* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
+/* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
+#define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
+
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "ssl_local.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
return NULL;
}
/* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
-int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
+int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
if (lu == NULL)
if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
md = NULL;
} else {
- md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
+ md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
}
* with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
*/
#define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
-static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
- if (rsa == NULL)
+ if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
return 0;
- if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
+ if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
- * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
- * is fixed by the certificate type.
+ * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
+ * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
+ * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
+ * certificate type from |s| will be used.
+ * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
*/
static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
{
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
return NULL;
return lu;
}
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
+ return NULL;
return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
}
/* Set peer sigalg based key type */
}
#endif
+/*
+ * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
+ * error.
+ */
+static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ int secbits = 0;
+
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
+ return 0;
+ if (md != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Security bits: half digest bits */
+ secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
+ } else {
+ /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
+ if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
+ secbits = 128;
+ else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
+ secbits = 224;
+ }
+ return secbits;
+}
+
/*
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
* algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+ int secbits = 0;
/* Should never happen */
if (pkeyid == -1)
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- if (md != NULL) {
- /*
- * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
- * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
- */
- sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
- sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
- EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
- (void *)sigalgstr)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
- SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- return 0;
- }
+ /*
+ * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
+ * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
+ */
+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
+ if (secbits == 0 ||
+ !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
+ md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
+ (void *)sigalgstr)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
}
/* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
*
* Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
*/
-int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
+int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
{
if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
+ SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
}
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
if (hctx == NULL) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
goto end;
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
goto end;
}
- if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+#else
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+#endif
+ {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
+ rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
+ nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
+ ctx,
+ ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
+ 0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
+ /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
+ rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
- ctx, hctx, 0);
+ ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
+#endif
if (rv < 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
+ EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
+
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto end;
}
- if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
- sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
- EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
+
+ aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
+ s->ctx->propq);
+ if (aes256cbc == NULL
+ || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
+ "SHA256") <= 0
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
renew_ticket = 1;
}
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
- mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
+ mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
if (mlen == 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
- || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
+ || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
end:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
+ ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
/*
* If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
}
/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
-static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
{
unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
int secbits;
/* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
return 0;
/* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
}
}
- if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
- return 1;
- /* Security bits: half digest bits */
- secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
+ secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
{
- X509_NAME *nm;
+ const X509_NAME *nm;
int i;
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
int mdnid, pknid, supported;
size_t i;
+ /*
+ * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
+ * the answer is simply 'no'.
+ */
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ if (supported == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
+ * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
+ */
if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
+ return 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
- if (lu == NULL
- || !X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL)
- /*
- * TODO this does not differentiate between the
- * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
- * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
- * signing certificate.
- */
- || mdnid != lu->hash
- || pknid != lu->sig)
+ if (lu == NULL)
continue;
- ERR_set_mark();
- supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, mdnid);
- ERR_pop_to_mark();
- if (supported == 0)
- continue;
/*
- * If it didn't report a mandatory NID (supported < 0), for
- * whatever reasons, we just ignore the error and allow all
- * hashes to be used.
+ * TODO this does not differentiate between the
+ * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
+ * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
+ * signing certificate.
*/
- return 1;
+ if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
+ return 1;
}
return 0;
}
- ERR_set_mark();
- supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
- ERR_pop_to_mark();
- if (supported == 0)
- return 0;
+
/*
- * If it didn't report a mandatory NID (supported < 0), for
- * whatever reasons, we just ignore the error and allow all
- * hashes to be used.
+ * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
+ * a viable public key is permitted.
*/
-
return 1;
}
|| lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
continue;
/* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
- if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
+ if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
continue;
if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
|| (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
#endif
} else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
- if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(tmppkey), lu))
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
continue;
}
break;
/* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
- if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
+ if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
continue;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
#endif
break;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ /*
+ * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
+ * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
+ * we have to assume GOST support.
+ */
+ if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
+ if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
+ if (!fatalerrs)
+ return 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
+ SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ i = 0;
+ sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
{
return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
}
+
+/*
+ * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
+ */
+SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
+ && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
+ ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
+ if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+ mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
+ if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ EVP_MAC_free(mac);
+ return ret;
+ err:
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
+ EVP_MAC_free(mac);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->old_ctx;
+}
+#endif
+
+EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->ctx;
+}
+
+int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
+
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
+ *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
+ *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+ if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
+ return 1;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
+ return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
+ EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
+ return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
+ size_t max_size)
+{
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
+ unsigned int l;
+
+ if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
+ if (len != NULL)
+ *len = l;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
+ return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
+ if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
+ return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff