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
+                                    hello->num_extensions,
+                                    TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
+
+    if (suppgroups == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
+    if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
+                                     &supported_groups_list)
+        || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
+        || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!s->hit
+            && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
+                              &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
+                              &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
+ * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
+ * used.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is 1)
+ * 0 otherwise
+ */
+static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
+                         const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
+                         int checkallow)
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
+        unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
+        if (group_id == share_id
+                && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
+                                                     SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (i == num_groups) {
+        /* Not in list */
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
  * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
@@ -1886,6 +2006,15 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
 
     s->srtp_profile = NULL;
 
+    /*
+     * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
+     * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
+     */
+    if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
+        *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     /*
      * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
      * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
@@ -2027,26 +2156,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
                     return 0;
                 }
             }
-        } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) {
-            PACKET supported_groups_list;
-
-            /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
-            if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
-                                             &supported_groups_list)
-                || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
-                || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
-                return 0;
-            }
-
-            if (!s->hit) {
-                if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
-                                   &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
-                                   &s->
-                                   session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
-                    *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-                    return 0;
-                }
-            }
         }
 #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
         else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
@@ -2201,8 +2310,124 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
         }
 #endif
         else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
-                 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
+                 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
             s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+        } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
+                   && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION && !s->hit) {
+            unsigned int group_id;
+            PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
+            const unsigned char *curves;
+            size_t num_curves;
+            int group_nid, found = 0;
+            unsigned int curve_flags;
+
+            /* Sanity check */
+            if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &key_share_list)) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                       SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
+                if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
+                        || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list,
+                                                         &encoded_pt)
+                        || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                           SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                /*
+                 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
+                 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
+                 */
+                if (found)
+                    continue;
+
+                /* Check this share is in supported_groups */
+                if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &num_curves)) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                           ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 0)) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                           SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                /* Find a share that we can use */
+                if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                           ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, curves, num_curves, 1)) {
+                    /* Share not suitable */
+                    continue;
+                }
+
+                group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
+
+                if (group_nid == 0) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                           SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
+                    /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
+                    EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+                    if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
+                        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                        EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                    s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
+                } else {
+                    /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
+                    EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
+                    if (pctx == NULL
+                        || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
+                        || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
+                                                                  group_nid) <= 0
+                        || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
+                        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+                        EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+                        return 0;
+                    }
+                    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+                    pctx = NULL;
+                }
+                s->s3->group_id = group_id;
+
+                if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
+                        PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+                        PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
+                    *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+                    return 0;
+                }
+
+                found = 1;
+            }
+        }
         /*
          * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
          * tls_check_client_ems_support()
@@ -2491,16 +2716,71 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
                 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
                 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
                 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
+        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
+                (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->version < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
             s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
             if (!s->hit)
                 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
-        }
+        } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
+                && s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+            unsigned int group_id;
+            PACKET encoded_pt;
+            EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
+
+            /* Sanity check */
+            if (ckey == NULL) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                       SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
+                /*
+                 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
+                 * key_share!
+                 */
+                *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                       SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
+
+            if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
+                    || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+                       SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+                                                PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+                return 0;
+            }
+
+            if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
+                *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+                return 0;
+            }
+            EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
         /*
          * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
          * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
          */
-        else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+        else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
             return 0;
     }
 
@@ -2934,7 +3214,7 @@ int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
 
 /*
  * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
- * ClientHello
+ * ClientHello and we can support it
  * Returns:
  *  1 on success
  *  0 on error
@@ -2945,7 +3225,8 @@ int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
 
     s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
 
-    if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)
+    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
+                            || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
         return 1;
 
     emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,